The representation of Muslim-related international conflicts in contemporary Anglo-American theatre, 1992–2011 by Ali, Alaa
1 
 
 
 
 
 
The representation of Muslim-related 
international conflicts in contemporary Anglo-
American theatre, 1992–2011 
 
by 
Alaa Abdelaziz Abdelaziz Mohamed Ali 
 
 
 
The Department of Drama and Theatre 
Royal Holloway 
University of London 
 
 
A thesis submitted as a partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Ph.D. 
 
 
January 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Declaration of Authorship 
 
 
I, Alaa Abdelaziz Abdelaziz Mohamed Ali, hereby declare that this thesis and the work 
presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always 
clearly stated. 
 
 
Signed: ____Alaa Ali_____ Date: ___22 January 2015_____ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Abstract 
 
Focusing on plays created over the last two decades, this thesis investigates British 
and American playwrights’ depiction of the Anglo-American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
and also their dramatisation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. My main hypothesis is that 
these plays’ comments on the conflicts challenge the dominant discourses of both the 
Anglo-American politicians and the leaders of terrorists. Instead of reducing bloody 
confrontations to jingoistic labels such as the War on Terror or the War on Islam, the 
dramatic texts analyzed insist on portraying the suffering of innocent victims of these 
politically exploited conflicts, including civilians and soldiers.  
Concerned with both common and different features of the three places and contexts 
of confrontation, the plays are insistently topical, in some instances by suggesting a 
comparison between historical and present episodes of the conflicts on the grounds of 
repetition and causal relations. As the texts seek to achieve an informative goal, their forms 
vary from tribunal theatre to dreamlike plays. Therefore, my theoretical approach to these 
plays eclectically utilises a combination of insights drawn from political theatre, 
documentary drama and performance studies, supported by explanatory paradigms of social 
semiotics. 
The thesis is organised thematically so that the first chapter explores the intersecting 
roots of current confrontations. The second chapter focuses on the different forms of 
representing topical events whether by adopting documentary techniques, creating 
imaginary plots, or mixing both. In the third chapter I explore dramatic portraits of the Iraqi 
people’s oppression throughout four disasters: the Gulf War in 1991, the economic 
sanctions, the unjustified invasion of 2003, and its aftermath. The fourth chapter analyses 
dramatic responses to the War in Afghanistan, on which playwrights comment by depicting 
three phases of Western occupations since the nineteenth century by Britain, Russia, and 
America, respectively. The fifth chapter focuses on the representation of two post-
9/11incidents of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, within which occasional individual 
tolerance keeps resisting the inherited hatred.  
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Introduction 
 
The last twenty five years have witnessed an unprecedented inclusion of the 
dramatic characters of Muslims within Western playwrights’ works. This dramatic 
phenomenon was the matter that initiated this project six years ago. The main question of 
my research was about the way in which Muslim characters are portrayed by these 
playwrights. Back then, I was aware of the causal relationship between the so-called War 
on Terror and the increasing representation of Muslim characters. However, I considered 
neither the specific circumstances of each event of the multi-phased military 
confrontations, nor the geopolitical roots of the conflict before 9/11. In addition, I did not 
consider the social, cultural and political aspects that might define Western societies, some 
of which were targets of operations planned and executed by violent Islamist groups since 
the 1990s. Instead, from a standpoint of an Egyptian researcher, I simplistically relied on a 
vague mixture of geographical, linguistic and ethnic features of the notion ‘Western’ to 
describe non-Arabic, European and American playwrights. I consider this old topic the first 
phase of my thesis because some of this early topic’s aspects intersect with those my 
current topic investigates. Moreover, some early answers to the main question raised by the 
old project helped me in shaping both the topic and the hypotheses of my thesis.  
By taking a historical approach, I found that examples of portraying Muslim 
characters in European theatre can be traced back to the sixteenth century. For instance, 
Shakespeare’s characters use the word ‘Turk’ in a negative sense, which can be read on the 
grounds of Jonathan Burton’s claim that ‘the term Turk was coextensive with Islam in early 
modern European rhetoric’ (Burton 2000, 126). In the first scene of the second act of 
Othello, Iago says ‘it is true, or else I am a Turk’ (Shakespeare 1997, 169).1 However, the 
most offensive words against Muslims come from Othello, the most famous, or infamous, 
Moorish character. As a Moor, Othello is supposed to be Muslim. However he fights for 
Venice against the Turks. Moreover, in his last speech before stabbing himself he harshly 
declares:   
 
Where a malignant and turbaned Turk 
                                                 
1 Because of the discrepancy of line numbers between different editions of Shakespeare’s plays, his works are 
cited here by page number to avoid confusion. At the same time, play divisions are mentioned through in-text 
citations. 
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Beat a Venetian, and traduced the state, 
I took by th’throat the circumcised dog 
And smote him—thus! (Shakespeare 1997, 331) 
 
Whether Othello, a Moorish refugee who converted to Christianity, hides his Islam for 
military glory, or even believes in no religion at all, it seems that Shakespeare’s character 
reflects the Elizabethans’ foregrounding of the Moors’ ethnicity rather than religion.2 
Anthony Barthelemy explains:  
 
The word Turk itself carries many of the same connotations that 
Moor does, but Turk almost always means Muslim and hence an 
enemy of Christianity. The single greatest difference between Turk 
and Moor seems to be the recognition of the ethnic difference and 
the Eurasian origin of the former group. […] The Turk may be an 
enemy of Christianity, but he is neither African nor black. 
(Barthelemy 184) 
 
In this respect, while Iago’s description of Othello as a ‘black ram’ who dared to marry a 
‘white ewe’ (Shakespeare 1997, 121–2) is an ethnic and non-religious discrimination, the 
Moorish character’s condemnation of Turks distinguishes them, as Muslims, from 
Christians.3 
However, I realised that my reading of the word ‘Turk’ in the Elizabethan plays 
simplistically limited its connotation to the religious identity, because I neglected the 
historical and political contexts of these dramatic texts. The Ottoman Empire was a great 
power, which reached one of its peaks in the sixteenth century and had confrontations with 
European/Christian states. At the beginning of The Jew of Malta, the Turkish officials 
threaten the Christian governor of Malta by asking for unpaid tribute, which might reflect 
on the historical event of the Turks’ siege of Malta in 1565. Likewise, the Ottoman-
Venetian Wars were factual events that shaped the background to the dramatic action of 
Othello. 
Although the references to the historical incidents within The Jew of Malta and 
Othello are marginal, the critique of the Turks, including their image as enemies of 
                                                 
2 A claim that a few number of Turks and Moors converted to Christianity in England since the second half of 
the sixteenth century can be found in Matar (19-21). 
3 For more examples, see Shakespeare (1986, 120-1), where Hamlet uses the phrase ‘turn Turk’ whose 
meaning according to Bernard Lott, is to ‘take a turn for the worse’, and/or to ‘change from a Christian to an 
infidel’. In Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta, not only do the Turkish slave Ithamore and his Jewish master 
Barabas kill Christians out of religious hatred, but Ithamore also betrays his master.    
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Christianity, possibly references Ottoman military aggression against European territories. I 
also realised that while the reasons for the Turks’ wars in Europe were mainly political and 
economic, the Ottoman rulers motivated their soldiers by claiming that this war aimed to 
spread Islam over the land of the infidels. In turn, the leaders of European states utilised 
Christianity as a method of achieving an alliance against the Muslim army.4 
The focus on distancing Islam from Christianity as two different systems of ethics 
and behaviour continues throughout the seventeenth century as I can find in Christian 
Turned Turk, written by Robert Daborne in 1610, Philip Massinger’s The Renegado, or The 
Gentleman of Venice (1624), The Island Princess, written by Francis Beaumont and John 
Fletcher in 1621, and John Dryden’s The Conquest of Granada (1670). However, it is hard 
to decide whether these specific aspects of the Turks are totally shaped in the Elizabethan 
era or inherited from earlier stances of conflictual and/or cultural encounters between 
Europeans and Muslims such as the Crusades.5 
Mixing political and religious reasons to negatively depict Muslim characters is 
manifest within a number of Spanish plays. These plays seem to respond to the long 
encounter with the Muslim occupation of the Iberian Peninsula in the period between the 
eighth and fifteenth centuries in what was known as Andalusia. Despite the end of Islamic 
rule, a small Muslim population stayed in Spain only to be expelled in 1614. Marchante-
Aragón mentions that, just after three years of the eviction of Muslims, in 1617, the Duke 
of Lerma commissioned Mira de Amescua to write The Masque of the Expulsion of the 
Moriscos, which was performed in the same year. Apart from the festive nature of the 
Masque, which recalls the Duke’s successful effort to expel Muslims, the image of Moorish 
characters in the performance is always related to evil and anti-Christianity (Marchante-
Aragón 98–101). The playwright Francisco Martínez de la Rosa’s Aben Humeya o La 
Rebelión de los Moriscos, 1830, is a history play in which the writer portrays the revolution 
of Moors led by Aben Humeya against Philip II in the middle of the sixteenth century. The 
play depicts Muslims as barbarians, whose defeat occurs because of their betrayal of Aben 
Humeya who is eventually beheaded. 
                                                 
4 For more information about the economic motives of the Ottoman–Venetian Wars, see Inalcik, (262–8). A 
detailed eyewitness record of the siege of Malta can be found in Balbi di Correggio. For discussions of the 
exploitation of Islam to justify the Ottoman wars in Europe, see Yurdusev (190-9), and Rudolph Jr. (53). For 
using Christendom to unite European countries against the Turks as ‘infidels’, see Curtis (2009, 25). 
5 For detailed discussions of the Crusades from different points of view, see the studies of Hillenbrand and 
Madden. 
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Even decades after the Muslim occupation of Andalusia, the negative image of 
Muslims can be found in Federico García Lorca’s Play without a Title.6 The character of a 
lustful Muslim young man in the play feels happy to be killed only because he will be able 
to live together with a large number of women. The Muslim character explains: ‘I’m 
hoping to die so I can have a million concubines. The women are expensive here’ (Lorca 
122). This speech parodies some verses of the Holy Qur'an, which describe the eternal life 
of Muslims in heaven. What distinguishes Play without a Title from The Masque of the 
Expulsion of the Moriscos and Aben Humeya is that Lorca’s play, whose dialogues revolve 
around the comparison between the bourgeois and working-class audiences, does not 
include any reference to the nationalist struggle against the Muslim occupation. The most 
striking feature of the Muslim’s speech within Play without a Title is that it suggests that 
the playwright acquires information about Islam that enabled his critique of Muslim 
characters to extend beyond their physical traits or behaviour to draw a link between such 
behaviour and the Qur'an. In their analysis of the suicide operations by the members of 
some radical Islamist groups since the 1990s, a large number of European and American 
academics and journalists comment on specific verses of the Qur'an, which are recited by 
the leaders of these groups in order to justify violence.7 
The previous examples of plays do not offer a comprehensive record of the 
representation of Muslim characters, or culture, within Western drama in general or English 
and Spanish theatres in particular. Nevertheless, my examination of these dramatic texts led 
to some observations, which I utilised to define the topic of this dissertation. Firstly, the 
inclusion of Muslim characters within these plays seems to be partly pertinent to, and 
motivated by, specific sociopolitical contexts of conflict. Secondly, while the polemically 
intersecting circumstances of the ongoing War on Terror are remarkably different from 
both the Ottoman wars in Europe and the Muslim occupation of Andalusia, the discourse of 
Osama Bin Laden since the middle of the 1990s seems, in some respects, to recycle the 
historical claim of the Muslim holy war against the Christian infidels. Moreover, some 
                                                 
6 Lorca unfinished play was written in 1936, but not published until 1978. 
7 Claims that the Qur'an (Koran) includes many verses that praise brutality and violence can be found, for 
example, in McCarthy, B. Gabriel, M. Gabriel, and Winn. More profound approaches to reading the 
relationship between the Qur'an and terrorists’ discourse of justifying violence is taken by a large number of 
scholars such as Roy 2004, Juergensmeyer, Silverstein, and Kurzman. 
11 
 
scholars and historians analyse the attacks of militant Islamists in the US and Europe on the 
grounds of a nostalgic desire to retrieve the powerful Muslim state in Andalusia.8 
My third observation was that although the phrase ‘Muslim characters’ seems able 
to serve as a general descriptive term, it ignores the differences between, for example, 
Moorish and Turkish dramatic characters. Such differences are based on the intrinsic 
interactions amongst ethnic, religious, geographic, and historical elements. Thus, I realised 
that my simplistic categorisation of Muslim characters as a feature of the contemporary 
plays I intend to study ignores the differences that can be found between, for instance, 
Sunni and Shii dramatic characters in a play about Iraq.9 Moreover, discrepant ethnic and 
non-religious traditions can be crucial in distinguishing both from dramatic characters that 
represent the Sunni majority in Afghanistan. 
Finally, and most importantly, within the vast majority of these English and Spanish 
plays, the representation of both Moorish and Turkish characters usually includes aspects of 
a stereotyped image commonly created and accepted by the society of each playwright. In 
many cases, these images reflect on the official political orientations of England and Spain 
at the time of the play. In his comment on the representation of the Moors by English 
dramatists in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Barthelemy argues: ‘Because 
playwrights could rely on a common tradition, on widely held assumptions about Moors, 
Moors serve as valuable examples of moral depravity in general or of special moral vices 
and lapses’ (Barthelemy 199). Such an aspect is very crucial to distinguish these examples 
of plays from the dramatic texts studied in my thesis, where contemporary playwrights 
comment on different events of the War on Terror by questioning, and even contradicting 
specific claims raised by official political discourse and/or the Western media coverage of 
the ongoing conflicts. 
From these observations, I concluded that my initial project noticeably needed to be 
modified. Thanks to my supervisor’s advice, I have taken a different approach to studying 
contemporary British and American political theatre. The prominence of Muslims 
characters has proven to be one of the salient features in representations of Muslim-related 
                                                 
8 For examples of such a psychohistorical approach to explain international militant Islamism, see Kepel 
(2004, 8), and Domínguez (86). In Ahmed (2), the term ‘the Andalusia syndrome’ is coined to describe the 
fear that haunts the Muslim minority in India, whose members allegedly recall the fate of the Moors in The 
Iberian Peninsula.  
9 Shii, Shiti, or Shhi‘ite is the largest faction amongst the minor sects of Islam, while Sunni, or Sunna is the 
major sect, especially in the Arabic countries. Inside the Shii sect, there are several subdivisions. In addition, 
Shii or Sunni is utilised as an adjective to describe Muslims who belong to each sect. 
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conflicts with Western countries, especially the Anglo-American coalition. Yet British and 
American playwrights have not chosen Muslims as dramatic characters to explore 
particular societies or social dynamics; instead, the task of portraying the military and 
political conflicts of the past few decades is what has demanded the utilisation of these 
characters. In this respect, the wider approach enables this research not only to explore 
these dramatic characters, but also, and most importantly, to investigate the response of 
contemporary British and American theatre to one of the most controversial conflicts in 
history: the War on Terror. Consequently, instead of dealing with the War on Terror as 
merely motivation for portraying Muslim characters, which was the assumption of my old 
project, I realise that investigating both the pivotal phases of the War on Terror and the 
violent operations that initiated it is necessary in order to analyse dramatic texts.  
In addition, the plays studied in my thesis cannot be reduced to the inclusion of 
Muslim, or even Arabic, characters. Rather, these topical plays respond to specific events 
of the ongoing conflicts, within which geopolitical, economic, religious, and cultural 
factors interact. In such complicated contexts, even notions such as the West, Arabs, 
Muslims, and terror demand a clarification. To give an example, considering the overlap 
between ethnic and religious elements is crucial in order to distinguish Arabic nationalist 
movements from radical Islamist groups, the vast majority of whose members are Arabs. 
Based on their violent operations against Western targets, including civilians, both types of 
organisations are described as terrorists. However, there are subtle differences between 
each, whether in terms of their methods of violence or regarding their leaders’ declared 
reasons for their operations. 
 
Initial observations on dramatic texts 
The vast majority of contemporary Anglo-American playwrights’ responses to 
Muslim-related confrontations with the West tend to increase their spectators’ awareness of 
the conflicts in general, or of a specific factual incident. To achieve such an enlightening 
role through their topical plays, it seems that playwrights themselves have to extend their 
knowledge beyond what the media coverage of the events offers. The inclusion of this 
information within texts adopts the techniques of documentary theatre and Bertolt Brecht’s 
approach to epic drama. It seems that contemporary political theatre is a revival of both 
Piscator’s works in 1920s and the tribunal plays of Peter Weiss and his comrades in the 
1960s.  
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Moreover, I realised that many playwrights insist on referring to a process of 
research they have made before writing their plays, which can be related to the adoption of 
documentary theatre. For instance, The Great Game: Afghanistan is a group of thirteen 
plays, premiered at the Tricycle Theatre, London on 17 April 2009.10 In the introduction to 
the publication, the artistic director of the Tricycle Theatre, Nicolas Kent, who 
commissioned the thirteen British and American playwrights, declares that ‘some of them 
have chosen their own subject, and some have been ‘coerced’ into periods of Afghan 
history about which they knew nothing, and have now become expert’ (Kent 8). Apart from 
the exaggeration of supposing that few months of reading is enough to turn a playwright 
into an ‘expert’ in a topic he/she used to know ‘nothing’ about, Kent’s observation suggests 
the necessity of research for writing topical plays.  
A perfect example of playwrights’ intentional mentioning of their sources of 
information can be found in the American playwright Naomi Wallace’s published plays 
about the conflicts in Iraq and Palestine, where bibliographies of many political and 
historical studies are added under the title of ‘Further Reading’. Although such lists of 
references can be accessed by the readers rather than the audiences of these plays, it is 
possible that directors of potential productions of these plays—and all practitioners—
follow Wallace by reading one or more of these studies.  
It seems that playwrights ‘reading about conflicts is crucial to represent events that 
occur in geographically and culturally distant places, namely Afghanistan and Iraq. To 
increase their own knowledge about the topic on which their plays comment, playwrights’ 
pre-writing readings usually focus on social, cultural and historical aspects of Muslim and 
Arabic societies. Moreover, with the echoes of conflicts within playwrights’ own societies, 
they may need to consider knowing more about domestic matters such as, to give examples, 
the co-existence of Muslim and Arabic immigrants, or the military system of recruiting 
soldiers and sending them to battlefields. 
I have gradually realised that the vast majority of the plays’ comments on the 
different phases of the War on Terror are interwoven with a critique of several aspects of a 
stereotyped discourse about the conflicts. Most of these negative stereotypes are variations 
stemming from the age-old dichotomy of West versus East. While terrorists’ speeches 
                                                 
10 The ‘Great Game’ was the expression that described the fierce competition in the nineteenth century 
between Britain and Russia, both of whom had colonial ambitions to dominate the Central Asia region, 
especially Afghanistan. 
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insist on a Christian-Muslim confrontation, terrorists’ attacks are sometimes reduced to a 
sign of cultural inferiority, which is full of hatred and envy.11 
I do not argue that the group of plays I study in this thesis suggests that there is no 
difference between Western and both/either Arabic and/or Muslim cultures. My claim is 
that these dramatic texts suggest that, firstly, dealing with both cultural and religious 
differences is an unavoidable part of the consequences of the presence of Western soldiers 
and humanitarians in Afghanistan and Iraq. Secondly, some of these discrepancies must not 
be seen by either side as a deviation from its own culture as a benchmark. Finally, my 
investigating of these plays gradually implied that, regardless of religion, cultural values, 
social class, or age, the soldiers and civilians from both sides are – to different extents – 
victims of terrorists, politicians, and the exploitive creation of, and support for, 
misconceptions. These observations drew my attention to the necessity of reading what 
these plays suggest as Western values through a specific, although not ultimate, 
understanding of the ‘West’ as a cultural identity of both playwrights and their dramatic 
characters. 
 
What is the West? 
The word ‘Western’ is insufficient to encompass the differences between British 
and American playwrights though I have resorted to using it because dramatists in both 
countries comment on comparable aspects of the wars their nations fight in the name of 
secular democracy. The latter I utilise as an essential feature of what I mean by Western 
societies, within which secularity and democracy respectively materialise the religious and 
political aspects of the freedoms of belief and expression. This observation is crucial to 
understand that I occasionallydescribe some Arabic and Muslim regimes as secular, 
because their leaders marginalise, or even neutralise, religious presence in their political 
systems. However, these dictatorships are systematicallyagainst political freedom. 
In contrast to Arabic secular dictatorship, I contextualise the notion of secular 
democracy by drawing on shared values between Britain and the US as Western countries. 
My thesis adopts James Gow’s definition of the West, which he mainly establishes on a 
                                                 
11 Here, I refer to the terrorists, who planned and executed the attacks of 9/11, as they were described by 
George W. Bush, the American President (2001-2009). Bush’s comment has been controversially analysed by 
both journalists and scholars. 
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discussion of Samuel Huntington’s description of the ‘West’ in the latter’s controversial 
study The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1997). Gow argues: 
 
The focus on individualism, rather than collectivism, that marks out 
the West is at the core of the values and culture on which Western 
societies depend, whatever the defects in practice over time. This 
core value gives rise to the way in which others manifest 
themselves in Western societies – whether artistic creativity, 
scientific enquiry, the rule of law, or pluralist and representative 
politics, where change is assumed on the grounds that no rulers can 
be perfect, omniscient or comprehensive. All of this constitutes 
values that both represent and generate Western power. (Gow 10) 
 
Gow’s insistence on ‘individualism’ as an essence of Western ‘values and culture’ was 
helpful in supporting my claim that various forms of ‘collectivism’ played a crucial role in 
the emergence of the violent groups in the vast majority of Arabic and Muslim countries in 
the first place. In order to strengthen their authority, dictators and radical Islamists lure 
individuals to concede their rights and freedoms in the name of ‘collectivism’, which is 
based on jingoistic mottos and religious promises of heaven, respectively.  
Furthermore, I utilised what Gow refers to as ‘the defects in practice’ to analyse the 
effect of political mottos, raised by the US administration, which, I suggest, contradict the 
Western essential value of ‘individualism’. To give an example, I mentioned how, for the 
sake of ‘patriotism’ and ‘protecting the soldiers’, American media coverage of negative 
consequences of some events of the War on Terror was limited, and some dramatic 
representations of these incidents were criticised. In this respect, this research urged me to 
realise that there are many differences between British and American political discourse 
about the conflicts and the media coverage of the events of the War on Terror in each 
country. Moreover, in terms of theatrical techniques and critical responses, especially in 
terms of political topics, there are some discrepant features. 
Finally, I utilised my understanding of the West to explore one of the most 
significant consequences of the War on Terror, which is raising questions about the 
relationship, or even the discrepancy, between secularism and Islam. In the heart of these 
debates are the so-called rules of political Islam, or as Peter Mandaville prefers to name 
them: ‘Muslim politics’ (Mandaville 2007, x), which essentially contradict the Western 
notion of politics as a secular realm that must not be mingled with religion. On the other 
hand, political Islamists base their credibility on the belief that Islam is a thorough system 
16 
 
of life, which intrinsically includes the way in which Muslim societies must be ruled. In 
addition, these rules define both the rights and obligations of the minorities of other 
religions, by which they exclusively mean Christians and Jews.12 
It seems important to mention that this claim dominates the speeches of a large 
number of Muslim clerics in the vast majority of Arabic and Muslim countries, including 
many of those who are described as moderate Sheikhs.13 In other words, the believers in 
political Islam include, but are not limited to, the movements that seek to rule in order to 
apply ‘Muslim politics’. I utilise this observation in order to analyse the conflict amongst 
dictators, political Islamists, nationalists, and liberals in some Arabic and Muslim 
countries, wherein terror was born.14 
 
Topic of study 
 The dramatic phenomenon this research attempts to examine is the noticeable 
increase in British and American contemporary political theatre, which can be described as 
a revival of political theatre in general and documentary practice in particular. My main 
hypotheses are that, firstly, this increasing presence could be described as the dramatic 
equivalent of waves of international successive events that are accompanied by series of 
conflicting hypothetical ideas and a large number of mingled theories. Put differently, the 
catastrophes caused by terrorist attacks, followed by several military confrontations as part 
of the War on Terror, have created an increasing public interest shaped by extensive media 
coverage. I read dramatic texts as cultural product of, and a comment on these interactive 
contexts. Thus while these plays reflect the standpoint of playwrights as part of public 
opinion, they also, and most importantly, function as means of shaping this public opinion, 
alongside, but usually in opposition to, the dominant discourses of Western politicians and 
media. Secondly, it is crucial to study these trans-continental, ever-changing events and 
                                                 
12 Unlike Christianity and Judaism, other minority religions are forbidden by all Islamists, who call them 
infidels. In several Arabic and Islamic dictatorships, minor religions, other than Christianity, are not allowed 
to advocating or practicing their beliefs publicly. Muslims who insist on converting to any other religion or 
become atheists are considered apostates, whose punishment is death penalty. For more information, see Fox 
(218-49), Schabas (91), and Lawrence (2014, 218).         
13 The word sheikh (ﺦﯿ ﺷ) literally means any person who is over fifty years old. In this context Sheikhs, with 
uppercase, means clerics of Islam, or Muslim scholars of religion. Both are the most common uses of the 
word in all Arabic and Muslim countries. 
14 While Marranci explores the relationship between secularity and Islam from different perspectives, 
examples of the confrontation within Western societies between secularity and some of Islamic laws and 
values can be found in Gutkowski (2014, 162–209), Mandaville (2009), and Roy (2007).  
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theories as they profoundly influence the creation of the dramatic subject which lies at the 
heart of this research.    
To examine these hypotheses my research raises a major question: how do these 
contextual events and attitudes influence the dramatic text, in respect of ideas and structural 
aspects? Three sub-questions follow: firstly, how do these plays comment on the different 
events in terms of political content and theatrical representation? Secondly, are there 
specific common features of the images of the soldiers and the civilian victims in the places 
of military conflicts? And what are these features? Finally, how do these features differ 
according to the background of both playwright and the theatrical characters? 
To seek answers to these questions and to study the dramatic aspects of that 
considerable emergence of political and topical plays as a significant phenomenon within 
contemporary Anglo-American theatre, this research examines the social, political and 
historical contexts which, firstly, incited the western playwrights to bring those topics to 
their dramatic texts, and, secondly, motivated directors to put them on stage. Finally, but 
maybe the most important, these various contextual elements have created the atmosphere 
that prepares the audiences' collective interest in such topics. Accordingly, this research 
attempts the project of combining the approaches drawn from political theatre, 
documentary drama, performance studies and critiques of Orientalism, supported by the 
explanatory paradigms of social-semiotics. 
I started by reading in Orientalism and interculturalism. While both helped me in 
shaping a theoretical approach through which to understand the dramatic texts’ mention of 
social and political aspects of the War on Terror, I realized that some Western politicians, 
supported by the media, sometimes repeat the old colonial discourse. However, unlike the 
British and French writers who supported colonialism, most contemporary playwrights are 
against the Anglo-American occupation of both Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, the 
exceptional aspects of the War on Terror make its effect on discrimination against Muslims 
in Western countries more complicated than a matter of co-existence of different cultural 
groups. 
The informative nature of the plays demanded readings in the media coverage of 
the events alongside a large number of contradictory writings by politicians, academics and 
military specialists about the War on Terror. It seems important to highlight that although 
my knowledge as a Sunni Egyptian was helpful in understanding some aspects of the 
different phases of the conflicts, this knowledge not only has been proven to be 
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insufficient, but also dangerous unless I examine the socio-political, nationalist, cultural 
and religious contexts of the conflicts with maximum objectivity. As a researcher, my 
awareness of the necessity of excluding, or at least marginalising, my initial conceptions—
and sometimes misconceptions—of the thorny circumstances of the War on Terror has 
been supported by my supervisor’s guidance and a large number of scholarly studies. 
The texts of academics such as Kepel, Roy, Mandaville, Esposito, and 
Juergensmeyer offered precise and profound readings of political Islam and the War on 
Terror. In addition, I occasionally recite controversial claims by scholars such as 
Finkelstein, Chomsky, and Spivak along with opinions of popular polemicists such as 
Huberman and Hopsicker. On several occasions, I even extend my citations to include 
journalistic comments on different aspects of the conflicts. Although some of these 
opinions are dogmatic or inaccurate, especially compared to academic studies, their 
significance relies on the fact that they are more accessible to the public. Moreover, British 
and American playwrights comment on both the hasty, overlapping, and successive events 
of the War on Terror and the contradictory discourses about these events. 
As many plays adopt documentary techniques with Brechtian influences, reading in 
political theatre and documentary drama was essential in shaping my understanding of how 
this political background is dramatised. I realized that many of the plays use a specific form 
of documentary theatre, which I knew nothing about, which is [V]erbatim theatre. I was 
reading the word ‘verbatim’ as its literal meaning suggests. This form of documentary 
theatre has its origin in British theatre and is sometimes conflated with tribunal plays, 
whether by practitioners or some critics.  
Working on the first chapter, ‘Contextual frames of dispute: Dominating 
misapprehensions within contradictory discourses’, enabled me to realise that playwrights’ 
critiques of cultural misconceptions seem to be a response to the excessive presence of 
these stereotypes within both Western politicians’ discourse and the media coverage of the 
War on Terror. Most of these misconceptions suggest simplistic comparisons between the 
superior Western countries, especially the US, and uncivilized, barbarian or terrorist 
Muslims. Similarly, with some exceptions, the image of the West within most Arabic 
political, religious and literary discourses is haunted by a simplistic generalization. In a big 
sector of Arabic writings, Western confrontations with Muslim and Arabic countries are 
usually portrayed with exaggerated self-critique or self-pride, which reduces these 
confrontations to a large number of inaccurate dichotomies. In this sense, the West as the 
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occupier, materialist, evil, intelligent, democratic, scientific, secular, Christian, or even the 
infidel, is usually opposed to the occupied, spiritual, ethical, naïve, authoritarian, 
superstitious, or the religious, Muslim and Arabic countries. 
The role of a large sector of the American media was crucial in portraying 9/11 as a 
sudden and purposeless act of hatred. However, reading about the historical contexts of the 
dispute between the US and Muslim/Arabic countries suggests that there are causes for 
anger against US policies.15These reasons were exploited by terrorists to justify killing 
American innocents. One of the most important causes for conflict is the Israeli-Palestinian 
dispute, which, despite the specific aspects that distinguish it from the American-led 
confrontations with terrorists, was mentioned by Israeli officials as part of the War on 
Terror, at least theoretically. This situation led me to extend the range of study in the thesis 
to include plays that comment on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the 2000sin addition to 
the American-led military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Through Chapter One, I support my arguments by mentioning specific speeches 
and/or dramatic actions within plays, most of which comment on particular aspects of the 
War on Terror, other than the three places of conflict. For instance, I cite from dramatic 
texts that depict how the US deprives the detainees in Guantánamo of their right to be 
treated as Prisoners of Wars according to International Laws. I also give two examples of 
plays that portray the problem of discrimination against Muslims in both the US and 
Britain as a consequence of 9/11. 
Studying the revival of political theatre that included documentary techniques led me 
to realise the essential difference between contemporary political theatre and the work of 
both Piscator and Brecht. Instead of the latter’s ideological insistence on Marxism, as an 
alternative to capitalism, most contemporary plays avoid this agitprop theatre by focusing 
on the disastrous effect of the wars from the perspective of the witness rather than the 
political rival. Chapter Two, ‘Forms of topicality: New goals of political theatre’ canvasses 
these issues. 
In Chapter Three, ‘The Representation of Iraqi conflict: Two Decades of military 
confrontations and economic sanctions’, I discuss the First Gulf War in 1991 as I realised 
that many Western playwrights’ comments on Iraq started with this conflict. Others have 
                                                 
15 For more discussions about the role of the Palestinian struggle as a significant factor in agitating Arabic and 
Muslim populations, and, consequently, as a repeated excuse by terrorists in order to justify their violent 
operations against the US, see Roy (2004), Kepel (2004), and Kepel (2008). 
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responded to the United Nations’ economic sanctions on Iraq (1990-2003). In addition, the 
chapter explores the difference between British and American playwrights regarding their 
responses to the invasion and its aftermath.  
Chapter Four deals with Afghanistan and traces misconceptions about three phases of 
conflict. I highlight the way in which playwrights’ responses to the aftermath of the 2001 
War in Afghanistan revisit history by portraying two historical events: the British and 
Russian occupation of Afghanistan in the nineteenth and twentieth century, respectively. 
While I analyse playwrights’ highlighting of specific common features of the intervention 
in Afghanistan by Britain, Russia, and the US, I explore how these writers underscore 
specific aspects that distinguish humanitarian and political reasons for the American-led 
international presence in the Asian country from both British and Russian occupations. 
Chapter Five focuses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and covers controversial plays 
that comment on this complicated and long-running dispute. While some plays attempt to 
give a close image of life in both Israel and the West Bank through verbatim theatre by 
interviewing people from both sides of the conflict, other plays focus on specific bloody 
events within imaginary plots, where documentary material is marginal and scattered.  
In chapters three, four, and five, my choice of case study plays is designed to 
explore the wide spectrum of perspectives adopted by British and American playwrights on 
different phases of the three confrontations. In addition, my reading of these examples of 
plays investigates the variety of dramatic styles by which topical themes are represented, 
whether through different forms of documentary theater, imaginary plots, or a mixture of 
both styles. Within the latter, I show how factual events are interwoven with fictional 
characters and actions. While I comprehensively analyse specific dramatic texts, I 
selectively highlight aspects of other plays in order to support my argument about the way 
in which British and American playwrights comment on each conflict. 
In addition to exploring social, political, and cultural contexts of the War on Terror, 
to which contemporary British and American plays respond, I suggest that the contribution 
of my thesis to the field of theatre studies relies on my focus on the revival of political 
theatre, which, firstly, adopts the forms of documentary drama. Secondly, dissimilar to the 
agitprop political theatre, plays studied within my thesis tend to raise questions about the 
disastrous aftermath of the conflicts rather than attacking, or defending, a specific ideology. 
In 2009, while I was developing the topic of my thesis, Alison Forsyth and Chris Megson 
declared: ‘The upsurge in fact-based and verbatim theatre in recent years has attracted a 
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voluminous amount of coverage in the arts pages of newspapers and websites but scholarly 
engagement has, to date, been limited’ (Forsyth 2009, 1). Moreover, and most importantly, 
as a result of the emergence of the 2011 revolution in Egypt, the last three years has 
noticeably witnessed Egyptian practitioners’ increasing preference of utilising documentary 
theatre in order to address political matters, which, because of the police state, used to be 
concealed behind symbolic plots. As a playwright and a potential academic, I hope that 
what I have learned from this research enable me to be a tiny part of creating free Egyptian 
theatre as well as to study this emerging documentary drama in Egypt.  
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Chapter One 
Contextual frames of dispute:  Dominating misapprehensions within 
contradictory discourses  
 
This chapter explores some of the most decisive aspects of the complicated 
historical, geo-political and socio-cultural circumstances, within which the ongoing 
conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine were shaped. This chapter does not claim or 
intend to be a comprehensive study of the contextual frames of the conflicts, which needs 
profound and huge interdisciplinary research, including history, politics, and sociology. The 
rationale of investigating selected specific watersheds in the prolonged confrontations is to 
elucidate the reading of contemporary British and American plays, in which different 
phases of the conflicts are portrayed. Therefore, the main criterion that regulates the content 
of this chapter is its linkage with specific matters raised within the plays studied in this 
thesis. 
 
The roads to 9/11: Palestine, dictatorship, and colonialism 
a. Introduction 
I trace the examples of the incidents of targeting the US by Arabic and Islamist 
violent groups back to the early 1970s. Leo Daugherty recalls: ‘On March 1, 1973, a group 
of armed terrorists belonging to the Black September Organization conducted an armed 
attack on the Saudi Arabian Embassy [in Khartoum] and abducted the U.S. ambassador and 
the former U.S. charge d’affaires’ (Daugherty 202). The Black September Organization 
(BSO) was a Palestinian group without any Islamic orientation; it was described by George 
Headlam as a militant group, which was founded in 1971 as a branch of the PLO 
[Palestinian Liberation Organisation]. To draw the international community’s attention to 
the rights of the Palestinian people, Headlam argues, the BSO committed several violent 
operations, including the murder of eleven Israeli athletes during the Olympic Games in 
Munich in 1972 (Headlam 54-5).16 
                                                 
16 The PLO (ﺔﯿﻨﯿﻄ ﺴﻠﻔﻟا ﺮ ﯾﺮﺤﺘﻟا ﺔ ﻤﻈﻨﻣ) was established in 1964. Regardless of the degree of recognition by the 
international community, the PLO has acted as the official Palestinian authority. Yasser Arafat was the leader 
of the PLO from 1969 to 2004. 
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The main feature that distinguishes the violent operations of the BSO from the style 
of Hamas, as a Palestinian Islamist group, is the fact that the members of the BSO never 
committed suicide bombings. I highlight such an observation in order to realise that 
imposing nationalistic conflict within a religious context not only enabled the discourse of 
violent groups to include more justifications of their operations, but it also offered an 
allegedly Islamic permission for new methods of violence.17 
In Beirut, hundreds of American soldiers and civilians were killed in two separate 
operations, which targeted the US embassy and the Marine Barracks on 18 April and 23 
October 1983, respectively. In the 1990s, several attacks targeted many American interests 
in different countries, such as the residence of the American soldiers in Saudi Arabia on 25 
June 1996 and the US embassies in both Tanzania and Kenya on 7 August 1998. Radical 
Islamists proved their ability to reach targets on American soil on 26 February 1993, when 
an explosion at the World Trade Center (WTC) wounded thousands and killed six civilians, 
including a pregnant woman. 
Similar to the attacks of 9/11, these limited examples of earlier incidents of violence 
against American soldiers and civilians, whether by Arabic and/or Islamist groups, cannot 
be understood without exploring the historical circumstances within which the reasons for 
the ongoing conflicts are rooted. I establish my reading of these intersecting contexts on 
two correlative propositions. Firstly, I argue that what is claimed by the militant Islamist 
groups as an international holy war against the alleged Christian-Zionist conspiracy seems 
to be motivated by nationalist, political, and/or personal interests of the leaders of these 
groups. In other words, religion is exploited by these leaders to recruit, mobilise, and 
convince new members to execute violent operations, including suicide attacks. In this 
respect, I avoid the simplistic reading of the aftermath of both the terror and the war(s) 
against it as a religious conflict or a confrontation between cultures.18 
The awareness of both religious and cultural differences, and sometimes 
contradictions, is necessary to analyse the war of words that accompanies military conflicts, 
including the discourses of the terrorists, Western politicians, and the media coverage of the 
                                                 
17 In Arabic the word Hamas (سﺎ ﻤﺣ), which literally means enthusiasm, is the initial letters of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement (ﺔﯿﻣﻼﺳﻹا ﺔﻣوﺎﻘﻤﻟا ﺔﻛﺮﺣ). 
18 While radical Islamists, including both nonviolent and militant groups warn about the threat of an 
American-led Christian-Jewish alliance, a large sector of intellectuals in both Arabic and Muslim countries 
insists that a new wave of the Western colonialism, which is led by the US, is accompanied, or even 
dominated by, the Western objective of the so-called ‘cultural invasion’. For more information, see Abaza 
(174–81), Dessouki (48–9), and Hollander (xxxviii).    
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events, whether in Arabic or English. However, I insist that the causes for the militant 
Islamist violence and the American-led international war against it are essentially political 
rather than religious or cultural. Olivier Roy profoundly analyses the rationale of mingling 
religion and nationalist claims by terrorist groups. Roy claims: 
 
The ‘nationalisation’ of Islamist movements is, incidentally, 
congruent with general phenomenon: Islam as such is never a 
dominant strategic factor. The religious dimension always 
contributes to more basic ethnic or national factors, even if it 
provides afterwards a discourse of legitimisation and mobilisation. 
(Roy 2004, 70) 
 
On the grounds of my understanding of Roy’s comment, Bin Laden exploited nationalist 
disputes and political confrontations, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the 
American-led UN sanctions on Iraq, to justify al-Qaeda’s international holy war—within 
which all Muslims must fight—against the allegedly united forces of Jews, Crusaders, and 
infidels. Even the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, which the Arabic media used to describe as 
the Arabic-Israeli conflict until the middle of the 1970s, was gradually turned into a 
Muslim-Jewish religious war according to Hamas and the vast majority of its supporters.19 
Through this intersecting process of ‘legitimisation and mobilisation’ militant 
Islamist leaders underscore one  of the most dominating thoughts in the minds of a large 
sector of Arabic and Muslim populations, which is the belief that the policies of the US in 
the Middle East exclusively seek to protect Israel by harming the latter’s Arabic and 
Muslim neighbouring countries. Most political and artistic narratives in Arabic are haunted 
by the idea that the US has to be blamed for any Israeli action. Such an obsession can be 
understood partly due to the US political, military and financial support for Israel, and 
partly because it is much easier to convince yourself that your enemy cannot be as strong as 
it is without the help of a third party. Both possibilities might explain why both nationalist 
and Islamist violent groups have proven to be successful in recruiting successive waves of 
fighters against the US.20 
                                                 
19 In Arabic the word al-Qaeda (ةﺪﻋﺎﻘﻟا) has two meanings: the base or the rule. 
20 For more information about the history of blaming the US for Israeli actions by Arabic leaders and media 
since the 1940s, see Gardner (2009, 59), and Rubin n (2005, 155-86). One of the paradoxes of the so-called 
Arab Spring is that both pro- and anti-revolution powers in different Arabic countries accuse each other of 
serving an American-Israeli conspiracy. For more information, see Selim (97-110), and Khatib (69). For 
scholarly explorations of the linkage between these uprisings and the US policies and interests in the region, 
see the studies of Pollack, Hudson, Rabi, and Gilboa.       
25 
 
My second proposition is that acts of international terror since the middle of the 
1990s are rooted in regional conflicts in the Middle East as well as internal political 
problems in some of Muslim and Arabic countries. At the heart of this polemic reality, the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict—as a nationalistic matter—occupied a core position from early 
on in the confrontation between Muslim and Arabic countries with the West in general, and 
with the US in particular. This conflict has been exploited by some Arabic and Muslim 
countries and movements, including nationalist and religious, nonviolent and terrorist 
groups, to achieve their political goals. These goals in turn are sometimes mixed with 
personal agendas of the leaders of these countries and groups. 
To support my claim I start by giving an example of the political competition 
between Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both of which influenced the political 
scene in the Middle East at many decisive moments since the 1950s.In addition, the two 
countries were the cradle for a large number of radical Islamists, who shaped the core of 
both nonviolent and militant movements. Many members of the latter became the planners 
or fighters of the international holy war against the alleged American-led Christian-Jewish 
alliance. Not only do the first and second leaders of al-Qaeda – Bin Laden and Ayman al-
Zawahiri – point to a long history of radical Islamism in Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
respectively, but their unity is also the product of political mistakes made by successive 
regimes of the two countries. 
 
b. The Saudi-Egyptian cold war: pan-Islamism versus pan-Arabism 
Established in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is a good example of 
what can be called moderate political Islam, especially in comparison with other groups, 
most of which adopted some aspects of the framework of the MB, whether in Egypt or 
Arabic and Muslim countries. Mandaville describes the MB as ‘the prototypical modern 
Islamist movement and model for many subsequent groups around the Muslim world’ 
(Mandaville 2007, 3). However, there are usually marginal or essential differences between 
these ‘subsequent groups’ and the original paradigm manifested by the MB. The essential 
aspect of the Egyptian movement, which has enabled it to increase its popularity in Egypt 
since the 1970s is its charitable services, especially in the most marginalised villages and 
the slums around Egyptian big cities. Mandaville suggests that ‘we might want to wonder 
about correlations between increased urban poverty in Muslim-majority countries and the 
strength of Islamist social influence and mobilizing potential (Mandaville 2007, 349). This 
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observation does not mean that either the members or supporters of the MB belong to an 
impoverished population, but it suggests the way in which the group introduced itself as an 
alternative to the state.21 
I highlight this charitable aspect in order to define one of the reasons for the 
popularity of Hamas amongst the Palestinians, as the group was essentially founded by the 
branch of the MB in Gaza. Roy explains: ‘The Palestinian MB, active mostly in the Gaza 
strip, founded the organization Hamas in 1987, directed by Sheikh Yasin; it immediately 
contested the legitimacy of the PLO, whose secular and nationalist ideology (there are 
many Palestinian Christians) is considered anti-Islamic’ (Roy1994, 110-1). Thus, in the 
footsteps of its Egyptian prototype, the MB in Palestine improved its status by offering 
charitable services to the deprived population of Gaza. Moreover, similar to Egypt, the 
Palestinian MB was appreciated by the Palestinians in comparison with the corruption of 
the PLO.22 
Before I trace the role of the Saudi-Egyptian competition in the birth and expanse of 
militant Islamism, it seems important to ask: why would Israel accept the existence of the 
MB in Gaza in the first place? Gilles Kepel answers: 
 
In Palestine itself, the Muslim Brothers, which had been in 
existence for much longer than the PLO, were tolerated by the 
Israelis because the Brothers’ concerns were mainly charitable and 
pious. The Jewish state saw them as a nonpolitical outlet for the 
frustrations of the occupied Palestinian people and an inoffensive 
substitute for the militant nationalism of the PLO. (Kepel 2006, 
122) 
 
On one hand, Hamas seemed to inherit, and build on the Palestinians’ appreciation of the 
civil services of the MB, which partly explains the group’s victory in the 2006 
parliamentary elections against the PLO. On the other hand, it seems that successive Israeli 
governments did not expect, or perhaps underestimated, the possibility of the ‘nonpolitical’ 
                                                 
21 While I limitedly focus on specific aspects of the MB, a detailed record and analysis of the establishment 
and growth of the movement and different radical Islamist movements in Egypt can be found in Wickham, 
Kepel (2005), and Zollne. For detailed discussions about the expansion of the MB in Europe, see the studies 
of Marécha, and Meijer. In Rubin (2010), several scholars explore the MB’s presence in a large number of 
countries in the Middle East, Europe and North America.  
22 For information about the financial corruption and nepotism within the PLO, see Shannon (2012), and 
Foreign Affairs Committee (2006, 159–60). For more information about the economic and political 
corruptions in Egypt since the 1970s, see the studies of Ghannam, Amin, and Blaydes. In Sonbol, corruption 
is claimed as a constant aspect of the rule of Egyptian military officers since 1954.   
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MB, not only to become a political group in 1987, but also to extend its activities to include 
violent operations against Israel. I utilise Kepel’s precise explanation of the reasons for 
Israel’s acceptance of—not the support for—the Palestinian MB, not Hamas, in order to 
contradict the controversial claim that Israel intentionally and secretly contributed to 
creating Hamas as a political opponent to the PLO.23 
After an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Egyptian President Gamal Abd el-
Nasser (Nasser) in October 1954, six members of the MB were executed. Subsequently, 
thousands were imprisoned and brutally oppressed until the end of Nasser’s era in 1970.24 
Meanwhile, a large number of the members escaped to Saudi Arabia. In addition to the 
Saudi Kings’ confrontation with the 1952 Revolution, which ended the monarchy in Egypt, 
the Saudi regime opposed Nasser’s ambition to achieve the so-called pan-Arabism, of 
which the Egyptian President was seen as the leader by a large sector of Arabic 
populations. While the two regimes were fighting their cold war, the Egyptian MB had the 
chance to ally with Wahhabism, the extremely conservative Saudi sect. According to Roy, 
Wahhabism is ‘the most opposed to Shiism, and vice versa’ (Roy 1994, 218). Roy’s 
observation is crucial in explaining the role of this sectarian tension in two of the fiercest 
regional conflicts: the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) and the Iranian-Iraqi War (1980–
1988).25 
In contrast to Nasser, his successor Anwar el-Sadat had a good relationship with the 
Saudi’s regime. The latter vitally utilised its oil to support the 1973 War against Israel. In 
addition, el-Sadat allowed the Egyptian Islamists, including the MB to increase their 
presence in the Egyptian universities and media in order to tackle the nostalgia for Nasser’s 
socialism and charisma. Both attributes respectively seemed to challenge el-Sadat’s 
political and personal image, especially before 1973. A turning point in the history of the 
region was el-Sadat’s visit to the Knesset in 1977, which led first to the Egyptian-Israeli 
Peace Treaty in 1979. Secondly, after nearly fifteen years of Egypt’s political, economic 
                                                 
23 Examples of this journalistic rather than academic argument can be found in Dreyfuss (191), and O’Neill 
(2007, 18). 
24 The incident is attributed to the MB by many scholars such as Blackwell (415), and Soage (41), while 
Kepel (2005 23-4) mentions that the MB accused the regime of arranging a fake attempt to assassinate Nasser 
in order to get rid of the movement.  
25 For discussions about the so-called Saudi-Egyptian cold war, see Lacroix (322), and Hegghammer (17). For 
more information about Wahhabism since its establishment in the eighteenth century, including its later 
relationship with the MB, see the studies of Commins and DeLong-Bas. A detailed record of the war between 
Iraq and Iran can be found in Hiro, while more academic analysis is introduced in Johnson (2011). For more 
information about the Lebanese Civil War, see Rubin 2009, and Haugbolle.     
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and military alliance with the former Soviet Union, the American-Egyptian relationship 
witnessed an unprecedented boost. The Soviet diplomat and scholar Viktor Israelyan 
argues: Sadat’s growing contacts with the Americans, only some of which were known to 
Moscow, proved that Egypt had embarked on an entirely new foreign policy, which was 
pro-American and anti-Soviet’ (Israelyan 214). Thus, the Russians lost a decisive battle of 
the Cold War, which was soon-to-be succeeded by one of the most significant chapters of 
the conflict between the two super powers in the second half of the twentieth century: 
Afghanistan.26 
A few months prior to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, not only was el-Sadat 
called a traitor by most Arabic leaders, but the latter also imposed economic sanctions on 
Egypt. Zachary Selden claims: 
 
The Arab League, with the exception of Morocco, Sudan, [Somalia, 
Djibouti,] and Oman, threatened to impose a complete boycott on 
trade and aid with Egypt beginning in March 1978. In response, the 
U.S. offered $4.8 billion in additional aid to Egypt. The Arab 
League implemented somewhat less stringent sanctions, and at [the] 
Saudi Arabia’s request, did not take retaliatory measures against the 
U.S. (Selden 1999, 130) 
 
I mention this incident for two reasons. Firstly, as Zachary’s comment suggests, the Saudi 
regime was eager not to disturb its strategic relationship with the US, even for the so-called 
Palestinian struggle, which is declared as one of the central causes of the Saudi pan-
Islamism. Secondly, and most importantly, the most insistent call for these sanctions on 
Egypt was from Saddam Hussein, who became the President of Iraq in July 1979. In the 
footsteps of Saddam, the PLO ‘called for economic sanctions against the United States as 
well as against Egypt’ (Safran 279). Since then, the Iraqi president protected his 
dictatorships and justified many of his humanitarian crimes in the name of being the 
defender of Palestine. Arafat in turn seemed to give Saddam unconditional support, 
sometimes at the expense of the credibility of the Palestinian cause. 
                                                 
26 For more information about el-Sadat’s utilisation of Islamists to support his political objectives, see 
Dalacoura (112–13), Baker (1990, 243–70), and Ismail (615-6). Claims about el-Sadat’s awareness of the 
difficulty of competing with the superior image of his precursor can be found in Dawisha (29-2), and Ajami 
(108–9). For the effect of the Egyptian foreign policy during the era of Nasser and el-Sadat on the Cold War, 
see Saull (75–6), and Boyle (2008). 
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While the American aids overpowered the Arabic sanctions, el-Sadat was being 
praised by the Egyptian media as ‘the hero of war and peace’.27 However, the Egyptian 
President was considered as an enemy of Islam by the newly founded extremist groups such 
as al-Jama’a al-Islameia (Islamic Society) and Tanzim al-Jihad (The Jihad Organisation). 
Led by Shukri Mustafa, a former member of the MB who was released from the prison in 
1971, the Islamic Society was commonly named al-Takfir wal-Hijra whose meaning in 
Arabic suggests that the members of the group assume that most Egyptian Muslims are 
sinful and must be considered apostate. The group’s last and most brutal operation was the 
murdering of Sheikh el-Dhahabi, one of the moderate religious men, who the group 
kidnapped from his house.28 
The most striking feature of this operation is highlighted by Kepel when he claims 
that, because ‘Shukri's credibility within the group was threatened’, the leader of the group 
‘decided that some master stroke was needed to restore his authority, some direct challenge 
to the state’ (Kepel 2005, 97). In this respect, if the boom in the violence of radical 
Islamism in the 1970s partly resulted from el-Sadat’s political and personal interests, the 
religious objectives declared by some of these violent groups are mixed with their leaders’ 
ambition to obtain power. 
With a more disciplined framework than the Islamic Society, the Jihad 
Organisation, whose members included al-Zawahiri, did not antagonise the entire society. 
Instead, the militant group limited its goal to the overthrow of el-Sadat. According to the 
Egyptian jihad, although el-Sadat is a Muslim ruler, his friendship with Israel not only turns 
him into a faithless ruler, but the Egyptian President also becomes as dangerous for Islam 
as his Jewish ally. The significance of this interpretation of the notion of jihad by the 
Egyptian terrorists in the 1970s is its suggestion that even Muslims can be seen as foes of 
Islam by radical Islamists. Such an observation is mentioned by many scholars in the 2000s 
in order to differentiate Islam from the Islamic extremism in general and from the militant 
Islamism in particular. For instance, Adam Silverstein argues that ‘some extremists view all 
non-Muslims, and even those Muslims who disagree with them on points of theology or 
law, as infidels who must be defeated (Silverstein 73). With a cultural approach to explain 
                                                 
27 See Moeller (200), and Meital (64). 
28 For references of Shukri Mustafa’s initial affiliation with the MB, see Khatab (211), and Chasdi (168). The 
incident of el-Dhahabi is mentioned in Dalacoura (113). Both Kepel (2005, 70), and Kenney (130–1) insist 
that the brutality of the incident was shockingly conceived by the vast majority of Egyptians as an anti-Islam 
act. 
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the way in which many Muslims are considered against their religion by radical Islamists, 
Gow claims that the latter adhere to ‘a narrow view of Islam, politics, and the world, in 
which modernity is a corrupting force and in which the representatives of modernity – 
including Muslims contaminated by it – are enemies’ (Gow 11). In this respect, I can 
understand, but indeed never justify, how al-Qaeda’s leaders dared to claim that they 
brutally kill non-Muslim innocents in the name of jihad. 
Moreover, and most importantly, claiming the Palestinian matter as a major reason 
for the militant jihad was a remarkable turning point after two decades, within which the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict was essentially described as an Arabic nationalist struggle. In 
Arabic, the word Jihad (دﺎﮭِﺟ) means: suffering, exerting maximum effort, and resisting. In 
its religious context, while jihad implies that Muslims must resist their evil desires, which 
contradict the orders of God, the direct meaning of the word is: defending religion, or 
fighting against the enemies of Islam. Later, jihad became relevant to defending one’s own 
country against occupiers. For instance, in the public speeches of Nasser and el-Sadat, 
especially before 1973, the word jihad is utilized to describe the struggle of the Arabs, not 
Muslims, against the British, Israeli, and French occupations of Egypt, Palestine, and 
Algeria, respectively.29 
Egyptian politicians and clerics have mentioned the religious value of Jerusalem (al-
Quads) since 1948. However, during the heyday of pan-Arabism (1954–1974), al-Quads’ 
religious significance was mostly highlighted in order to support the mainly nationalistic 
cause rather than to indicate a Muslim-Jewish religious conflict.30 In contrast to Egypt, the 
Saudi regime, which is the fierce enemy of pan-Arabism, insisted on the religious aspect of 
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Hegghammer explains: 
 
The Saudi support for the Palestinian resistance was consistently 
justified and rationalized with reference to religion, and the 
government sought the approval of senior religious scholars for its 
policies. […] On 3 December 1968, the [Saudi Great] Mufti issued 
a fatwa authorizing ‘the use of part of the zakah, [the Islamic 
equivalent of the taxes on wealth] to purchase weapons for the 
                                                 
29 For discussions about the linguistic and religious meanings of jihad, see Mandaville (2007, 49-50), 
Silverstein (71–75), Ramadan (243), and Kepel (2006, iv). For examples of the speeches of the two Egyptian 
presidents in Arabic, see Abd el-Nasser and El-Sadat, respectively. 
30 There are only Two Holy Sanctuaries located in Saudi Arabia, in Mecca and Medina. Both Mosques have 
all Muslims’ ultimate respect as the most sacred sites. Nevertheless, some Muslim clerics imprecisely and 
literally describe al-Masjid al-Aqsa (al-Aqsa Mosque) in al-Quds as the third of the Two Holy Sanctuaries. 
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fida’in [fighters for freedom] who are fighting the Jewish enemies 
of God’. (Hegghammer 20) 
 
While the gerund of the Arabic word fida’in or fida’yeen is fidaa’ (ءادﻓ), which means 
sacrifice, fida’yeen was used as a description of commando-like Egyptian guerrillas who 
fought against the British occupation without any hint of suicide tactics. In this respect, the 
word describes the fighters for freedom, who neither belong to a regular army nor fear 
risking their lives.  
Recently, the phrase sacrificing operation (ﺔﯾﺋادﻓ تﺎﯾﻠﻣﻋ) has been utilised by some 
Arabic media in order to avoid using more decisive expressions such as suicidal (ىرﺎﺣﺗﻧإ), 
martyr ( ىدﺎﮭﺷﺗﺳإ /دﯾﮭﺷ ), or terrorist (ﻰﺑﺎھرإ), each of which suggests a different degree of either 
acceptance or disapproval of any violent operation within which the attacker loses his/her 
life. In some cases, the Arabic media utilises more neutral words such as explosive or 
blasting attacks. Examples of such an elusive use of language by the Arabic media are too 
many to be mentioned here, For instance, while the official Arabic site of al-Jazeera 
describes the executors of suicideattacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians as fida’yeen, many 
articles on the English site of the Qatari channel use the phrase ‘Palestinian suicide 
bombings’.31 
While it is hard to decide what the Saudi Mufti meant by ‘fida’in’, his fatwa extends 
the call for supporting the Palestinians, as a religious obligation, beyond humanitarian aid 
to include weapons. Both types of support might have been introduced by Saudi Arabia 
prior to the Mufti’s decree, whether for the PLO or other Palestinian militant groups. 
Nevertheless, the most striking feature of the fatwa is that it is based on the assumption that 
the Jews are the ‘enemy of God’, which suggests that Israeli civilians, not only soldiers, are 
legitimate targets for the ‘fida’in’. Put differently, this fatwa was an early permission for 
later Saudi regimes to finance Hamas whose ‘charity associations were bulging with petro-
dollars to spread throughout Gaza and the West Bank’ (Kepel 2004, 25), when Hamas’ 
militant branch – the Brigades of Ezze-Deen al-Qassam – started to attack both Israeli 
soldiers and civilians in the 1990s. 
Before I move to the second phase of the road to 9/11 through the political conflicts 
within and between Arabic and Muslim countries, it seems important to highlight the most 
                                                 
31 For more information, cf. ‘Qa’ema bel-‘Amleiat al-Feda’ya al-Phalastineia’, Falk, and ‘Israel Says Bus 
Blast was "Terrorist Attack"’. 
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significant consequence of the emerging Saudi project of pan-Islamism, which is turning 
the nationalistic Palestinian struggle to a religious war against Israel. Hamas was classified 
as a terrorist group by the US and the European Union in August and September 2003 
respectively. A few months after the American-led coalition’s invasion of Iraq, speeches by 
members of Hamas condemned what they called an international hypocrisy that allows a 
Christian-Jewish coalition to kill people in three Muslim countries. So far, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict seemed to be the major cause of Islamist terrorism and, consequently, 
the War on Terror. Now, the conflict becomes part of both.32 
In this respect, Hamas’ attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians enabled Israeli 
officials to identify with the American administration as victims of, and fighters against, 
terrorism. Kepel explains: 
 
Given Sharon’s insistence that Arafat and bin Laden must be treated 
as equals, each suicide attack [against Israel] has reinforced 
Washington’s support of Tel Aviv, and increasingly united the two 
capitals in their common “war on terror”. That, in turn, has assured 
Sharon of the benign neglect of George W. Bush while Tsahal (the 
Israeli Defence Forces) reoccupies Palestinian territory, destroys its 
infrastructure and plunges its population into misery. (Kepel 2006, 
xiii) 
 
As Kepel’s statement suggests, the Israeli Prime Minister insisted on the resemblance 
between Arafat, not Hamas, and Bin Laden, which can be understood on the grounds of 
Israel’s claims that the leader of the PLO is responsible for all of his compatriot groups, 
including violent movements. Therefore, when Slavoj Žižek refers to the similarity that 
enabled the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be part of the US War on Terror, he mentions the 
PLO rather than Hamas. Žižek explains: 
 
[F]or the US and Israeli hawks, the ‘war on terrorism’ is the 
fundamental reference, and Israel’s fight against the PLO is simply 
a subchapter in this struggle; […] for the Arabs, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is the fundamental reference and the September 
11 events are ultimately rooted in the injustice perpetrated by Israel 
and the USA against the Palestinians. (Žižek 127-28)  
 
                                                 
32 For more details about the two decisions and the comments of Hamas’ leaders, see the articles of Bruni and 
La Guardia.  
33 
 
What Žižek suggests as a kind of analogy between the US and Israel, in terms of their 
dispute with the Taliban and Hamas respectively, can be portrayed by Hans Hansen’s 
model of ‘metaphorical parallelism’.33 
 
 
Figure (1) 
Hans Hansen’s Metaphorical parallelism  
 
According to Hansen, metaphorical parallelism occurs when the relationship between two 
elements, like (A) and (B) in Figure (1), becomes a metaphor of another relationship like 
(C) and (D). Whether (A-B) is a metaphor of (C-D) or vice versa, the two relationships 
must share a similar quality, which is (X). In addition, each element shares a specific aspect 
with the corresponding element in the other relationship. In the Figure, (Y) is the common 
feature of both (A) and (C), while (Z) is the shared trait between (B) and (D) (Hansen 7-8). 
Realising such resemblances is important to reveal the repetition of particular features 
within each conflict. In addition, stressing the likeness between specific aspects of the three 
conflicts exposes the way in which they intersect and interact, which is the case in the 
alleged similarity between the War on Terror and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Figure (2) illustrates the alleged similarity between (Israel) and (the US) in terms of 
being victims of terror. While the analogy (al-Qaeda – Hamas) is based on their sharing of 
several attributes, such as belonging to fundamentalist Islam and killing civilians, and most 
importantly being agitated by hatred, both the US and Israel are liberal, democratic 
countries whose innocent citizens have been attacked by radical Islamists.  
 
                                                 
33 Hansen’s model is based on Charles Sanders Pierce’s explanation of the double representative levels of 
metaphor. 
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Figure (2) 
The War on Terror in Palestine 
 
Although Figure (2) does not distinguish the multi-national structure and targets of al-
Qaeda from the nationalist nature of Hamas, it is important to consider the support of both 
Saudi Arabia and Iran for the Palestinian movement.34 
Turning the nationalistic resistance into an Islamic jihad, including suicide 
bombings, had disastrous effects on the Palestinian cause. Kepel declares: 
 
For the Palestinians, confusing a national struggle and the kind of 
terrorism embodied by suicide attackers has proved to be a political 
disaster in both the eyes of the world, and of the intellectuals and 
civilians in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem who have called for 
their immediate halt. (Kepel 2006, xiii) 
 
I use Kepel’s observation, along with my earlier exploration of the Nasserist secular 
conception of the dispute as an Arabic-Israeli conflict, in order to discuss Jacques Derrida’s 
2001 claim that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a ‘confrontation between two groups with 
a strong religious identification’ (Derrida 117-18). In general, each side of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict usually conflates the other’s ethnic, nationalistic and—most regularly—
religious facets of identity according to the situation. Distinguishing between these 
complicated elements of identity seems to be difficult, if not impossible.  
On one hand, although Israel was established as a home for Jews, the bulk of Israeli 
officials’ discourse since the 1950s has mainly identified with Western democratic 
                                                 
34 References of Iran’s support for Hamas can be found in Levitt (171-8), and Axworthy (358). 
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countries in contrast to the surrounding Arabic dictatorships. However, many Israeli settlers 
insist on the religious nature of Israel as a Jewish state. Such an insistence can be traced 
back to the 1970s, Kepel argues: 
 
Gush Emunim (The Bloc of the Faithful), [was] a political-religious 
movement born in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of October 
1973’, which ended in a psychological defeat for the Jewish state. 
[…] It became the self-proclaimed herald of the re-Judaization of 
Israel, over against a state and a society culturally dominated by a 
secular and quasi-socialist conception of Zionism. (Kepel 1994, 
140)   
 
The most striking feature of Kepel’s statement is that such religious movements are 
opposed by both the Israeli government and the vast majority of Israeli populations. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to ignore the fact that Israel gave its raids in Gaza religious names, 
which are borrowed from the Old Testament, such as Operation Cast Lead in December 
2008 and Operation Pillar of Cloud in November 2012. 
On the other hand, while turning the Palestinian resistance into an Islamic jihad is 
usually attributed to the establishment of Hamas, Arabic countries’ support for the PLO on 
the grounds of the idea of pan-Islamism can be traced back to the 1960s. In addition, 
denouncing the Jews as a race and a religious group gradually became a common feature of 
the sermons of Muslim clerics in Arabic countries, especially after 1967.In this context, 
while Egyptian jihadists’ dream of an Islamic, anti-Israel rule of Egypt seemed to be more 
plausible after the 1979 Revolution in Iran, the assassination of el-Sadat by a group of 
military officials of jihadists in October 1981 was encouraged by the description of the 
Jews as the ‘enemy of God’. Moreover, when the Egyptian President hosted the toppled 
Shah of Iran, who was replaced by the radical religious and political leader Ayatollah al-
Khomeini identified el-Sadat with the Shah, as both are allies with the US and Israel, and 
allegedly enemies of Islam. Later, a street in Tehran was named after one of the assassins of 
the Egyptian President, Khalid el-Eslambolly.35 
                                                 
35 In many Arabic and Muslim countries, including Egypt, the murder of el-Sadata was praised by 
Communists and Christians, who were provoked by al-Sadat’s initial alliance with Islamists. For more 
information, see Kifner A1, McDermott (59), Scott (64–91), and O'Mahony (72–3). For discussions about the 
Iranian Islamic regime’s relationship with Egypt, including the former’s reaction to the assassination of el-
Sadat, see Rubin (2014, 47-8), Habeeb (6-7), and Hunter (202).      
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In addition to increasing the number of anti-Israel regimes in the Middle East, one 
of the significant consequences of the Revolution in Iran was the unity of the three 
authoritarian rulers of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt against the revolutionary dictatorship 
in Iran. Such a situation led to several violent confrontations within the region, wherein 
both American and Israeli interests intersected. 
 
c. The Saudi-Iranian cold war: Sunni or Shii pan-Islamism? 
In addition to representing the possibility of an Islamic revolution in general, the 
Iranian leaders attempted to revolutionise the politically oppressed Shii sectors in different 
Arabic countries. Gary Sick claims that ‘[t]he earliest targets of attention by the 
revolutionaries were there brethren among the disadvantaged Shi’i populations of Iraq, 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon (Sick 356). For the Saudi regime, Roy explains, ‘The 
Iranian revolution of 1979 immediately contested the very legitimacy of the Saudi dynasty 
(“There is no king in Islam” said the slogans). [...] Iran became the main adversary, but this 
antagonism was translated in religious terms: true Islam versus Shiite heresy’ (Roy 1994, 
116).36 
This complicated Sunni-Shii, Arabic-Persian dispute was the background of the 
attacks of 1983 on the American embassy and the marine barracks in Beirut, wherein the 
Iranian-Saudi competition over the political leadership of the region interacted with the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Lebanese Civil War, and the Iranian-Iraqi War. The two 
violent operations against the US in Beirut were preceded by the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon on 6 June 1982. David Wills argues: ‘Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was 
looking for a reason to invade Lebanon and “clean out” the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO); he got it on June 3, 1982 when Palestinian gunmen attempted to 
assassinate the Israeli ambassador to Great Britain, Shlomo Argov’ (Wills 49).37 
Whether the Israeli intervention in Lebanon was previously determined, the 
presence of the PLO in Lebanon gave Israel a good excuse to attack. However, the Israeli 
                                                 
36 For more information about the Shii populations in the countries of the region and their practice of politics, 
see Nafissi. Claims about the political marginalisation of the Shii relative majority in Lebanon and Iraq in the 
1980s and 1990s can be found in Roy (1994, 124) and Shanahan. The Iranian-Saudi political rivalry since 
1979 is soundly analysed in Fürtig.  
37 Although many scholars argue that the failed assassination was operated by Abu Nidal Organisation 
(ANO), whose leader dismissed the PLO, some Israeli officials usually accuse the leader of the PLO of being 
a supporter for any violent operations by Palestinians. For more information about the ANO and the 
exchanged accusations between Arafat and the Israeli officials regarding the support for Abu Nidal, see 
Murphy (27–8), and White (219). 
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response extended beyond the retribution for a failed attempt to kill an Israeli official. As 
Wills describes:   
 
Within a matter of days, the IDF [Israel Defence Forces] was at the 
outskirt of Beirut, pounding away at suspected PLO strongholds 
with artillery and airstrikes. […] The carnage was catastrophic, and 
the media quickly broadcast pictures of the siege, including reports 
of numerous civilian casualties, to the rest of the world. In 
Washington, President Reagan38 saw the pictures and was appalled. 
[…] Reagan phoned the Israeli prime minister and demanded the 
shelling be stopped. (Wills 49-50) 
 
The most striking point in Wills’ observation is the fact that Reagan obliged the Israeli 
government to stop its excessive use of power, at least temporarily. However, when the US 
sent its soldiers to Lebanon as part of a multinational peacekeeping force, the Israeli 
invasion was turned into an occupation, for which Hezbollah declared its attack on 
American soldiers and civilians as a punishment.39 
With a nationalist orientation, Hezbollah declared its responsibility for the bombing 
of the embassy only as retaliation for the American support for Israel, which enabled the 
latter to occupy Lebanon. Later, it was proven that Hezbollah was the mastermind behind 
the killing of the US marines. Declared as revenge for the US supporting Iraq in its war 
against Iran, the attack on the marines’ barracks was initially claimed by the Islamic Jihad 
Organization. Ihsan Hijazi, the correspondent of the New York Times in Lebanon argues: 
‘The Islamic Jihad Organization, which took responsibility for today's bombing of the 
United States Embassy here, is believed to be an underground group associated with 
Moslem Shiite fundamentalists in Lebanon who support the Iranian leader, Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini’ (Hijazi A12). Later, it was revealed that the Islamic Jihad 
Organization was ‘founded by members of Hizb Allah in 1982 and used by Hizb Allah for 
cover operations’ (Esposito 2003, 147). Hezbollah’s manoeuvre exemplifies the 
intersections between nationalist and religious reasons for violence, both of which 
demonstrate political interests. Despite Hezbollah’s major quest to free Lebanon, its 
structure is intrinsically religious because the groupis ‘mainly constructed of the large Shii 
                                                 
38 Ronald Reagan was the American President from 1981 to 1989.  
39 The Arabic phrase (ﷲ بﺰ ﺣ), which is sometimes written as Hizb Allah or Hizbullah, literally means the 
party of God. However, by considering the interpretation of the expression within the Holy Qur'an, it more 
precisely describes God’s followers or God’s worshippers.  
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clans of the Bekaa Valley and Shii refugees forced by civil war into the slums of Southern 
Beirut’ (Esposito 2003, 115). In addition, Hezbollah applies the Shii rule of Wilayat al-
Faqih (ﮫﯾﻘﻔﻟا ﺔﯾﻻو), according to which the political leader of the group must be or consult the 
higher cleric whose religious authority is based on divine superiority.40 
However, Hezbollah’s contribution to Iran’s revenge for the American 
administration’s support for Iraq cannot be reduced to a religious collusion. Such an 
alliance is based, instead, on political interests, whose influence on Hezbollah’s decisions 
can be realised in the context of The Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990). Although Esposito 
claims that the members of Hezbollah ‘strongly identify with the Palestinians and deeply 
resent Israel’ (Esposito 2003, 115), the movement allied with the Lebanese Phalange, the 
Christian party which committed one of the most brutal crimes against Palestinian refugee 
camps in September 1982. Known as the massacre of Sabra and Shatila, the carnage was 
encouraged by Israel. Mark Ensalaco argues: 
 
No one knows with certainty the number of Palestinians slaughtered 
in Sabra and Shatila, but it was no fewer than 700 and perhaps three 
times that many. Israel’s complicity in the massacres is beyond 
doubt. Israeli soldiers transported the Phalangist militiamen to 
Sabra and Shatila, and they were present just outside the camps 
throughout the massacre. (Ensalaco138)  
 
While there is not enough evidence to prove Hezbollah’s direct participation in the attack, 
the Shii movement’s grouping with the Phalange Party continued.41 
Along with Iran’s support for Hezbollah, the latter’s alliance with the Phalange 
seemed necessary to fight several Lebanese Sunni groups, which were supported by some 
Arabic countries, especially Saudi Arabia. The intervention of the Saudi Kingdom in 
Lebanon can be traced back to the 1950s. Frederic Wehrey, Theodore W. Karasik, Alireza 
Nader, Jeremy Ghez, Lydia Hansell, and Robert A. Guffey claims that the Saudi regime 
‘has long seen Lebanon as a proxy arena to outmaneuver its regional competitors, 
illustrated by its support in the 1950s and 60s for Lebanese opponents of Nasserism such as 
                                                 
40 For information about Hezbollah’s adherence to Wilayat al-Faqih, see Alagha (248–50), and Sivan (66–7). 
In Roy (2004, 60), Kepel (2006, 392), and Dekmejian (65), Hezbollah is respectively described as an ‘Islamist 
movement’, ‘Islamic party’, and ‘Islamist group’. 
41 In Axworthy (222), there is a reference to the arrival of Iranian soldiers to Lebanon few days after the 
Israeli invasion. Some of these fighters stayed in Lebanon after the massacre in order to train the members of 
Hezbollah. Nevertheless, Axworthy does not assert the participation of the Iranian soldiers or Hezbollah in 
killing the Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila. 
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Pierre Gemayyel and Kamil Sham‘un’ (Wehrey et al. 78). As this observation suggests, the 
Sunni Kings allied with Christian Lebanese politicians in order to tackle what William 
Harris describes as ‘the high tide of Nasserism’ (Harris 2012, 214).  
The Saudi-Iranian proxy war in Lebanon turned into one of the bloodiest chapters of 
the history of the region when Iraq—backed by Arabic financial and military support—
utilised American weapons to attack Iran on the latter’s soil. With Saddam’s own fears 
from the encouraging influence of the Iranian revolution on the Shii populations in Iraq, the 
new dictator sought to achieve several goals.Kepel argues: 
 
The threat of Persian nationalism served as an excuse for Saddam 
Hussein’s attack against the Islamic Republic [of Iran] in September 
1980. [...] At the same time, by militarizing his own society, he 
hoped to consolidate his recently won power while preventing 
Iraq’s narrow majority of Shiites from mobilizing against his 
regime, as the Iranian Shiites had done against the shah. (Kepel 
2006, 120) 
 
While the US exploited the political goals of Arabic regimes in order to deter the emerging 
Islamic foe in Iran, Saddam managed to create his fake image as a nationalist and Sunni 
hero. Later, the Iraqi tyrant directed his power to kill his people. Furthermore, not only did 
Iraq invade Kuwait, but Saddam also threatened Saudi Arabia, the major financial patron of 
the Iraqi aggression on Iran. Eventually, the US-Iraq alliance turned into a series of political 
and military conflicts whose aftermath affected the Iraqi people for decades. 
The most significant aspect of the Iranian-Iraqi War is the so called ‘martyrdom 
operations’ of Iranian children. When the Iraqi troops managed to occupy part of the 
Iranian territories, Saddam’s army utilised land mines to prevent the Iranian soldiers from 
retrieving their land. In response, Iranian children voluntarily stepped on these mines. Since 
then, suicide attacks have become a common feature of many violent attacks by nationalist 
and religious groups. In this example, the word suicide is replaced by ‘martyrdom’, which 
describes the most consecrated sacrifice made by a Muslim, leading to a high-ranked place 
in Heaven.42 
                                                 
42 While Kepel highlights the influence of Iran’s suicide operations on Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda, Roy, 
who traces the phenomenon of suicide attacks back to the nineteenth-century Russia, refers to the utilisation 
of this method as a common feature of guerrilla warfare in different places of conflict in the 1980s. For more 
information, see Kepel 2008, 9 – 10, and Roy 2004, 43.  
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As with el-Sadat and the Shah, Saddam was declared an enemy of Islam. Dilip Hiro 
argues ‘Khomeini had characterized Saddam Hussein as ‘an infidel’ who was ‘corrupt, a 
perpetrator of corruption and a man who resembles the Shah’ (Hiro 53). Consequently, 
Iraqi soldiers who obey the ‘infidel’ deserve to be killed. 
It is important to assert that, according to the rules of Islam, committing suicide is a 
mighty sin; the Muslim person who intentionally ends his/her life dies a non-Muslim. 
Furthermore, in Islam, no one is entitled to decide, on behalf of God, whether the person is 
going to Heaven or Hell. Moreover, the notion of martyrdom is exclusively related to death 
in a specific situation, including the case of being killed when compelled to defend one’s 
life, land, religion, honour, or even while obliged to protect money and other possessions. 
Finally, there is not a single mention of jihad by Muslims’ suicide, whether in the Holy 
Qur'an or the Sunna.43 
So far, I have argued that specific political situations in Arabic and Muslim 
countries as well as these countries’ endeavours to expand their influences on the region are 
the main reasons for the emergence of both nationalist and Islamist violent groups. If Mark 
Curtis claims that ‘[el-] Sadat’s policies helped spark the emergence of global Islamic 
radicalism’ (Curtis 2012, 107),the Egyptian President’s predecessor and successor, along 
with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq played vital roles in turning this evil ‘spark’ 
to an uncontrolled fire, whose flames reached the heart of many Western countries, 
including the US. Yet, this claim does not ignore the fact that, when the American 
geostrategic goals intersected with, or intervened in, some of the political or individual 
interests of Arabic and Muslim leaders, the US became the target of the terror. 
 
d. Frankenstein creates the monster: whose mistake is it? 
In the Tricycle’s 2004 Verbatim play Guantánamo: Honour Bound to Defend 
Freedom, compiled by Victoria Brittain and Gillian Slovo from spoken evidence, Wahab 
Al-Rawi is one of five British-Muslim detainees in Guantánamo.44Al-Rawi recalls his 
factual experience as a prisoner when he was asked by the American interrogators about 
Bin Laden. The Muslim prisoner replies: ‘I don’t know Mr Bin Laden, you probably know 
him more than I do, you trained him’ (Brittain 17). Because he was proven to be innocent, 
                                                 
43 Here, the word Sunna means the practices and the narrative of the prophet Mohammed, including his 
explanations of the verses of the Holy Qur'an, both of which shape Sharia, or Shariah, Law (ﺔﻌﯾﺮﺸﻟا). 
44 In order to distinguishing this specific type of documentary theatre, which I explore in the next chapter, 
from the literal meaning of the word ‘verbatim’, I write it with an uppercase letter.  
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Al-Rawi’s answer evokes the irony of being punished for the US’s mistake of turning Bin 
Laden into a terrorist, the action for which the US is widely blamed in most political and 
historical studies, including the writings of American authors.     
Linguists suggest that the excessive use of any metaphor usually turns it into a 
cliché. However, it seems that utilising the two imaginary characters in Mary Shelley’s 
novel as a metaphor of the reversal of the relationship between the monster and his creator 
does not lose its novelty in the world of politics.45Elizabeth Young argues: ‘The 
Frankenstein story has a long history of being used as a political metaphor, and at the start 
of the twenty-first century, it continues to shape political debate’ (Young 2008, 1). In what 
could be one of the first utilisations of the metaphor to describe the relationship between 
the US and Bin laden, in January 1999, one of the US officials in Peshawar, Pakistan 
claimed: ‘The point is that we created a whole cadre of trained and motivated people who 
turned against us. It's a classic Frankenstein's monster situation’ (qtd. in Burke 1999, 19). 
At this point, Bin Laden’s stated hostility was accompanied by evidence of his links with 
all the Islamists’ attacks on the US targets in the 1990s. After 9/11, for many Western 
scholars and journalists, using the metaphor became more tempting in hindsight. 
Khondakar Mowla claims that Bin Laden was ‘supported by Reagan administration’s 
“Frankenstein factory”. Contrary to what many Bush administration officials want you to 
believe, bin Laden was no stranger to the United States, especially the intelligence agencies 
under the Reagan-Bush Sr. administration’ (Mowla 486).46 
Limiting the responsibility for the horror caused by the leader of al-Qaeda to the US 
not only ignores Bin Laden’s complex mixture of religious, political and personal 
objectives; it also underestimates the roles played by many leaders of Arabic, Muslim and 
Western countries in turning the alliance between religion and politics into the threat of 
international violence. Exploring historical events suggests that monsters often have more 
than one creator. Put differently, the US was not the only lead actor where the three 
locations of ongoing conflicts were stages for powerful countries’ successive competitions, 
whether in the recent or distant past. Moreover, within the locations of conflict, there are 
always supporting players, whose political desires contradict their peoples’ interests. 
The American intervention in Afghanistan during the Cold War can be seen as part 
of a wider strategy to tackle the former Soviet Union’s influence over several Third World 
                                                 
45 Frankenstein: Or, The Modern Prometheus is the title of Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel.  
46 George H. W. Bush was Vice-President to Ronald Reagan, and succeeded him between 1989 and 1993. 
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countries. Because of Afghanistan’s strategic significance, the competition between the US 
and Russia was fierce, especially when the latter invaded the Asian country in 1979, which 
proved to be a very decisive year in the modern history of the Middle East with 
international repercussions. Kepel claims: 
 
The takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran and the 
internment of its staff on November 4 [1979] were followed 
immediately by the Soviet Army’s invasion of Afghanistan at the 
end of December. In the Cold War world, in which anything that 
was bad for Washington was good for Moscow and vice versa, the 
dramatic confluence of these two events brought the region into the 
geopolitical spotlight as never before.47 (Kepel 2006, 137) 
 
Carter’s administration opposed the Iranian Revolution.48Consequently, a group of Iranian 
activists attacked the American embassy in Tehran and detained fifty Americans as 
hostages. Known as the Iran Hostage crisis, this started in November 1979 and did not end 
until January 1981. Derek Gregory claims that ‘on the day that the hostages were released, 
President Ronald Reagan announced that terrorism would replace human rights as 
America's primary foreign policy concern’ (Gregory 78). Ironically, in order to defeat the 
Russian occupation of Afghanistan, Reagan’s administration encouraged the unity between 
the Saudi Wahhabism and Egyptian jihadists, which led to the birth of the most powerful 
militant Islamist group: al-Qaeda. 
The invasion of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union is an example of the co-
operation between colonialism and dictatorship. Because the communist government of the 
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which took power after a takeover in 
April 1978, was suffering from increasingly angry insurrections, the leaders of the PDPA 
repeatedly asked Moscow to intervene. Although the Russian politicians were reluctant to 
accept the eager calls of their Afghan allies for invasion, the former eventually decided that 
a military presence in Afghanistan was essential for protecting Russian political interests in 
the region.49 
                                                 
47 The co-operative effects of the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on dragging the 
US into the Muslim World are mentioned in Clarke (36), and Schulzinger (41–2).   
48 Jimmy Carter preceded Reagan in the period between 1977 and 1981.  
49 For more information about the political circumstances of the Russian invasion, see the studies of Galeotti, 
Westad and Suri.  
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Seen by a large number of Afghans as a symbol of atheism, the former Soviet 
Union’s relationship with the PDPA fuelled religious anger, even before the invasion. Peter 
Tomsen observes some of the Afghan communist government’s provoking procedures. 
Tomsen argues: 
 
Marxist-Leninist sloganeering on Kabul radio broadcasts, and the 
introduction of a new flag––red with a yellow seal––that was 
similar to those in the Soviet Central Asian Republics, stirred 
popular resentment that the Afghan communists were attempting to 
foist Soviet atheism on the country. […] Mullahs fulminated against 
the PDPA decrees in their Friday sermons. (Tomsen 133)  
 
Mosques had started to play a political role by alerting Muslims to the danger of an atheist 
government. Later, after the Soviet invasion, the situation worsened because of the Russian 
army’s atrocious practices. According to Tom Lansford the occupation ‘prompted Afghan 
Muslim clerics to declare a jihad, or holy war, against the regime and its Soviet allies. The 
rebels became known as mujahideen, or holy warriors’ (Lansford 2003, 125).50 Thus, 
Russia and its Afghan puppet regime engendered the alliance between the nationalist 
struggle for freedom and the Islamic call for jihad. 
The significance of the foregrounding of religious affiliation can be realised in 
terms of the complicated fabric of the Afghan population, which demanded the use of Islam 
as a common element of ethnic and tribal variety. Roy explains: 
 
[C]harismatic leaders, generally ulamas or leaders of religious 
orders, launched the call for jihad and formed tribal coalitions. To 
unify the tribes, they imposed the sharia in defiance of the local 
common laws; the fundamentalism of the mullahs became a 
political force because the sharia was used against asabiyya, 
against tribal and ethnic segmentation, which in contrast was 
exploited by the colonizers.51 (Roy 1994, 31-2) 
 
The most striking feature of Roy’s claim is his suggestion that, by utilising the claim of 
defending Islam as the common goal of the fighters for freedom, Afghan clerics extended 
their role as preachers to become political leaders. Put differently, these Sheikhs acquired 
                                                 
50 Mujahideen (sometimes Mujahidin) pronounces the Arabic word (ﻦﯾﺪ ھﺎﺠﻣ). The latter is the plural of 
Mujahid (jihadist), which in this context means soldiers who fight to defend Islam.   
51 In this context, ‘asabiyya’ means that the members of each tribe or ethnic group ultimately and zealously 
adhere to the norms of their tribe and the orders of its leader.  
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the credibility to make political decisions, including the acceptance of the Christian US as 
an ally in the holy war against the atheist Russia.  
In his first comment on the Russian invasion, Carter condemned it as ‘a deliberate 
effort by a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people’ (qtd. 
in Glad 199). Not only didthe American Presidenteloquently address the Afghans’ 
nationalist and religious feelings, Carter’s short statementhinted at the common aspect of 
the Christian US and the Muslim Afghanistan: both believe in God, in contrast to the 
‘atheistic’Soviets. Later, the US aids were blessed and mediated by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, 
and Egypt, three of the most powerful Muslim countries. Phil Rees argues that ‘it was 
Pakistan’s ISI [the Pakistani intelligence agency] that had the most direct control over the 
mujahedin [sic]. The ISI and the Wahhabi sect in Saudi Arabia had forged a partnership in 
Afghanistan that would be difficult to split later’ (Rees 274). 
 Accepting the American orders and privileges, Mubarak’s regime encouraged a 
large number of Egyptian Islamists to fight in the holy war in Afghanistan. Kepel argues: 
 
[M]any of the radicals jailed after Sadat’s killing [in October 1981] 
had been freed in 1984, and sent to perform pilgrimage in Mecca, 
whence they boarded connecting flights to Peshawar, Pakistan, the 
operation base for Arab volunteers fighting in Muslim International 
brigades against the Red Army. At the time, they were dubbed 
‘freedom fighters’ by Washington and Riyadh alike, trained and 
equipped by the CIA, and supported by petro-dollars from the 
Arabian peninsula (Kepel 2005, 16) 
 
Disguising their political and personal interests with the pretense of defending a Muslim 
country, the leaders of these regimes served the geostrategic goals of the US, leading to the 
latter’s Cold War victory. However, what was meant to temporarily exploit the religious 
motivations of a nationalist struggle to challenge the Soviet Union turned into a decisive 
factor in al-Qaeda’s capability of waging its holy war against the US. In turn, the US 
declared the War on Terror, whose consequences ironically included the intervention of the 
American-led forces in Afghanistan. Thus, this Muslim-Christian alliance against the 
Russians seems to be a paradoxical moment in history, at which point the Afghan clerics, 
the Americans and the leaders of Muslim countries pragmatically deferred to religious 
disputes in what was actually motivated by political goals. In other words, while the US is 
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the most responsible for creating the Bin Laden’s monstrous terrorism, the Doctor had other 
assistants helping to create Frankenstein, including rulers of some Muslim countries.52 
Considering that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was the last episode of the 
so-called Great Game, I argue that the responsibility for provoking the holy war as a 
method of mobilising and instigating fighters for freedom can also extend to include the 
British Empire, which repeatedly invaded Afghanistan from 1839 onwards. According to 
Harold Raugh, the Afghan tribes, which fought the British soldiers, were inspired by an 
idea of holy war against the infidels (Raugh 10). Here, I can see that the US plays the role 
that the British Empire used to play, not only in Afghanistan, but also in the two other 
places of current conflicts, namely Iraq and Palestine. Such an observation is underlined by 
contemporary British and American playwrights in their commentary on the three conflicts. 
It is important to realise that several scholars read American foreign policies in the post-
Cold War era as a manifestation of imperial ambitions. For instance, Noam Chomsky 
claims that ‘the United States is behaving like every other power. So when the British were 
running the world, they were doing the same thing’ (Chomsky 2003, 119).53 
On one hand, my thesis highlights specific resemblances, whether between the 
conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine, or between the American-led intervention in 
the three places of conflict and the role of the British Empire in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century in the three countries. On the other hand, my metaphorical reading does 
not neglect the significant geopolitical and historical circumstances of each conflict, which 
also distinguishes all of them, as part of the complicated political scene in the twenty-first 
century, from historical colonialism. My reading of British colonial history is not limited to 
considering it as a comparable example of, or even an ancestor to the American 
interventions in Arabic and Muslim countries. I also focus on the way in which Britain has 
effectively utilised its colonial experience in the War on terror. In 2014, Stacey Gutkowski 
argues that ‘the UK has played a significant role in the ways in which the wars of the past 
decade have been conducted. In particular, the appropriation of the British imperial 
counterinsurgency strategy has proved deeply influential within the US and NATO military 
                                                 
52 Ironically, when some of the Egyptian Islamists returned to Egypt in 1990, they were interrogated and 
imprisoned as a terrorist group referred to by the government as ‘The Returners from Afghanistan 
Organisation’. For more information, see Kepel (2003, 12-13).      
53 For detailed discussions about the American imperialism, especially in comparison with the historical 
British Empire, see the studies of Bacevich (2002), Harvey, and Freeman. In Gregory, resemblances are 
claimed between the presence of the American-led coalition in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.        
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establishments’ (Gutkowski 2014, 21). Realising the important part played by the British 
imperial experience in the War on Terror has crucially helped me to read many journalistic 
and political comments on the relationship between Bush’s administration and the 
government of Tony Blair. The British Prime Minister was repeatedly accused of being 
subordinate to American policies. The criticism of Blair extends beyond political comments 
to works of art, including theatre.54 
Caryl Churchill’s Drunk Enough to Say I Love You, premiered in November 2006 at 
the Royal Court Theatre, London, seems to be an example of the critique of Blair’s 
conformity with Bush’s policies. Churchill metaphorically represents the British subsidiary 
role in supporting American politics as a homosexual relationship. The two characters in 
the play, as Michael Billington explains, are ‘Sam (as in Uncle) and Jack (as in Union) - 
they might even be Bush and Blair’ (Billington Drunk Enough, web). However, when the 
play was published, Churchill weakened such a metaphor by changing the name of Jack to 
Guy. She explains:  
 
Sam was always called Sam, because of Uncle Sam. I gave the 
other character the name Jack, thinking of it as just a name, but 
some people understandably thought it referred to Union Jack and 
that Jack was Britain in the same way that Sam was America. But I 
always meant that character to be an individual, a man who falls in 
love with America, so I have changed his name to Guy’. (Churchill 
2008, 269) 
 
It is hard to define whether Churchill was retreating or if this case is one example of the 
text’s ability to suggest ideas that their authors do not intend. In either case, the word 
‘understandably’ suggests that Churchill believes that seeing Jack as Blair was a valid 
interpretation of her play, which was interpreted as critique of the Prime Minister’s policies 
towards the US.   
Jenny Hughes suggests that it is possible to assume that ‘Blair’s decision to work 
with the US administration represented a fundamentalist enactment of his own Christianity 
in concert with the US administration’s faith in its own moral integrity rather than any 
                                                 
54 For more information about the condemnation of Blair’s alleged docility to the American President, where 
the former is described by journalists and through the mass media as Bush’s ‘puppet’, ‘poodle’, or ‘foreign 
minister’, see Deer (174), Tripathi (36), and Seymour-Ure (245). These derogatory descriptions of the British 
Prime Minister are sceptically mentioned in Foreign Affairs Committee (2010, 136). For claims that Blair’s 
friendly policy towards the US was at the expense of Britain’s relationship with Europe, see the studies of 
Morgan (2003), Riddell, and Larres. 
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concern for reason, evidence or democratic process’ (Hughes 2011, 115-16). In addition to 
the fact that Hughes’s speculation is impossible to prove, Blair’s discourse contradicts this 
religious interpretation of the British partnership with the US. Not only did Blair’s 
discourse avoid any religious reference, but he also did his best to raise Bush’s awareness 
of ‘the importance of getting public opinion on side, of creating international coalitions, of 
avoiding a war of civilizations between Muslims and Christians’ (Meyer 191). I argue that, 
whether because of England’s long colonial history or due to modern English society’s 
inclination towards secularity, British politicians were more against imposing religion in 
political and militaristic confrontations, especially in Arabic and Muslim countries. Thus, 
Blair’s partnership with Bush in the War on Terror, including the invasion of Iraq, seems to 
reflect Britain’s interests. In 2003, when criticism of Blair’s co-operation with Bush’s plans 
peaked, Ben Pimlott argued: 
 
[T]he Blair Government believes—and the Prime Minister himself 
appears to believe passionately—that the American President needs 
British moral support so badly, the United States could not go to 
war without it; and that Britain's friendliness towards the 
Americans, so far from being a sign of weakness, is therefore a 
position of leverage and strength. (Pimlott 186) 
 
By linking what Pimlott describes as the British ‘position of leverage and strength’ and the 
claims that the US clandestinely seeks to achieve imperial interests in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
I suggest that Britain seems to retrieve its colonial history, rather than being the obedient 
follower of the US. 
In this context, I agree with Mark Curtis’s political explanation when he claims that 
Blair excessively supported the US policies for ‘reasons of pure self-interest: that terrorism 
would provide a rationale for a new phase in Britain’s own military intervention around the 
world’ (Curtis2012, 249). Curtis’ argument takes account of historical facts about Britain, 
not only as an Empire, but also because the three locations of conflict were located in areas 
of former colonial domination, something that is mentioned by many plays that comment 
on the current Anglo-American wars. The British historical intervention in these locations 
within plays, though, is not introduced as an irrelevant fact to the present occupations, but 
as an episode in three long stories of the chaotic outcome of Great Powers’ ambitions. 
A crucial moment in the history of the British Empire was the Suez War, also 
known as the tripartite aggression (ﻰﺛﻼﺛﻟا ناودﻌﻟا) in 1956. Following Nasser’s nationalisation 
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of the Suez Canal, Egypt was attacked by an alliance of Israel, Britain and France. As the 
subtitle of Keith Kyle’s book suggests, the failure of this aggression was a sign of Britain's 
End of Empire in the Middle East. In his comment on the consequences of the aggression, 
Klaus Larres argues: 
 
In the process of recovering from the humiliating Suez Crisis and 
after the resignation of Prime Minister Anthony Eden, [...] London 
had realised that without close co-operation and collaboration with 
the United States, Britain would no longer be able to punch above 
its weight and maintain an important voice in global affairs. This 
was also one of the main reasons why Tony Blair joined George W. 
Bush in the invasion of Iraq. (Larres206) 
 
In addition to tracing the reasons for Blair’s role in Bush’s war in Iraq back to the 1950s, 
which conforms to Curtis’ claim about British imperial ambitions in the new millennium, 
Larres’ statement suggests that the US seemed to fill the vacuum created by the declining 
British role in the Middle East.55 
The resemblance between the old British and new American policies appears in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The former Empire played the most crucial role in creating the 
conflict in the first place by what is known as the Balfour Declaration in 1917. In a letter 
from British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to Walter Rothschild, the unofficial leader of 
the British Jewish community, the British government promised to give its support for the 
establishment of a Jewish nation in Palestine. During the British Mandate for Palestine, 
which started in the early 1920s, Britain sought to make good on its promise by the 
establishment of the country of Israel in 1948.56 
David Hare’s Via Dolorosa, which premiered in 1997 at the Royal Court in London, 
is a good example of the effect of Britain’s historical role in the dispute between Israel and 
Palestine as depicted by contemporary British representations of the conflict. Via Dolorosa, 
in which Hare reflects on his 1997 journey to Israel and the Palestinian territory, was his 
participation in a three-part project about the British Mandate of Palestine. In his comment 
on Hare’s play, the Israeli academic Eitan Bar-Yosef claims that‘the postcolonial guilt that 
                                                 
55 For more information about the harmful effect of the 1956 War on the image of the British Empire, whether 
politically or ethically, see Marlay (1073), Allain (47–72), and Stockwell.  
56 In Arabic countries, the Balfour Declaration is called the Balfour’s Promise (رﻮﻔﻠﺑ ﺪﻋو). The text of the letter 
can be read in Schneer (341). For more information about the British mandate for Palestine and the 
consequences of Balfour Declaration, see Allain (73–100).  
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seems to permeate Hare’s narrative, both his representation of Israel/Palestine and the 
representational techniques employed in the production could be traced back to Hare’s 
Victorian and early twentieth-century predecessors’ (Bar-Yosef 261). Whether due to the 
feeling of ‘guilt’ or the belief in the aggression of Israeli governments, what Bar-Yosef 
refers to as Hare’s sympathy for Palestinian people seems to be a dominant tone of 
contemporary British playwrights’ response to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The fifth 
chapter of this thesis raises a question about the difference between the representation of 
the conflict by British and American playwrights. 
Since 1948, successive American administrations dealt with the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict in various ways, which the vast majority of Arabs and Muslims usually consider to 
be in favour of Israel. However, the Palestinian suffering has never been neglected by any 
American President to the extent endured during George W. Bush’s Presidency. The 
problem of the era of Bush, Jr., according to Patrick Tyler, is that the members of his 
administration who were aware of the necessity of focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict were outnumbered and defeated by their more influential colleagues, who 
convinced him later, according to Tyler, to invade Iraq (Tyler 11-12). The consequences of 
this neglect of the Israeli-Palestinian matter proved to be disastrous. In 2004, Richard 
Clarke, who was responsible for US counter-terrorism policies declared: ‘If we could 
achieve a Middle East peace much of the popular support for al Qaeda and much of the 
hatred for America would evaporate’ (Clarke 224). The significance of Clarke’s 
observation is its consideration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an essential factor in 
agitating most Muslim and Arabic populations, from which the supporters and members of 
al-Qaeda emerged. 
In order to understand Clarke’s statement, it seems important to realise that, a few 
months before Bush’s arrival at the White House, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict witnessed 
the beginning of one of its fieriest crises: the so-called Second Intifada, which Lasted 
between September 2000 and the early months of 2005. Hamas’ victory in the 2006 
parliamentary elections is hugely attributed to the increasing popularity of the movement as 
the only resistant to the Israeli oppression during the Intifada. Kepel explains: ‘The 
mosques and the international Arab media revived the legitimacy of Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad, strengthening their hands against Arafat’ (Kepel 2004, 19). Ironically, the leader of 
the PLO was blamed by a large sector of the Palestinians for his peace negotiations with 
Israel, while the latter accuses him of encouraging Hamas’ violence. 
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Since September 2000, the scenes of Palestinian casualties have increased the anger 
of Arabic and Muslim populations against Israel. Kepel explains: ‘In the weeks before 
September 11, 2001, the Arab world—and more generally the Muslim world, including 
Asia, Africa, and even the outskirts of European cities—was swept up in feelings of 
solidarity with the Palestinian cause and hatred of Israel’s policies’ (Kepel 2004, 20). This 
anger though was not limited to Israel or even the US, but it extended to include the 
dictatorships of most Muslim countries, especially Arabic regimes, whose rulers were 
described as pro-Israel and American puppets. The Palestinian Uprising proved that these 
dictators are too weak to have any influence on the American administration. Kepel argues: 
‘The depth of bitterness among Muslims was matched only by their sense of powerlessness. 
The fatal weakness of Arab armies had never been revealed so harshly’ (Kepel 2004, 20). 
Moreover, before 2011, demonstrations for Palestine used to be the only permitted 
gathering of people for a political cause in most Arabic and Muslim dictatorships. 
However, with their political and military weakness exposed to their peoples, these 
dictators brutally dealt with the demonstrations during the Second Intifada. Kepel argues 
that ‘pro-Palestinian protests were quickly contained or squelched by neighboring Arab 
regimes as soon as these rallies showed any sign of challenging the state’s passivity’ (Kepel 
2004, 21).  
Not only did a large sector of Muslim and Arabic populations blame the US for 
supporting Israel, the American policies were also accused of supporting dictatorships in 
the Middle East. Chomsky argues that ‘the leaders of the Arab states are at some level pro-
Israel because they understand that Israel is part of the system protecting them from their 
own people’ (Chomsky 2003, 103).Derrida goes further by stressing the role of the 
American support for Arabic dictators in motivating Islamist violence, including the attacks 
of 9/11, which according to Derrida were an attempt to undermine pro-America Arab 
regimes more than an attack on the US (Derrida 111–12). Along with Chomsky’s claim, 
Derrida statement can be understood on the grounds that radical Islamists attacked the US 
for the latter’s support for Arabic dictatorships, which in turn protect Israel.  
While the explanation suggested by both Chomsky and Derrida might be valid, to 
some extent, in describing both the monarchy of Saudi Arabia and Egypt under the rules of 
Mubarak and his predecessor, it is a fact that several anti-America regimes in Iraq, Iran, 
Syria, Libya, and even in Egypt during Nasser’s era were autocratic. Ironically, when the 
US utilised its mighty influence on some dictators in order to move Arabic leaders towards 
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democracy, radical Islamists were exploited the marginally allowed freedom of speech to 
criticise the allegedly American-led Christian West. Consequently, in order to strengthen 
their dictatorships, these leaders exploited the US administration’s fears of the duplication 
of the Iranian stance. Huntington argues: ‘Some openings in Arab political systems have 
already occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist 
movements. In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western 
political forces’ (Huntington 1993, 32). However, the bulk of these ‘openings’ came in the 
form of governmental support for puppet political parties, whose opposition was as 
superficial and futile as the Arabic regimes’ pretentious critique of the US policies.  
Just as Palestinians elected Hamas, more Arabic youths started to support Islamist 
movements, which were the only organised alternative to corrupt regimes. In both Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt, from which most of the leaders of Islamist groups have come, the vast 
majority of liberals were oppressed by both dictatorships and radical Islamists. 
Understandably, the latter’s violence against liberals was always tolerated by Arabic 
governments. Many liberals, who were too young, or perhaps too weak to bear this pressure 
have ended up as pro-regime or surprisingly became members of the increasingly powerful 
radical Islamist groups. Such an observation helps me to understand Jürgen Habermas’ 
claim that ‘some of those drawn into the “holy war” had been secular nationalists only a 
few years before’ (Habermas 33). This was one of the paths to 9/11, which perhaps could 
have been closed if the West, especially the US, were more supportive of liberals rather 
than trusting in puppet regimes, including superficial oppositions, to deter violent political 
Islam, whose defeat in its own soil seems impossible without unconditional democracy. 
The question is if the rationale of attacking the US is to punish Arabic regimes, why 
did militant Islamists not challenge these dictatorships directly? I answer this question by 
using the title of Roy’s 1994 book: The Failure of Political Islam. Put differently, the 
dream of replacing Arabic dictators by radical Islamic regimes was proved to be impossible 
by the early 1980s. Therefore, the major radical Islamist groups, namely the Egyptian 
jihadists and untamed Wahhabis in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia found their refuge in 
Central Asia during the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. Later, the jihadist-Wahhabi 
alliance, which was expelled from the two Arabic countries in the early 1990s, started to 
direct its revenge against the US and several Western countries, wherein democracy was 
punished under the motto of the holy war. Put differently, the dream of retrieving Andalusia 
in Western societies resulted from the failed attempts of radical Islamists to establish 
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Islamic states as religious ‘collectivism’ instead of the dominant political ‘collectivism’ in 
Arabic countries. I utilise Gow’s comparisonin order to suggest that the respect for 
‘individualism’ in Western countries enabled groups of militant Islamists to live, and 
spread their thoughts and violence seeking the alleged new Andalusia. 
As these episodes of history in both the Middle East and Central Asia suggest, the 
complicated interaction between nationalistic and religious motivations for violence against 
the US challenges any simplistic description of the terror attacks of 9/11 as a sudden or a 
causeless action. Moreover, different terrorist groups are not identical, especially if I 
consider the discrepancy, not to say the hostility, between Sunni and Shii violent 
movements. Furthermore, the intersection between the political situation in Arabic and 
Muslim countries were vital factors in shaping both the American policies in the region and 
the violent reactions to these policies. Finally, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict significantly 
occupies the centre of the contradictory projects of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. 
Consequently, referring to the suffering of Palestinian and Iraqi people will be a common 
feature of jihadists’ justification for violence. However, there are usually unspoken political 
goals behind the emphasis on retaliation against the US for its negative influences on Arabs 
and Muslims. In this war of words, both the Arabic and Western media played a crucial 
role. 
 
Terrorists discourse: How to justify violence? 
Whilepost-operation speechesimply the terrorist group’s victory, the most 
significant role of these statements is to insist on the reason(s) for which the leaders of 
these groups believe that violence is justified. By claiming that their attacks against the US 
retaliate for its harmful policies in the Middle East, both nationalist and Islamist violent 
groups indirectly assume the role of the original victim who obligatorily turns into an 
aggressor. Even when the plotters of terrorist operations are captured, courtrooms give 
them a perfect chance to extend their argument about the justness of their violence.  
In a statement made by Ramzi Yousef in his trial for planning the 1993 bombing of 
the WTC, he argues: ‘The ability of Israel to commit these crimes is the direct result of the 
considerable military and financial aid which the United States of America provides 
annually to Israel, and it is this aid which gives Palestinians and Lebanese the right to 
attack U.S. targets’ (qtd. in McKinley Jr. 27). While such a declaration seems to be 
addressed to the Western media, Yousef’s focus on Palestine and Lebanonis cleverly 
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designed to appeal to the nationalistic sense of Arabic populations. In other words, Yousef 
mentions the death of Muslim and non-Muslim civilians in both Palestine and Lebanon 
because of American weapons and Israeli soldiers in order to justify violence against 
American civilians. In addition, Yousef reminds his listeners from different nationalities 
ofthe Israeli government’s recent use of its mighty power in order to oppress the Palestinian 
First Intifada, which, according to Kepel, ‘had tarnished Israel’s reputation on television 
screens worldwide.The image of a child with a stone in his hand facing down an Israeli 
army tank suddenly transformed the descendants of Nazi Holocaust victims into oppressors 
of a dispossessed Third World population’ (Kepel 2004, 13).57 
Yousef’s political critique of the US took a further step, when he recalled historical 
cases of the US’s excessive use of its military and political powers against non-Muslim and 
non-Arabic countries. In its 9January 1998 edition, under the title: ‘Excerpts from 
Statements in Court’, the New York Times quoted Yousef’s claim that he is proud to be 
called a terrorist by the Americans. By killing tens of thousands of women and children in 
Japan and Vietnam, the militant Islamist argues, the US is the real terrorist. In addition, he 
mentions civilian victims of the American-led economic embargoes, which were placed on 
countries such as Iraq and Cuba (Esposito 1998, B4). On one hand, this list of what Yousef 
considers as victims of the American terrorism ignores the specific historical circumstances 
of the US military or political conflict with each country he mentions. On the other hand, 
by conflating all these cases, it seems that the militant Islamist seeks to turn the image of 
his brutal operation from a terroristic action to a just revenge for the crimes committed by 
the US. In addition, the nature of the courtroom as a secular space, wherein religion is 
irrelevant, can explain why the high-ranked member of al-Qaeda pragmatically chose to 
identify with nationalist cases rather than adhering to the most repeated word within al-
Qaeda’s discourse: al-jihad. 
Criticising the US did not absolve Yousef from his charges, which he concedes 
proudly. His message attempts to convince potential suicide bombers that attacking the US 
constitutes a rightful punishment for all its crimes, especially supporting the Israeli 
government. The operation Yousef successfully planned in 1993 proved to be ‘an eerie 
                                                 
57 Lasting between 1987 and 1993, the First Intifada was initiated as a response to the Israeli invasion of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Because the main feature of the Intifada was throwing stones at Israeli soldiers 
by Palestinian youth and children, the uprising is named in most Arabic countries as ‘The Children of the 
Stones’. This name was the title of a large number of articles, poems, documentaries and songs in different 
Arabic countries.   
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forecast of the terror to come scarcely eight years later’ (Juergensmeyer 4). In other words, 
Yousef’s motivating message seemed to be delivered more to Muslim and Arabic young 
men, some of whom decided to sacrifice their lives in the disaster of 9/11for a fake promise 
of heaven. 
The victims of the vast majority of the operations against the US included Arabs 
and Muslims. This fact usually does not prevent the leaders of terrorist groups from 
declaring their association with these operations. However, when Muslim or Arabic 
casualties of the violent attack outnumber the American or Western victims, it seems that 
the planners of the operation become reluctant to declare their responsibility. In addition, 
because several operations target American interests outside the US, it is more likely that 
the victims of the terrorist attack include a large number of the citizens of these countries. I 
do not claim that terrorists might sympathise or regret killing innocents regardless of the 
latter’s nationality or religion. Nevertheless, the increase in the number of the victims 
among local citizens, compared to the Americans, challenges the terrorists’ claim that the 
attack was a vengeful act against the US. Moreover, harming a large number of Muslims 
essentially invalidates the rationale of the holy war from the standpoint of those who 
support it and from which potential warriors of the holy war is needed by the leaders of 
militant Islamist groups.  
The incidents of Kenya and Tanzania are a good example of the terrorists’ 
reluctance to declare their responsibility. Describing the attacks on the US embassies, 
Kepel argues: ‘The first spectacular suicide missions that can be attributed to Al Qaeda’ 
(Kepel2008, 98). However, ‘the organization did not claim responsibility for them at the 
time’ (Kepel2008, 98). Moreover, Michael Scheuer, the chief of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit 
between 1996 and 1999, attributes the bombings to al-Qaeda. However, the only evidence 
given by Scheuer of Bin laden’s declaration of responsibility is an online source within 
which Bin Laden is claimed to describe the operations as ‘two mighty smashes’ (Scheuer 
117).58 I base my argument on the fact that a large number of Muslims and non-American 
were victims of the two attacks. This would seem to deter Osama Bin Laden from 
conceding his group’s connection with the incidents on the information that ‘[in] Nairobi, 
over 4,500 people, mostly Muslims, were wounded and 213 died (among them 12 
                                                 
58 For more claims about al-Qaeda’s responsibility for the attacks in the two African countries, see Kepel 
(2004, 93). In (Roy 2004, 306), a link is drawn between the strong presence of al-Qaeda in Nairobi since 1994 
and the allegations of its role in the attack on the American embassy. 
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Americans). In Dar es Salaam, 85 were wounded and 11 died (none of them American)’ 
(Kepel2008, 98). In this respect, although the mission of any terrorist organisation would 
never be completed without a declaration of responsibility for the damage its operations 
caused, Bin Laden’s reluctance to give a direct statement about these attacks is not 
meaningless. In addition, I use this incident to read Bin Laden’s contradictory statements 
about al-Qaeda’s most harmful attack in 9/11. 
Days after Bin Laden’s denial of any responsibility for the attacks, he announced 
the reasons for committing them on a televised statement through al-Jazeera News Channel 
on 7 October 2001.59 It is crucial to realise that Bush affirmed the responsibility of Bin 
Laden in an address to a joint session of Congress on 20September, 2001, before the leader 
of al-Qaeda’s two statements of denial and confession. More than a decade after the 
disaster and with considerable evidence pointing to al-Qaeda, the question about who did 
commit the attack is still asked by the public and journalists, who suggest an American 
conspiracy. Gerry Ganavan refers to the spread of this controversial explanation of the 
catastrophe inside the US itself. He explains: 
 
The 9/11 Truth Movement is the umbrella term for a number of 
groups that have sprung up following September 11 which seek to 
prove using video evidence that the attacks were undertaken by 
intelligence agencies rather than al-Qaeda for the purpose of 
justifying American military intervention in the Middle East. They 
typically spread their ideas through online discussion forums and 
viral videos, most notably the ninety-minute Internet film Loose 
Charge. (Ganavan 132) 
 
Whether such a claim was only part of a ‘mixture of rumour, gossip, and misinformation’ 
(Taylor 2003, 317), as Philip Taylor suggests, the narrative about the War on Terror 
includes many contradictory interpretations of a large number of events, especially with the 
occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. The question is why Bin Laden insists on making his 
declaration of responsibility more accessible than his denial? To answer this question, I 
focus on two things: the channel chosen by Bin Laden to deliver this speech and the 
messages included within his discourse. 
                                                 
59 On 28 September 2001, the Pakistani newspaper Ummat (literally means nation in both Arabic and Urdu 
and figuratively means the Muslim world), published a long interview with Bin Laden, in which he not only 
insists that he was not involved in 9/11, but he also claims that – as a Muslim man – he condemns the killing 
of innocent human beings.  
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The role played by al-Jazeera in making the voice of al-Qaeda clearly and widely 
heard has been criticised by many Western politicians and writers. Hugh Miles recites 
examples of negative comments given by the American and British media on the Qatari 
news channel. Miles observes: ‘Al-Jazeera was bin Laden’s ‘mouthpiece’, declared British 
tabloids, and was run by Palestinian and Syrian extremists. The Daily Telegraph called it 
‘Bin Laden TV’. ‘All News Channel bin Laden Loves,’ read the New York Post’s headline 
on 4 October [2001]’ (Miles 112).Simultaneously, because Israeli officials are allowed to 
give exclusive statements to al-Jazeera, which is an unprecedented policy by the Arabic 
media, the Qatari channel was usually blamed by many Islamists and nationalists for being 
the mouth of Israel.60 
But if al-Jazeera was seen by a sector of Bin Laden’s targeted audience as ‘pro-
Israel’, why would Bin Laden choose the channel to be his means of communication with 
the Arabic and Muslim populations? Since its emergence in 1996, al-Jazeera has 
revolutionised the Arabic media, whether in terms of its journalistic professionalism or 
regarding the channel’s inclination towards blunt critique of many Arabic regimes. 
Mamoun Fandy claims that ‘Al-Jazeera has contributed to raising the ceiling of what can 
and cannot be said on pan-Arab television. However, this does not apply to local television 
stations inside each country’ (Fandy 47). Therefore, al-Jazeera managed to maintain its 
popularity because the channel seemed to continue, or even replace, what the Arabic BBC 
offered to the Arabic populations, especially since the 1950s: an alternative to Arabic 
dictatorships’ propaganda.  
Decades before al-Jazzier, the BBC used to be the target of the Egyptian media 
during the epoch of Nasser, who denounced all British media, including the BBC, as the 
voice of colonialism. This observation might explain Hugh Miles’s claim that, while ‘the 
channel [is] now widely dubbed ‘the Arab world’s CNN’, [...] Al-Jazeera said it preferred 
to be compared to the BBC rather CNN’ (Miles, 113). One of the most famous examples of 
the credibility of the BBC Arabic radio, in comparison with the Arabic media coverage, is 
the War of 1967. When the vast majority of the Arabs were preparing to celebrate the fake 
                                                 
60 For examples of such accusations, see Rinnawi (103), and Swanson (58). 
57 
 
victory described by all Egyptian radio stations and newspapers, the painful facts about the 
humiliating defeat were bluntly offered by the Arabic BBC.61 
In this respect, the appearance of Bin Laden on al-Jazeera seems to maintain its self-
image as the only independent Arabic channel on which all contradictory opinions are 
represented, while the popularity of the channel generally suggests why Bin Laden 
practically decided to address Arabic populations through its screen. In addition, there are 
more pragmatic reasons for Bin Laden’s choice. These reasons can be realised by reading 
the content of Bin Laden’s speech from October 2001. Ewen MacAskill observes that the 
leader of al-Qaeda ‘proved tactically astute […] in releasing his video soon after the attack. 
His videotaped interview was designed to address the three main Arab grievances: the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Iraqi sanctions; and the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia’ 
(MacAskill 2001, 6). As causes for anger, the suffering of Iraqi people from the economic 
sanctions since 1991 and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which witnessed a new bloody 
episode with the Second Palestinian Intifada (2000 – 2005), are more influential on Muslim 
and Arabic populations than the American military bases.  
Nearly a decade before 9/11, the establishment of five American bases in Saudi 
Arabia during the preparation for freeing Kuwait from the Iraqi occupation was fiercely 
criticised by both the Arab-nationalists and Islamists. Roy claims that ‘during the autumn 
of 1990, the Islamist and neofundamentalist networks [with the exception of Hamas] 
abandoned Saudi Arabia en masse, accusing it of having allowed an infidel army to protect 
the sacred sites. Hamas, dependent on Saudi money and opposed to a PLO tied to Bagdad, 
chose [to support] Riyadh’ (Roy 1994, 121).62 Many Arabic regimes considered the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait a reasonable justification for the presence of the American troops in 
Saudi Arabia.Moreover, In addition, after the 1991 War, the harm of the American bases 
gradually seemed more symbolic than factual, especially when it was overshadowed by the 
aftermath of the economic sanctions on Iraq. The latter in turn seemed to be remarkably 
eclipsed by the bloody events of the Second Intifada. 
                                                 
61 Later, in the 1970s Monte Carlo Arabic-speaking station started to get Arabic populations’ trust as a source 
of information besides, or second to, the BBC. For more references to the incident of 1967, see (Hammond 
49), (Fandy 37), and Samuel-Azran (36–7). For more information about the Qatari channel news, see Seib. 
62 The way in which each movement of the two Palestinian rivals identified itself with one side of the new 
conflict between Iraq and the Saudi-led Gulf countries proved to be influential on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict through the following decade. For discussions about the consequences of this incident, see McNair 
(39), and Peretz (14).   
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Nevertheless, for the leader of al-Qaeda, it seems that the American bases’ offence 
extends beyond occupying part of the sacred land; it has become a sign of his own defeat. 
Because of his role in precipitating the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Bin 
Laden returned to Saudi Arabia as a hero. When the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait in August 
1990, Bin Laden was eager to fight the Iraqi soldiers. Tyler claims that:  
 
[I]n the fall of 1990, bin Laden approached the royal family, 
offering his services to drive Saddam out of Kuwait. [...] The royal 
family’s rejection of bin Laden’s offer marked the beginning of an 
estrangement that would lead him, ultimately, to violent opposition 
against the House of Saud. (Tyler 379-80) 
 
Apart from contradicting the 2003 allegations made by the Anglo-American alliance about 
long-time co-operation between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, this incident played a 
crucial role in paving the way to the soon-to-emerge confrontation between Bin Laden and 
the US.63 
Whether Bin Laden was provoked by the Saudi officials’ refusal to give him the 
chance to become the leader of liberating Kuwait, or because of the Saudi regime’s 
subservient relationship to the US, Lawrence Wright claims that Bin Laden lost both his 
nationality and his family’s financial support in 1994 (qtd. in Burton 2012, 75). Eventually, 
he returned to Afghanistan where he declared the War on America. Ensalaco refers to ‘bin 
Laden’s “declaration of War Against the Americans who occupy the Land of the Two Holy 
Mosques” in 1996’ (Ensalaco 5).64 It is important to realise that, in contrast to the vast 
majority of the Arab media, al-Jazeera occasionally allowed some of its nationalist and 
Islamist pundits to condemn the American bases in Saudi Arabia. Put differently, in 
addition to al-Jazeera’s popularity, the Qatari channel seemed to be the perfect platform for 
Bin Laden to revive his 1996 declaration of war against the US. 
Regarding the two other ‘main Arab grievances’, namely the sanctions on Iraq and 
the Palestinian Second Intifada, al-Jazeera was a vital factor in escalating the anger of 
Arabic and Muslim populations. Mohammed El-Nawawy and Adel Iskander observe: 
                                                 
63 Bin Laden’s proposal of using his followers of jihadists in order to fight the Iraqi army as an alternative to 
the American troops in Saudi Arabia is mentioned in Atwan (45-6), Lansford (2012, 234), and Gurulé (32). 
64 This declaration was published by the London-based newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi, whose name literally 
means the Arabic Jerusalem, on 23 August 1996. Two different translations of Bin Laden’s statement can be 
found in Lawrence (2005, 23-30) and Berner (30-61). For the analysis of some of the thoughts included 
within the declaration, see Kepel (2006, 317-9).    
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‘Upon the launching of Al-Jazeera, [in 1996] senior producers and directors have made this 
[matter of sanctions] a vital issue on the network’s agenda, with various documentaries 
aired to demonstrate the plight of the Iraqi people under the sanctions’ (El-Nawawy 36).65 
The most striking feature of al-Jazeera’s unequivocally supportive coverage of the  
Second Uprising is the religious blessing given on its screen to the Palestinian suicide 
operations against Israeli soldiers and civilians. Kepel explains: 
 
Suicide attacks soon won the support of preachers throughout the 
Muslim world, even among “moderate” Islamists like Sheikh 
[Yousef al-]Qaradawi, the star of a religious program on Al 
Jazeera’s satellite television channel. He justified the killing of 
Israeli civilians by explaining that all Israelis, men and women 
alike, perform military service and, as reservists, constitute 
legitimate military service and, as reservists, constitute legitimate 
military targets for a jihad that seeks to recapture Muslim territory 
from impious occupiers. (Kepel 2004, 19) 
 
As Kepel’s observation suggests, the speech of the ‘moderate Sheikh’ avoided considering 
the Jews as an intrinsic enemy to Islam. Instead, al-Qaradawi established his decree on a 
mixture of nationalistic and religious bases: the Israeli occupation of a ‘Muslim territory’. 
Moreover, the fatwa went further by permitting the killing of civilians rather than limiting 
the attacks on the soldiers of the aggressor(s).  
In contrast, a large number of Muslim clerics and movements, including al-
Qaradawi and Hamas, condemned the attacks of 9/11 as an anti-Islamic action. In its 
response, al-Qaeda expressed its eagerness to identify with the Palestinian suicide bombers 
by a statement released in April 2002, within which the leaders of the terrorist group 
blamed the critics of the attacks on the US for distinguishing the American civilians from 
the Israeli victims of suicide attacks.66 
 By failing to get the official religious acceptance to identify with Hamas, which 
itself condemned the attacks of 9/11, Bin Laden’s discourse seems to miss one of its most 
significant justifications for violence, although the Palestinian cause itself did not lose its 
effect on Arabic and Muslim populations. Moreover, by challenging the large number of 
Muslim clerics, who objurgated al-Qaeda’s attacks as anti-Islamic, Bin Laden breached the 
                                                 
65 For more information about the support of al-Jazeera for the Second Intifada, see the studies of Zayani and 
Al-Mutafy. 
66 For more examples of the condemnations of the attacks of 9/11 by official Egyptian and Saudi Sheikhs, and 
al-Qaeda’s response, see Burke (2011, 29), Kurzman (43–4), Wiktorowicz (76-7), and Miles (193). 
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rules on which he established his claim of the holy war, which are essential in mobilising 
new suicide bombers for the sake of alleged martyrdom. Nevertheless, two crucial factors 
seemed to retrieve the influence of Bin Laden’s discourse on a big sector of Arabic and 
Muslim population: the Invasion of Iraq in 2003 and some polemic messages included in 
the American officials’ statements, whether at the next moment of the attack, or within the 
US declaration of the War on Terror. Both were exploited by al-Qaeda to support their 
myth about the American-Israeli war on Islam.  
 
The American official discourse  
a. Envy theory ignores the causes for conflict   
In his response to the disaster of 9/11, Bush asked ‘Why do they hate us?’ Bush’s 
answer to his question was to argue that Muslim extremists are enemies of US democracy 
and freedom. Later, many US officials repeated the same claim. On one hand, such a 
depreciatory, ‘they-us’, reading of the attacks can be understood on the grounds of James 
Cherry’s description of 9/11 as ‘a moment that illuminates how the Manichean dichotomies 
favored by the Bush Administration – a black and white world spinning on axes of good 
and evil – did not, and do not, suit the complexities of the moment’ (Cherry 167). On the 
other hand, participating in the planning or finishing of any terrorist act needs an 
unimaginable amount of hatred and brutality.  The direct suggestion of the question and its 
simplistic answer is that there is no political or historical reason for ‘hate’.67 
Ignoring the causes for dispute can be understood on the grounds of most Western 
writers’ insistence that the refusal to consider terrorists’ demands or understand the causes 
of their violence has always been the US reaction to terror operations since the early 1970s. 
Although there is a possibility for what can be called behind-the-scene work of intelligence 
agencies, which might include secret negotiations with terrorists, I analyse the declared 
discourse of American Presidents. William Farrell argues: ‘No concessions to terrorists has 
been the official U.S. policy since it was first enunciated by President Richard M. Nixon in 
                                                 
67 The debate about Bush’s controversial statement about the reasons for hatred is discussed in several sources 
such as: Farer, Chomsky (2002), Hyde, and in Esposito (2007).The latter’s Arabic translation was published 
in 2009. For examples of journalistic writings, within which most Muslims are described as haters, see 
Gabriel (2002), Gabriel (2006), and Sowell. Claims that Islam intrinsically encourages violence can be found 
in the studies of McCarthy and Winn. 
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1972. A policy of no concessions is an absolute that allows no flexibility on the part of the 
national leadership’ (Farrell 298).68 
Successive US Presidents’ responses to terror operations suggest that all of them 
refused to respond to terror’s demands. Moreover, they tend to avoid mentioning the causes 
of violence. Instead they always describe violent operations as if they are reasonless acts. 
Joseph Campos describes Reagan’s comments on the crisis of the US embassy in Tehran. 
Campos argues that Reagan was ‘intensifying negative images of terrorists as he framed 
perceptions of terrorists using terms that suggested insanity, unpredictability, and the 
capacity to unleash advanced technological resources which threatened the nation’s 
security’ (Campos 47). It is understandable that terror must be treated seriously and 
decisively. Accepting terrorists’ requests gives them the recognition they seek. Moreover, it 
may encourage even peaceful groups to see violence as an effective way to get their 
demands. Nevertheless, ignoring terrorists’ discourse altogether is also dangerous, 
especially when the same reasons for violence are mentioned after several attacks.  
Unlike politicians, who have to consider the effect of declaring any ‘concessions to 
terrorists’, behaviourists, sociologists, and perhaps dramatists can undertake the mission of 
talking with members, or ex-members, of violent group in order to understand how and 
why political, or religion, opinions are expressed in such violence. Premiered at the Theatre 
Royal Bury St. Edmunds in April 2005, Robin Soans’s Talking to Terrorists comments on 
the War on Terror by suggesting that conversations with terrorists are a worthwhile activity. 
The Verbatim play is composed of factual statements of real persons. These 
statements include five stories that recall previous cases of violent groups from different 
places, namely the Irish Republican Army, the Ulster Volunteer Force, the Kurdish 
Workers Party, the National Resistance Army of Uganda, and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. 
It seems that Soans’ play indirectly reminds its audience that terrorism is not limited to 
Islam. The dominant tone of the play is one of sympathy with the five ex-terrorists who, to 
different extents, are portrayed as victims of their societies: due to difficult childhoods, they 
are more likely to be recruited by violent groups. To understand and sympathise with, not 
to support or accept, the social, psychological, and even political motivations of violence is 
important to prevent potential terror from (re)occurring. In addition to the stories of people 
who used to be terrorists, Soans cites the former Secretary of State, who argues: ‘If you 
                                                 
68 Nixon’s comment was on the kidnapping of US diplomats in Khartoum, which occurred in 1973, not 1972.  
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want them to change their minds, you have to talk to them. They won’t do it very willingly 
because they don’t trust you, but yes, you have to talk to terrorists’ (Soans 2005, 28). 
Despite all the difficulties, Soans’ play suggests that talking to terrorists is necessary.  
In contrast, by describing violent groups as envious, nihilist, insane, unpredictable, 
and ineradicable, it seems that the US official discourse elusively attempts to exempt US 
policies from any blame for stimulating violent responses; as long as terrorist operations are 
merely unprovoked actions rather than reactions to US previous harmful policies, there is 
no way to prevent future terror. Consequently, there is no need to consider terrorists’ 
discourses. The disaster of 9/11 though is different from the crises that both Nixon and 
Reagan had to deal with. While violent groups negotiated with them over specific measures 
in return for the release of American hostages, the suffering of Palestinians was repeatedly 
mentioned by both Arabic and Western human rights organisations and a large number of 
writers of different nationalities. 
Thus, portraying 9/11 as a sudden and reasonless—except for envious hatred—
disaster ignores both historical facts and other suggested reasons, whether related to British 
and US policies or the dominant structure of power in most Arabic and Muslim countries. It 
is understandable that the mighty toll of the terrorist attack was an unprecedented and 
terrific moment. This moment was exploited and fixed by the mass media, whether for 
political or commercial reasons. Stuart Hall argues that the mass media ‘have an 
integrative, clarifying, and legitimating power to shape and define political reality, 
especially in those situations which are unfamiliar, problematic, or threatening’ (Hall 77). 
Put differently, the media’s insistence on repeating the spectacular act of horror keeps 
depicting it as an exceptional event, an unavoidable disaster, caused by terrorists.  
Furthermore, the footage of the terrorist attack portrays a rare moment of weakness 
in the history of the US. Wendy Hesford argues: ‘The visual repetition of the 2001 burning, 
collapse, and ruins of the World Trade Center [sic] on 9/11 on television screens across the 
world had codified perceptions of the terrorist threat and U.S. vulnerability’ (Hesford 30). 
In addition to this negative uniqueness of the moment, or because of it, its ‘visual 
repetition’ means that there is no place for more weakness, no consideration of terrorists’ 
reasons, even if these reasons are shared by millions of Muslims and Arabs. In contrast, as 
many of the plays studied in this thesis suggest, terrorism is not a foundling, it is the child 
of two grotesque parents: brutal puppets in Arabic countries and their operators’ disastrous 
mistakes on the two sides of the Atlantic. Moreover, if 9/11 was an exceptional moment, as 
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an unlawful brutality, the War on Terror has seemed to include many occasions when law 
and humanity are excluded. 
 
b. The crusade(s): wrong message and intentional misreading  
 In 2001, during the preparation for the war in Afghanistan, President Bush’s use of 
the word ‘crusade’ generated what seemed to be an endless debate in the Arabic media, 
where most Islamists, along with a large number of journalists claimed that Bush had 
revealed the religious rationale of his War on Terror. The voices of Arabic scholars, who 
explained the figurative connotation of the word as a campaign to achieve a specific goal, 
seemed fewer than Bush’s enemies in Arabic countries, who are not limited to Islamists. 
Insisting on the similarity between ‘crusade’ and jihad in terms of the discrepancy between 
the literal meaning and the implications each word has in its own language, Kepel argues:  
 
In the Muslim World, a significant proportion of public and media 
opinion see this “war on terror” as a “crusade” directed against 
Islam—following the American President’s use of the term in the 
wake of the bloodbaths in Washington and New York. […] 
Although English is not my native tongue, I have had to explain to 
number of acquaintances in the Arab World, during the year 
following 9/11, that in English the term “crusade” has acquired a 
metaphorical character. (Kepel 2006, iv) 
 
Yet, the unpopularity of the American President and the language barrier were not the only 
reasons for urging a large sector of Muslims to relate the word to the Christian 
military expeditions between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. 
Bin Laden literally and excessively utilised the word ‘Crusade(s)’ and phrases such 
as the ‘American-Crusade’, ‘Zionist-Crusader alliance’, and ‘Judeo-Crusader forces’ in all 
his statements and interviews through the 1990s. For instance, within Bin Laden’s 1996 
declaration of war against the US, he not only uses the word to describe the American-
Israeli responsibility for the suffering of Muslims in Palestine, Iraq, or even Bosnia, but the 
leader of al-Qaeda also blames this alleged Christian-Jewish alliance for what he calls the 
massacres of Muslims in Burma, the Philippines, and Thailand.69 
                                                 
69 For more examples of Bin Laden’s use of the word ‘Crusade’ in the 1990s, see Lawrence (2005, 58-63), 
which is a translation of Bin Laden’s declaration of the World Islamic Front on 23 February 1998. The soon-
to-be leader of al-Qaeda’s interview with John Miller, the reporter of ABC, is quoted in (Berner 70-82).       
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Similarly, prior to Bush’s use of the word crusade, Bin Laden’s declaration of 
responsibility for 9/11 traces the allegedly Western religion-based aggressions against 
Muslims back to British, French, and Italian colonialism in the 1920s. According to the 
leader of al-Qaeda, Muslim countries were occupied by what he calls the ‘Crusader 
banner’, under which Bin Laden conflates the Serbian atrocities in Bosnia and the suffering 
of the Chechens from the military intervention of Russia. The latter, Bin Laden argues, 
‘embraces the Christian Orthodox faith’ (qtd. in Rubin and Rubin 2002, 258). In this 
respect, Bush’s speech seemed to justify the leader of al-Qaeda’s claim about the holy war 
against America. 
It is important to realise that Reagan utilised the same word many years earlier to 
describe the war on communism. Therefore, he was called ‘The Crusader’, a title also used 
for Paul Kengor’s 2007 book, The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism. 
In this respect, Bush seems to follow Reagan in intending the metaphorical meaning of the 
word. However, the atheist identity of the former Soviet Union, which was described earlier 
by Carter as an‘atheistic’ country, might imply a religious connotation associated with the 
campaign against communism. For instance, ‘Onward Christian Soldiers’ is the caption of 
Tony Auth’s cartoon, published in Philadelphia Inquirer on 10 March 1983, within which 
Auth mockingly depicts Reagan as a Crusader whose cross is equipped with a bayonet (qtd. 
in Foglesong 184). What distinguishes Bush’s use of the word from Reagan’s is the fact 
that the Crusades are part of the history of Muslims. Considering that Jerusalem, whichwas 
the significant battlefield of the Crusades, is in the heart of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict, might explain why Bush’s speech hugely offended Muslim populations and 
suggests the reason for Bin Laden’s use of the phrase ‘Zionist-Crusader alliance’. 
Apart from Bush, some Western writers claimed that many US politicians’ speeches 
included several religious connotations, which mistakenlysent very negative messages to 
Muslims all over the world. For instance, Derrida argues that ‘phrases such as “God bless 
America”, “evildoers”, “axis of evil” and “infinite justice” are just some of the signs that 
prove the biblical reference in America’s official political discourse’ (Derrida 117).Whilst I 
argue that the occasional imposing of religious phrases within political speeches is more 
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likely a method of mobilisation rather than a belief in waging a Christian war on Islam, 
every use of the phrase increased support for Bin Laden’s claim of a Holy War.70 
Later, when Bush announced that God asked him to invade Iraq, he left no 
alternative for a large number of Muslims than to believe Bin Laden’s claim that the Anglo-
American coalition intentionally fights Islam. Jack Huberman argues that Bush claims that 
God tells him what he has to do, not only about wars against Muslim countries, or even US 
foreign policies, but also regarding American domestic matters (Huberman 181-2). The 
most striking point of Huberman’s argument is his observation that religious claims tinted 
Bush’s discourse in general, which means that the US President’s infamous reference to the 
war in Iraq was not a deliberate offence to Muslims. However, it was hard for most 
Muslims to take such observations on board, especially when most of the coalition’s pre-
war declarations were proven to be lies. Rees explains: ‘Many Muslims argue that the ‘War 
on Terror’ is a crusade, using terror as a euphemism similar to others used by Anglo-
American forces during the attack on Iraq. That conflict was described as a war not an 
invasion, a liberation not an occupation, and cities were secured not captured’ (Rees366). 
With the figurative rather than factual inclusion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the 
War on Terror, the negative consequences of religious discourse were multiplied. 
It is important to stress that, in addition to a large number of scholarly and 
journalistic writings, the American President himself was keen to remove any 
misunderstanding by distinguishing terrorists from the rest of Muslims. Jonathan Rieder 
claims that Bush ‘studiously avoided stigmatizing Islam, separating the terrorist squads 
who perverted the faith from those who were its true exemplars’ (Rieder 265). 
Nevertheless, the critique of specific aspects of the War on Terror was sometimes mingled 
with hints at its allegedly religious motivation. Richard Harries claims: ‘The phrase “Just 
War criteria” is […] sharply contrasted with a crusade mentality that works on the 
assumption that one side is fighting God’s enemies on behalf of God’ (Harries 31). As this 
comparison suggests, Harries seems to describe a [C]rusade versus a Holy War, a reading 
with which I disagree, although many aspects of the War on Terror challenge its lawfulness 
as a fair punishment for the disaster of 9/11.When the US breaches ‘Just War criteria’, their 
leaders may assume the authority of the international community, not God. Put differently, 
                                                 
70 There are hundreds of Arabic web sites, including electronic journals, blogs, and videos, which exploited 
Bush’s use of the word ‘crusade’ to link between the American-led conflicts in Muslim countries and the 
Crusades. 
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unlike Bin Laden’s directly and excessively religious discourse, the occasional use of 
religious terms by US politicians, whether intended to be conceived literally or figuratively, 
seems to be a method of mobilisation of their people, or troops, rather than a declaration of 
a religious war. 
In this respect, and despite Bush’s neglect of several factual reasons for anger, or 
even hatred, his question/answer explanation of the terrorist attack is a statement stressing 
superiority at a moment of national disaster. McCrisken argues: ‘Indeed, on September 11 
itself, President Bush argued that America’s exceptionalism was the very reason it had been 
attacked by terrorists’ (McCrisken 2009, 187). However, establishing superiority on the 
basis of religion is against the US principle of freedom of belief, which is one of the 
essential features of ‘individualism’, if I use Gow’s expression. In this respect, the 
inferiority of the other, even if Bush was referring to all Muslim countries, is due to the 
lack of Western values. America’s exceptionalism is mainly irreligious. It is based on the 
Western core value of freedom, which is backed by the mighty economic, political and 
military powers of the US. However, I claim that the clearer this exceptionalism practically 
and regularly manifested itself, the more infamous the War on Terror became, not as a war 
on Islam, but rather as a challenge to Western respect for law and human rights.71 
 
c. The rule of exceptions 
As the battlefields of the coalition’s confrontations extend to include more 
locations, the most substantive sign of the US’s enforcing of its own rules is not in Muslim 
or Arabic countries: it is Guantánamo Bay detention camp in Cuba. Thousands of articles 
and studies written by politicians and experts in international law insist that the US 
practices unlawful detention. Reports by tens of organisations have revealed inhuman 
treatment and brutal interrogations in Guantánamo. Even when Britain expressed its 
concerns, which caused ‘a row [that] threatened to snowball into the first major Anglo-
American split since the attacks of September 11’ (Watt 2002, 1), the infamous prison is 
still there, challenging law and humanity. In Drunk Enough to Say I Love You, Sam/the US, 
declares that Guantánamo ‘need[s] exemption from rules forbidding cruel, inhuman or 
                                                 
71 For detailed discussions about the history and aspects of the so-called ‘American exceptionalism’, see the 
studies of Bacevich 2008, Murray, and Hodgson.  
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degrading’ (Churchill 2008, 304). As the speech of Churchill’s character suggests, 
Guantánamo is itself an exemption from rules.72 
Guantánamo: Honour Bound to Defend Freedom cites Donald Rumsfeld’s 
comment on accusations of illegality in the US’s treatment of prisoners of war (POW), the 
American Secretary of Defense argues: ‘We said from the beginning that these are unlawful 
combatants, and we’re detaining them. We call them detainees, not prisoners of war. We 
call them detainees’ (qtd. in Brittain 32). The most noticeable aspect of Rumsfeld’s 
argument is its insistence on the exceptional case of the ‘detainees’ in Guantánamo, who 
cannot be considered ‘prisoners of war’ because they are ‘unlawful combatants’.  
Such an elusive use of language attempts to evade the US’s description of its 
military expedition(s) to defeat terror as a ‘war’, which Habermas considers an inaccurate 
definition. Habermas argues: 
 
‘I consider Bush’s decision to call for a “war against terrorism” a 
serious mistake, both normatively and pragmatically. Normatively, 
he is elevating these criminals to the status of war enemies; and 
pragmatically, one cannot lead a war against a “network” if the term 
“war” is to retain any definite meaning’.  (Habermas 34-5) 
 
Made in 2001, the importance of Habermas’s comment is his prediction of future practical 
problems arising from the use of the word ‘war’. Whether we call the captives in 
Guantánamo ‘detainees’ or ‘prisoners’, ‘unlawful combatants’ seems inapt to describe them 
according to International Humanitarian Law. Gary Solis argues that ‘there are only two 
categories of individual on the battlefield: combatants and civilians. Unlawful 
combatants/unprivileged belligerents are not a third battlefield category’ (Solis 207-8). 
Moreover, after years of Rumsfeld’s claim, it was proven that a large number of these 
alleged ‘unlawful combatants’ are innocent.  
In his statement after being released from Guantánamo, Jamal Al-Harith says: 
‘[s]ometimes I do think it’s a war on Muslims, a war on Islam. That came to mind when I 
was over there’ (Brittain 53). The War on Terror, which was declared because a disastrous 
attack was made by tens of envious terrorists, seems to create more enemies, whose anger 
is not due to US policies, but because of unfair treatment at the hands of American guards, 
                                                 
72 For claims that many techniques of interrogation at Guantánamo breach the UN Convention, see the studies 
of Nowak and Saul. 
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interrogators, or soldiers. Luke Howie argues: ‘Through acts of violence carried out in the 
name of ‘counterterrorism’, it [the War on Terror] has also created generations of future 
terrorists ready to once again make witnesses of those who are watching their televisions or 
computer screens when terrorists strike’ (Howie 3). Although Howie’s claim precludes a 
religious explanation of the war, he suggests that the exchanges of extreme violence allow 
the possibility of an endless war.     
Both Rumsfeld’s speech and Sam’s line in Churchill’s play describe a case of 
exception, wherein the rule is disrupted. Commenting on the status of the detainees at 
Guantánamo, Giorgio Agamben argues: 
 
Neither prisoners nor persons accused, but simply “detainees,” they 
are the object of a pure de facto rule, of detention that is indefinite 
not only in the temporal sense but its very nature as well, since it is 
entirely removed from the law and from judicial oversight. The only 
thing to which it could possibly be compared is the legal situation 
of the Jews in the Nazi Lager [camps], who, along with their 
citizenship, had lost every legal identity. (Agamben 3-4) 
 
In this respect, Agamben suggests that the detainees are not only excluded from being 
considered POW, but they are also deprived of their identity; as they are not charged, they 
are not even prisoners. Put differently, they do not exist. 
In his 1921 pioneering study, Carl Schmitt claims: ‘From a juridical point of view, 
it is only relevant that, whenever a state of exception arises, the one who is in full command 
has to decide for himself’ (Schmitt 13). In his comment, Schmitt justifies the right of the 
ruler, who own the power, to enforce whatever he solely considers necessary during a state 
of exception, regardless of the institutions of the country. This dictatorial image is based on 
the ruler superiority. In other words, this ruler himself seems to be an exceptional person, 
whether in comparison with other individuals or even legal institutions.  
Similarly, I argue that the supremacy of the US is the vital factor in its ability to 
apply the ‘politics of exception’. Trevor McCrisken claims:  
 
The term ‘American exceptionalism’ describes the belief that the 
United States is an extraordinary nation with a special role to play 
in human history; not only unique but also superior among nations. 
[…] The ways in which US foreign policy is made and conducted 
are influenced by the underlying assumptions Americans hold about 
themselves and the rest of the world. (McCrisken 2003, 1)  
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As McCrisken’s words suggest, US superiority seems to be a fundamental belief, which 
extends beyond the comparison with the inferiority of the Arabic and Muslim world to 
include all other countries. In this context, I can understand US reactions to European 
countries’ opposition to the invasion of Iraq. Charles Peña argues that ‘Rumsfeld was 
dismissive of France and Germany […] Rumsfeld also antagonized Germany by including 
it with two countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism – Cuba and Libya’ (Peña 
129). In addition to suggesting that the US assumed its superiority towards powerful 
countries, the standpoint of two Christian—if I use this simplistic description—countries 
rebuts the allegation that the invasion of Iraq was part of the alleged Crusade. 
Jenny Hughes utilises Bertolt Brecht’s The Exception and the Rule (1930) in order 
to suggest that ‘politics of exception’ (Hughes 2011, 2) were applied to Guantánamo and 
the invasion of Iraq. In Brecht’s short play, a rich Merchant kills his Coolie by shooting 
him. However, the Judge declares the killer innocent because the Merchant mistakenly 
thought that his Coolie was trying to kill him with a stone. Apart from the fact the Coolie 
was trying to give his own bottle of water to his master, the most important point of the 
incident is the exceptional circumstances that justified the verdict. Both the Merchant and 
his Coolie were tired, thirsty, and lost in a desert, where there was no protection from any 
possible attack from the Coolie on the Merchant. According to the Judge, because of the 
Merchant’s fear, he had the right to expect his servant to kill him. Eventually, the Merchant 
is acquitted. 
Jenny Hughes argues: ‘During the most recent war on terror, declarations of 
exceptions to the rule supported the spread of war into new territories and the indefinite 
detention of prisoners of war held without recourse to legal representation’ (Hughes 2011, 
2). In this respect, both Guantánamo and the War in Iraq are as exceptional as the Judge’s 
verdict in Brecht’s play. However, there is a big difference between the latter and the two 
factual events of the War on Terror. To reveal this difference, it can be useful to utilise the 
model of metaphorical parallelism in order to compare between Brecht’s play and both the 
detainees in Guantánamo and the War in Iraq.  
By combining the two analogies, figure (3) portrays the rule of exception in the 
three cases. Just like the Coolie in Brecht’s play, both the invasion of Iraq and Al-Harith, as 
an example of Guantánamo’s prisoners, are blamed and penalised for what were later 
proven to be false accusations made by the US, the coalition, and the Merchant, 
70 
 
respectively. However, in Brecht’s play, the decision to exempt the merchant/aggressor is 
taken by a third party, which is the judge. In contrast, the US as an aggressor, whether 
solely or as part of the coalition, decides by itself that the prisoners of Guantánamo and the 
War in Iraq are two exceptions to International Humanitarian Law. 
 
 
Figure (3) 
The rule of exceptions 
 
Put differently, when the invincible political and military power supplants the undisputed 
authority of law, the Anglo-American coalition possesses the dual identity of aggressor and 
judge, who has the ultimate authority to define all exceptions as a rule. It is important to 
reaffirm that while Bin Laden establishes his exceptional brutality on religious authority, 
the coalition relies on its political and military power.  
So far, I have argued that the reasons for Islamic and nationalist terrorism against 
Western countries in general and the US in particular are rooted in national and regional 
disputes. However, the co-operation of dictatorships in Arabic and Muslim countries with 
the geopolitical interests of the British Empire, the former Soviet Union, and the US was a 
crucial factor in implanting terror in Western lands. Moreover, while radical Islamists kept 
repeating the myth of a new Crusade, the discourse of some American politicians as well as 
specific aspects of the War on Terror mistakenly supported such a myth, at least for a big 
sector of Muslim populations.  
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One of the most significant consequences of both 9/11 and the War on Terror, 
which was exploited by extremists to affirm the allegation of the war on Islam, is the so-
called discrimination against Muslims in Western countries, including Britain and the US. 
The following is my argument that, apart from very few stances wherein Islam was 
identified with terrorism, the bulk of discrimination was incited by patriotic and/or cultural 
worries, rather than religious prejudice.  
 
Secularity versus Sharia Law 
As soon as the attack of 9/11 was proven as planned and executed by a group of 
Arab Muslims, a large number of both British and American Muslims and Arabs felt that 
they were obliged to defend themselves by declaring their refutation of terrorist acts. 
Simultaneously they sought to acquit their religion by refuting the terrorists’ allegations, in 
which the latter cited verses from the Holy Qur'an to justify their violence. Commenting on 
the state of Muslim minorities on the two sides of the Atlantic in 2003, Mandaville 
observes: 
 
Suspicion, discrimination, and outright persecution of Muslims 
have been commonplace over the past two years, and Muslim 
leaders-now constantly challenged to repudiate militancy in the 
name of their religion-have been put on the defensive. [...] New 
debates (combined with rehearsals of older ones) about what it 
means to be a Muslim, who speaks for Muslims, and how Muslims 
should respond to September 11 have emerged. (Mandaville 2003, 
ix) 
 
However, Muslims in Britain and the US were still seen as enemies by some of their 
compatriots. Jessica Falcone argues that because of ‘[t]he barrage of television images of 
Osama bin Laden and his fellow Al Qaeda extremists, clad in turbans and sporting long 
beards, there was a series of cases of “mistaken identity” in which Sikh Americans were 
targeted as terrorists’ (Falcone 89-90). The most striking point of such incidents of 
discrimination is their twofold generalisation: first, by blaming all Muslims for 9/11; 
second, and most importantly, by reducing the image of radical Islamists to a stereotyped 
code of costume and appearance. This phenomenon is mentioned by HollyHill in her 
introduction to Salam. Peace: An Anthology of Middle Eastern-American Drama. Hill 
claims: 
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Just few weeks after 9/11, Cornerstone [Theatre Company in Los 
Angeles] opened The Festival of Faith, a work they had been 
developing long before the attacks. The Festival of Faith explored 
feelings about being Muslim, as well as South Asian and Sikh 
(Sikhs were mistaken for Muslims and attacked after 9/11), and 
presented twenty-one theatrical offerings at a Buddhist temple, a 
Bah’i center [sic], a Methodist church, a Jewish temple and an 
Islamic school. (Hill 2009, xxiv) 
 
Both this performance and its timing suggest that theatre swiftly responded to the terrorist 
attacks in general, and commented on the consequences of 9/11 on Muslim Americans in 
particular. The most significant aspect of Hill’s observation is that the company was 
preparing the play prior to 9/11. On one hand, al-Qaeda’s attacks foregrounded the 
question: how do you feel as a Muslim in the US? On the other hand, such a question seems 
pertinent to the intrinsically complicated structure of multicultural societies, which acquired 
new difficulties after 9/11. 
The huge religious and cultural variety in the US suggests that the vast majority of 
discrimination against Muslims was not established upon the dominance of Christianity or 
the minority status of Islam, even when the discriminator is Christian. In Britain, 
Gutkowski claims that ‘it is not entirely clear who is the dominant group: is it Christian or 
non-religious’ (Gutkowski2010, 320-1). Furthermore, with consideration of the fact that 
there are different degrees of secularity and that some secular people are inclined, to some 
extent, to a specific religion, attacks on Muslims are more likely to be an attack upon the 
enemy of the country, not of the religion, especially with the possibility of the conflation 
between the nationality, race, and religion of Muslims and Arabs. Put differently, Muslims 
and Arabs are attacked because the terrorists, who attacked our country, are the same. 
Moreover, these Muslims and Arabs repeat the same reasons declared by terrorists for 
attacking our country. 
Later, the attacks of 7/7 on London, which seemed a punishment for the British 
alliance with the US in the occupation of both Afghanistan and Iraq, worsened the image of 
Muslims and underlined the link between Islam and violence. The most striking point of 
7/7, in addition to the innocent victims, is that the terrorists werehome-grown Muslims, 
who might be expected to be loyal to their nationality. Instead, they waged an alleged holy 
war on the country they lived in, which meant that a new War on Terror had to be launched 
in Britain. In her comment on British policies to deter terrorism, Gutkowski seems to agree 
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with the critique of the stereotyped image of terrorists suggested by US officials. 
Gutkowski claims that ‘secular views made it difficult, for example, for British 
policymakers to understand the dynamics of Islam as a social phenomenon or how 
Islamism might motivate an otherwise well educated, well-off and socially integrated 
individual to commit violence’73 (Gutkowski International Relations, 349). As 
Gutkowski’s observation suggests, it seems that British policies repeated Bush’s answer 
about envious hatred, which again contradicts the fact that hundreds of young Muslims, all 
over the world, did not turn into terrorists because they were poor, ignorant, or lived in 
Western segregated societies.  
As a result, a large number of Muslims and Arabs became reluctant to express their 
anger, fearing that they would be misunderstood. Ronan Bennett argues ‘Muslims are under 
siege. Worried that if they speak out they will be accused of being quasi-Islamist’ (Bennett 
2007, G2). These circumstances suggest the significance of contemporary British and 
American plays that comment on the War on Terror. While the vast majority of these plays 
mainly focus on the roots and aftermath of the war in the three locations of conflict, some 
plays respond to the echoes of the war, which are heard on the two sides of the Atlantic, 
where the question of co-existence is increasingly asked in both the US and Britain. 
In Back of the Throat, written by the Egyptian-American playwright Yussef El 
Guindi in 2004 and premiered at Theatre Schmeater, Seattle, in June 2005, Khaled is a 
Muslim-American, who is visited by two official interrogators. There is an uncertainty 
about Khaled’s casual relationship with someone, who was suspected of being a terrorist in 
a failed operation. However, the play suggests that after 9/11, being a Muslim is reason 
enough to be accused. Bartlett, one of the two American investigators, tells Khaled: 
 
[A]t no time should you think this is an ethnic thing. Your ethnicity 
has nothing to do with it other than the fact that your background 
happens to be the place where most of this crap is coming from. 
[…] You’re a Muslim and an Arab. Those are the bad asses 
currently making life a living hell and so we’ll gravitate towards 
you and your ilk until other bad asses from other races make a 
nuisance of themselves. Right? Yesterday the Irish and the Poles, 
today it’s you. Tomorrow it might be the Dutch.  (El Guindi 34) 
 
                                                 
73 In the 1980s and 1990s, Egyptian governments failed to deter the noticeable increase of radical Islamists 
because of the wrong supposition that they were uniformly poor, ill-educated, and unemployed     
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As Bartlett’s words suggest, Khaled is suspected, not because all Muslims are terrorists, but 
because, by coincidence, the members of al-Qaeda are Muslims and Arabs. At these 
exceptional moments, some Muslims and Arabs might become an exception to the entire 
society, and the exception’s differences from the rule must be underlined. However, despite 
the similarity between El Guindi and his protagonist, in terms of original nationality and 
religion, Khaled is not portrayed as an ideal person, who becomes a victim of US brutality. 
He is a normal person who makes mistakes. This part of his character makes him 
representative of a large number of Arabs and Muslims, rather than a melodramatic sign of 
goodness being assaulted by evil.   
As the following dialogue from Back of the Throat reveals, the first two letters in 
Khaled’s name ‘Kh’ is the equivalent to only one letter in Arabic language: )خ(  whose 
sound, as it should be pronounced in Arabic, does not exist in the English alphabet. It is 
more like the sound of ‘X’ in Russian, ‘J’ in Spanish and (CH) in German. Bartlett intends 
to emphasize the difficulty of uttering Khaled’s name to hint at his different culture – or, 
put differently, to remind him that he cannot consider himself a completely integrated 
American citizen:  
 
BARTLETT: ‘Haled’? 
KHALED: More Khaled. 
BARTLETT: ‘Kaled’. 
KHALED: That’s good. 
BARTLETT: But not exactly. 
KHALED: It doesn’t matter. […] 
BARTLETT: It’s that back of the throat thing. 
KHALED: Right. (El Guindi 28)  
 
Because the sound of (خ) comes from the back of the throat, the title of the play suggests 
that, in spite of all efforts to be close, some cultural differences cannot be denied. In the 
movie My Name is Khan, the Indian Muslim protagonist’s surname name begins with the 
same letter (خ) and he is accused of being a terrorist as well. However, unlike Khaled, 
Rizvan Khan, who suffers from mental illness, repeats ‘My name is Khan and I’m not a 
terrorist’ (My Name is Khan DVD). In addition, with a happy finale, just like the vast 
majority of Bollywood movies, Khan is released and consoled by the newly elected first 
African-American President. Such a sign of hope that Barack Obama’s presidency may end 
the era of discrimination against Muslims is affirmed by glimpses of some women who 
75 
 
wear hijab amongst the crowd. As Back of the Throat suggests, Khaled does not mind being 
called ‘Kaled’ or ‘Haled’, as long as he is not accused of being a terrorist. Khaled’s hope is 
unlikely to be realised, at least ‘until other bad [members of] other races make a nuisance of 
themselves’. Nevertheless, both the play and the movie suggest that pronouncing (خ) is 
hard, but not impossible. It just needs some effort. 
Thirteen years after 9/11, the difficulties that face Muslims’ integration in Western 
society extend beyond, and scarcely include the possibility of being mistakenly suspected 
as terrorists. Rather it is the tension, not to say the collision of some of Islamic culture, in 
the heart of which is Sharia Law, with secularity, which—to different degrees—regulates 
the majority of Western countries. In the heart of this Islamic culture—religious rules and 
traditions—is Sharia Law, which strictly defines the conduct of matters of marriage, 
education, inheritance.  
In this respect, it seems that Muslim culture, not Muslims, is the exception to 
secular values, not to Christianity. However, it seems crucial to consider two points. Firstly, 
the number of secular people with Christian inclinations is more likely to be larger than 
secular Muslims in Western countries. Secondly, while both secularity and Christianity co-
exists in a conformation with the dominant laws and most values of Western countries, the 
latter are hugely contradicted by many aspects of Muslim culture, especially regarding 
women rights and equality, and the freedom of belief. In 2007, Roy claimed: 
 
[T]he critique of Islam is today a rallying point for two intellectual 
families that have been opposed to each other so far: those who 
think that the West is first and foremost Christian (and who, not that 
long ago, considered that the Jews could hardly be assimilated) and 
those who think that the West is primarily secular and democratic. 
In other words, the Christian Right and the secular Left are today 
united in their criticism of Islam. (Roy 2007, ix) 
 
This crisis of multicultural societies is portrayed by the English playwright Richard Bean’s 
England People Very Nice. Premiered at the Oliver Theatre, National Theatre in February 
2009, the play exploits the current debate about Muslims’ integration in British society to 
investigate Britain’s history of receiving and absorbing several cultures and religions. The 
play portrays four waves of immigration to England, the French Huguenots, the Irish, the 
Jews, and Asian Muslims; it seems that the newcomers are always discriminated against 
because they are different. Differences are not limited to religion and language, but also the 
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type of food each group eats. Historically, there are big gaps in time between the four 
waves, but Bean treats them as successive periods.  
The technique of the play-within-a-play enables Bean to make the same actors play 
different characters over the course of four acts, which shape the inner play. In the frame 
play, these actors are a group of asylum seekers, who are waiting in the airport, hoping to 
be accepted into England. Killing time, they collectively write a play, which is an overview 
of four acts of historical immigration. It seems that Bean suggests that Britain will always 
be attractive for immigrants. Both the frame play and the four acts of the inner play contain 
a large number of ethnic slurs and disparaging remarks, whether regarding religion or 
culture. For instance, when Sanya, one of the asylum seekers from Kosovo, rehearses her 
lines as a narrator in the frame play, she offends the French, the Irish, the Jews and 
Muslims, respectively. She says: ‘Fucking FROGS! Fucking MICKS, Fucking YIDS! 
Fucking PAKIS’ (Bean England People, 10). Similar derogative remarks are made about 
all of the four groups throughout the inner acts. 
The most striking feature of the play’s message is its fluctuation between suggesting 
that different cultures and religions are able to live together, and the impossibility of such 
integration. On one hand, Mushi, the moderate Asian Muslim, is a smart, kind and 
attractive man, who is able to turn himself from a poor immigrant into a successful 
businessman. Moreover, he drinks alcohol and has a relationship with an English girl. Even 
his mistakes in language are not conceived as an inability to communicate as he always 
manages to say understandable and smart things. Furthermore, Mushi is upset because his 
daughters wear hijab; he complains: ‘My daughters gone hijabi, and they bully my wife 
into niqab! One minute I’m living with four beautiful Indian women, next minute I’ve got a 
house full of bloody Arabs!’ (Bean England People, 105). Relating niqab-wearing to Arabs 
relies on the fact that it is mainly worn by women in Saudi Arabia. However, the burqa is a 
more strict form of dress worn by Afghan women, which shapes one of the Western 
‘secular misconceptions’, as the plays studied in the fourth chapter suggest.  
On the other hand, the play utilises visual elements to suggest that every new wave 
of immigrants enforces its religion; while the French build a church (20), ‘the RABBI 
disposes of the cross on the outside of the church and puts up a star of David’ (75), then an 
‘Islamic crescent replaces the Star of David’ (90). It is hard to know exactly which meaning 
England People Very Nice suggests. At this point, the message of the play is baffling. 
Finally, it is important to mention that Bean’s play discusses the ways in which radical 
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Islamists are portrayed in theatre. Through a discussion between Philippa, the English 
officer who undertakes the role of director, and Taher, the Christian Palestinian asylum 
seeker they debate:  
 
PHILIPPA: Iqbal. You’ve shaved your beard off. Your beard was 
the reason we cast you as the mad Imam. […] 
TAHER: The group turned my imam into stereotype – mad, blind, 
hooks for hands. The imam will be better without the beard and the 
beard wig.    
TATYANA: It is not a stereotype, they’ve all got beards! (Bean 
England People, 11-12)   
 
Both opinions seem reasonable. As an Arabic Christian, Taher knows that neither the beard 
nor its size is relevant to radicalism. Tatiana, the Serbian girl, is right because this is the 
image of radical Islamists in the Western media. By asking for a more normal image of the 
radical imam, Taher suggests that theatre can profoundly represents the facts by 
contradicting both: the superficial image of reality and its reflection in the eye of the media. 
The gap between the media coverage and dramatic representation is investigated in the next 
chapter. In order to give their comment on the three ongoing conflicts, contemporary 
Anglo-American playwrights theatricalise the complex historical, cultural and political 
contexts explored in this chapter. The next chapter investigates the ways in which their 
plays utilise different dramaturgical forms in order to engage these contexts in the 
imaginary realm of theatre. 
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Chapter Two 
Forms of topicality: New goals of political theatre 
 
This chapter investigates how the large number of plays that comment on the 
ongoing War on Terror have foregrounded political theatre as a prominent trend in 
contemporary British and American theatre. In addition, the chapter explores the different 
ways in which playwrights utilise specific theatrical techniques in order to represent the 
events that preceded and accompanied the Anglo-American coalition’s confrontations in 
the three locations of conflict.  
 
All plays can be political, but not political theatre 
Due to the essential effect of the ruling political system on all aspects of society, 
dramatic representations of this society may indicate specific political features. 
Sociological approaches to the study of theatre suggest that, since Aeschylus’ The Persians 
(472 B.C.), plays can reflect indirectly on the dominant political structure of their time. 
Even a farcical or a melodramatic love story, for instance, can reveal the tension between 
the two different classes the lovers belong to. These occasional political manifestations, 
though, do not prove that the whole history of theatre can be described as political theatre. 
By its nature, political theatre intentionally utilises textual and theatrical methods in 
order to express its opposition to a de facto situation which was created by the dominant 
political power(s), whether directly or indirectly. By addressing this situation, political 
theatre insists on the need for change. In this respect, we can understand Augusto Boal’s 
opinion as he argues that ‘all theatre is essentially political, because all the activities of man 
are political and theatre is one of them. Those who try to separate theatre from politics try 
to lead us into error – and this is a political attitude’ (Boal ix). As a director and theorist, 
who believes in the social and political function of theatre, Boal’s claim can be understood 
as an attack on the capitalist commodification of theatre, which turn it into an apolitical 
method of entertainment. In contrast, a literal reading of Boal’s argument will contradict his 
noticeable dedication to creating an alternative political theatre, which is made by, and 
addresses, the politically and economically marginalised social classes.74 
                                                 
74 For claims that Marxism essentially framed Boal’s theory and practice of the Theatre of the Oppressed, see 
Babbage (53-9), and Magnat (200-1). For several perspectives on Boal’s theatre, see Emert and Friedland. In 
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All theatre can be political, but is not necessarily political theatre. This is what 
Graham Holderness insists on when he claims: 
 
Theatre may be ‘political’ without becoming ‘political theatre’, in 
the sense that a play may represent political matters or address 
political issues, in exactly the same way as a play can represent 
love, or old age, or poverty, or madness; if, that is, the play 
performs that representation of politics in an objective way, without 
taking sides. Such drama is in a sense political by accident. Politics 
proper is surely, however, incompatible with a detached, objective 
perspective (Holderness 2). 
 
However, Holderness suggests a very strict criterion: that even plays that raise political 
matters can be excluded from political theatre, unless they become, Holderness argues, 
‘partisan, splitting along the lines of party conflict, lining up with one particular political 
group, or cause, or ideology’ (Holderness 2). This insistence that political plays cannot be 
objective describes agitprop plays, in which the political message is obviously based on a 
strict political affiliation. In such plays, the playwright’s support for a specific political 
side, whether that is an ideology or a political party, is inseparable from his/her critique of 
the other ideology or party and vice versa. Although this ‘partisan’ type of political theatre 
can be found in a large number of plays in specific periods of the twentieth century, it is 
different from the vast majority of contemporary British and American political plays that 
comment on the three conflicts. For instance, when an American playwright contradicts the 
invasion of Iraq he/she does not seek to attack the Republican administration in order to 
support the Democratic Party, even if he/she belongs to the latter.  
Moreover, although the vast majority of the plays studied in this thesis have clear 
standpoints on the conflicts to which they respond, their ‘cause’(s) does not take the form 
of a dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Opposition to any aspect of the War on Terror, for 
instance, cannot be considered to constitute support for terrorists. In addition, some plays 
do not declare their messages in a direct way, or they even confine their purpose to giving 
an objective narrative about the topic they comment on. Theatre in general is very 
responsive to social and political changes. Political theatre in particular reflects on these 
changes. Therefore, the goal of political theatre in the twentieth century cannot be identical 
                                                                                                                                                     
Duffy and Vettraino, an anthology of thirteen studies explore the educational and political utilisation of the 
Theatre of the Oppressed to work with youth in classrooms, prisons, and various outdoor spaces.   
80 
 
to those of its ancestors in the previous centuries, regardless of the similar theatrical 
techniques.  
One of the most striking features of political theatre is that it usually flourishes at 
the decisive junctures in the history of societies. Jenny Hughes claims: 
 
Crisis has inspired and mobilised political performance practice 
across the contemporary history of western performance, from the 
explosion of workers’ theatres in between the two World Wars […], 
to the proliferation of alternative theatres of the counter-cultural 
movement in the 1960s (Hughes 2011, 18). 
 
Focusing on the 1920s and 1960s does not contradict the fact that there have always been 
Western playwrights, including British and American, who write political plays. However, 
the third and the seventh decades of the twentieth century were two booms in political 
theatre, in which theory was engaged with practice. Moreover, the legacy of both is 
crucially influential on the vast majority of political plays since the 1930s, including 
contemporary plays, wherein the techniques of documentary theatre seem to prevail in the 
representations of the conflicts. The following is an attempt to highlight the major 
characteristics of ‘political performance practice’ in the 1920s and 1960s.  
 
The origin(s) of Documentary Theatre: Piscator and Brecht 
The inclusion of documentary content within plays, whether by representing factual 
incidents or in the shape of fragments of real persons’ speeches uttered by dramatic 
characters, seems to be an old phenomenon. Attilio Favorini argues:  
 
From its origins and throughout its history, Western theatre has 
engaged, represented, and/or attempted to affect the course of 
history. Phrynichus and Aeschylus wrote plays on the Persian wars 
when they were still fresh in the memories of their auditors. […] 
Early in the sixteenth century French sotties commented on Papal 
politics; late in the same century Elizabethan playwrights began to 
exploit contemporary crime stories. (Favorini 31) 
 
Apart from the satirical nature of the ‘sotties’, which distinguishes them from the Greek 
tragedy and Elizabethan drama, the most common feature of all these cases, mentioned by 
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Favorini, is playwrights’ instant response to actual events.75This aspect is always present in 
all topical plays, including the plays studied in this thesis, which can be explained as an 
exploitation of ready subject matter, in which public opinion is interested. Yet, the 
representation of recent or historical factual incidents does not mean that the play belongs 
to the so-called documentary theatre. In other words, neither the topicality nor the factual 
origin of the dramatic action or characters, as such, determines the genre of the play.  
Documentary theatre, in which documentary content is utilised in order to deliver a 
specific political message, started with the German director Erwin Piscator. Even Favorini, 
who insists that the roots of documentary theatre can be traced back to the Greeks, declares: 
‘In 1925 Erwin Piscator directed and co-authored what in retrospect may be named the Ur-
text of the documentary theatre movement’ (Favorini 33). Describing documentary theatre 
as a ‘movement’, though, involves a kind of undervaluation regarding its post-Piscator 
manifestations. Derek Paget argues: ‘The term “Documentary Theatre” can be conveniently 
given capital letters, because it is much easier to establish as a coherent (and self-defining) 
signifying practice’ (Paget 1990, 42). Paget’s claim is supported by the recurrences of this 
theatrical ‘practice’ in the 1960s and 2000s, both of which are influenced by socio-political 
and cultural aspects. 
From the beginning, documentary theatre was highly influenced by historical 
circumstances, which suggests an inseparable linkage between social matters and arts, 
including theatre. Markus Nowatzki argues: 
 
After World War I it seemed no longer possible to win the strongly 
diverse public with the utopian concepts of the late expressionists. 
[…] In opposition of [sic] this late expressionism a new style 
became stronger – NeueSachlichkeit [The New Realism]. […] Thus 
writers of the whole political spectrum of Weimar could be found 
among the group.  […] Common for all of them was either to 
condemn the technology cult around America or to follow the 
inherent excitement of the public for Americanization. 
(Nowatzki17) 
 
Despite Piscator’s belief in Marxism, he does not ‘condemn’technology, which was a sign 
of American cultural domination. In contrast, highlighting Piscator’s dependence on 
technological devices is a common feature of all definitions of his theatre in particular and 
                                                 
75 For more information about the history and structural features of the sotties, see Ross. 
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all the practice of documentary theatre in general. Paget argues: ‘I would describe 
documentary dramas as plays with a close relationship to their factual base – a twentieth-
century extension of the historical drama or the pièce à thèse.76 […] [T]he ‘extension’ is 
inherent in the technological means of presentation’ (Paget 1998, 110). As Paget’s claim 
suggests, the use of these technological methods seems to be the essential difference 
between documentary theatre and all previous ways of imposing factual material within 
plays.   
 In this respect, Piscator’s use of technology accords with German spectators’ 
preferences. However, he exploits these technological methods in order to express his 
political beliefs, which not only opposed the ‘Americanisation’ of German society in the 
1920s, but also contradicted the capitalist commercial vision of theatre as a method of mere 
entertainment. Nowatzki claims that ‘Piscator used theatre for his social criticism, showing 
social and economic hardships’ (Nowatzki 17). Mel Gordon explains Piscator’s theatrical 
utilisation of technology, arguing: 
 
Piscator relied on the new technologies – especially film and print 
journalism – to mount Marxist interpretations of the classics and 
kaleidoscopic historical enactments. Projections, movie clips, 
archival recordings, and symbolic, flying stage architecture 
surrounded his actors like a media gale. […] Here was political 
drama aided by layers of scientific expertise and the new spectator’s 
thirst for anti-illusionist entertainment. (Gordon 158) 
 
Thus, it seems that Piscator lures his spectators into the temptation of watching new 
technological methods in order to confront them with political and economic problems in 
their society. Gordon’s mention of the audience’s ‘thirst for anti-illusionist entertainment’ 
recalls the state of the Western theatre in the first three decades of the twentieth century, 
where both directors and playwrights were in search of an alternative aesthetic to 
naturalistic plays.77 In addition, while the emergence of cinema as a new art form was seen 
                                                 
76 The term refers to a nineteenth-century type of play, in which the playwright discusses controversial social 
matters. Each point of view on a particular matter is raised and adopted by a specific dramatic character. 
Usually, contemporary critics use the term as a derogatory description of plays’ lack of vitality, especially 
when playwrights use their characters as mouthpieces. 
77 While playwrights’ opposition to Naturalism was materialised in the expressionist theatre, as can be found 
in the works of German playwrights such as Reinhard Sorge, Georg Kaiser, and Ernst Toller, directors 
insisted that visual elements are the essence that distinguishes theatre from literature. One of the most 
revolutionary opinions was introduced in 1938 by Antonin Artaud. In The Theatre and its Double, the French 
theorist and director calls for neglecting the written text, or considering it a marginal factor in the 
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by theatre practitioners as a threat to theatre’s popularity, Piscator managed to include this 
new art within his plays. In other words, documentary theatre seems to be Piscator’s answer 
to the crisis of theatre in the early twentieth century as well as an appropriate method of 
raising political matters.  
In terms of challenging naturalistic plays and illusionist theatre, the significant role 
of technological devices in delivering political messages extends beyond being a container 
of documented information. Apart from their political contents, the successive display of 
‘projections’, ‘movie clips’ and ‘archival recordings’ prevents the audience from escaping 
the problems of their real life to a fictional realm. In contrast, the interventions of 
technological methods in the fictional plot urge spectators to use their critical mind in order 
to recognise and conclude from the facts they receive, which are intrinsically related to 
their real life. Integrated into the whole unity of the performance, technological methods 
enabled Piscator’s plays to ‘relay facts to an audience and to signify a dramatic 
methodology that diverged from the dominant naturalism/social realism to include two-
dimensional ‘characters’ who could represent abstractions (rather like the creations of 
medieval religious drama)’ (Paget 1998, 109). Unlike naturalistic characters, the ‘two-
dimensional’ characters in documentary theatre are more of a device to state 
facts/thoughts/opinions/claims rather than a depiction of a human being. The most striking 
point of Paget’s note is that it indirectly refers to the fact that Piscator’s documentary 
theatre demands that actors take a new approach to their roles other than the dominant 
Stanislavski system of acting.78Put differently, actors in documentary theatre are usually as 
utilitarian as technological devices; sources for information rather than emotive imaginary 
characters. 
Because of his influence on European and American practitioners, Piscator is seen 
as a pioneer of documentary practice alongside the revolutionary director, playwright, and 
theorist Bertolt Brecht. Gordon argues: ‘Piscator’s Epic Theatre shared many qualities 
associated with his German comrade Bertolt Brecht’ (Gordon 158).79 However, despite 
                                                                                                                                                     
performance. Artaud’s claim of the ability of theatre to write its own nonverbal poetry influenced the trend of 
creating visual metaphors on stage in the French avant-garde theatre by the middle of the twentieth century. 
78 A group of training methods, instructions and advice – known as the Method – was suggested by the 
Russian director, actor and theorist Konstantin Stanislavski (1863–1938). Stanislavskian techniques help 
actors to use their psychological and physical qualities in order to acquire those of the dramatic characters to 
the extent that actors may identify themselves with the characters at specific moments. Stanislavsky’s system 
is respectively introduced and investigated in Stanislavski and Whyman.  
79 For more information about Marxist documentary plays in Britain and the US in the 1930s, see Gray (1976, 
182-207), and Watson. 
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Piscator’s vital role in contradicting illusionist traditions by creating the ‘Epic Theatre’, the 
latter is sometimes described as a Brechtian invention. The word ‘Epic’ itself, which 
challenges Aristotelian differentiation between narrative and dramatic representations, is 
usually linked to Brecht’s theatre. Peter Brooker claims: 
 
‘Epic’ is the description most commonly applied to Brecht’s 
theatre. We should realise that the term was in use in German 
debates before Brecht adapted it, however, and that for Brecht too it 
had several sources: the political theatre of Erwin Piscator and 
German agitprop; the cabaret of Frank Wedekind and the work of 
the music hall comedian Karl Valentin; Charlie Chaplin and 
American silent film; Asian and revolutionary Soviet theatre; as 
well as Shakespeare and Elizabethan chronicle plays. (Brooker 211) 
 
On the one hand, as a theorist, the origins of the vast majority of Brecht’s suggestions can 
be found in many sources, including Piscator. On the other hand, as a playwright and a 
director, Brecht had the ability to materialise and improve his own theory of Epic Theatre 
with didactic goals, which are influenced by the thoughts of Marx and Hegel.80 
During his experiments, Brecht recruited all these borrowed thoughts from different 
sources in order to formulate a consistent totality that includes all the elements of the 
performance. It can be useful to explain how Brecht modifies others’ thoughts in order to 
build his theory of theatre. Brecht’s notion of alienation81 is a good example because it is 
considered one of the cornerstones of Brecht’s epic Theatre. Moreover, alienation is usually 
mentioned as the element that distinguishes Brecht from Piscator. When Christopher Innes 
claims that ‘[t]he most obvious difference between their work [sic] is that Brecht replaced 
Piscator’s principle of direct confrontation with his own concept of alienation’ (Innes 1972, 
199), I can realise how Brecht’s Epic Theatre depends on alienation, which was originally 
mentioned in the studies of Russian Formalism.  
As Brooker argues: ‘The new narrative content signalled by the term ‘epic’ was to 
be communicated in a dialectical, non-illusionist and nonlinear manner, declaring its own 
artifice as it hoped also to reveal the workings of ideology’ (Brooker 215). Underscoring 
the aspect of ‘declaring its own artifice’ as the essence of Brecht’s theatre, Brooker 
                                                 
80 For a detailed analysis of Brecht’s attempts to compose a combination of Marxism and the Hegelian 
dialectic, see Robinson (2008, 167-234). 
81 Brecht’s German term ‘Verfremdungseffekt’ is sometimes translated by scholars as ‘estrangement’, the 
‘making-strange effect’, or the ‘V-effect’.   
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indirectly refers to the influence of Russian Formalism. Gerd Bjørhovde explains: ‘The 
term defamiliarization (ostranenie: “make strange”) is of course, generally associated with 
Russian Formalism and perhaps above all the name Victor Shklovsky’ (Bjørhovde 129).82 
However, Brecht extends Shklovsky’s narrow formalist understanding of 
‘ostranenie’ to give it a political quality. Bjørhovde claims that ‘the formalists were 
primarily concerned with technical matters, while Brecht was above all interested in the 
political aspects – and effects – of the literary text or dramatic situation’ (Bjørhovde 129). 
Shklovsky’s apolitical focus on ‘technical matters’ can be understood on the grounds of the 
Russian Formalists’ interest in the essential features of literature that distinguish it from all 
other sorts of discourse. Susan Bennett claims that ‘Shklovsky discusses defamiliarization 
as the device by which literature is recognized as literature’ (Bennett2005, 28). In addition, 
the literary work, in/on which Shklovsky based his notion of defamiliarisation, utilised the 
‘declaring [of] its own artifice’ for no political reasons. Raman Selden explains: 
 
As Shklovsky’s essay on Sterne83 reveals, the Formalists had a 
more revolutionary concept of plot than Aristotle. The plot of 
Tristram Shandy is not merely the arrangement of story-incidents 
but also all the ‘devices’ used to interrupt and delay the narration. 
Digressions, typographical games, displacement of parts of the 
book (preface, dedication, etc.) and extended descriptions are all 
devices to make us attend to the novel’s form. (Selden 2001, 34) 
 
In this sense, by commenting on literary devices, Sterne’s novel intentionally reveals its 
fact as a novel rather than an imaginary realm, which can be described as the eighteenth-
century narrative equivalent to the anti-illusionist theatre sought by Piscator and Brecht. 
The question is how Brechtian methods of alienation help in achieving his plays’ political 
function to the extent that they distinguish his work from Piscator’s? The importance of 
such a question relies on the fact that—regardless of the degree to which contemporary 
British and American political plays are influenced by the Piscatorian documentary 
practice—Brecht’s techniques are a common feature of the vast majority of these plays. 
                                                 
82 The influence of Russian Formalism on Brecht is mentioned in Holub (18-19) and Meyer-Dinkgräfe (2001, 
65-6). 
83 Laurence Sterne (1713–1768) is a British writer, whose novel The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy 
was studied by Shklovsky as an example of the significance of the composition of the novel compared to the 
unimportance of the story it tells. The novel is full of the narrator’s interventions, as a writer, in the narrative 
by commenting on the techniques of writing and the arrangement of chapters.  
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In Brecht’s Epic Theatre, alienation regulates allthe elements. In other words, each 
visual and verbal component of the performance is intentionally ‘declaring its own artifice’, 
in its own way. Christopher Baugh describes the scenery of one of the productions of 
Brecht’s The Caucasian Chalk Circle. Baugh claims:  
 
The performance imagery attains the power of dramatic utterance: 
harsh white lighting from exposed lighting instruments, stripped 
bare stage, undyed or ‘earth’ coloured hessian and canvas costumes, 
half stage-height curtains running on horizontal strainer wires 
across the stage and terse, combative ‘literary’ captions painted or 
projected onto screens which straddle the stage. (Baugh 272)   
  
The importance of Baugh’s observation is its underscoring of the cooperative work of all 
the visual elements in raising the audience’s awareness of the artificiality of the 
performance as a work of art, by revealing the theatrical devices of the make-believe. For 
instance, reducing the use of theatrical lighting to the practical function that enables the 
audience to watch is emphasised by the self-reflexivity of revealing lighting equipment.    
The actor, whose practice combines both verbal and nonverbal qualities, has a 
central function in the process of alienation.84 Brecht explains: ‘To achieve the V-effect the 
actor must give up his complete conversion into the stage character. He shows the 
character, he quotes his lines, he repeats a real-life incident’ (qtd. in Eddershaw 279). Here, 
Brecht takes a further step than the ‘two-dimensional’ characters in documentary theatre, as 
explained by Paget, in terms of challenging Stanislavskian illusionist acting and the effect 
on spectators. Unlike two-dimensional characters in documentary theatre, Brecht’s plays 
are full of profoundly sophisticated and lively characters such as, to give only a tiny 
example, Mother Courage and Azdak.85 However, these characters are contextualised in a 
specific form of representation. Philip Auslander argues:  
 
Brecht privileges the actor over the character, but for a different 
reason than Stanislavsky: in order that the actor’s commentary on 
the character be [sic] meaningful to the audience, the actor must be 
                                                 
84 Songs, which also combine both verbal and nonverbal theatrical language, are utilised by Brecht to achieve 
the alienation effect when they interrupt, comment, and even mock the dramatic situation or characters. 
85 Respectively in Mother Courage and Her Children (1939), and The Caucasian Chalk Circle (1944). 
Neither Brecht’s plays nor his characters can be thoroughly analysed in this thesis.   
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present as herself as well as in character and her persona must carry 
greater authority than the role.86 (Auslander2002, 56) 
 
Auslander stresses the ‘role’ of the Brechtian actor, which includes, but is not limited to, 
representing dramatic characters. As they are aware of their own identity as actors, they 
distinguish themselves from the imaginary characters. This dual existence enables actors to 
comment on the characters’ feelings or actions. In this respect, actors can assume the 
position of critics, whose opinions prevent spectators from identifying with imaginary 
characters. Put differently, the acting style in Brecht’s theatre motivates the audience’s 
critical sense regarding both dramatic characters and situations.  
In this respect, as Paget explains: ‘the means of production is granted to an audience 
expected not to consume passively, but engage actively with the material being presented’ 
(Paget 1990, 42). However, unlike the formalist lack of social function of revealing the 
artifice, alienation is Brecht’s way of engaging his spectators with the political matter the 
play raises. Paget claims that ‘all this is done with a polemical purpose, the company and/or 
writer(s) wishing to argue a case forcefully, which generally opposes an established point 
of view’ (Paget 1998, 110). Paget’s note suggests that Brecht’s model of theatre has 
become an inspiration for theatre practitioners, not only in his work as a theorist, but also as 
a playwright, whose texts are a crucial factor in giving his work its coherence; not only 
because of the political messages they include, but also due to the way in which the 
structure of the plays helps in delivering and underlining these messages.  
 Brecht’s play The Exception and the Rule, which was mentioned in the first chapter, 
can be a good example of how Brecht’s text works politically. In the prologue to the play, 
The Players directly addresses the audience, with no pretence of a fourth wall that 
distinguishes the real world of spectators from the imaginary realm of the play: 
 
Examine carefully the behavior [sic] of these people: 
Find it surprising though not unusual 
Inexplicable though normal 
Incomprehensible though it is the rule. 
Consider even the most insignificant, seemingly simple 
Action with distrust. Ask yourselves whether it is necessary 
Especially if it is usual. 
We ask you expressly to discover 
That what happens all the time is not natural. (qtd. in Drain 110) 
                                                 
86 Stanislavsky is another form of writing the name of the Russian director in some English studies.  
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By this kind of instruction, spectators seem to be in a mission as they are asked by the 
actors to be alert and skeptical. Therefore, when spectators watch the Merchant while he is 
humiliating and beating the Coolie throughout their journey, Brecht does not need them to 
fear by identifying themselves with the servant, or even to pity him. Spectators are 
demanded by the Players to think; to realise the unjust situation, which should lead them to 
anger. Although Margaret Eddershaw describes the effect of the relationship between the 
Brechtian actor and the dramatic character on the audience in general, her explanation 
seems to apply to The Exception and the Rule. She claims:  
 
[W]hile not eliminating emotion altogether in his or her 
performance, the actor would stimulate the audience to feel 
emotions that were not the same as those ‘felt’ by the character. For 
example, if the character were [sic] ‘sad’, the audience might 
experience ‘anger’ at the circumstances which made the character 
feel that way. (Eddershaw 279)  
 
To protect spectators from the feelings of fear or pettiness, Brecht utilises the theatrical 
trick of asides, wherein both the Coolie and the Merchant comment on their own actions. 
At these moments, the distance between the actor and the imaginary character can be 
revealed by, for example, the actor’s use of his own voice.    
Moreover, during the court scene, where the Merchant is tried for killing the Coolie, 
spectators will scrutinise the Judge’s verdict of claiming the Merchant’s innocence on the 
grounds of the exceptional circumstances of his crime. At this moment the political 
function of the play, which was initiated by the prologue, can be read in the context of 
Brecht’s Marxist critique of capitalism. The arrogant and brutal Merchant, as an individual 
capitalist, kills his servant, who belongs to the working class—just like the vast majority of 
Brecht’s targeted audience. Then, the institution of the law, which is represented by the 
Judge, exempts the capitalist murderer from punishment. By depicting the crimes of 
capitalism, the play comments on the harmful consequences of the dominant capitalist 
system in the society. In this respect, Brecht’s goal extends beyond the mere confrontation 
between his spectators and the economic and political problems in their society. Brecht 
seeks ‘to jar audiences out of their passive acceptance of modern capitalist society as a 
natural way of life, into an attitude not only […] of critical understanding of capitalist 
shortcomings, but active cooperation with the forces of change’ (Abrams 183). In other 
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words, Brecht’s political theatre not only defines and reveals the problems of the ruling 
political system, but suggests the alternative, which is communism.  
Both Piscator and Brecht are perfect examples of Holderness’ firm rule that political 
theatre cannot achieve an ‘objective perspective’. Their Marxist beliefs define their points 
of view on both theatre and society, which are expressed in their harsh and continuous 
attack on capitalism. Although their techniques are widely utilised by the vast majority of 
contemporary British and American playwrights who comment on the events of the War on 
Terror, there is an obvious discrepancy in terms of the goal of political theatre. 
RyanReynolds argues: 
 
The most influential political theatres, of Brecht and Piscator, were 
contingent upon the existence of and belief in alternative social 
structure to capitalism – in this case socialism and communism. 
These clear and tangible utilitarian aims seem impossible today in a 
society with no revolutionary context or belief in such alternative 
social ideals. (Reynolds 19) 
 
Apart from utopian dreams of a more reasonable and peaceful world in a few of the plays 
studied in this thesis, there is no suggestion of a political or ideological ‘alternative’ to the 
disastrous aftermath of the bloody confrontations. Moreover, a large number of the plays do 
not even allude to such a dream of a better world. In contrast, their messages seem to be a 
warning of worse to come. In addition, by relating the ongoing conflicts to similar 
historical events in the three locations of conflict, some plays seem to suggest that 
humanity never learns from its mistakes. Furthermore, many plays literally contradict 
Holderness’ opinion on political theatre by adopting an ‘objective perspective’. As Derek 
Paget argues: 
 
Politics domestically (even internationally after the collapse of the 
USSR and the end of Cold War negative certainties) has mutated 
into a depthless, programme-less form that has over time 
increasingly privileged the figure of the witness as the last best hope 
of opposition. (Paget 2009, 234) 
 
A big sector of contemporary Anglo-American political theatre opposes the Anglo-
American coalition’s military adventures by being an ‘objective’ ‘witness’, although 
ultimately objectivity seems impossible, as the reading of the plays will suggest later.  
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In all these cases, whether the plays tend to be dreams of peace and tolerance, 
warnings of more atrocities or unbiased displays of specific happenings, all these dramatic 
comments on the conflicts are in opposition to dominant discourses within which all 
exceptions are justified: wars are described as an inescapable inevitability in which Muslim 
civilian and Western soldier victims are forgivable mistakes of smart weapons. Avraham 
Oz argues: 
 
[T]he political theatre uses the conventions of a chosen theatrical 
form to emphasize, reveal, and criticize the ideology serving as the 
social background of human actions or situations, to locate 
alternative discourses to the one preferred by the ruling ideology, 
and to liberate human consciousness from its circular binding to 
mythical formations. (Oz 30) 
 
According to Oz’s definition of political theatre, the collective message of these plays can 
be considered an ‘alternative discourse’ to the dominant discourses, insisting that many 
aspects of the violent conflicts are always avoidable, usually unnecessary, and sometimes 
unethical. Recognising the difference between adopting documentary techniques in political 
theatre as a device and the purpose of this adoption is crucial, not only to differentiate 
contemporary documentary plays from Piscator/Brecht theatre, but also to distinguish 
between the latter’s agitprop goals and the function of the first revival of documentary 
theatre in the 1960s. 
 
The revival of Documentary Theatre: Weiss and his comrades 
With Rolf Hochhuth’s The Representative (1963),87 Heinar Kipphardt’s In the 
Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer (1964), and Peter Weiss’ The Investigation (1965), 
documentary theatre was revitalised in the 1960s. Hochhuth’s play wonders about the 
silence of the Catholic Church, represented by Pope Pius XII, about the Nazi crimes against 
the Jews in the first half of the 1940s. Kipphardt’s play depicts the 1954 inquiry, in which 
the American scientist Oppenheimer was blamed for his regretful statements about his early 
contribution in developing nuclear bombs. In The Investigation, Weiss reconstructs the 
Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials of German officials and civilians for their role in the murder of 
Jews.  
                                                 
87 The Deputy is another translation of the German title of the play: Der Stellvertreter. 
91 
 
On the one hand, the original events on which the three plays comment—the 
hearing and the Nazi crimes—belong to the near history rather than the present. On the 
other hand, the increasing debate about the threat of nuclear weapons and the Frankfurt 
Trials in the middle of the 1960s brought back, or raised, the Germans’ interest in the two 
matters. Put differently, the topicality of these plays relies on the public’s concern rather 
than the actual date of the original event. This observation can help us to recognise the 
topicality of some contemporary British and American plays, which comment on one of the 
three ongoing conflicts—in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine—by depicting historical 
incidents. However, regardless of the difference between the factual event and the trial or 
inquiry, this type of documentary theatre considers the documented material of the 
investigation. Therefore it is called tribunal theatre. Paget explains: 
 
In tribunal theatre, the ‘plays’ are edited transcripts (‘redactions’) of 
trials, tribunals and public inquiries. These constitute the basis for 
theatrical representation. […] Where tribunal theatre is concerned, 
mise-en-scène and acting style alike must be realist and ‘authentic’ 
in that sense. (Paget 2009, 233-4) 
 
Paget’s note about the ‘theatrical representation’ is crucial to distinguish tribunal plays 
from the rest of contemporary documentary theatre. The ‘realist’ and ‘authentic’ 
representation that involves each single element of the play indicates the playwright’s 
loyalty not only to the documented material, but also to the context of the actual trial. Such 
loyalty, though, seems impossible because the documented material of the trial is usually 
too huge to fit the limited time of a theatrical performance. Commenting on Kipphardt’s 
play, Ivo Schneider argues: 
 
Kipphardt used the 300 pages of the minutes of the hearing as the 
main source of this play. Since only 1% or 2% of this text would 
have sufficed to fill the time available for a play he had to shorten 
and condense the hearing considerably. Whereas in the real hearing 
which lasted about a month 40 witnesses were heard, in Kipphardt’s 
play only six show up, three of them defending Oppenheimer and 
other three being convinced of his guilt. (Schneider 131)    
 
On the one hand, this problem indicates the playwright’s big effort to condense documented 
material in order to fit theatre demands. On the other, this process of editing will always be 
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accused of inadequacy, especially if the topic is controversial, which is usually the case 
with trials and inquiries.     
The most striking feature of this resurgence of documentary theatre is its political 
goal. Thomas Irmer argues: 
 
The political agenda of the 1920s, as shown in Piscator’s 
productions of the time, was the class struggle; the context was the 
unstable economic and political situation of Weimar Germany [...] 
In contrast, the political agenda in West Germany during the early 
1960s was unified in its desire to put the Nazi past literally on trial 
and to find out about the forces behind this historical process that 
had led to Nazism. (Irmer 17) 
 
In this sense, years after the fall of ‘Nazism’, neither The Investigation nor The 
Representative contradicts a dominant political system. Even if In the Matter of J. Robert 
Oppenheimer can be considered as an indirect critique of the American capitalist eagerness 
to obtain nuclear weapons, such criticism does not suggest communism as an alternative 
because the former Soviet Union was as keen as the US to win the arms race during the 
heyday of the Cold War in the 1960s. When Irmer uses the verb ‘find out’ as the goal of 
these plays, he suggests that documentary theatre in the 1960s was an attempt to involve the 
audience in a process of raising questions about the near past and searching for answers in 
order to avoid the disastrous mistakes of this history. In this respect, both Piscatorian and 
Brechtian techniques are utilised without their political agitprop narrative. 
Paget suggests that all documentary forms, including theatre, whether they deal with 
communal, national or international matters, usually seek to achieve one or more of four 
goals: to re-evaluate histories, to respect and focus on the past and the ambitions of 
suppressed sectors of society, to scrutinise controversial events, and to distribute 
information as a method of convincing the audience (Paget 2009, 227-28). Reading 
documentary plays of the 1960s with Paget’s four functions in mind suggests, for instance, 
that The Representative indicates Hochhuth’s desire to reconsider history by examining its 
controversial events in order to raise the audience’s awareness of them. In this respect, the 
informative purpose seems to be the common aspect of all the functions of documentary 
theatre. In its turn, informing spectators is a method of social change, which is the ultimate 
goal that The Representative, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, and The 
Investigation seek to accomplish. This feeling of the need for change is what these political 
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plays of the 1960s share with Piscator and Brecht, regardless of the difference about the 
means of reforming society. Weiss argues: ‘Brecht is the one who has helped me most, 
because he never wrote anything just for the sake of the dramatic event but rather to show 
how the world is and find out how to change it. […] Brecht is so alive, so much more alive 
than most contemporary playwrights’ (Weiss 1966, 112). This vision of theatre as a method 
of enlightening the public seems to define contemporary British and American plays in 
their response to the War on Terror.  
Weiss’ insistence on the significance of Brecht’s theory and practice generates two 
observations. Firstly, just like Piscator and Brecht, Weiss believes that documentary theatre 
in the 1960s was a reform of both society and theatre. Weiss justifies the choosing of the 
documentary form as a matter of necessity, as he argues: 
 
[T]he traditional theatre […] is lost, as petrified as the bourgeois 
audience which goes to it. But there are new possibilities for a 
theatre which can take up the reality in and around each human life, 
and a renaissance is coming for theatre from vastly different and un-
expected directions–at one side, the theatre of Happenings, and on 
the other extreme the theatre of documentation (Weiss 1966, 108). 
 
Although documentary theatre in the 1960s does not suggest communism as an ideological 
alternative, Weiss condemns ‘bourgeois’ spectators, whose preferences cause the crisis of 
the German theatre. Daniel Meyer-Dinkgräfe argues that during the 1950s and the 1960s, 
boulevard comedies were at their peak in Germany, where spectators were paying money to 
watch trivial, shallow, and pointless entertainment (Meyer-Dinkgräfe 2005, 3-4). In this 
respect, the resurgence of documentary theatre in the 1960s, similar to its birth in the 1920s, 
was a result of historical – social and artistic – circumstances in Germany. Put differently, 
if political theatre with documentary techniques was Piscator’s revolt against what 
Nowatzki calls ‘the utopian concepts of the late expressionists’, Weiss’ contradicted the 
‘petrified’, merely entertaining theatre by ‘the theatre of documentation’. In addition to the 
prosperity of the bourgeois commercial plays, the 1950s was the heyday of the Theatre of 
the Absurd. The latter based its apolitical nature on more philosophical rather than 
commercial bases. In their introduction to Weiss’ play The New Trial, James Rolleston and 
Kai Evers argue that documentary theatre ‘revolts against a drama that turns its own despair 
and anger into its main theme and that clings to the concept of a hopeless and absurd world’ 
94 
 
(Rolleston 11).88 At the end of this chapter, I will extend my comparison between the two 
booms in political theatre in the twentieth century to suggest that the utilisation of 
documentary techniques as a challenge of dominant apolitical forms of theatre seems to be 
repeated with the second revival of documentary theatre in the twenty-first century. 
My second observation on Weiss’ comment on Brecht is that it can explain the 
continuity of the latter’s twofold influence on contemporary political theatre. This influence 
comes not only through Brecht’s own works but also from the presence of Brechtian theory 
and techniques within the works of a large number of playwrights and directors. Weiss is 
just one of several German dramatists who followed Brecht, at least for a while; others 
include as Heiner Müller and Peter Handke. Mary Luckhurst argues that: 
 
Brecht was the most radical theorist and practitioner of twentieth-
century theatre. His methods of writing and developing plays, his 
training for writers, actors and directors, his interrogation of design 
and stage lighting, and his collaborations with composers, singers 
and musicians defined a particular kind of political theatre – and 
practitioners the world over continue to modify and rework Brecht’s 
theory and praxis to make interventionist theatres of their own. 
(Luckhurst 2006, 193) 
 
When Luckhurst uses the phrase ‘of their own’ she reminds us of the flexibility of 
employing Brechtian techniques for completely different ideological reasons.89 
In addition, the insistence on extending Brecht’s practice to include nonverbal 
elements of the performance explains his influence on both directors and playwrights. 
Commenting on the American playwright Arthur Miller’s stage directions, Arnold Aronson 
claims that ‘Miller’s scenographic combination of realistic detail with heightened 
theatricality makes him sound amazingly like Bertolt Brecht’ (Aronson 84). In Britain, the 
effect of Brecht’s thoughts can be seen within political plays in the 1970s and 1980s, which 
were written by playwrights such as Caryl Churchill, David Hare, Howard Brenton, and 
David Edgar. Janelle Reinelt explains: 
 
                                                 
88 For more information about the influence of the Theatre of the Absurd on German theatre in the 1850s, see 
Lehmann (52-3), and Castein (195). 
89 The effect of Brecht on Western theatre is a huge topic that this thesis cannot thoroughly explore. It may be 
useful to mention that Brechtian influences on both Egyptian and Syrian theatre can be traced back to the 
1960s, when political theatre reached its peak. In addition, Brecht’s techniques are widely utilised as the 
intentional exposing of theatrical artifice, regardless of its political goal, seems to amuse Arabic spectators.   
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Brecht’s dramaturgy was able to […] become a “legacy,” because 
the postwar situation in Britain was hospitable to, or compatible 
with, epic theatre practice, accommodating a space for political 
opposition in theatrical representation that produced a hybrid 
British form of recognizably Brechtian theatre—sometimes when 
the relationship to Brecht was unconscious or even hotly contested 
(Reinelt 1999, 1). 
 
Although Reinelt’s observation underscores the importance of social circumstances in 
encouraging playwrights to borrow from ‘epic theatre practice’, she also refers to 
playwrights’ involuntarily utilisation of Brechtian techniques, which indicates the latter’s 
huge effect. In this respect, it can be understood why the vast majority of the plays studied 
in this thesis, even those whose playwrights do not choose the documentary form, recruit 
Brechtian techniques such as minimal scenes and props, and actors’ playing of different 
characters within the same play. Alongside the influence of documentary theatre, whether 
of Piscator or Weiss, contemporary British and American playwrights make political 
theatre ‘of their own’. However, with some similarities and discrepancies, the revitalisation 
of ‘political’ documentary theatre since the 1990s, especially in Britain, seems to be much 
more complicated than its ancestors in the 1920s and its renewal in the 1960s. The vast 
majority of contemporary documentary theatre belongs to one of two types: tribunal or 
verbatim theatre.90 
 
Tribunal plays: Is it theatre or journalism? 
In the footsteps of the documentary theatre of the 1960s, political documentary 
theatre in Britain began a new era. As David Lane explains: 
 
In June 1994 the Tricycle Theatre in Kilburn, North London, 
produced a play constructed from nearly 400 hours of evidence 
given at the Scott Inquiry, the investigation concerning the sale of 
arms to Iraq under the Thatcher government. As well as condensing 
the material into two and a half hours of stage time, almost all of 
Half The Picture: the Scott Arms to Iraq Inquiry, edited by 
journalist Richard Norton-Taylor, was constructed from words 
spoken by the lawyers and by those who had given evidence. (Lane 
58) 
 
                                                 
90 Although the differences between the two forms are supposed to be obvious, there is a noticeable mistake 
of using the two terms as if they are identical, whether by practitioners or critics. The reasons for this 
conflation will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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The most prominent difference from the 1960s, though, is that the text of Half the Picture 
is edited by a journalist, not a playwright, something which will be repeated with more 
tribunal plays in the following years. Chris Megson argues: 
 
Half the Picture was the first of the so-called Tribunal plays to be 
staged at the Tricycle, and this model of testimonial theatre, with its 
roots in the European documentary tradition, has been adopted or 
adapted by a great many practitioners and companies in the ensuing 
period (Megson 2006, 530). 
 
Critics’ claims about the linkage between Half the Picture and German documentary 
theatre in the 1960s is usually limited to mentioning Weiss’s The Investigation, which was 
preceded by the two plays of Hochhuth and Kipphardt. When Paget claims that 
‘documentation [within Hochhuth’s play] was mainly achieved via lengthy published ‘stage 
directions’ (which were in effect footnotes)’ (Paget 1998, 109), it seems that Paget 
indirectly suggests that The Representative is more suitable to be read rather than 
represented in theatre. In addition, although In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer is a 
good example of a tribunal play, Kipphardt’s play did not get the popularity Weiss’s play 
remarkably obtained.  
The Investigation ‘was first presented as a play simultaneously in thirteen theatres in 
both East and West Germany on October 19th 1965 and had a public midnight reading by 
the Royal Shakespeare Company under the direction of Peter Brook that same night at the 
Aldwych Theatre, London’ (Weiss 2010, 8). Such international interest in Weiss’s play can 
be understood on the grounds of the significance of its topic. In addition, apart from 
documentary theatre, Weiss is better known as a playwright than his comrades, especially 
with his utilisation of Brecht’s devices, as can be seen, for instance, in Marat/Sade 
(1963).91 
Being a journalist, Norton-Taylor had to discover the difficulty of turning long 
hours of factual testimonies into a tribunal play, the same problem that faced German 
playwrights in the 1960s. Norton-Taylor explains the difficulties of writing what he calls 
‘courtroom drama’. He argues:  
 
                                                 
91 Weiss’ most translated and reproduced play. Its complete title: The Persecution and Assassination of Jean-
Paul Marat as Performed by the Inmates of the Asylum of Charenton under the Direction of the Marquis de 
Sade, is probably the longest in the history of theatre. 
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[H]ow to boil down six weeks of oral evidence into a little over two 
hours. The problem was not what to put in, but what to take out. 
Despite past experience I seriously underestimated the difference 
between writing for a newspaper and writing for the stage, even 
though we were dealing with precisely the same raw material, 
precisely the same words. (Norton-Taylor The Guardian, A6) 
 
It seems that Norton-Taylor raises our awareness to the big task of turning the documents 
of a trial into a play, which demands long hours of work. Such a tremendous process of 
editing is appreciated by Luckhurst, who comments on Norton-Taylor’s turning of different 
inquiries into plays. She claims:  
 
Editing seems an insufficient term to describe the stringent selection 
and dramatic shaping that he has to do: for the Nuremberg War 
Crimes Trials over 50 million pages of documents were produced; 
the Lawrence Inquiry lasted for 69 days, the Saville Inquiry took 
2,500 witness statements and heard evidence from 921 witnesses, 
and the Hutton Inquiry sat for 25 days. (Luckhurst 2008, 206) 
 
But, if Norton-Taylor’s work on tribunal plays makes him more than an editor, does this 
make him a playwright? This question draws our attention to Norton-Taylor’s previous 
comment when he compares the work of playwrights and journalists, which hints at another 
matter of tribunal plays: the critique of their lack of art. Put differently, documentary 
theatre in general, and tribunal plays in particular are, to use Norton-Taylor’s words, 
‘seriously underestimated’.   
It is important to realise that Norton-Taylor has never claimed that he is a 
playwright. All the front covers of his published plays describe him as an editor. However, 
it seems important to discuss the constant devaluation of all documentary drama, including 
documentary movies and TV docudramas, on the grounds of their less artistic and more 
journalistic nature. Paget mentions the consistency of these accusations when he claims: 
‘The very event-specificity of the form (not to speak of its technical complexity, collective 
tradition, and oppositional left-wing history) has tended to militate against its construction 
as ‘art’ by those empowered to make such judgments’ (Paget 1992, 173).First and 
foremost, establishing the claim of the less-theatrical/more-journalistic documentary plays 
on the utilisation of ready material would raise questions about all historical plays, whose 
dramatic actions and characters are borrowed, in different degrees, from factual incidents 
and real persons. Moreover, being based on factual contemporary stories does not prevent 
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Woyzeck or Miss Julie from becoming the most acclaimed dramatic work of Georg Büchner 
and August Strindberg respectively. Furthermore, the history of theatre is full of plays that 
re-create other works, which means that the process of composition itself gives the new 
play its uniqueness. For example, we cannot consider Jean Racine’s Phèdre (1677) a less 
theatrical work than Euripides’ Hippolytus (428 B.C.), which itself is a rewriting of the 
Greek mythical narrative. The same can be said about Hamlet and Thomas Kyd’s The 
Spanish Tragedy, and about Brecht’s rewriting of Shakespeare’s Coriolanus.  
Finally, and most importantly, even in the case of writing a completely ‘imaginary’ 
play, or a novel, is it really completely imagined? Whether in terms of dramatic characters 
or actions the process of writing is very complicated, as the writers themselves cannot 
differentiate between conscious and unconscious aspects of their own writing. What may 
seem, even to the playwright, to be his/her invented dramatic character can be a rewriting 
of a real person(s) or an old fictional character. There is no writer whose text does not 
include this kind of intertextuality. Paget insists that ‘‘drama’ and ‘documentary’ do not 
automatically map on to ‘fiction’ and ‘fact’. […] The ‘fully-fashioned’ version […] is a 
thing of autobiographical fragments, of half-remembered and misremembered moments, of 
fantasy and imagination’ (Paget 1998, 106-7). It is important to realise that the general 
debate about documentary drama’s lack of validity as art becomes fiercer regarding tribunal 
plays because of the latter’s ‘realist’ and ‘authentic’ representation/reconstruction of the 
trial or the inquiry. 
Further debate about tribunal plays stems from the process of editing itself, during 
which as Norton-Taylor mentions, the editor has to decide ‘what to take out’ from the 
original documents. Several scholars and critics raise questions about the effect of editing 
on the accuracy of the original documentary material, part of which is excluded from the 
tribunal play. In 2005, Norton-Taylor turned the documents of the Saville Inquiry, which 
reinvestigated the death of thirteen Irish citizens by British bullets in 1972, into a tribunal 
play. Bloody Sunday: Scenes from the Saville Inquiry was premiered in April 2005 at the 
Tricycle Theatre in London. In her comment on the performance, Karen Fricker draws our 
attention to a potentially immoral aspect of the inevitable need for editing huge documented 
materials. According to her, this process ‘raises serious ethical concerns. Editing is always 
subjective, but especially so in this type of theatre, where it is the primary creative tool’ 
(Fricker 79). By considering that the spectator of a tribunal play builds his or her point of 
view on the available documents, I realise the significance of Fricker’s observation. 
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In his study of Half the Picture, Megson argues that the tribunal play’s ‘overall 
effect draws attention to the evasive circumlocutions, sophistic indirections and rhetorical 
gymnastics of politicians and other public officials’ (Megson 2009, 196). The question is: 
do Norton-Taylor’s editing interventions lead spectators to a specific opinion? The editor’s 
own preferences can be expressed through selecting what documentary material is to be 
included within, or excluded from, the play. Secondly, the rearrangement of the chosen 
material can hint at a particular message within the play. But does the editor have this right 
to express his own opinion, even indirectly?   
This gap between the raw documents and the tribunal play, in which these 
documents are processed, seems inevitable not only because of the practical limit of time in 
theatre, but also, and most importantly, because the editor has his own point of view, 
because of which he has chosen to transmit this documentary material to a play in the first 
place. Without the editor’s efforts, any tribunal play will be reduced to a mere copying of 
the real inquiry, an abridged version of its large number of documents. It can be argued that 
the main, perhaps only, rationale of a tribunal play should be to inform the public about the 
inquiry itself. This claim ignores the relationship between the original documents and the 
play as a work of art, where the latter is a representation of the former. 
The original, precise, and chronological record of the inquiry—including its verdict, 
if there is such a decision—can be obtained by the readers. However, Fricker’s note about 
the ethical factors seems reasonable since the tribunal play was performed before the 
publication of the inquiry’s documents. Put differently, until the original documents of the 
inquiry become available for the public, the tribunal play is the only source of information. 
In her comment on Bloody Sunday, Claire Shannon claims: 
Perhaps this is the best way to do politics, and make important 
decisions in our complicated fractious world, condense our events 
and catastrophes into cool, calm presentations, and allow the 
audience to become a jury, as it seemed to do here. The Saville 
Inquiry will not be published until late this year or early 
2006[sic]. (Shannon 2005, 20) 
 
Ending her review with this notice in bold, Shannon seems to encourage the readers to 
watch the play as the only method of information about the Inquiry, especially with her 
indirect promise to spectators that they will be unofficial members of the ‘jury’.   
The insistence on the informative goal of the tribunal play can be seen by 
considering that the vast majority of Norton-Taylor’s plays were produced before the public 
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declaration of the inquiries they represent. The only exception is Tactical Questioning: 
Scenes from the Baha Mousa inquiry, whose premiere at the Tricycle Theatre coincided 
with the release of the inquiry outcome in the summer of 2011. Without spectators’ 
awareness of the representative nature of any documentary play, the latter can be conceived 
as an imperfect and unethical replica of the factual event. Half the Picture specifically goes 
further in contradicting the demand of objectivity. When Megson mentions that the play ‘is 
unique amongst Norton-Taylor’s tribunal plays in featuring interpolated monologues 
written by the socialist playwright and director […] John McGrath (Megson 2009, 196), we 
cannot decisively consider whether the absence of such an addition from Norton-Taylor’s 
next plays constitutes a kind of retreat or not. The effect of McGrath’s speeches on the play 
as an ‘authentic’ representation of the trial extends the influence of omitting some of the 
original testimonies or the rearrangement of those which were chosen. These added 
speeches shape an independent discourse that must create a dialectical relationship with the 
rest of the play. Not only do McGrath’s speeches suggest a specific message, they also 
create a tension between their literary language and the practical nature of testimonies. The 
ethics of the tribunal play seem to be a controversial matter. However, it is hard to ignore 
the editor’s own opinion on the topic of his/her play. Moreover, this opinion may be what 
some members of the audience want to know, considering the credibility of the editor 
whether as a writer or a journalist. These debates about the tribunal plays were repeated on 
a wider scale about the Verbatim Theatre, the second form of documentary theatre, which 
proved to be more popular than tribunal plays, especially amongst practitioners and 
playwrights.  
 
‘Verbatim’ versus ‘verbatim’: The chaos of terminology 
In 1987, Paget coined the term ‘Verbatim Theatre’ to describe a specific type of 
documentary theatre, which he uses to describe a group of performances in Britain between 
1971 and 1987. He suggests a list of twenty-three titles of Verbatim plays, which were 
performed in twenty-four productions (Paget 1987, 23). Just like Paget’s suggestion about 
using capital letters in writing the term Documentary Theatre, Michael Anderson and 
Linden Wilkinson argue that they ‘capitalise ‘Verbatim Theatre’ to distinguish it as a 
theatrical form’ (Anderson 168). I will follow their suggestion to avoid the confusion 
between the literal meaning of the word ‘verbatim’ and the form of Verbatim Theatre. This 
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confusion seems one of the reasons for Paget’s insistence on distinguishing Verbatim 
Theatre from tribunal play, twenty-two years after he suggested his term. Paget explains: 
 
In verbatim theatre, the ‘plays’ are edited […] interviews with 
individuals. Sometimes these interviews are taped and transcribed, 
sometimes actors work directly with the tapes themselves. 
Whatever the variants, aural testimony constitutes the basis for 
theatrical representation’. (Paget 2009, 233-4)  
 
In this sense, there are two essential differences between Verbatim Theatre and tribunal 
plays regarding both the documentary material and theatrical representation. As the sub-
title of his 1987 article ‘Oral history and Documentary Techniques’ (Paget 1987, 317) 
denotes, the material of a Verbatim play is ‘oral’ speeches collected through ‘interviews’, 
not a documented log of a tribunal or inquiry. In terms of the performance, instead of the 
strict ‘realist’ and ‘authentic’ representation in tribunal plays, Verbatim plays, according to 
Paget, ‘have closer connection with documentary theatre of the past in terms of their more 
fluid use of stage space and more flexible expectations of actors’ (Paget 2009, 234). In this 
respect, Piscatorian/Brechtian techniques can be utilised to give the performances of 
Verbatim plays much more vitality compared to the rigidity of tribunal plays. In addition, 
while tribunal plays are thoroughly based upon the original documented tribunals, Paget 
claims that: 
 
‘Collage’ […] is frequently the key descriptive term for 
practitioners of Verbatim Theatre. As with most variants of 
documentary theatre, the essential difficulty in the working process 
is the reduction of mass of source material to some sort of viable 
theatrical shape, producing a very real uncertainty at the outset, 
when a company initially assembles with no material at all beyond a 
basic subject area. (Paget 1987, 323) 
 
The most striking feature of Paget’s observation is that the Verbatim play sometimes starts 
with a suggested theme, which consequently defines the people who are going to be 
interviewed, rather than the editors’ commitment to the strict record of the trial. 
 In his 1987 article, Paget defines two different types of Verbatim Theatre: 
‘Celebratory’ play and a play whose topic is ‘Controversy’. In addition to their theatrical 
differences, Paget’s categorisation describes these Verbatim plays in terms of their topics. 
According to Paget, ‘Celebratory’ Verbatim plays are more like ‘'human interest' stories in 
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journalism: in celebrating locality, and in seeking out discourse not normally privileged by 
either the journalistic or the entertainment media’ (Paget 1987, 322). Unlike the individual 
or communal nature of the ‘Celebratory’, Verbatim plays of ‘Controversy’, as Paget 
explains, investigate, or raise national controversial matters that concern the entire country 
at the moment (Paget 1987, 22). The difference between the two types seems to be at the 
root of Paget’s conception of the four general functions of documentary drama (Paget 1990, 
68-9), which he has elaborated upon (Paget 2009, 227-8). According to these functions, 
Celebratory documentary plays ‘celebrate repressed or marginalised communities and 
groups, bringing to light their histories and aspirations’ (Paget 2009, 227). I am wondering 
if I might take the risk of suggesting that the word ‘Celebratory’ perhaps seems relevant to 
describe documentary autobiographies in terms of their similarity with ‘human interest 
stories in journalism’. 
By including international matters, many of the plays studied in this thesis can be 
considered Verbatim theatre of ‘Controversy’, which ‘investigate contentious events and 
issues in local, national and international contexts’ (Paget 2009, 227). I claim that both the 
topic and message of most political drama are intrinsically controversial. In this respect, 
plays such as Guantánamo: Honour Bound to Defend Freedom, and Talking to Terrorists – 
both were mentioned in the first chapter – are Verbatim plays of Controversy because both 
plays comprise ‘interviews with individuals’. However, in the latter play, Soans does not 
stick to the veracity of the statements. In contrast, Brittain and Slovo commit themselves to 
a high degree of objectivity, which extends to the published text. They adopt the strict rules 
of academic writing by placing their few descriptive interventions in square brackets to 
distinguish them from the citations from documented testimonies. While stage directions 
can be translated to visual aspects of the performance, these notes address the reader rather 
than spectators.   
Similarly to Soans, Hare has been criticised for his alterations of the statements in 
his Verbatim plays such as The Permanent Way, which premiered in November 2003 at the 
Theatre Royal in York. The topic of Hare’s play is a controversial as he addresses a 
national matter, which is the crisis in the British railway system. Reinelt argues: 
 
While it is true that plays like The Permanent Way or Talking to 
Terrorists (2005) are composed of such materials, their authors 
(David Hare and Robin Soans, respectively) freely admit they 
sometimes combine material from more than one source within one 
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speech, or even provide generically representative dialogue in 
places. I dislike the term ‘verbatim’ because it needlessly ups the 
ante on the promise of documentary. (Reinelt 2009, 13) 
 
On the one hand, it seems that the critique of playwrights’ interpositions extends to the 
form itself. Moreover, the ‘expectations’ of the word ‘verbatim’ seem to ignore the origin 
of the term ‘Verbatim’, which describes the way in which the material is collected and 
represented without any insistence on the ultimate commitment to the precision of the 
speeches given by the interviewees. In contrast, according to Paget, Verbatim shows during 
the 1970s and 1980s freely edited these statements. Therefore, Paget does not exclude Hare 
from Verbatim Theatre. Instead, the former describes the latter’s Verbatim plays as 
‘transmutations’ of the factual statements (Paget 2009, 233). On the other hand, Reinelt’s 
argument can be understood on the grounds of her awareness of the misuse of the word 
‘verbatim’ by a large number of practitioners and critics, when they mean documentary 
theatre in general, or tribunal plays in particular. 
 Demanding Verbatim theatre to be precise seems to recall the strict conditions of 
the 1960s, in which Clas Zilliacus claims that the ‘conscientious adherence to the letter of 
the material used was, to a much higher degree than before, regarded as a sine qua non’ 
(Zilliacus 224). The insistence on such a demand can indicate an unconscious upholding of 
the 1960s prototype. Paget gives an example of what he claims as an ‘apparent 
determination of theatre journalism to conflate verbatim and tribunal theatre’ (Paget 2009, 
233). To give an example of the confusion between the two different forms, Kate Kellaway 
argues:  
 
Several of the most successful verbatim (relying on actual 
testimony) plays have been written by journalists. The Colour of 
Justice, the 1999 recreation of the Stephen Lawrence inquiry by 
Richard Norton-Taylor, led the way. He went on to produce 
Justifying War: Scenes from the Hutton Enquiry. Then came 
Guantanamo, by Victoria Brittain and Gillian Slovo (neither of 
them playwrights) about the treatment of prisoners at Camp Delta’. 
(Kellaway, web) 
 
Although Kellaway’s observation on the fact that there is a larger number of documentary 
plays written by journalists and even actors, she uses the word ‘verbatim’ to describe three 
plays, including two tribunal plays.  
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The conflation between tribunal and Verbatim Theatre extends to the writing of 
both critics and academics. For instance, Aleks Sierz argues that: 
 
Plays such as David Hare’s Stuff Happens, Robin Soans’s Talking 
to Terrorists and Bloody Sunday: scenes from the Saville Inquiry 
are interesting in content but, being verbatim theatre, somewhat 
unexciting in form. What is missing is a wilder, more off-the-wall 
engagement. Instead of mimicking journalism, theatre needs to use 
metaphor and imagery to awaken our imaginations. (Sierz New 
Statesman, 26) 
 
Confusing ‘[V]erbatim [T]heatre’ with Norton-Taylor’s tribunal play leads Sierz to 
contradict the common critique of Hare and Soans regarding their dramatic alterations of 
the factual material. Instead, Sierz blames their plays for the lack of imagination. Such a 
critical judgment is based on Sierz’s negative opinion on using documentary material in 
theatre in general.  Sierz claims: 
 
If all plays, no matter how domestic, are political, then no plays are 
political. A better way of defining a political play might be to insist 
that it should offer both explicit political ideas and some hope of 
change. By this definition, the problem with verbatim theatre is that 
it merely reflects reality, when the point, surely, is to change it. 
(Sierz PAJ, 59) 
 
Apart from using the phrase ‘verbatim theatre’ to describe documentary theatre, Sierz’s 
objection to the claim that all plays belong to political theatre can be understood in the 
context of the discussion at the beginning of this chapter. Moreover, suggesting the ‘hope 
of change’ as a function of political plays fits the nature of contemporary political theatre. 
However, Sierz’s supposition that documentary theatre is not able to achieve this goal 
ignores the effective role of the informative function, which itself includes the hope of 
change not only in Verbatim Theatre, but also in tribunal plays. Even when the play 
‘merely reflects reality’, the disastrous facts that shock the audience involve a ‘hope of 
change’.  
Commenting on Paget’s distinguishing between ‘celebratory’ and ‘controversy’, 
Jenny Hughes suggests an alternative classification of [V]erbatim plays in the 
contemporary British theatre. She declares that ‘three categories of verbatim theatre are 
offered, each of which denotes distinct dramatisations of the voice: the ‘forensic’, the 
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‘exceptional’ and the ‘composed’ (Hughes 2011, 93). When Hughes starts to explain what 
she means by these three categories, she argues:   
 
The ‘forensic’ refers to Tricycle Theatre’s ‘Tribunal plays’, a form 
of verbatim theatre that stages edited transcripts of Public Inquiries 
and draws on precise, legalistic framings of the voice’. [...] My 
discussion here focuses on Half the Picture (1994), Justifying War 
(2003) and Called to Account (2007). (Hughes 2011, 93) 
 
Apart from considering Norton-Taylor’s tribunal plays a category under ‘verbatim theatre’, 
which here means documentary theatre, Hughes’ description of the tribunal play as 
‘forensic’ is not new.92 Moreover, although using such descriptions is useful in terms of 
explaining the nature of tribunal theatre, it seems confusing to replace the well-known term 
by another one.    
 The two other ‘categories’ suggested by Hughes include Verbatim plays, which 
means that we can exclude the first category and consider these two categories a 
development of Paget’s 1987 term in order to suite Verbatim plays in 2000s. She claims:    
 
The second category, the ‘exceptional’, refers to the staging of 
testimony from spaces of exception, and the discussion here focuses 
on Victoria Brittain and Gillian Slovo’s Guantánamo: Honour 
Bound to Defend Freedom (2004, originally staged at the Tricycle 
Theatre), Robin Soans’ Talking to Terrorists and Alan Rickman and 
Katharine Viner’s My Name is Rachel Corrie (both originally 
staged at the Royal Court Theatre in 2005). (Hughes 2011, 93) 
 
The phrase ‘spaces of exceptions’, which figuratively refers to the unjust breach of law, 
ethics, or human rights, can describe most Norton-Taylor’s tribunal plays, which Hughes 
separates as ‘forensic’. The death of Dr David Kelly in the context of inventing reasons for 
invading Iraq is an exceptional space in Justifying War. Likewise, questioning Tony Blair’s 
role in the War in Iraq is related to ‘spaces of exceptions’ visited by Called to Account. 
Similar aspects can be found within many of tribunal plays, including the exceptional 
atrocity of the Holocaust in Auschwitz as Weiss’ The Investigation represents.  
Moreover, even if what Hughes means by ‘spaces of exceptions’ is literally based 
on geographical criteria, because the events on which these plays comment take place in 
                                                 
92 For example, four years before Hughes’ book, Michael Billington described tribunal plays as ‘forensic’ in 
his review of Called to Account in The Guardian, 24 April 2007. 
106 
 
different locations of the world, Verbatim Theatre of ‘controversy’ extends to include 
international matters. Put differently, why do we need a new terminology? When Hughes 
explains the third category, this question seems to be necessary. She claims:  ‘The third 
category, the ‘composed’, refers to plays that combine ‘found’ speech drawn from 
documented records and ‘made’ speech devised by playwrights, and this section focuses on 
David Hare’s Stuff Happens (produced by the National Theatre in 2004)’ (Hughes 2011, 
93). After basing the first two categories on thematic features, Hughes builds the distinction 
of Stuff Happens on technical grounds because the play is ‘composed’ of documentary 
statements and imaginary characters’ speeches written by Hare. On theses technical 
grounds, Soans’ play should belong to this third category, not the second. However, is not 
the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq as Hare portrays in Stuff Happens one of the ‘spaces of 
exceptions’? Here, the contradiction between subject matter and theatrical composition as a 
base for classification becomes clear.     
Another variation of confusing use of terms is to distinguish both Verbatim and 
Tribunal plays from documentary theatre. Lib Taylor argues: 
 
In recent times this [Fact-based theatre] has taken three 
predominant forms, though these forms are tendencies, not always 
distinct from one another. First, verbatim theatre, like Black Watch 
(2007) and Guantánamo (2004), is based in the representation of 
the actual words of real people collected through, for example, 
interviews or letters. Second, tribunal theatre, like The Colour of 
Justice (1999) and Justifying War (2003), is based on court and 
public enquiry transcripts and also uses actual words, but they are 
collected from formal documents and court records. (Taylor 2011, 
227) 
 
So far, Taylor’s classification seems to be relevant to the differences between the two forms 
of the ‘fact-based theatre’, which is understood to be a description of documentary theatre.  
However, when Taylor argues: ‘Third, documentary plays, such as David Hare’s The 
Power of Yes (2009) and The Permanent Way (2003) and Robin Soans’s Talking to 
Terrorists (2005)’ (Taylor 2011, 227), she excludes the plays of Hare and Soans from her 
first category: Verbatim theatre.  
One reason for such confusion can be the fact that there is a wide spectrum of 
utilising documentary material within plays, which are neither Verbatim nor tribunal. 
Moreover some of these plays include testimonies. Forsyth explains: ‘During the last two 
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decades there has been a marked multiplication of dramatic works which utilize testimony 
(verbatim theatre, Tribunal plays, documentary theatre)’ (Forsyth 2013, 1). Such an 
observation is significant to realise that some testimonies are not collected through 
interviews or strictly edited from official statements given in a courtroom.  
This excessive misuse of the word ‘verbatim’ by British critics may explain why the 
American academic Carol Martin argues: ‘In the United Kingdom, documentary theatre is 
known as “verbatim theatre” because of its penchant for direct quotation. However, 
verbatim theatre does not necessarily display its quotation marks, its exact sources’ (Martin, 
‘Bodies of Evidence’ 23). Moreover, in her introduction to the anthology Dramaturgy of 
the Real on the World Stage, she extends the terminological conflations by declaring: 
‘Theatre of the real, also known as documentary theatre as well as docudrama, verbatim 
theatre, reality-based theatre, theatre of witness, tribunal theatre, nonfiction theatre, and 
theatre of fact, has long been important for the subjects it presents’ (Martin, 
’Introduction’1). On one hand, describing documentary theatre as ‘Theatre of the real’ and 
‘reality-based theatre’ is as accepted, to some extent, as calling tribunal plays ‘theatre of 
witness’. On the other hand, the generalisation of considering both tribunal and Verbatim as 
synonyms to documentary leads to another simplistic description of documentary theatre as 
‘nonfiction’. 
These discrepant examples of defining the utilisation of documentary material in 
theatre suggests that the insistence on using the term ‘[V]erbatim [T]heatre’ as an 
alternative to documentary theatre partly relies on the comparison between the documented 
discourse within tribunal and Verbatim plays because speeches are literally much more 
verbatim in the former than the latter, which is supposed to be called Verbatim theatre. 
Even with the awareness of the difference between Verbatim and tribunal plays, the former 
is sometimes criticised because it does not apply the rules of on the former. Deirdre Heddon 
argues that ‘Verbatim plays do not, typically, provide us with the contextual information of 
the interviewing process itself; speech is lifted out of context and used within a different 
context’ (Heddon 118).  
In addition, the Verbatim plays of both Soans and Hare seems to be repeatedly 
compared to the veracity of documented speeches within the Verbatim play Guantánamo: 
Honour Bound to Defend Freedom. Therefore, when Sara Brady refers to Hare’s Stuff 
Happens, she claims that ‘Guantánamo was performed with an authority more closely 
aligned with strict verbatim’ (Brady 28). In contrast, Maurya Wickstrom uses the phrase 
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‘nearly verbatim’ (Wickstrom 190) to describe Ariane Mnouchkine's Verbatim play Le 
Dernier Caravansérail: (Odyssées), premiered at the Cartoucherie, Paris in April 2003.93 
On one hand, descriptions such as strict, nearly, quasi, more, or less verbatim seem to 
mistakenly use the literal meaning of the word, which is more suitable to describe tribunal 
plays. On the other hand, as Mnouchkine's play suggests, the revival of documentary 
theatre in general, and its Verbatim form in particular is not limited to contemporary 
political theatre in Britain and the US. Put differently, all over the world, documentary 
theatre became a method of informing the public about specific political or social matters, 
and a means of opposing the dominant authoritative discourses about such matters.94 
While many practitioners and critics extend the term verbatim to include all forms 
of documentary theatre, some of them do not mention Paget.As editors of the anthology 
Verbatim Verbatim: Contemporary Documentary Theatre (2008), Will Hammond and Dan 
Steward combine comments of Norton-Taylor and the director of his tribunal plays Nicolas 
Kent with testimonies of Soans and Hare. In addition to this baffling adjacency of the two 
documentary forms, the term ‘verbatim’ is repeatedly and loosely used to denote 
documentary theatre in general or tribunal plays in particular. Moreover, Christopher Innes 
mistakenly argues that ‘Alecky Blythe (artistic director of the Recorded Delivery theatre 
company) has labelled this style of documentary drama, at its most extreme, ‘‘verbatim’’ 
theatre’ (Innes 2007, 436).Innes’s description of ‘[V]erbatim theatre’ seems more suitable 
to fit tribunal plays, within which the strict adherence to the veracity of documents reaches 
‘its most extreme’.   
It seems necessary to mention that the importance of Paget’s explanation of 
Verbatim Theatre as a British phenomenon in the 1970s and 1980s does not mean that he 
suggests a break with the traditions of neither the 1920s nor the 1960s. In her comment on 
Paget’s 1987 article, Luckhurst argues: ‘While acknowledging that the German 
documentarytradition has been a major influence, Paget focuses on tracing a domestic 
lineage of documentary theatre’ (Luckhurst 2008, 201).Considering such continuity is 
important to realise that documentary theatre does not appear suddenly in the 2000s. In this 
                                                 
93 The play turns letters and testimonies of refugees from turbulent countries such as Afghanistan, Kurdistan, 
Iran, and Iraq—collected and edited by Mnouchkine and some actors of her company—to a five-hour 
dramatisation of the suffering of asylum seekers. For more information, see Turk (297-8).  
94 The same subject matter of Mnouchkine’s play was the topic of several Verbatim plays produced by 
Australian practitioners since 2001. After the 2011 Revolution in Egypt, there has been a noticeable trend for 
writing documentary plays, most of which were performed in fringe theatres. 
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respect, I can understand how British and American old forms of documentary theatre were 
as influential as their German ancestorson contemporary playwrights.  
Realising these various roots of the current revival of political theatre helps me to 
understand why many contemporary British and American Plays, which employ 
documentary material to comment on the ongoing conflicts, are neither Verbatim nor 
tribunal. Within these plays, documentary material is represented in different ways. Even 
dream-like plays tend to include some documentary materials, which are utilised to achieve 
the informative purpose. However, to describe such plays as documentary seems imprecise. 
Therefore, I focus on their topicality, which is the common feature of all the examples of 
plays studied in this thesis, and underline the employment of these plays’ documentary 
content.  
An explanation of this phenomenon can be suggested by recognising that, just like 
the 1920s, the popularity of both political and documentary plays in Germany in the sixties 
had echoes in Britain and the US. Paget claims: 
 
Theatre Workshop’s Oh What a Lovely War (1963) […] Peter 
Brook about the Vietnam war, U.S. (1965), were sometimes called 
‘theatre of fact’ at the time, as were American plays like Father 
Daniel Berrigan’s 1968 The Trial of the Catonsville Nine (about 
Vietnam ‘draft dodgers’) and Donald Freed’s 1970 Inquest (about 
the Rosenberg trial). (Paget 1998, 109) 
 
Such prosperity started to fade with the 1970s appearance of postmodernism raising a 
group of philosophical and social calls against dominant, traditional thoughts. The 
postmodernist denial of the essential notion of representation fogged the relationship 
between the factual world and theatrical performance, in which dramatic texts are seen as a 
burden on the sought dominance of visual elements. Secondly, the vast majority of theorists 
deal with the non-political aspect of postmodernism as if it is, by nature, an essential 
feature.95 
Whether influenced by the postdramatic foregrounding of visual elements of the 
performance, a specific type of play emerged in British theatre during the 1990s: the so-
called In-yer-face. The most striking aspect of these plays is their dramatic characters’ 
adherence to excessive verbal and physical violence. Although without a specific political 
                                                 
95 For more information about the apolitical nature of postmodernist theatre in the 1970s and 1980s, see 
Connor (142), Grant (13), Auslander (2004, 2), Lehmann (179), Hughes (2011, 18), and Hughes (2007, 133).    
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message, took two steps toward political theatre, firstly, by its reconsidering of dramatic 
text. When ‘cruelty’ reached its peak, it was a sign of more reasonable expression of 
opposition to emerge. Put differently, In-yer-face plays can be considered more political 
than postdramatic theatre. Both, nevertheless, are far from political theatre. In-yer-face 
plays were more of raucous cries rather than clear critical messages.96 
 As with the emergence of documentary theatre in the 1920s and its revitalisation in 
the 1960s, the boom in political drama with documentary techniques on the two sides of the 
Atlantic in the twenty-first century followed a period during which apolitical theatre 
prevailed. Hansen’s model of ‘metaphorical parallelism’ might help in illustrating this 
resemblance. While different historical circumstances and fundamental philosophies 
distinguish the motivation and function of political theatre in each period from the others, a 
cycle of neglecting and adopting documentary techniques is respectively correlated with the 
marginalisation and prosperity of political drama. 
 
 
Figure (4) 
                     The Cycle of Apolitical and Political Theatre 
 
As figure (4) depicts, I highlight such sequential occurrence of apolitical and political forms 
of theatre in order to suggest the effect of both postmodernism and In-yer-face plays on the 
                                                 
96 The term ‘In-yer-face’ was suggested by Aleks Sierz as he traces the common features of the British theatre 
in the 1990s. More information about this type of theatre can be found in Sierz (2001), Kritzer (28), Urban 
(43), Bottoms (56), and Reinelt (2006, 81). 
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contemporary revival of political theatre. Such influence can be realised in a large number 
of political plays, wherein marginal documentary lines are pronounced by fictional 
characters. In addition to the adjacency of documentary and imaginary aspects, the political 
themes within many plays I study in this thesis are woven with dreamlike plots.97 
Furthermore, Piscator’s documentary theatre was stylistically influenced by anti-
naturalistic features of the avant-garde movements in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, including Expressionism itself, whose apolitical nature was contradicted by the 
ideological orientation of Piscator’s theatre. Likewise, and apart from the tribunal plays of 
the 1960s, Weiss mingled documentary material with surrealistic and even absurd, verbal 
and visual elements in the imaginary plots of his plays Song of the Lusitanian Bogey 
(1967), Discourse on Vietnam (1968), and Mara/Sade.98 
Thus, dreamlike aspects of many contemporary political plays might indicate traces 
of postdramatic and In-yer-face plays, the documentary drama of the 1920s, and/or Weiss 
documentary but not tribunal plays. In addition, while contemporary tribunal plays seems 
to draw on their German ancestors of the 1960s, the free utilisation of documentary 
materials within contemporary Verbatim Theatre suggests the influence of Piscator’s plays 
as well as a linkage with what Paget calls ‘Controversy’ Verbatim plays whose responses to 
‘local, national and international’ events in the 1970s and 1980s highlight their political 
aspect. 
Whether one or more of these historical practices influenced contemporary political 
theatre, the inclusion of documentary material, which varies from regulating the entire play, 
in the case of tribunal to few, but significant scattered lines or facts within the imaginary 
realms of other plays, raises the question: why documentary material seems to be a 
common feature of most responses of contemporary political theatre to the violent 
conflicts?  
The simple answer to this question can be suggested by the history of documentary 
practice, which flourished during the two prominent periods of political theatre in the 1920s 
and 1960s. Put differently, the factual events that led to and accompanied the War on 
Terror encouraged playwrights to adopt documentary forms, whose emergence and revival 
                                                 
97 For scholars’ focus on the dreamlike feature of postdramatic theatre and In-yer-face plays, see Carroll (21), 
McConachie (167), Law (429), and Peacock (272).     
98 For claims of the inclusion of aspects of Expressionism within Piscator’s plays, see Warden (81), and 
Allain (2006, 142). For more information about Weiss’ employing of anti-naturalistic techniques alongside 
documentary material, see the studies of Beggs, Niemi, and Kamla.         
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in the twentieth century were pertinent to political theatre. Reinelt claims: ‘Documentary 
theatre is often politically engaged; although its effects may not match its intentions, it does 
summon public consideration of aspects of reality in spirit of critical reasoning’ 
(Reinelt2009, 12).Moreover, the capability of responding quickly to public interest in 
topical matters is the virtue of documentary plays, especially with the rapidly-unfolding 
events of the conflicts. Gerwin Strobl argues that ‘immediacy’ is what distinguishes topical 
plays from the vast majority of conventional theatre (Strobl 59). Similarly, Stuart Little 
links topical theatre with what he calls the play’s ‘Immediate meaning’ (Little 45).I suggest 
that describing imaginary plays as ‘conventional theatre’ is confusing because the term has 
been utilised by several artistic and theatrical reformers as a negative description of earlier 
trends, movements, or doctrines.99 
For contemporary topical plays, this ‘immediacy’ relies on the long history of 
documentary theatre of Piscator and Weiss alongside Brechtian techniques offers a model 
for both playwrights and directors to apply. Paget claims: ‘The theatre has one ready-made 
technique for treating immediate events in an overtly political way – factually-based, non-
naturalistic documentary theatre in the European tradition established by the likes of 
Piscator and Brecht’ (Paget 1992, 173). In addition to offering ‘ready-made technique[s]’ to 
contemporary playwrights, the ‘non-naturalistic’ and minimal scenery seems crucial in 
accelerating the process of production and reducing the cost of the performance.100As the 
following three chapters suggest, despite the propagandistic purpose of Piscatorian and 
Brechtian political theatre, the latter’s formalist aspects are manifested in contemporary 
American and British political plays. 
The need for a quick response to the events can explain a trend to reproduce classic 
plays to hint at the ongoing conflicts. This tendency is obvious in the case of the invasion 
of Iraq. Ilka Saal argues: 
 
Compared to fiction or film, theatre tends to react fairly swiftly to 
contemporary geopolitical crises such as the wars in Yugoslavia, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq, for instance, by alluding to them in the mise-
                                                 
99 In the late nineteenth century, the Romanticist plays were condemningly called conventional by Émile Zola. 
In turn, the term was utilised by the avant-garde movements in the early decades of the twentieth century to 
denounce the forms of popular theatre, including Naturalism. Later, the callers for postmodernist since the 
early 1970s described modern drama as conventional. For examples of such use of the term, see Garner Jr. 
(2003, 72), Saddik (19), Jannarone (499), Birringer (130), Abbotson (303), and Watt (1998, 113).         
100 This financial aspect could be one of the reasons for adopting documentary forms by the low-budget 
productions of local communities, amateur groups, and educational institutions.   
113 
 
en-scène of a production or by promptly reviving classic war 
dramas such as The Persians, Lysistrata, and The Trojan Women. 
(Saal 65) 
 
Aristophanes’ Lysistrata (411 BC) was utilised as a method of opposing the War in Iraq in 
a way that proves the role of alternative media in shaping and mobilising public opinion in 
an international sense. On 3 March 2003, nearly two weeks before the invasion, according 
to earlier arrangements among professional and amateur practitioners via emails, Lysistrata 
was read by thousands of groups all over the world, including many American cities.101 
Aristophanes’ mocking of men’s eagerness for wars did not prevent the Anglo-American 
coalition from invading Iraq, but it does what theatre is entitled, and needed, to do: 
profoundly protest.  
Chris Megson gives two examples of using old dramatic texts to comment on the 
topical events. In the first, theatrical direction plays the big role in creating the metaphorical 
linkage between the production and the events of the War on Terror. In the second 
example, the original text is freely adapted to match the current events. Megson argues:   
 
The conflict has also functioned as a resonant intertext perhaps 
most notably in a range of productions at the National Theatre. […] 
Simon McBurney’s Measure for Measure (May 2004) featured 
projections of President Bush and prisoners wearing the orange 
uniforms of Camp Delta whereas David Farr’s adaptation from 
Gogol, The UN Inspector (June2005), partly drew on the 
provenance of the Iraqi conflict in its focus on the anxiety caused to 
a former Soviet republic by a (presumed) visiting UN official 
(Megson 2005, 369) 
 
The most prominent point of Megson’s observation is mentioning McBurney’s employing 
of ‘projections’ in order to raise his audience’s awareness of the suggested relationship 
between the misuse of power in Measure for Measure and its similar in the real world. Put 
differently, the director’s utilisation of one of documentary techniques enabled 
Shakespeare’s play to be relevant to comment on Guantánamo.  
In contrast, the topicality seems to be one of the reasons for which documentary 
drama is criticised; the immediate response to ongoing events makes most documentary 
plays look like a temporary type of theatre. In his comment on the British theatrical 
                                                 
101 Many readings were arranged in Egypt on the same day. 
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representation of the Falklands War, Paget claims: ‘The ‘provisional’ nature of all 
documentary plays makes them vulnerable’ (Paget 1992, 173). Commenting on the tribunal 
theatre in the 1960s Germany, Lane claims: ‘The context of recent history demanded a 
response: theatre’s was to remove the mediating hand of creativity and lay the facts bare. 
Quantifying widespread human atrocity was deemed beyond the capabilities of dramatic 
fiction’ (Lane 60). The word ‘capability’, though can be understood in two different ways. 
Firstly, it can refer to the instant response, and precise representation offered by 
documentary theatre. In contrast, if Lane suggests that comments on the factual events 
within imaginary plots cannot be as effective on the audience as tribunal plays, many of the 
plays studied in this thesis contradict this claim, not only by being more emotive, but also 
by achieving the informative goal.In either case, Lane’s comment suggests that tribunal 
plays lacks ‘the mediating hand of creativity’. 
Joel Schechter goes further by defining all ‘topical’ plays as opposed to ‘innovative’ 
theatre (Schechter 38). This dichotomy seems to ignore the fact that documentary theatre, at 
least Verbatim plays, can be ‘innovative’. Moreover, imaginary plots can be topical. In 
other words, although the vast majority of documentary plays are topical, not all topical 
plays are documentary, as many of the plays explored in the next three chapters suggest. 
With a more balanced standpoint, Johnny Saldaña claims that some topical plays are 
excellent works of art, which are appreciated by spectators as well as critics. Saldaña 
explains: 
 
[T]opical theatre can sometimes, if not most of the time, be short of 
art. There’s a reason that titles such as The Laramie Project, The 
Exonerated, and The Vagina Monologues have become so well 
known, and the play I Am My Own Wife won the Tony Award and 
Pulitzer Prize for best Drama. Yes, they are all socially conscious 
works, but they are also excellent artistic products. (Saldaña 203) 
 
As Saldaña’s observation suggests, when the topic on which a documentary play comments 
loses the public interest, this play has little chance to attract an audience.  In contrast, a 
‘human interest story’—to use Paget’s expression—can attract spectators any time and/or 
place. Put differently, some topical plays can extend their messages beyond the limited 
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comment on specific incidents or factual happenings to generate various post-facto 
readings/viewings.102 
All the examples of what Saldaña calls ‘excellent artistic products’ are based on 
interviews, which means that they are Verbatim plays, whichare considered by many critics 
as more artistic than tribunal plays. Nevertheless, it seems that both playwrights of 
Verbatim Theatre and editors of tribunal plays feel the need to defend their works from the 
accusations of being less artistic than fictional plots. Soans argues: 
 
How is this any different from a well-written and well-constructed 
imagined play? The answer is: it isn’t. [...] Verbatim plays are far 
more like conventional plays than is generally acknowledged – and, 
in fact, I think conventional plays are far more like verbatim than 
most people realise (Soans 2008, 18).  
 
Soans’ last line in his comment draws my attention to the fact that while playwrights are 
working on their ‘imagined plays’, they practice some of the pre-writing research, each in 
his own way. Perhaps because of this kind of effort in research, Hare goes further by 
claiming that:  
 
Dramatising history and the movement of society is mistakenly 
thought to be an activity more akin to journalism than to art. [...] 
The creation of a great political play will demand exactly the same 
measure of genius, torture and art as the creation of any other. And 
maybe more. (Hare2005, 23-4) 
 
As a journalist, Norton-Taylor cannot compare the tough mission of editing to playwrights’ 
efforts. Similarly, Norton-Taylor’s journalistic qualities cannot be claimed by all 
playwrights. Sometimes, the harsh critique of tribunal and verbatim plays seems to 
underestimate the effort of both editors and playwrights.  
Yet, the critique of documentary theatre seems to be unable to prevent either 
dramatists or journalists from writing Verbatim theatre and tribunal plays in order to 
                                                 
102 The Vagina Monologues was performed at the theatre of the American University in Cairo to mostly elite 
spectators for three nights in February 2004. In 2008, three amateur actresses made their own Verbatim play 
Kalam fi Serri (My Unspoken Speech), which frankly comments on Egyptian women’s suffering from social 
discrimination and political marginalisation. With minimal production, the play was noticeably acclaimed by 
most Egyptian critics and a large number of spectators. Because of such a success the play was chosen to 
participate in Cairo International Festival for Experimental Theatre (CIFET). Consequently, an inquiry in the 
Egyptian Parliament blamed the Minister of Culture for encouraging the imitation of Western moral decay.  
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comment on successive events of the War on Terror. Documents about these events are 
abundantly offered by the media coverage; historical, socio-political, and cultural studies; 
and official reports and speeches. Although turning this raw material into a documentary 
play could be very tough mission, it is usually much faster than writing an imaginary plot. 
Commenting on the theatrical production of Eliot Weinberger’s What I Heard About Iraq, 
premiered in August 2005 at the Fountain Theatre, Los Angeles, Claire Allfree asks: ‘Why 
bother writing a play about the invasion of Iraq when you can let the facts speak for 
themselves? That notion is certainly justified by this stark, powerful piece, that dramatises 
Eliot Weinberger’s blog and book’ (Allfree, web). The alternative media is crucial in 
enriching sources for documentary material such as blogs and online videos. For instance, 
the Culture Project in New York City had a unique attempt to bring Iraqis’ own voices up 
by commissioning Kim Kefgen and Loren Noveck to adapt a blog of an unknown person to 
a dramatic text. The blog: Baghdad Burning is allegedly written by an anonymous Iraqi 
young woman in the shape of diary that documents the suffering of her country since 8 Jan 
2003. The production, Baghdad Burning: Girl Blog from Iraq 2003 was performed in 
2005.103 
It seems important to realise that the flourish of documentary theatre is not limited 
to theatrical responses to political or comments on the War on Terror, in Particular. 
StuartYoung argues: 
 
[W]ithin the space of three months in the first half of 2007 alone 
there were at least four productions of documentary-style plays in 
London: Aalst by the National Theatre of Scotland; Called to 
Account: the Indictment of Anthony Charles Lynton Blair for the 
Crime of Aggression Against Iraq – a Hearing at the Tricycle 
Theatre; Ilium Productions’ and the ICA’s Fallujah; and The Gay 
Man’s Guide at the Drill Hall. (Young 2009, 73) 
 
Out of the four examples given by Young, only two are related to the war in Iraq. While 
Aalst uses the documentary material of the trial of two parents who killed their children in 
Belgium in 1999, The Gay Man’s Guide can be called a ‘celebratory’ Verbatim, based on 
interviews with more than fifty homosexual men. Moreover, theatre is not the only field of 
this documentary prosperity; all sorts of media increasingly adopt the documentary form. 
Paget states: ‘The proliferation of documentary modes in a variety of media can be 
                                                 
103 The blog website is http://riverbendblog.blogspot.co.uk/ 
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regarded as part of cultural response to changed circumstances nationally and globally – a 
response in which distrust is the default position’ (Paget 2009, 235).104 This ‘distrust’ 
seems to shape one of the most significant features of contemporary British and American 
political theatre regarding playwrights’ utilisation of the documents. 
  
Documentary material in the age of uncertainty 
The wide spectrum of comments on the three conflicts introduced by the media is a 
rich source of information for both playwrights and the public. This source, nevertheless, 
sometimes becomes baffling. Luke Howie argues ‘In the twenty-first century the media is 
ubiquitous and ambivalent’ (Howie 42). This bafflement increases due to political 
vindicatory discourses, ignoring the complex influence of historical events on the current 
conflicts, and some Western misapprehensions about the socio-cultural nature of the three 
locations, where violent confrontations take place. Furthermore, for different reasons on the 
two sides of the Atlantic, there are claims that the media coverage of the events is biased. 
For instance, Hare argues: 
 
It is certainly true that the recent much-publicised flush of British 
drama on factual subjects is taken by many to be a response to the 
failures of the press [...] Everyone is aware that television and 
newspapers have decisively disillusioned us, in a way which seems 
beyond repair, by their trivial and partial coverage of seismic issues 
of war and peace.  (Hare 2005, 28) 
 
Hare’s opinion seems unfair not because the British media coverage of the conflicts is 
completely unbiased, but because such ultimate objectivity cannot exist, especially during 
wars. Regardless of the British public opinion on the credibility of these wars, there is a de 
facto presence of British soldiers on the battlefields. For instance, it is not predictable that 
when a group of Iraqi youths, who are against the occupation, attack British soldiers, the 
BBC, for example, might describe the former as fighters for freedom, especially if one 
soldier is killed or even injured. However, especially compared to the American media, it is 
hard to accept Hare’s judgment, which indirectly suggests that the popularity of topical 
                                                 
104 The boom in all sorts of factual-based presentation can be linked with the hugely increasing popularity of 
Reality TV. For more information, see Murray and Ouellette, wherein seventeen articles explore Reality TV 
as a genre, industry, and a manifestation of cultural and political factors. A large number of case-studies with 
examination of the link between Reality TV and non-fiction genres can be found in Holmes (2004) and Hill 
(2007). 
118 
 
plays is a result of the distrust in the media. Despite the complaints of British people about 
the media, I agree with Bottoms when he claims that ‘most Britons still believe (somewhat 
gullibly?) in the underlying truth/reality of the news as mediated by the BBC and by 
newspapers such as the Guardian’ (Bottoms 57). For instance, as far as my observation on 
the British media is concerned, I disagree with Hare’s claim about what he calls ‘partial 
coverage of seismic issues of war’. The British media critique of American and British 
politicians, especially regarding the reasons for the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, is too 
regular and objective to be overlooked. In particular, I argue that most British media 
coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is biased towards the Arabic side.105  
In the US, it seems different not only because the War on Terror was framed as a 
fair revenge for the terrorist attack of 9/11, but also due to the dominance of zealous 
patriotic discourses. Therefore, Bottoms argues that ‘distortions and biases [sic] paraded as 
fact not only by explicitly conservative broadcasters but by hitherto trusted sources like the 
New York Times’ (Bottoms 57). In the context of this overriding sense of patriotism, several 
American Verbatim plays responded to 9/11 with different goals. As the title of Annie 
Thoms’s With Their Eyes: September 11th,the View from a High School at Ground Zero 
(2002) suggests, the play attempts to give a close image of the catastrophe through 
statements given by eyewitnesses. Thoms, who edited these statements explains that, 
because ‘Stuyvesant High School is four blocks north of the World Trade Center, […] 
hundreds of Stuyvesant students saw the planes hit, saw people jumping from their office 
windows, saw the towers fall’ (Thoms 1–2). This kind of reproduction of the terrifying 
moments of the attack resembles what the American media did for years since 9/11: 
highlighting the immensity of the disaster. In addition to reminding the American people of 
the undisputed reason for the War on Terror, the reminiscence of the scenes of the calamity 
might be meant to function as a justification for the large number of the victims of this war. 
Similarly, Anne Nelson’s The Guys was an immediate response to 9/11. The play 
was first performed in December 2001 at the Fela Theatre in New York, and ‘ran to sold-
out houses for 13 months’ (Cherry 160). However, The Guys takes a further step beyond 
the mere representation of the factual disaster. Nelson’s play seems to encourage its 
audience to realise how both politicians and the media exploit the disaster, by drawing fake 
                                                 
105 In Phillips (197–202), British media, especially the BBC and the Guardian, is harshly accused of 
favouring Palestinians, including Hamas, over Israel. For the comparison between the American and British 
media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see Dunsky (293-9). In Evensen, the intrinsic difficulty of 
reporting the Middle-East conflict is analysed from a subjective and academic perspectives.  
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images of the victims as heroes, in order to insist on jingoism. In the play, Nelson rewrites 
her conversations with Nick, a fireman who is supposed to make a speech about Bill, one of 
his colleagues who died while he was fighting the fire on 9/11. Joan, an academic who 
represents Nelson, is surprised by how it is hard for Nick to say things about Bill. Nick 
explains: 
 
I keep hearing all these speeches from the politicians on tv. [sic] 
The pictures in the papers.Hero this, hero that. I don’t even 
recognize them. […] Bill. Yeah, Bill. Well, see that’s the problem. 
There’s just not much to say. This hero stuff, like they were some 
guys in a movie (qtd. in Nelson 2003, 54). 
 
However, because of this dominant heroic and patriotic discourse in the US, the play turned 
into what Nick criticizes. Nelson claims that ‘some productions of The Guys imposed 
nationalist elements such as flags and anthems, which ran contrary to my intent’ (Nelson 
2013, email). 
In contrast to American playwrights’ preferences of Verbatim Theatre to comment 
on 9/11, most of their plays that represent the events of the War on Terror tend to avoid 
documentary forms.In his comment on the large number of British documentary plays that 
respond to the War on Terror, Bottoms argues:  
 
It is less clear why no similar [documentary] trend has been 
apparent in the U.S., beyond an initial spate of documentary plays 
about the events of 9/11 itself. […] American theatrical responses to 
recent world events have often taken the form of grotesque satire 
rather than any attempt at “accurate” documentary reflection. 
(Bottoms 57) 
 
This observation though does not suggest that all contemporary British political plays adopt 
an ‘accurate documentary reflection’, whether Bottoms’ words describe tribunal plays, or 
the less ‘accurate’ documentary form of Verbatim Theatre.  
It is hard to define why American playwrights have chosen to avoid documentary 
forms in their responses to the War on Terror. However, perhaps the postmodernist cut with 
the traditions of political drama since the 1970s was more effective on the American than 
the British theatre, within which regional documentary plays flourished during the 1970s 
and 1980s. Further explanation can be related to the dominant thought over the bulk of the 
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American society since 2001: supporting our troops. In other words, the insistence on the 
priority of protecting American soldiers over revealing the facts of the aftermath of the War 
on Terror seems to be the common feature of the discourses of the American media and 
politicians. Therefore, while the vast majority of British ‘factually-based’ plays gratingly 
expose the defects of the American-led coalition by using documented events, most 
American playwrights metaphorically represent the conflicts through imaginary plots and 
characters rather than factual events or real politicians. In the following three chapters I will 
discuss this explanation through my reading of specific American plays, especially when 
the dramatic text doubts the credibility of the documentary material it includes.  
In this respect, it seems important to conclude that, as with their forebears in the 
1920s and 1960s, the vast majority of political plays of the twenty-first century critically 
represent factual events, in which public opinion interests. In 2006, Reinelt declared: ‘In 
accounting for the appearance and success of these [documentary] plays, the critical 
relationship to the contemporary events that sparked them is almost always central’ (Reinelt 
81). However, the most striking feature of contemporary documentary drama, which 
distinguishes it from its ancestors of the twentieth century, is that documentary materials 
within a large number of Verbatim and imaginary documentary plays of the twenty-one 
century are usually introduced as doubtable claims rather than authoritative or credible 
facts.  
Contemporary playwrights’ mistrust in documents is not limited to documentary 
material about the War on Terror. Although Carole-Anne Upton declares that documentary 
theatre usually establishes its argument on the trust in documentary material as an 
unassailable truth or factual reality, she refers to some contemporary documentary plays in 
Northern Ireland that expose their documentary sources just to contradict them as suspect 
official interpretations of the real event (Upton 179-94). On the two sides of the Atlantic, 
these ‘official interpretations’ of the events are usually adopted and documented by the 
media coverage of the events of the War on Terror. Therefore, documentary theatre in the 
2000s seems to ‘suspect’ what Paget calls ‘the ''official'' media of newspaper, radio and 
television, subject as they all are to “spin” – that ubiquitous term describing the active 
manipulation of information by which all institutions (especially those under pressure) 
attempt to ''manage communications''’ (Paget 2008, 130). In other words, while the 
informative function of the twentieth-century documentary drama was based on the 
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credibility of documentary materials, this credibility itself is usually scrutinised by the 
playwrights of contemporary dramatic representations of the War on Terror.  
Paget’s realisation of this phenomenon motivated him to add a fifth goal for all 
forms of documentary drama, including theatre. He explains: ‘In the current age, where 
means of persuasion have come under increasing scrutiny, this function has led more and 
more to a fifth function of documentary forms: […] They can interrogate the very notion 
documentary’ (Paget 2009, 228). In this respect I can understand James Frieze when he 
claims:  
 
Documentary’ is often used as a genre term synonymous with 
‘nonfiction’ and ‘issue-based’. Stressing the non-fictive and issue-
based qualities of ‘documentary theatre’, however, occludes the 
great extent to which documentary theatre, from the mid-1990s 
onwards, is increasingly about documentary processes, including 
those of theatre. (Frieze 131) 
 
Writing plays ‘about’ documents, rather than presenting these documents is supposed to be 
noticed within Verbatim Theatre, wherein playwrights do not adhere to the documents 
literally. Moreover, as many of the plays studied in the following chapters suggest, an 
imaginary plot can include a critical reading of historical or more recent documents.    
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Chapter Three 
The representation of Iraqi conflict: Two decades of military confrontations and 
economic sanctions. 
 
If the war in Afghanistan in 2001 was declared to punish Al-Qaeda for its actual 
crimes, the attack on Iraq was initially described as a pre-emptive measure to prevent the 
Iraqi regime from utilising its weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Objections to the 
invasion were raised by people from everywhere in the world, including the leaders of 
many Western countries. Gradually, with the threat of Iraqi possession of WMDs revealed 
to be false, fiercer protests increased against the war, which began to be described as an 
occupation by a large number of both Western and Arabic scholars, journalists, and 
officials.106 
While supporting their army on the grounds of patriotism, citizens in the United 
States increasingly questioned the validity of the war, especially with the large number of 
casualties among Western soldiers and Iraqi civilians. For a big sector of British people, 
despite their resentment against Saddam’s tyranny, the invasion of Iraq has never proved its 
legality, while rescuing the Iraqis from the atrocities of their regime was highlighted by the 
pro-war voices in some British media.107 
Years after Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship was overthrown, neither had the 
suffering of Iraqis ended nor the American-led intervention in the troubled country became 
unnecessary, especially with the brutally violent operations of the newly established Sunni 
militant Islamic State (IS).108 It is important to mention that although the current chaotic 
situation in Iraq suggests the failure of the American policies in the country since the 
invasion of 2003, the idea of founding an Islamic state has always been the kernel and 
ultimate goal of Islamists in general and militant groups in particular. Furthermore, these 
                                                 
106 To give examples, see Bensahel, Schumacher, Allawi, and Cockburn. 
107 For detailed interpretations of the complicated aspects of shaping American public opinion on the 2003 
War, see the studies of Holsti (2011), Holsti (2012), Berinsky, Gelpi, Gallup, Jr., and Dorman. 
Comprehensive analyses of the British media coverage of the invasion and its aftermath can be found in 
Robinson (2010). The split in the British public opinion on the 2003 War in Iraq is mentioned in Kuhn (99–
100), and Gowland (158). For a comparison between responses of American and British media to the war in 
Iraq, see DiMaggio. In addition to the US and the UK, the anthology edited by Nikolaev and Hakanen extends 
its spectrum to include the coverage of the Iraq War by the media of Australia, Europe, and the Middle East.      
108 Formerly known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), the IS 
has chosen its victims on a religious, ethnic, and sectarian basis. However, the terroristic group also killed 
Sunni Iraqis, who did not abide with its rules.  
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troubles in 2010’s Iraq must be read in the context of the consequences of the recent 
uprisings in several Arabic countries, especially in Syria.  
Apart from such intersecting and controversial events, which need to be studied 
thoroughly, this chapter focuses on the dramatic responses of both British and American 
playwrights to the 2003 war in Iraq and its consequences until 2011. These plays shape the 
biggest sector of contemporary topical plays as part of the revival of political theatre in the 
US and the UK. In 2009, Nicolas Kent, the artistic director of the Tricycle Theatre, 
confirmed: ‘For much of the last fifteen years Iraq has been the big story for the world’s 
media. […] Iraq was in the headlines almost every day, and artists, writers, film and 
theatre-makers produced much work about the invasion and its aftermath’ (Kent 7). On one 
hand, when Kent refers to the international focus on the conflict in Iraq, I realise why the 
number of plays that comment on one or more of the events in Iraq is larger than those that 
respond to the War in Afghanistan. On the other hand, although Kent recognises that 
Western interest in the situation in Iraq goes back to the first half of the 1990s, he limits the 
effect of this interest to the plays written since 2003. Thus, Kent’s observation neglects 
several plays, within which both British and American playwrights comment on the 
military conflict between the Anglo-American armies and the Iraqi regime in the First Gulf 
War in January 1991 and its aftermath.109 
 
The road to the 2003 invasion 
The circumstances of the 2003 invasion are different from historical and 
geopolitical contexts of the 1991 War, wherein a coalition that included several Arabic 
countries, with the approval of the United Nations, was dedicated to ending the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait. In addition, compared to the invasion of 2003, this war has been 
portrayed as more justifiable by mainstream Western media. Similarly, the vast majority of 
Arabic media identified with the standpoint of their governments by condemning the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait and supporting the international coalition against Saddam’s regime. 
Nevertheless, before exploring the way in which British and American plays comment on 
the 2003 War in Iraq, this chapter investigates examples of the dramatic responses to the 
1991 War and its consequences, which paved the road to the invasion. 
                                                 
109 This war is also known as Operation Desert Storm, the Persian Gulf War, and the War of liberating 
Kuwait. This conflict was preceded by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), whose episodes were part of a ‘big 
story for the world’s media’, if I use Kent’s description.   
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While Iraqi people were losing innocent civilian victims, their surviving dictator 
was not ashamed to declare his victory over Iran, Kuwait, and the international coalition. 
Then, Iraqis had to endure more than twelve years of comprehensive economic sanctions, 
which failed to deter Saddam’s regime. Instead, the vast majority of the Iraqis had to suffer 
from the lack of food and medicine. After Saddam’s useless ventures in Iran and Kuwait 
and the defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, even the exempted goods from sanctions were very 
expensive. While the vast majority of Iraqi people were unable to meet their basic needs, 
Saddam and his junta kept enjoying their luxurious life.  
Moreover, because of Western fears of the Iraqi regime’s attempts to produce 
chemical weapons, basic components of vital medicinal drugs, including those for treating 
cancer, were banned. In the Report of the United Nations’ High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges, and Change, the international organisation declares:  
 
As a result of growing concern over the humanitarian impact of 
comprehensive sanctions, the Security Council stopped imposing 
them after the cases of Iraq, former Yugoslavia and Haiti, and 
turned exclusively to the use of financial, diplomatic, arms, 
aviation, travel and commodity sanctions, targeting the belligerents 
and policy makers most directly responsible for reprehensible 
policies. (United Nations 32)  
 
Compared to Iraq, sanctions were imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Haiti 
for short periods, three and a half and three years, respectively. The agony of the sanctions 
was ended by the catastrophe of the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003, which 
followed and preceded some of the most controversial episodes of the War on Terror.110 
I claim that if the American-Arabic support for the Iraqi war against Iran increased 
the power of Saddam, the main factors responsible for the Iraqi people’s struggle in 
successive decades are oppressive, aggressive, and evasive policies of the Iraqi’s regime 
towards its own people, neighbouring countries and the UN, respectively. These three 
features of the Iraqi regime interactively intersect to shape the complex circumstances of 
many events of the confrontation between Iraq and the international community in general, 
and between Saddam and the US in particular. To give examples, Saddam’s dictatorship 
                                                 
110 For the catastrophic impact of the sanctions on Iraqi people, especially children, see Addis (584), Farrall 
(108), Yaphe (128), Hechter (69–70), and Simons (2004, 382). For detailed explanations of the difference 
between comprehensive and selective sanctions, see Cortright. 
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forced a large number of Iraqi citizens, especially intellectuals, to live in exile. A big sector 
of these expats actively participated in the American-led preparations for the invasion. 
 Similarly, it is hard to discuss the harmful impact of the sanctions on Iraqi people, 
especially children, without considering that the tiny circle of Saddam’s corrupt regime 
benefited from the Oil-for-Food Programme rather than enhancing the condition of life for 
the vast majority of the Iraqi population. Moreover, Saddam’s reluctance to co-operate with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the 1990s and early 2000s suggested 
that the dictator was able to produce WMDs, which were crucial in extending the sanctions 
to include chemical substances. Finally, and most importantly, the American and British 
discourse about a potential threat of Iraqi WMDs can be understood on the grounds of the 
Iraqi regime’s resistance against the nuclear inspections by IAEA as well as the dropping of 
chemical weapons on the Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988. The latter was part of several 
attacks against the Kurds, known as the al-Anfal Campaign.111 
The most significant reason why this chapter examines examples of British and 
American plays about Iraq before 2003 is my observation that these plays are similar to the 
vast majority of representations of the 2003 invasion in terms of contradicting specific 
claims raised by Western politicians and media. Thus, in terms of subject matter, dramas by 
contemporary Anglo-American playwrights portraying the conflict in Iraq can be divided 
into two major groups that reflect the phases of the conflict. The first group consists of the 
plays in which the First Gulf War in 1991 and its consequences are depicted. The second 
group includes the dramatic works that respond to the 2003invasion of Iraq and its 
aftermath. It is important to mention that, despite this thematic classification, this chapter 
highlights the way in which dramatic texts diversely represent political and military aspects 
of the Iraqi conflict with the international community in general and with the American-led 
coalitions in particular before and after 2003. 
 
Representing the 1991 War and its aftermath 
a. Anti-war or anti-America? 
The first Gulf War showed the significant role of the media in offering an 
immediate coverage of the military actions. It was the first time in history when audiences 
were able to watch battlefields on their screens instantly. William O'Neill argues: ‘As 
                                                 
111 For more information about this massacre, see Mikaberidze (67) and Hardi (13-37). For the report of 
Human Rights Watch about the genocide of the Iraqi Kurds, see Black.     
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entertainment the war could not be surpassed, and it had the further advantage for media 
barons of being inexpensive compared to a prime-time series’ (O'Neill 2009, 48).In 
addition to highlighting this drama-like nature of the media coverage of the war, Jeanne 
Colleran goes further by suggesting its effect on the audience. Colleran claims: 
 
As one of the most spectacular struggles in recent history, with 
round-the-clock, globally transmitted coverage, the Gulf War’s 
visibility made it a drama with an international audience. Yet this 
very visibility seems also to have ensured that no audience was left 
for critical reassessment or historical judgment. (Colleran 2003, 621 
– 22) 
 
The crucial point, which Colleran draws attention to, is the dominance of media, which can 
lead spectators to a state of immersion where their critical sense gives way to a kind of 
negative reception that cannot evaluate the perceived message in the terms of its 
sociopolitical conditions.  
In addition, I argue that this astounding ‘visibility’ underscores the superiority of 
the US in terms of technology, which perhaps makes American officials’ claims about the 
‘smart weapons’ and ‘clean war’ believable. Promoted by the media, such slogans 
suggested that using advanced technology can guarantee weapons’ high degree of precision 
to avoid mistakes. Thus, civilians are unlikely to be mistakenly killed by the coalition’s 
bombing. On the ground, a large number of murdered and injured civilians were victims of 
these smart weapons.112 
Such televised scenes of the explosions excluded any harmful effect on Iraqi 
civilians. Petra Rau argues: ‘Intellectuals were highly disturbed less by the war itself than 
by the way in which it was presented to the world as a war without bodies in which 
superior technology and state power controlled the visibility of human cost’ (Rau 12). In 
addition to displaying the American ‘superior technology’, the live broadcasting of the 
attack focuses on the work of the smart weapons rather than their harmful effect on the 
Iraqis. In a post-war comment, Ian Hargreaves argues that ‘the public in Britain and in 
America will have had the impression that this was a war involving very little death and 
very little utter horror’ (ctd. in Taylor 1992, 13). In this respect, the absence of the image of 
victims is more likely to support the claim of a clean war. 
                                                 
112 An examination of the role of Western media in supporting the myth of clean war with smart weapons can 
be found in the studies of Lee and Stauber.   
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Furthermore, as with the ‘point of view shot’ in movies, most of these live scenes 
are taken from the cockpits of fighter aircrafts. By ‘metaphorical parallelism’, spectators 
might identify themselves with the pilots. In this respect, spectators not only support the 
war, they can feel that they are fighting in it. Perhaps this patriotic identification with the 
pilots/attackers accounts for the Americans’ eagerness to watch these live scenes, and vice 
versa. Colleran insists on the role of this footage in shaping the audience’s opinion of the 
war: 
 
[T]he way in which the public simply watched the war on television 
also had something to do with the large degree of consensus in the 
United States about the appropriateness of American military 
action. The customary habits of millions of television viewers 
contributed to the high degree of support the war rallied. 
(Colleran2003, 619) 
 
Here, Colleran goes further than the claims of both Stephen Bottoms and David Hare about 
Western media’s prejudicial coverage of the international conflicts. These scenes suggest 
how the ‘visibility’ – without any discourse – is able to generate several messages, which 
create and raise spectators’ support for the war.113 
The two plays I select as examples of the representation of the 1991 war are The 
Gulf between Us, or, The Truth and Other Fictions, written by the British playwright 
Trevor Griffiths in 1991, and produced by the West Yorkshire Playhouse in January 1992, 
and the American playwright Naomi Wallace’s In the Heart of America, premiered in 
August 1994 at the Bush Theatre in London. Both plays give good examples of the gradual 
and marginal occurrence of documentary materials within topical plays. 
In The Gulf between Us, Griffiths exploits one of these real televised scenes at the 
beginning of his play to define the place and the time of actions. The stage directions read: 
‘In the deep silence, mute cockpit-videos of famous strikes on bridges, buildings, 
installations replace the pre-dawn light on the sky-cyc’ (Griffiths 1992, 2). This familiar 
scene is removed from the authority of the media to be planted in a new revealing context, 
wherein the discourse about the precision of ‘smart weapons’ and ‘clean war’ is strongly 
challenged by the death of innocents. 
                                                 
113 For more information about how the audience is more likely to identify with the beholder in the point of 
view shots, see Allen (238-40), Gaut (261-3), and Casetti (64).     
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The play represents a factual incident when American weapons mistakenly killed 
Iraqi civilians, most of them were children. Commenting on the disaster, Daniel Hallock 
declares: ‘"Smart bombs" did nothing to save the 1,200 innocent women and children 
incinerated in the Al-Amariyah Shelter during the 1991 bombing of Baghdad’ (Hallock 
143). Thomas Rid argues that ‘Iraqi sources accurately said that 200-300 civilians, 
including over 100 children, had died in the bunker’ (Rid 85). It seems important to realise 
that, whether the Iraqi regime is responsible for allowing civilians to use a military shelter, 
this fact ‘was not known to the pilot or the target planners before the attack (Rid 85). 
However, The Gulf between Us blames the Iraqi regime for enabling the catastrophe to 
happen; the play casts the incident as the responsibility of an excessive and intentional 
American use of power. In this respect, Griffiths’ play extends its comment on the war 
beyond challenging the myth of ‘smart’ weapons, to criticising the US as a brutal and 
aggressive military power. I claim that this critique leads The Gulf between Us to suggest 
several polemic messages, which controversially link the topical theme of the play with 
different historical events.  
Commenting on The Gulf between Us, Griffiths declares that ‘it’s not a 
documentary, it’s not a journalistic piece. It’s a kind of dreamplay’ (Griffiths 1992, VIII). 
Whether this statement can be understood on the grounds of the derogatory image of 
documentary theatre as a less artistic theatre, the playwright precisely describes his play. As 
its subtitle –The Truth and Other Fictions – suggests, Griffiths’ play weaves the factual 
incident within a fictional plot, which is introduced to the audience by Fanibar O’Toole as a 
narrator. Within his first speech, O’Toole seems to imitate traditional travelling storytellers 
in Arabic countries until the early decades of the twentieth century, when they used to 
introduce the narrative by praising God and the prophet Mohammed. In addition, O’Toole 
refers to the Arabian Nights as a source for ‘fable and adventure’ (Griffiths 1992, 1). In 
addition to hinting at the geographical frame of the play’s action, this speech highlights the 
fictional aspects of the play.  
According to O’Toole, the play represents ‘the Tale of the Builder, the Gilder, the 
Minder and the Gulf between them’ (Griffiths 1992, 1). Before he participates in shaping 
the dramatic action of the play as the character of an Irish gilder, O’Toole introduces the 
three main characters of the play, including himself. The builder, Ryder came from 
Swansea to Iraq searching for a chance to make a profit only to find himself in a war zone. 
In order get an exit visa and a ticket, Ryder is ordered by the Iraqi regime to rebuild the 
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wall of a shrine, which was destroyed by an American missile. Representing the Iraqi 
regime, Ismael is the minder, a teenager who observes the repairing of the building, which 
had been utilised as a secret store of weapons and a crèche. Moreover, in what seems to be 
an explanation of the play’s title, O’Toole takes the word ‘Gulf’ further than its description 
of the location of the war to denote a cultural gap not only between the two British 
characters and the Muslim and Arabic character, but also between O’Toole and Ryder.114 
It is hard to define whether Griffiths chooses to make the building a shrine in order 
to suggest that the Iraqi regime exploits places of worship for military purposes, or whether 
the play highlights Saddam’s brutality against Shii children whose nursery is attached to a 
potential military target. In either case, Ismael himself was not aware of the fact that the 
children were victims of the American missile. At the end of the play, when Ismael is killed 
by another American attack, O’Toole mockingly addresses the former’s corpse:  
 
You didn’t even know the babs [sic] were in there, did you, your 
Major told you they’d been washed away in the river, he had you 
execute the poor bloody driver for falling asleep at the wheel, […] 
you took his lies for truth and now you’re down to die for it, you 
poor ignorant bastard. (Griffiths 1992, 53)     
 
The significance of O’Toole’s revelation is his claim that Ismael, who died by American 
bombs, is a victim of the deceitful orders of the Iraqi Major. The latter ‘failed to return 
from the brothel one afternoon, and was not on hand when the crèche supervisor rang in to 
say the bus had not arrived to take the kids over the river’ (Griffiths 1992, 56). In this 
respect, the play reduces the Iraqi regime’s responsibility for the catastrophe to an 
individual mistake made by the Iraqi official. 
The information offered by O’Toole explains one of the earliest scenes of the play, 
when Ismael kills the innocent bus-driver as the stage directions read:  
 
Two armed People’s Militia arrive, pushing a middle-aged man in 
bus-driver’s uniform ahead of them. […] One of the militiamen 
hands ISMAEL a document, […] ISMAEL reads out the document 
aloud over the weeping driver, fold it, pockets it, walks behind the 
man, draws his pistol, lays it to the man’s head, fires. The driver 
                                                 
114 For the Shii sect, the shrine is a place for worship, equivalent to the Sunni mosque. Every shrine is 
associated with a sacred person, whose grave is usually attached to the building.   
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flops forward in a spray of blood. The militiamen move impassively 
in to drag him off face down across the rubble. (Griffiths 1992, 3) 
 
Physical violence was an aspect of many of In-yer-face plays in the 1990s, whose writers 
saw Griffiths as an old model of leftist playwrights. Leslie Wade argues that In-yer-face 
playwrights ‘rejected the socialist platforms and platitudes of the left, the politics espoused 
by such writers as Howard Brenton and Trevor Griffiths’ (Wade 284).115 
Whether Griffiths was influenced by the increasing popularity of the violence on 
stage or he simply insists on the bloody nature of the Iraqi regime, Ismael’s brutality 
contradicts his initial image as he appears with ‘a kid’s football balanced on his raised 
right foot’ (Griffiths 1992, 2). Such a discrepancy is one of several examples of the 
deliberate challenge of naturalism in The Gulf between Us. Garner Jr. explains: ‘Griffiths 
deploys stage devices, technical as well as conventionally theatrical, to heighten the play’s 
nonnaturalistic effects’ (Garner Jr. 1999, 232–33). For instance, the process of building the 
wall is represented in real time, while the action in front of this naturalistic background 
occurs through extended dramatic time, which includes many temporal and spatial gaps.  
The characterisation of O’Toole is a good example of Griffiths’ utilisation of 
different theatrical techniques that avoid the naturalistic presentation of the incident. As a 
narrator, O’Toole has the authority of knowing what other characters, and the members of 
the audience, cannot realise. Theatrically, O’Toole is distinguished from other characters by 
moving onstage in ‘a tight golden spot’ (Griffiths 1992, 1). As one of the characters who 
participate in the play’s action, his identity is vaguely described by a series of his discrepant 
statements. Although O’Toole claims that he participates in building Saddam’s Monument 
by applying ‘gold on the President’s shoulders’ (Griffiths 1992, 16–7), the Irish gilder 
declares that he is an undercover reporter for the Sun (Griffiths 1992, 14). This enables 
different interpretations of Griffiths’ character and play. For instance, Janelle Reinelt 
claims that ‘most likely he [O’Toole] is a British government operative, an agent of some 
sort who gilds as his cover (Reinelt 1999, 172). Reinelt’s suggestion gives the Irish 
character a political aspect, which urges me to ask whether this British agent, who 
participated in building the President’s Monument, was secretly supporting the Iraqi 
dictatorship? Moreover, with the consideration of O’Toole’s speech to Ismael, when the 
                                                 
115 As a committed socialist author, Griffiths’ style in the 1970s and 1980s is usually described as ‘critical 
naturalism’ or ‘critical realism’. For more information, see Clark (77–80), Bignell (51–2), Rabey (235), and 
Harris (2006, 9–11). 
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former declares: ‘I was in this place before you were born, son’ (Griffiths 1992, 12), does 
Griffiths’s play hint at the historical role played by the British Empire in Iraq?  
The play does not include clear answers to these questions. What The Gulf between 
Us insists on is the critique of the West in general and the US in particular. After seeing the 
building damaged by the American missile, even before knowing about the dead children, 
Ryder apologetically declares: ‘Ismael, you have every right to be angry at what the white 
… at what the West is doing to your people and your country’ (Griffiths 1992, 6). Later, the 
play suggests that Ryder’s identification with ‘the white’ and/or ‘the West’ entails his 
superior self-image. For the Welsh builder, the Indian man who is brought to help him is a 
‘Paki’ (Griffiths 1992, 38), and O’Toole is a ‘thick Irish […] Paddy’ (Griffiths 1992, 12). 
Commenting on the relationship between the two British characters, Jonathan Bignell 
argues that ‘the uneasy relationship of Irishness to Britishness enabled Griffiths to use his 
characterization to challenge the simple nationalism of skinhead culture’ (Bignell 51). On 
one hand, I agree with Bignell’s observation, which draws attention to the fact that there are 
usually subtle differences between dramatic characters who are classified under the same 
category of culture, nationality, or religion. I claim that realising such differences is one of 
the difficulties faced by the reader/audiences of political dramas, which comment on multi-
cultural conflicts. 
On the other hand, despite their belonging to, and representing the same Western 
culture and British nationality, each character has a specific combination of physical, 
social, and psychological attributes, some of which may, or may not, make him 
distinguishable from others. Put differently, characters in political plays simultaneously are 
able to represent an abstract concept and a unique human existence. For example, Ryder 
may portray the economic aspect of the declining imperial project in Iraq. He can also be 
seen as a critique of Western Capitalism in general. In either case, Ryder is a white 
Westerner who, similar to the Iraqi Muslim Ismael, is driven by his self-interest. In 
contrast, O’Toole seems more similar to Dr Fadia Aziz, the Christian Iraqi woman who 
investigates the crèche in order to check on the safety of the children. Before she discovers 
the disaster, Dr Aziz utilises the last four lines of Ozymandias to describe the rubble. To her 
surprise, the Irish gilder recognises that she cites Shelley (Griffiths 1992, 16). Put 
differently, perhaps the gulf between O’Toole and Ryder is wider than the gap between the 
former and Aziz.  
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I argue that the ambiguously complicated identity of O’Toole is essential in 
Griffiths’ comment on the factual incident, which the play imposes in a broader context, 
neglecting the specific circumstances of the 1991 War. After the introductory video of 
Baghdad, the audience listens to overlapping voices and sounds of different urban and 
military sources including ‘a moral litany from First World Leaders justifying the punitive 
use of force against Third World intransigents’ (Griffiths 1992, 2). Griffiths’ intention of 
generalising the conflict, as a confrontation between ‘First World’ powers and ‘Third 
World’ countries neglects the specific circumstances of the 1991 War. In this respect I 
understand Stanton Jr., when he claims that Griffiths ‘positions the military conflict 
between West and East in a broader historical and literary landscape’ (Garner Jr., 1999, 
233).In creating this ‘broader historical and literary landscape’, the character of O’Toole is 
the main factor.  
If the action of both Ryder and Ismael is justified by specific reasons pertinent to 
the present dramatic time and place, O’Toole’s existence seems to be transcendental as he 
witnessed historical events. O’Toole remembers: ‘Outside the besieged city, the massed 
ranks of the Christian host from the north pitilessly prepare the next assault, cold in their 
resolve to render life impossible for the unfortunate citizenry huddled within and so bring 
the Caliph to his knees’ (Griffiths 1992, 15). In this respect, O’Toole suggests a 
resemblance between the 1991 War and what seems to describe the historical Crusades. 
Insisting on such an alleged similarity, O’Toole proceeds: 
 
And down in the Caliph’s courtyard, so recently despoiled by 
enemy fire, our heroes scheme and plot their survival in a tiny war-
play of their own, The Builder smells advantage on the poisoned 
air; the youthful minder searches for manhood on the sticky paths of 
duty; and Fanibar [O’Toole], our Wandering Gilder, his plans deep 
laid and all but ready to spring, struggles to recall the details of his 
tale from the wearing darkness that engulfs him. (Griffiths 1992, 
15)   
 
While defining the main attribute of Ryder, Ismael, and O’Toole, the latter imposes their 
story with the historical scene of the religiously-oriented conflict. Put differently, O’Toole 
suggests the following fictitious ‘metaphorical parallelism’: 
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Figure (5) 
      Alleged similarity between the Crusades and the First Gulf War 
 
As figure (5) suggests, when O’Toole conflates the Crusades and the liberation of Kuwait, 
he ignores both the reasons for the First Gulf War and the international backing for the 
coalition, including the support of several Muslim and Arabic countries. Moreover, and 
most controversially, the play seems to identify with both Bin Laden’s claims and 
Saddam’s propaganda.116 
At the heart of this generalised and polemic image of the conflict, The Gulf between 
Us represents the death of the children as a result of an intentional attack. Within his last 
speech, O’Toole sums up the story by accusing the Americans. The narrator argues that 
‘they could see it [the shrine] was being used for military purposes but managed to 
overlook – or at least overcome – the fact that it was used as a nursery, oh come on, Lord, 
these men know exactly [sic] what they’re doing, the rest is teasing’ (Griffiths 1992, 15). 
O’Toole’s statement affirms Dr Aziz’s claim about the American’s awareness that children 
were inside the target of the missile.  
Looking at the sky, Dr Aziz gives vent to her anger by addressing the President of 
the US. Her final words are: ‘We have a holy place, a place of worship, a place your 
cameras tell everyday is filled with children. And you send a missile, not a wayward falling 
bomb, to burn it up’ (Griffiths 1992, 49). In Brechtian style, Dr Aziz’s speech interrupts a 
very emotive moment that provokes sadness and upset when Iraqi mothers desperately call 
                                                 
116 Assuming the role of the heroic defender of Palestinians, the Iraqi dictator was identified by his media with 
Saladin (Salah el-Deen), who reconquered Jerusalem from the Christians in the twelfth century. Examples of 
British and American journalists, who highlighted such a phenomenon, include MacAskill (2003), Brooks, 
Hirst, and Woollacott. 
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their murdered children. Although these mothers do not appear on stage, their voices 
increase the tension of the action, wherein burnt remains of the children, collected in Dr 
Aziz’s shawl, are being revealed to the audience.  
The most striking aspect of Dr Aziz’s speech is her suggestion of a constant and an 
inseparable relationship between American advancement and the excessive use of power 
against unequal enemies, including civilians. Dr Aziz declares:  
 
I have seen you, Mr President, with your sensitive expression and 
sorrowing eyes on my television screen … And I had forgotten, 
what you will not acknowledge but the world knows, that yours is a 
country forged and shaped in brutal genocide, the destruction of 
whole people, lives, customs, beliefs, men, women and children 
who had learned respect for the place that nourished them, who had 
learned to tread gently on this good earth. (Griffiths 1992, 48–9)      
 
 
As with O’Toole’s reference to the Crusades, Dr Aziz mentions the disaster of the 
indigenous people of America. By suggesting such a false ‘metaphorical parallelism’ 
between the ‘brutal genocide’ and what Dr Aziz claims as a designed murder of Iraqi 
children, The Gulf between Us seems to be an anti-America play, rather than being a 
dramatic response to the internationally-supported 1991 War in general, and the attack on 
the Al-Amariyah Shelter in particular. The most significant consequence of neglecting the 
intersecting circumstances of both events is distracting the play’s focus on the fact that 
civilians are always victims of all wars, regardless of any allegation about faultless 
weapons.        
Extending the comment on the First Gulf War to include historical atrocities 
committed by the US is one of the main aspects of Wallace’s In the Heart of America, 
wherein the narrative about the conflict in Iraq is interrupted by regular references to the 
Vietnam War. But if In the Heart of America was written after the end of the First Gulf 
War, why does Wallace criticise the US military intervention in the Arabic-Arabic conflict 
by reminding the American public of the notorious prolonged presence in Vietnam?  
In both wars, American armies were protecting US geopolitical interests in the Far 
and Middle East against the former Soviet Union and the Iraqi dictator, respectively. On the 
other hand, the two cases are completely different, whether in terms of the standpoint of 
both American society and the international community, or regarding the outcome of each 
war. Therefore, it is hard to decide whether Wallace’s play predicts that the American 
135 
 
intervention in the Gulf will turn into an occupation of Iraq in the 2000s, or whether the 
playwright expresses pacifistic beliefs by addressing the so-called Vietnam Syndrome. 
What Wallace’s play suggests is that the atrocious activities of American soldiers against 
civilians are a common feature of the two wars.117 
Lue Ming is a ghost of a Vietnamese woman whose regular recalling of the killing 
and raping of her compatriots is conflated with other characters’ discourse about the 1991 
War. In one of her dialogues with Craver, the American soldier, Ming wonders: 
 
LUE MING: How can they fight in Vietnam and the Gulf at the 
same time? 
CRAVER: We’re not fighting in Vietnam. 
LUE MING: Of course you are. […] How many gooks have you 
killed? 
CRAVER: I don’t kill gooks; I kill Arabs. (Wallace 2001, 85–6) 
 
In addition to Ming, the character of Boxler is described by Wallace as ‘the soul of 
Lieutenant Calley’ (Wallace 2001, 101), who was tried for his responsibility for killing 
Vietnamese civilians, in what is known as the My Lai Massacre, in March 1968. Colleran 
argues that Ming is one of Calley’s victims (Colleran 2012, 30). In this respect, Wallace’s 
dream-like play is a fierce critique of the US as an aggressive and excessive military power 
whose leaders do not care about the victims of American foreign policy.  
Moreover, In the Heart of America blames the US for the struggle of the 
Palestinians. Remzi is a Palestinian-American soldier who fights against the Iraqi army in 
the desert of Saudi Arabia during the First Gulf War. Throughout the play his sister, 
Fairouz insists on comparing the discrepant reaction of the American-led international 
community towards Iraq and Israel. Remzi refuses the ‘metaphorical parallelism’ his sister 
draws between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Israeli actions in Palestine. He argues  
 
REMZI: Iraq invaded a sovereign country. That's against 
international law. 
                                                 
117 Sam Shepard’s States of Shock, which was premiered in May 1991 at New York City's American Place 
Theatre, was one of the first American plays to oppose the First Gulf War by linking it with Vietnam as an 
infamous chapter of National memory. Detailed analysis of the origin and effect of the so-called Vietnam 
Syndrome on American foreign policy can be found in the studies of Simons (1997), McCrisken (369–71), 
Martini (162–3), and Klare. 
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FAIROUZ: International law? Ha! Your own land is overrun, 
occupied, slowly eaten […] And no one's ever smacked a Desert 
Shield on those bastards! 
REMZI: There's just no parallel. (Wallace 2001, 93) 
 
Unlike Griffiths’ play, In the Heart of America does not ignore the legitimate reasons for 
the 1991 War. However, Fairouz’s argument repeats the discourse of a large number of 
both Arabic Islamists and liberals, including those who contradicted Saddam’s aggression 
against Kuwait. The comparison between Iraq and Israel shapes the core of Norman 
Finkelstein’s ‘Israel and Iraq: A Double Standard’ (1991). But why does the play insist on 
weaving the matter of Palestine within the discourse of the war in Iraq? The answer can be 
found in the consequences of Arafat’s political support for the invasion of Kuwait, when 
the vast majority of Palestinians believed that Saddam was the new Saladin.118 
The two Palestinian characters though are more complicated than representing 
opposite opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the First Gulf War. While Fairouz 
is politically committed to her homeland, she knows that the traditions of her people cast 
her as a disgraceful woman, because she lost her virginity before marriage. Therefore, she 
cannot even think of going back to Palestine. Remzi, on the other hand, is concerned about 
his home land and dreams of Palestinian sovereignty. Nevertheless, he is aware that his 
homosexuality is disgraceful according to the social norms of his home country. Therefore, 
he seeks security under the mask of American identity by concealing his political 
preferences. 
Although Wallace highlights the freedom of sexual orientation as one of the 
Western values, which distinguishes life in the US from Arabic countries, the play criticises 
American society. Remzi declares: ‘On the streets of Atlanta I've been called every name 
you can think of: pimp, terrorist, half-nigger, mongrel, spic, wop, even Jew-bastard’ 
(Wallace 2001, 108).The significance of this speech is that it suggests that these incidents 
of intolerance, which confuse Arabic Muslims and Jews, can be traced back to the early 
1990s, years before 9/11.  
                                                 
118 The bombing of Tel Aviv and Haifa by Iraqi missiles during the war was seen by most historians as 
Saddam’s attempt to identify with the Palestinians in order to gain the support of Arabic populations against 
their leaders who condemned the Iraqi President. The American administration played a crucial role in 
preventing Israel from responding to the Iraqi attacks. For more information, see O'Neill (2009, 64-5), and 
Reich (161–2). 
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The discrimination against the Palestinian young man is not limited to his ethnic 
background. Ironically, he is humiliated because of his sexual orientation by one of the 
American lieutenants as the following confrontation suggests:   
 
BOXLER: (Whispers): Faggot. Shit-fucker.  
REMZI: Stop it! Get off of me. 
BOXLER: Sodomite. Fairy. (Beat) Feel it? Feel it inside you, Mr. 
perry? Now grab hold of it. (Wallace 2001, 101)  
 
Although this homophobic incident takes place in Saudi Arabia, the aggression occurs in 
one of the American military premises. Thus, when the play condemns this assault against 
freedom, which is at the heart of American values, in general, Wallace seems to focus on 
the discrimination against homosexuals as a phenomenon inside the American military 
system. Such focus explains why Wallace includes Randy Shilts’ 1993 book Conduct 
Unbecoming: Gays and Lesbians in the Us Military, in the afterword ‘Select Bibliography’ 
(Wallace 2001, 141–2). Stressing her defence of the freedom of Remzi and his 
colleague/partner Craver, Wallace make them units after the assault of their Boss in order 
to mention different sorts of specialist weapons in a very long monologue (Wallace 2001, 
113). While they grotesquely describe parts of weapons as sexual objects, their 
conversation indirectly highlights the massive power of the US compared to that of the 
Iraqi army. Moreover, by mentioning the manufacturers of these weapons, such as 
‘Boeing’, and ‘General Electric’, Wallace hints at the controversial role of military-
industrial complex that may influence politicians’ decisions about waging wars. Eventually, 
Remzi’s death by Iraqi soldiers seems to mock Saddam’s claims of being the defender of 
Palestinians and Remzi’s unlimited pride over the superiority of American weapons.  
As with The Gulf between Us, Walllace’s play utilises nonnaturalistic techniques by 
establishing its plot on fragmented actions. These fragments, nevertheless, are distinguished 
from postdramatic theatre by direct political discourses. In terms of the topicality, Griffiths’ 
play is based on a factual incident whose representation contradicts some of its factual 
circumstances. In contrast, while Wallace constructed a fictional situation, her play 
included several references to factual aspects of the 1991 War. Although In the Heart of 
America focuses more on the responsibility of Saddam for the war, both plays mainly 
blame the US for the excessive use of power against unequal enemies by referring to 
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historical events, whose geopolitical circumstances are different from the First Gulf War, 
on which both plays comment. 
Within both plays dramatic characters utilise discriminatory slurs, which reflect 
Western feelings of superiority not only aimed at other cultures, but also directed at their 
compatriots, especially minorities. In order to highlight the uniqueness of Arabic characters 
in the two plays, the playwrights have them speak a few scattered Arabic phrases. Although 
the gist of these few lines is supposed to be easily understood by the audience, especially 
with the aid of characters’ gestures, I argue that these occasional moments function as 
Brechtian techniques meant to activate spectators’ critical thinking by interrupting the 
familiarity of English discourse.  
Wallace and Griffiths maintained their interest in commenting on the conflict in Iraq 
in the early decades of the 2000s, when Iraq was mentioned by Western media for two 
reasons: the consequences of the economic sanctions and Saddam’s challenging of the work 
of the IAEA. Wallace’s monodrama The Retreating World was written in 2000 and 
premiered at the Cambridge New Writing Festival in July 2002, while Griffiths’ Camel 
Station was written in 2001 for The Artists Network of Refuse and Resist in New York, as 
part of an evening of staged readings under the collective title: Imagine: Iraq. Each play 
focuses on the suffering of an individual Iraqi after the 1991 War. While Wallace’s play 
refers to a factual incident, the fictional plot portrays the disastrous effect of the economic 
sanctions on an Iraqi youngman. The imaginary plot of Griffiths’ play, which was inspired 
by a joke about Saddam, blames the US for the death of an Iraqi child.  
 
b. Portraying the protector as an aggressor: Camel Station contradicts facts  
In Griffiths’ play, Tarek is a thirteen-year old shepherd, who lives in ‘a Northern 
No-Fly Zone, Iraq’ (Griffiths 2007, 261). As these stage directions suggest, Tarek is 
Kurdish. Put differently, the boy belongs to the Iraqi ethnic minority, whose members were 
victims of Saddam’s brutality on different occasions. In this respect, enforcing this No–Fly 
Zone in Iraqi Kurdistan was an American-led international measure to protect the Kurds 
from Saddam’s attacks. Paradoxically, in Griffiths’ play the Kurdish boy becomes a victim 
of a needless American military action. However, not only is this paradox concealed from 
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the audience of the play, which does not read Griffiths’ stage directions, but the finale of 
Camel Station itself misses the connotation of the dramatic place of the action.119 
Tarek regularly moves his eyes between watching wolves and reconnaissance 
drones. Meanwhile, he is busy with his writing pad, revising a story he is writing in order to 
attend the ‘Hakawati School’.120 In the largest part of the play, we listen to his story while 
he tells it to his female cousin Suriya, a sixteen-year old. The story is originally a joke 
about Saddam, which was extended by Griffiths to become a short story.121 
Griffiths adds some mythological aspects to the joke, which are derived from 
traditional Arabic literature such as The Arabian Nights. Suddenly, just as Tarek finishes 
his story, the plane returns and shoots him. On one hand, Tarek is portrayed as bright and 
peaceful which are the same qualities hoped for in the future of Iraq after decades of 
dictatorship, which specifically harmed the boy’s ethnic minority. Therefore, his death can 
be seen, in a more figurative way, as a symbol of the gap between declared goals of 
American policies and the disastrous consequences of their military and political 
interventions in Iraq.  
On the other hand, spectators who link Tarek’s single comment that the plane has 
‘no pilot’ (Griffiths 2007, 261), and the factual circumstances of the Northern No-Fly Zone, 
will see his death as an unintentional fallout from the noble mission of protecting the Kurds 
from Saddam. Nevertheless, even these spectators are more likely to be baffled by Tarek’s 
speech while he is dying:  
 
Tarek: (His voice strangely altered, as if disembodied) […] With 
these acts you demand your own destruction, we have no choice but 
to oblige. […] Call it not revenge but justice. We will chase you 
down the days until you are no longer. […] (He draws the Yankees 
cap from his tunic). (Griffiths 2007, 265–6)      
 
It seems that Tarek has already turned into a ghost, which not only justifies the mature tone 
of his final words, but also gives his character a shadow of transcendental existence. 
                                                 
119 For more information about Saddam’s 1991 attacks on the Kurds and the enforcement of a no-fly zone in 
Northern Iraq, see Shareef (148–52).   
120 Hakawati School literally means the school of the storyteller, where, as the play suggests, children are 
supposed to learn the art of telling stories. 
121 While Saddam was travelling in the desert his camel collapsed. While he was desperate and thinking of his 
death Saddam suddenly saw a camel station. When the camel was brought to the station, the Camel-Mechanic 
strongly hit the camel’s testicles with two stones. Crying from pain, the camel flies in the air before running 
away. Blaming the Camel-Mechanic Saddam agitatedly wonders: ‘how can I catch him now’. The Camel-
Mechanic replied: ‘The same way he went’.   
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Therefore, instead of pledging that he will take ‘revenge’ for his own death, he insists on 
seeking unlimited ‘justice’. The pronoun ‘we’ moves the individual story into a broader 
societal context, whether his words mean that the retaliation for the American violence will 
be undertaken by the live Iraqi people or by the ghosts of dead victims. In this sense, 
Tarek’s death in the play can be seen as a representation of a large number of similar cases 
not only during the years of sanctions, but also in the more recent ongoing occupation.  
I am aware that it is polemic to suggest how the audience, especially British and 
American spectators might receive a play. However, I argue that, without the awareness of 
Tarek’s identity as a Kurdish Iraqi, who is supposed to be protected by the drone that killed 
him, the Camel Station’s comment on the conflict might be distracted from factual aspects 
of the post-1991 Iraq. I support my claim by Michael Billington’s review of the British 
premiere of the play.122  Without any reference to Tarek’s ethnicity, Billington argues: ‘The 
final dream-image of the boy brandishing a rifle and crying "No more Yankees, no more 
stories" carries its own powerful prophetic charge’ (Billington To the Mountain, web). 
Describing Griffiths’ 2001 play as ‘prophetic’, suggests that the performance in 2006 is 
more likely meant by its director to be perceived as a comment on Iraq post-2003.   
 
c. Is it a crime to punish Iraqis for Saddam’s crimes?   
Ali, the Iraqi young man in The Retreating World, is forced because of the sanctions 
to sell his entire collection of books, including his favourites, Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, 
and Hemingway’s The Sun also Rises, to continue his habit of tending pigeons. Then, he 
sells his pigeons as well in order to survive. As with Dr. Aziz in The Gulf between US; and 
Remzi and Fairouz in In the Heart of America, Ali is secular. He tells the audience ‘My 
father, he loved movies and so my mother named my sister Greta, after Garbo. We were 
secular, our family’ (Wallace, 2003, 38).123 
Moreover, Ali explains how much he hated Saddam, and still hates him. However, 
he had no choice but to fight against the coalition in the First Gulf War, where he lost his 
close friend Samir. Here, the mutual responsibility of both the US and the Iraqi dictator is 
suggested by Wallace. Ali remembers: 
                                                 
122 Along with Griffiths’ Thermidor and Apricots, Camel Stationwas performed under the collective title To 
the Mountain in April 2006 at the Studio Theatre in the Victoria and Albert Museum, London. 
123 Because Saddam belongs to the minor religious sect, he encouraged some aspects of secularity except for 
any gesture of individuality that may contradict his socialist dictatorial regime. For more information, see 
Hechter (69).  
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And then we walked towards the American unit to surrender, our 
arms raised beside seven hundred other men. […] As we walked 
towards them—this is documented—the commander of the U.S. 
unit fired, at one man, an anti-tank missile. A missile meant to 
pierce armor. At one man. […] I remember. I could not. I could not 
recognize. My friend Samir. A piece of his spine stuck upright in 
the sand. (Wallace, 2003, 40)     
 
Although the bulk of Ali’s speech is dedicated to revealing his agony during the time of the 
comprehensive economic sanctions, Wallace insists on linking his individual situation with 
the previous war. And Samir’s death is part of a factual event as Ali asserts: ‘European 
Parliament, 1991. Members of the committee recorded the testimony, drinking cups of cold 
coffee: the defeated troops were surrendering. We, a nation of “unpeople,” were 
surrendering’ (Wallace, 2003, 40). Like his close friend, Samir did not support Saddam, but 
had to fight in the war to be killed while he was surrounded. 
Wallace’s play revisits the war by utilising this documented incident about the 
mistaken death of Iraqi soldiers in order to deepen the misery of Ali, the imaginary 
character of the play. In addition, weaving this factual disaster with the fictional realm of 
the play enables Wallace to insist on the continuity of the suffering of Iraqi people. In 
addition this fact-based story increases the emotional effect on the audience by highlighting 
Ali’s solitude after years of losing all who/what used to shape his world.  
Ali, at the very end of the play, asks spectators to catch the bones of his dead 
pigeons to keep them safe: ‘He roughly throws the contents of the bucket at the audience. 
Instead of bones, into the air and across the audience, spill hundreds of white feathers’ 
(Wallace 2003, 40). While this finale literally suggests that the content of the bucket is just 
the remains of Ali’s dead pigeons, the audience are also invited to conceive them 
figuratively as a symbol of innocent Iraqis, including Samir, the victims of an inescapable 
punishment for their dictator’s mistakes. In both cases, it seems that The Retreating World 
intends to raise the awareness of the audience; by comparing their own shock at a potential 
mess of feathers with the death of Ali’s friend by ‘a missile meant to pierce armor’, viewers 
may realise the mighty gap between their secure life and the struggle of Iraqi people. When 
I watched the play at the Exeter Northcott in February 2010, I cowardly avoided sitting in 
the potential range of the feathers, and I still regret doing that, especially because it turned 
out that the bucket was empty. 
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Similar to Tarek in Camel Station, Ali denounces the Iraqi dictator. However, 
Wallace’s play does not mention Saddam’s manoeuvres to evade the inspection of the 
IAEA, and his regime’s misuse of the Oil-For-Food-Programme. Ignoring the mighty role 
of Saddam’s elusive policies in toughening the effect of the economic sanctions turns The 
Retreating World into a critique of the international community in general and the US in 
particular, especially with Ali’s referral to the killing of unarmed soldiers. I suggest that 
Western media coverage of Iraq through the 1990s had drawn Saddam’s image as an anti-
international law dictator. Relying on such established and well-known attributes, most 
British and American playwrights, including Wallace, occasionally refer to Saddam. In 
contrast, these playwrights focus on the harm caused by American-led political and military 
activities. In other words, I argue that what really concerns British and American dramatists 
is exposing the way in which their political leaders and media contradict Western values 
and humanitarian principles. Playwrights’ critique of their own countries might explain 
why these plays neglect the international support for the 1991 War as a response to the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait. 
 
The Gulf between American and British theatres: same wars, different responses          
It is remarkable that Wallace’s two plays were premiered in the UK. When Scott 
Cummings claims that: ‘[t]he American theatre was slower and more ambivalent in its 
embrace of Wallace’s heightened, sensual, and frank political work’ (Cummings 4), it 
seems important to ask if American theatre was reluctant to produce political theatre in 
general and plays that criticise the First Gulf War and its aftermath in particular? The 
answer can be found in the tepid reaction of both American spectators and critics towards 
States of Shock. Frank Rich argues that Shepard’s play is ‘written with the earnest—one 
might even say quaint—conviction that the stage is still an effective platform for political 
dissent and mobilizing public opinion’ (Rich c1). It is hard to define whether Rich’s doubts 
about the ability of political theatre to make social changes are merely based on the 
dominance of apolitical postmodern drama in the late 1980s, or if the critic also expresses 
his opposition to the critique of the war.  
In either case, Rich’s negative opinion of States of Shock represents the vast 
majority of critical responses to the debut of States of Shock. In his comment on Rich’s 
harsh critique of Shepard’s play, Professor David DeRose argues:  
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I am not suggesting that States of Shock is a great play, or even a 
particularly good play. But […] Shepard was one of the few 
members of the American theater community to take a stance on the 
Persian Gulf war [sic]. His reward was to be treated with absolutely 
no comprehension by the New York press. (DeRose 122)  
 
I link DeRose’s avoidance of giving a verdict about the play’s dramatic quality with 
Colleran’s claim that the play’s ‘brevity and savage images, even its lack of depth, are the 
marks of a work written in a passionate hurry in order to make a passionate point’ (Colleran 
2012, 44–5). Moreover, in his review of the British debut of States of Shock in June 1993 at 
the Salisbury Playhouse, Irving Wardle claims that ‘there is no hiding the falseness of the 
ending’ (Wardle, web).124 
Did the anti-war message of States of Shock not appeal to the majority of the 
American public in 1991? It is possible, but hard to prove. However, I argue that the play 
was shocking because not only does Shepard remind its audience of the Vietnamese War, 
but Stubbs in States of Shock represents an American veteran with physical and 
psychological wounds, which might identify him with many characters portrayed by a large 
number of the literary works about the Vietnam War. Put differently, Shepard’s play 
indirectly accuses its audience of supporting a new Vietnam.125 
I have mentioned Shepard’s play more for the purpose of suggesting a reason for 
Wallace’s plays being premiered in the UK. Although I am not going to analyse States of 
Shock, I will selectively highlight the way in which Stubbs’s behaviour is conceived by 
other characters, which extends the scope of Shepard’s political opposition of the war to 
include social critique of America in the 1990s. Sitting in his wheelchair at a café, Stubbs 
blows a whistle hanging around his neck, and starts to describe how he conceded his 
serious injury. Addressing the White couple, who keep staring at him without any sign of 
sympathy, Stubbs recalls: ‘When I was hit— It went straight through me. Out the other 
side. […] When I was hit—I never saw it coming. I never heard a sound. The sky went 
white’ (Shepard 9). Obsessed with getting a meal, the couple is distracted from the young 
veteran’s speech by nagging about the poor service. Colleran claims that ‘the juxtaposition 
of war’s victims and voyeurs implicates the audience as well as the on-stage diners and 
                                                 
124 For more examples of the harsh, and sometimes scornful, reception of the play by several critics, see 
Willadt (147-8). 
125Polls of American public opinion on the 1991 War can be found in Gallup, Jr. (13), and Clymer (A 12). 
Examples of stereotyped disabled and psychopathic Vietnam veterans within American literature are 
mentioned in Boyle (2009, 100–43), and Wittmann. 
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makes explicit connections between consumerism, nationalism, and political isolationism 
(Colleran 2012, 45). The most significant point of Colleran’s observation is her suggestion 
of identification between the couple and the real spectators of Shepard’s play, as both are 
witnessing the victim of a war, supported by the vast majority of the American public.  
Moreover, moving his attention to Glory Bee, the waitress, Stubbs tells her about 
his injury while he is holding his shirt up to expose a huge scar. Glory Bee is too busy to 
care about Stubbs’s wounds or words. She ignores him by seeking more food orders 
(Shepard 10–11). Later, Glory Bee declares: ‘I worshipped the menu. To me it held a life. 
An unthreatened life. Better than the Bible’ (Shepard 41). Both the working-class waitress 
and the bourgeois white couple are driven by self-centred, materialistic motives.    
I am focusing on these extracted lines in order to highlight two aspects of States of 
Shock, both of which are represented in several plays about Iraq and Afghanistan after 
2001. Firstly, the anti-war message is contextualised, or even overshadowed by fierce 
criticism of the playwright’s own society and culture. Johan Callens argues that ‘the play 
enacts a cultural critique which far exceeds its immediate circumstances’ (Callens, 291). 
Secondly, the play bitterly portrays soldiers’ disappointment at the public lack of 
appreciation for the former’s sacrifices.  
In contrast to the few plays about the First Gulf War and its consequences, the 2003 
invasion of Iraq and its aftermath have prompted a large number of British and American 
playwrights to respond. Before exploring the following group of plays, which includes 
examples of the noticeable trend of contemporary political theatre on both sides of the 
Atlantic, it is important to mention two general observations. Firstly, the number of British 
plays that comment on the war is larger than that of American plays. In May 2005, 
Zinoman argued that ‘Americans may be doing the lion's share of the fighting in the Iraq 
war, but the British are shouldering the responsibility for writing plays about it’ (Zinoman 
E10). In addition to the American motto of ‘Supporting our soldiers’, such a phenomenon 
can be explained by the fact that most American people were convinced that the War on 
Iraq was part of the War on Terror because of the allegations about concealed connections 
between Saddam’s regime and al-Qaeda. In contrast, the reasons for the war have been 
doubted by a large sector of the British public. 
My second observation is that a remarkable increase in the inclusion of 
documentary material is evident within the topical plays of both British and American 
playwrights. However, while the vast majority of British plays adopt the forms of tribunal 
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theatre and Verbatim plays, most American playwrights respond to the conflict by 
imaginary plots, usually in dreamlike plays. The latter does not incorporate documentary 
material directly but draws from aspects of the war nevertheless.    
 
a. Fake warning of a potential danger: Justifying War 
Iraq’s ability to attack by using WMDs, which was the main reason for the invasion 
of Iraq, was represented by Justifying War: Scenes from the Hutton Inquiry. Edited by 
Richard Norton-Taylor, and premiered at The Tricycle Theatre in October 2003, Justifying 
War is one of the most controversial examples of British tribunal theatre. The play traces 
part of ‘Lord Hutton’s Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr David 
Kelly’ (Norton-Taylor 2003, 7). Dr Kelly’s controversial comments on the British 
Government’s dossier raised crucial doubts about Saddam’s ability to activate alleged Iraqi 
chemical weapons in forty-five minutes.126 
According to Andrew Gilligan, Dr Kelly implied to him that the dossier ‘was 
transformed [by Alastair Campbell] in the week before it was published, to make it sexier’ 
(Norton-Taylor 2003, 12). Susan Watts, who did not tell Dr Kelly that she was taping their 
conversation, argues that the latter told her that he did not say that it was Campbell who 
made the claim that Iraqi WMDs could be activated in 45 minutes (Norton-Taylor 2003, 
27).127 Apart from the person(s) who ‘exaggerated’ the threat of Saddam, and whether this 
exaggeration was based on honest concerns or it was an intentional attempt to deceive the 
British public, Dr Kelly, according to his widow’s statement, was turned into a target of ‘a 
kind of continuation of a kind of reprimand into the public domain’ (Norton-Taylor 2003, 
89). As Mrs Kelly declares, after a ‘very grim’ and ‘extremely tense’ period, within which 
her husband appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee, she was informed that he was 
found dead near their house (Norton-Taylor 2003, 86–94).128 
In the published text of his tribunal play, Norton-Taylor adheres to such a high 
degree of objectivity that he puts his few intervening lines into square brackets to 
                                                 
126 Published on 24 September 2002, the dossier’s title is Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction.  
127 As they describe themselves at the time of the inquiry, Gilligan was a correspondent of Radio 4, Watts was 
a BBC reporter, and Campbell was the Prime Minister’s Director of Communications and Strategy. 
128 Although the circumstances of Dr Kelly’s death indicate that it was a suicide wherein he utilised his knife 
along with his wife’s medicine, most journalistic speculations have doubted this official story claiming that 
Dr Kelly was murdered. For more information about these polemic allegations, see Dodd, Goslett, and 
Glover. In Baker (2007), a detailed reading of the circumstances of Dr Kelly’s death is contextualised, and 
sometimes driven, by a systematic and harsh critique of the Labour Party.   
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distinguish them from the citations from documented testimonies. However, by considering 
that Norton-Taylor deliberately foregrounds the phrase ‘Justifying War’ in the play’s title, it 
seems that the British political manoeuvres that preceded the invasion of Iraq are turned 
from being a background concerning the matter of Dr Kelly to acting as the main topic of 
the play. In addition to choosing the parts of the Inquiry that highlight the feeble reasons for 
the war, Norton-Taylor employed the title of his play as an indicator of the play’s focus on 
the Iraqi matter. 
Norton-Taylor’s most striking intervention is underlining the factual testimony of 
Dr Kelly’s wife by making it the finale. Jenny Hughes argues that ‘in valorising the final 
testimony of Mrs Kelly, the play frames the war as an individual tragedy and further 
narrows the terms of reference of the original Inquiry as well as constructs a debilitating 
and gendered personification of victimhood’ (Hughes 2011, 99). I partly disagree with 
Hughes because Janice Kelly’s testimony is intrinsically emotional, which means that 
changing its location may increase, but not invent its effect on the audience. In addition, 
and most importantly, the first line of Lord Hutton affirms: ‘This Inquiry relates to a very 
tragic death’ (Norton-Taylor 2003, 9). In other words, the Inquiry is neither about ‘the war’ 
nor the misconduct in the British political world and press, although both are investigated 
as by-products of tracing the reasons for Dr Kelly’s ‘tragic death’.   
Highlighting Mrs Kelly’s painful loss of her husband suggests that perhaps they are 
the first victims of the invasion. Megson explains: ‘Norton-Taylor’s editorial decision to 
alter the chronology of the Hutton inquiry by relocating, to the end of the play, Janice 
Kelly’s heartbreaking testimony about her husband’s suicide, placed the emphasis on the 
human cost of the whole WMD debacle’ (Megson 2005, 370). I argue that, as long as any 
‘editorial decision’ does not change the content of the original testimonies, the editor of a 
tribunal play can utilise his journalistic skills to encourage spectators to adopt a specific 
point of view.   
In the footsteps of the original Inquiry, the play doubts the British Government’s 
claim about the instant danger of Iraqi WMDs. In addition, Justifying War scorns Blair’s 
plagiarisation from a PhD thesis in order to claim Saddam’s link with al-Qaeda. Gilligan 
argues that ‘Marishi [Ibrahim al-Marashi] wrote the Iraqi Mukhabarat [Iraqi Intelligence 
Service] had a role in aiding opposition groups in hostile regimes, and that was changed in 
the February dossier to supporting terrorist organisations in hostile regimes, which is quite 
a substantial change’ (Norton-Taylor 2003, 17). Nevertheless, and apart from highlighting 
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British manoeuvres to justify the invasion, I argue that Justifying War does not deny, or 
affirm, the possibility of Iraq’s obtaining of WMDs or of having connections with al-
Qaeda.  
Regardless of the debate about the time needed for preparing these weapons for 
attack, references to Iraq’s potential acquiring of biological and chemical weapons are 
made by journalists, politicians, and allegedly Dr Kelly himself. Even the claim of the 
forty-five minutes seems to be based on Dr Kelly’s speculation. Watts argues: 
 
He [Dr Kelly] said that he was – he made clear that he, in his word, 
was guessing; but he said that in 1991 the Iraqis were, and I quote, 
‘playing around with multibarrel launches and that these take 45 
minutes to fill’. So that was his best guess, if you like, as to where 
that figure had come from. (Norton-Taylor 2003, 26)          
 
By mentioning the year 1991, Watts’ statement indirectly recalls the international coalition 
against Saddam, which indirectly highlights the Iraqi regime’s aggression against Kuwait. 
In addition, the incident mentioned by Dr Kelly may suggest that Saddam was preparing to 
use WMDs against the Kurds, as he did in the late 1980s, which urged the international 
community to impose a No-Fly Zone in Northern Iraq. In either case, the aggressive history 
of the Iraqi regime is implied.  
Finally, and most significantly, when Justifying War was performed, a few months 
after the invasion, the audience had no factual evidence that decisively proved or rebutted 
the allegations that Saddam was able to utilise WMDs. Furthermore, with the consideration 
that ending the suffering of Iraqi people from their dictatorial regime was one of the 
declared reasons for the Anglo-American intervention in Iraq, the play does not, actually 
cannot, claim that the invasion was unjustified altogether. 
 
b. Initial failure in Iraq: a prophecy of a new Vietnam? 
Going further in extending the investigation of the declared reasons for the war 
beyond the claims about Iraqi WMDs, Hare’s Stuff Happens focuses on the factual situation 
in Iraq immediately after the invasion as evidence of more disasters to come. Written in 
2004 and performed in September of the same year at the National Theatre in London, 
Hare’s Verbatim play combines his invented dialogue with parts of factual documented 
speeches. He explains: ‘Scenes of direct address quote people verbatim. When the doors 
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close on the world’s leaders and on their entourages, then I have used my imagination’ 
(Hare 2006, n.pag.). As with the introductory stage directions of Camel Station, spectators 
who do not read Hare’s note might assume every dialogue amongst the officials is a precise 
record of a factual meeting, while these spectators consider the five testimonies uttered by 
ordinary characters as though they are invented speeches by Hare.  
I base my claim on the way in which Hare introduces all the characters of the 
British and American officials by a group of actors, who function as narrators without 
intervention in the play’s action, as the overlapping speeches in the following quotation 
suggests: 
 
Powell: In Vietnam I learned a certain attitude, a certain distrust …  
An Actor: Major Colin Powell is pulled out of Vietnam six years 
earlier. By his own description, a serving soldier, schooled in 
obedience … 
Powell: the army is the most democratic institution in America. 
An Actor: November 1968: Powell is in a helicopter which falls to 
the ground, in his words, ‘like an elevator with a snapped cable’. 
(Hare 2006, 4)   
 
In his first appearance on stage, the play introduces the Secretary of State in Bush’s 
administration as a Vietnam veteran, which will be an essential aspect of Powell’s initial 
opposition of the invasion in the following scenes. In addition, both Powell and the 
Actor/narrator address the audience in a report-like language describing a factual incident 
during Powell’s service in Vietnam, for which he was rewarded a medal by the army.129 
Similarly, Hare utilises these actors to introduce most of the officials’ meetings with 
precise factual information. For instance, at the end of the sixth scene, an actor introduces 
the next dialogue by explaining: ‘September 15th, the President assembles his war cabinet 
for a weekend at Camp David’ (Hare 2006, 17-18). Therefore, I argue that without reading 
Hare’s statement in the published text of the play, spectators are more likely to consider the 
dialogue in the seventh scene as factual as both actors and characters within the 
introductory scenes. In contrast, there is no actor’s introduction to any of the five 
monologues, which are respectively stated by the following characters: an Angry Journalist, 
a New Labour Politician, a Palestinian Academic, a Brit in New York, and an Iraqi Exile. 
                                                 
129 For more details about this incident, see Harari (5), Mihalkanin (408), and Hook (8).  
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Despite this matter of reception, Hare’s play establishes its critique of the war by 
drawing his audience’s attention to the link between his play and the factual situation in 
Iraq. In the first scene, one of the narrators addresses spectators: ‘Stuff. Happens. The 
response of Donald Rumsfeld, when asked to comment on the widespread looting and 
pillage that followed the American conquest of Baghdad-Friday, April 11th 2003’ (Hare 
2006, 3). To highlight his critique of this controversial statement, Hare depicts the press 
conference in which the character of Rumsfeld pronounces it. Moreover, in the play’s last 
scene, the Iraqi Exile declares ‘Donald Rumsfeld said, “Stuff happens.” It seemed to me the 
most racist remark I had ever heard’ (Hare 2006, 119). As these two scenes suggest that the 
invasion is an American mistake, Hare’s play utilises this disorderly state of Iraq as a 
frame, within which much of the narrative of Stuff Happens represents the political 
manoeuvres of both American and British leaders in inventing an excuse for waging the 
war.  
In addition to suggesting that the chaos in Iraq is a result of an unjustified invasion, 
Hare utilises the imaginary dialogues to portray the docility of Blair towards American 
politics, especially compared to the French and Russian politicians’ opposition to the 
invasion. Moreover, the play stresses the gap between Bush’s aggressive standpoint and 
Powell’s reluctance to lose European countries’ support for the soon-to-occur invasion of 
Iraq. Powell’s experience in the Vietnam War gives his opposition to the military option 
more credibility than his colleagues’ reasons for opposing military intervention.  For 
example, the Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz is introduced only to cite weak 
reasoning:  
 
An Actor: [A] Yale professor, Paul Wolfowitz, spends the nineteen 
seventies chewing the implications of the involvement in Vietnam 
which he describes as: 
Wolfowitz: An [‘]over-expenditure of American power[’]. (Hare 
2006, 7)  
 
As with Powell’s remark, Wolfowitz’s negative description of the Vietnam War has 
become a famous quote.130 
Later in the play, Hare modifies this factual speech and weaves it with his 
imaginary dialogue, when Wolfowitz induces his colleagues to attack Iraq by claiming: 
                                                 
130 Wolfowitz’s quote is cited in Solomon (12) and Mann (53). 
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‘This is something we can do with very little effort. For a minimum expenditure of effort, 
we can get maximum result. Take out Saddam and we blow fresh air into the Middle East’ 
(Hare 2006, 20). In addition to highlighting the discrepant standpoints of Powell and 
Wolfowitz, the play’s comparison between the two wars contradicts Wolfowitz’s positive 
prediction for the American-led military intervention to achieve ‘maximum’ success by 
‘minimum’ exertion. Basing its prediction on the early factual consequences of the 
invasion, the play suggests, especially in its first and last scenes, that the war in Iraq could 
be as disastrous as that in Vietnam. Since 2004, when the play was written, Bush’s 
administration has been blamed for a tremendous loss of soldiers, civilians and credibility.  
Factual statements are utilised by Hare as if they are indirectly debating his play’s 
comment on the invasion as unjustified, disastrous war. However, it is important to realise 
that, although these speeches are supposed to be part of factual statements, Verbatim 
theatre does not follow the strict form of tribunal plays regarding the adherence to the 
precision of the documentary material. Moreover, Hare does not deny that he intervenes in 
factual statements. Commenting on such, Deirdre Heddon claims that ‘Hare’s formulation 
might more accurately be phrased as “voicing the voiceless,” since talking out is replaced 
in this act of ventriloquism by talking for or talking about’ (Heddon 116). Put differently, 
nothing could guarantee that Hare has not added to or excised from what his interviewees 
actually said.  
The significance of this observation is that although the opinions included in each 
statement do not necessarily coincide with Hare’s own point of view on the invasion, these 
testimonies reflect the ways in which the playwright represents these interviewees as 
dramatic characters. For instance, the only voice given a chance to defend the war in the 
play is that of the Journalist. Although the latter can be seen as an individual, regardless of 
his profession, the character is also able to be read on the grounds of Hare’s hyperbolic 
claim about the bias of most Western media.  The Journalist argues:  
 
A country groaning under a dictator, its people oppressed, liberated 
at last from a twenty-five year tyranny- and freed. […] How 
obscene it is, how decadent, to give your attention not to the now, 
not to the liberation, not to the people freed, but to the relentless 
archaic discussion of the manner [sic] of the liberation. Was it 
lawful? Was it not? (Hare 2006, 14) 
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As this statement suggests, despite the debate about the legitimacy of the war, the invasion 
should be supported because it liberated the Iraqis from Saddam’s brutality. Remarkably, 
the first sentence nearly repeats Blair’s phrase: ‘Iraqi people groaning under years of 
dictatorship’, which the Prime Minister used during his speech to the House of Commons 
on 18 March 2003.131 
In contrast to the Journalist, the Iraqi Exile refers to the Iraqis’ continued struggle 
even after the toppled dictator. The expat argues:      
 
And now the American dead are counted, their numbers recorded, 
their coffins draped in flags. How many Iraqis have died? How 
many civilians? No figure is given. Our dead are uncounted. We 
opposed Saddam Hussein, many of us, because he harmed people, 
and anybody who harms innocent Iraqis I feel equally passionately 
and strongly about, and I will oppose them. And I will. (Hare 2006, 
119–120) 
 
Firstly, this speech exaggeratedly imposes a kind of equivalence between the American-led 
coalition and Saddam, where the latter’s brutal dictatorship is allegedly replaced by the 
former’s harm to civilians. Secondly, when the Iraqi Exile mentions the lack of information 
about the Iraqi casualties, he stresses a significant reason for the critique of the media 
coverage of the war. The most important point of this statement is that the Iraqi Exile does 
not express his opposition of the war. As a victim of Saddam’s dictatorship, he might even 
be supportive of the invasion. Nevertheless, he is angry because of its aftermath.   
Further opposition to the Journalist’s argument can be found in the monologue of 
the Palestinian Academic, who is against the invasion. She wonders: ‘Why was the only 
war in history ever to be based purely on intelligence – and doubtful intelligence at that – 
launched against a man who was ten years past his peak of belligerence?’ (Hare 2006, 
57).It is hard to decide whether this question conceals the Palestinian Academic’s 
undeclared support for Saddam, or whether the Palestinian intellectual attempts to urge 
Hare’s spectators to realise that Saddam should have been punished several years before, 
when he was continually perpetrating his big crimes against Iran, Kuwait, and his own 
people, especially the Kurds. 
                                                 
131Blair’s phrase is cited in McGoldrick (303), Van Dijk (228), and Bayley (91).  
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The harshest critique of the War in Iraq comes from a Brit in New York, who goes 
further in criticising the US. Recalling his conversation with an American woman, who 
considered the invasion of Iraq revenge for 9/11, the British man argues: 
 
I was in Saks Fifth Avenue the morning they bombed Baghdad. 
'Isn’t it wonderful?’ says the saleswoman. ‘At last we’re hitting 
back.’ ‘Yes,’ I reply. ‘At the wrong people. Somebody steals your 
handbag, so you kill their second cousin, on the grounds they live 
close. Explain to me,’ I say ‘Saudi Arabia is financing Al Qaeda. 
Iran, Lebanon and Syria are known to shelter terrorists. North 
Korea is developing a nuclear weapons programme. All these you 
leave alone. (Hare 2006, 92) 
 
The Brit exaggerates by suggesting that the US ignores the dangers of supporting Hamas 
and Hezbollah by Iran and Syria. The claim that ‘Saudi Arabia is financing Al Qaeda’ is 
very controversial. On one hand, it seems to conflate the possible support of many non-
governmental organisations, whose members sympathise with the militant group and the 
Saudi regime which is one of the closest allies of the US. When the Saudi Kingdom openly 
supported Bin Laden, it was part of the American indirect confrontation with the Russians 
in Afghanistan, before the leader of al Qaeda antagonised his King. On the other hand, the 
complicated relationship between the strongly radical Wahhabists and the Saudi regime 
suggests that the latter may reluctantly overlook secret funds sent, or arranged, by the 
former to members of al Qaeda.132 
It is obvious that most factual testimonies within the play, which are selected and 
perhaps modified by Hare, criticise both the invasion and its declared reasons. However, 
despite Hare’s opinion on the war, the most significant aspect of these testimonies is that 
they seem to echo contradictory readings of the invasion offered by a large number of 
public commentators, politicians, writers, and all sorts of media around the world. For 
instance, part of the critique of the saleswoman’s standpoint within the statement of the Brit 
in New York can be read on the grounds of Roy’s comment on the invasion, within which 
the French scholar argues: ‘The American Leadership’s resolve to invade Iraq was only 
hardened by 9/11. Instead of responding appropriately to the attack, it took advantage of the 
                                                 
132 For more information about the Saudi regime’s relationships with radical Islamists in general and terrorist 
organisations in particular, see Gray (2014, 115–44), and Litwak (307–8).  
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American public’s thirst for vengeance to impose its original objective: the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein’ (Roy 2008, 13–4).133 
The Palestinian Academic wonders: ‘Why Iraq? The question has been asked a 
thousand times. And a thousand answers have been given. Why Iraq? Why now?’ (Hare 
2006, 57). As with all factual statements in Stuff Happens, these questions directly address 
spectators. Whether they have already shaped their opinions, or they come to the theatre 
with the same questions, the members of the audience are more likely engage in an 
unspoken debate with the answers expressed by the Palestinian Academic, when she 
proceeds: 
 
Here comes the familiar list of explanations. Because an Arab 
democracy would serve as a model. Because it was unfinished 
business – ‘He tried to kill my dad.’ Because Osama bin Laden had 
served notice on the dictatorship in Saudi Arabia, and now America 
needed a new military base. Because Cheney worked for 
Halliburton. ‘It was all about Oil!’ (Hare 2006, 57)   
 
As far as Stuff Happens reveals, it is hard to know whether Hare adopts one or none of 
these answers. Even throughout Hare’s invented politicians’ conversation behind closed 
doors, there is no reference to any concealed motive for the war. Was it too early or too 
difficult in 2004 to affirm that there is no evidence that Saddam was able to attack with 
WMDs? Perhaps, and it is also possible that Hare leaves it to the audience to decide, or to 
be baffled by these various speculations.  
I argue that Stuff Happens illustrates its opposition to the war in two ways. Firstly, 
the chaos in Iraq is represented in the first and last scenes. Secondly, the fictional scenes of 
the politicians, within which the British government dishonestly attempts to justify the 
invasion, while all members of the American administration, except for Powell, have 
decided to invade Iraq regardless of any international opposition.  Put differently, the 2003 
War in Iraq will always be an unjustified aggression, despite its declared or allegedly 
hidden reasons. The same message is in the core of The Vertical Hour, within which Hare 
uses imaginary dialogue, characters, and plot to affirm his continuous opposition of the 
war.    
 
                                                 
133 The removal of Saddam was advocated by several American politicians and intellectuals in 1998. For more 
information, see Meyer (169), Albanese (72), and Ohaegbulam (114).  
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Excessive political discourse within an imaginary plot 
Unlike Stuff Happens, the comment on the invasion of Iraq in The Vertical Hour is 
merged with other themes. The play was premiered on Broadway at the Music Box Theatre 
in 2006. Later, in January 2008 it was staged in Britain at the Royal Court Theatre. The 
matter of Iraq is raised through political discussions between Nadia, an American professor 
of international relations and Oliver, the father of her English boyfriend, Philip. Nadia 
supports the American-led intervention in Iraq regardless of its controversial circumstances 
and against any public opposition of the war on the two sides of the Atlantic: 
 
NADIA: I’ve taken a huge amount of flak. [...] In liberal 
Connecticut defending the war has not been a popular position.  
OLIVER: It’s not been big in Shropshire either. (Hare 2008, 35) 
 
On one hand, this short dialogue might suggest that the opposition to the war in both 
Britain and the US are identical, which is imprecise. On the other hand, putting the word 
‘liberal’ in such a negative context contradicts Nadia’s intellectuality. Does she mock the 
anti-war public for their naïve understanding of liberalism? Most probably, as Hare’s stage 
directions indicate that she is ‘formal’ (Hare 2008, 34), Nadia’s mention of her experience 
of being criticised for her support for the war is a sign sent to Oliver of her readiness to 
defend her opinion against his critique of the invasion of Iraq.         
In their debate, Nadia starts by recalling her previous work as a war correspondent 
in the Balkans, wherein, according to her, the delayed Western intervention led to appalling 
consequences for hundreds of thousands of European victims. She argues: ‘I've always 
supported human intervention in countries where terrible things are happening’ (Hare 2008, 
35). Then Nadia applies her belief to the War in Iraq. She proceeds, ‘If you want me to pass 
my evening defending the right of Western countries to use their muscle to free Arabs from 
systematic murder, believe me, I'm up for it’ (Hare 2008, 35). Not only does Nadia justify 
the invasion of Iraq, but she also considers the intervention to deter Saddam’s brutality 
against his people as the duty of Western countries. Similar to Stuff Happens, rescuing the 
Iraqis from their tyrant is the main excuse for the war mentioned by the pro-war character.  
In contrast to Nadia, Oliver expresses his opposition to the invasion. As a physician, 
he explains to Dina: ‘Let’s just say, I knew who the surgeon was going to be, so I had fair 
idea what the operation would look like’ (Hare 2008, 35). Put differently, although he does 
not contradict Nadia’s argument about the brutality of the Iraqi dictator, Oliver seems to 
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doubt both the intention and the ability of the American-led coalition to enhance the 
situation of the Iraqi people. The discrepant standpoints of Oliver and Nadia are represented 
when he uses the word ‘invasion’ and she insists on calling it ‘liberation’ (Hare 2008, 30). 
Despite their disagreement, Nadia becomes deeply stunned by Oliver’s persuasive 
and seductive personality. She returns to the United States with both her political beliefs 
and emotions profoundly shaken. Then she moves to a kind of self-awareness; she no 
longer loves her boyfriend and she does not believe in the rightness of the invasion any 
more. Eventually, she decides to work as a war correspondent again, but this time in Iraq. 
The play neither suggests that everyone has to go to Iraq in order to understand everything 
about the war nor that this kind of thorough understanding is possible. However, what The 
Vertical Hour seems to claim is that an academic standpoint, even when it is backed by an 
empirical experience, might lack depth. 
In what seems to be an allusion, which Hare’s play draws between Nadia’s private 
life and her political opinions, she tells Oliver about her initial feelings towards his son in a 
regretful tone. Nadia declares: ‘You’re not supposed to like men’s looks, are you? Aren’t 
looks meant to be a sign of shallowness? They say. ‘He was good-looking, in a shallow sort 
of way.’ They never say, ‘He was good-looking and it was profound.’ They never say that’ 
(Hare 2008, 81). Does Nadia realise that what she thought as ‘good-looking’ reasons for the 
war in Iraq are ‘shallow’? Or, despite the ‘profound’ reasons, the ‘shallowness’ was her 
suggesting a resemblance between the Yugoslavian victims of the Serbs and the Iraqi 
victims of Saddam’s regime? When Nadia realises that neither her academic expertise nor 
her previous practical experience is enough to understand the conflict insightfully, the play 
indirectly suggests that some aspects of the war are too controversial to be comprehensively 
understood; though this might be a reasonable claim, I find it hard to believe that Nadia, 
whose writing about Iraq prompted an invite to the White House to advise Bush, needed to 
meet Oliver in order to have such a revelation.   
Although the form of discussion enables Hare to display contradictory points of 
view, the play sometimes loses its dramatic vitality because the political discourse seems to 
burden the narrative with characters’ lives. Therefore, it is understandable why Charles 
Spencer, who watched the British performance, argues that ‘The Vertical Hour, which often 
feels like a finger-wagging lecture, does the cause of serious drama few favours […] It may 
be called The Vertical Hour but it is likely to leave many in the audience prone with 
boredom’ (Spencer 2008, web). Moreover, characters engage in several debates about the 
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meaning of abstract notions such as capitalism, politics, modernity and patriotism. Writing 
about the American debut of the play, Billington observes: ‘Hare's play, whatever its flaws, 
is about big ideas. Not just the tragic mess of Iraq. It also deals with the lawlessness of 
elected politicians, Anglo-American cultural differences, the dangers of denial, the futility 
of isolating politics from private life’ (Billington ‘A five-course meal’ web). I mention 
these negative reviews of the play in order to highlight two observations. Firstly, the 
comparison between Stuff Happens and The Vertical Hour challenges the claim that 
documentary plays are intrinsically less artistic than – and by nature are not as amusing as –
imaginary plots. Secondly, I underscore the difficulties of utilising imaginary characters to 
convey political discourse, which can lead to turning these characters into abstracted 
claims, losing the focus on political topic, or both.  
I am borrowing Spencer’s comment on The Vertical Hour to claim that If Hare’s 
play ‘does the cause of’ political drama with fictional plots ‘few favours’, Martin Crimp’s 
Advice to Iraqi Women is a unique example of how a political message can be delivered 
without direct political discourse.  
 
Talking to Iraqi women, addressing Western public 
Advice to Iraqi Women is a warning call against the invasion, but in a unique way. 
The Royal Court staged a reading of the play on 7 April 2003, less than a month after the 
invasion. Later, it was produced in February 2008 together with Churchill’s This is a Chair, 
as two short acts under the title: Welcome Stranger at the New Ballroom, Trades Hall in 
Melbourne, Australia. Advice to Iraqi Women gives the director the authority to decide the 
number and features of the characters who utter the successive lines of speech, as all the 
lines of speech within the play are unrelated to specific characters. The play’s title suggests 
that it is a warning that accompanies the Anglo-American invasion. Vicky Angelaki claims 
that ‘Crimp’s title, which raises certain expectations, dramatically clashes with content as 
any assumptions are very soon subverted’ (Angelaki 122). The play does not mention the 
war at all; it is a series of instructions that warn imaginary and absent women about 
exposing their children to a variety of domestic dangers.  
According to the play, a bike, roller-skates, mechanical toys, and loose eyes of 
teddy bears are just some examples of things that Iraqi women should protect their children 
from. Gradually, the gap between the world in which the absent dramaturgic receiver of the 
advice may live and the situation in Iraq becomes more obvious:   
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When driving in the country to see the country orchards, seat your 
child in the back and strap it down. Strap the child down hard and if 
you need to use your mobile, stop the car. Don't buy a car without 
rear airbags. Don't buy a car without side-impact protection. Don't 
let your child play under a car, or beside one, because a car is a 
minefield (Crimp, web). 
 
Apart from the certain and constant dangers of the coalition’s weapons, most of the unsafe 
things and situations mentioned within the play are a luxury for the vast majority of Iraqi 
people. Another example follows: ‘Supervise all swimming. Make sure your child wears 
goggles because of the chemicals in the water. By all means inflate a paddling pool in your 
garden but bear in mind that your garden is a potential war zone’ (Crimp, web). When the 
play refers to ‘a potential war zone’ while the entire country is actually being attacked, 
Crimp’s ironic message is exposed. British and American parents who may watch the play 
would agree that such domestic accidents really can be dangerous. However, because 
warnings are addressed to Iraqi women whose continuous struggle lasted for decades, the 
words create a sorrowful irony.  
For any Iraqi woman, Crimp’s advice would be a chain of harsh jokes, especially if 
she lost a child because of the lack of food or medicine. However, the play is not intended 
to be read or watched by Iraqis. It is meant to be delivered to English-speaking spectators. 
The irony will be realised by the members of a Western audience as soon as they recall 
what they have been watching and reading about Iraq, whether in the near past throughout 
the years of sanctions, or at the time when the country was invaded. Angelaki argues that 
Crimp’s play ‘develops as a comprehensive manual for protecting children in countries at 
peace, in societies where war is difficult to conceptualize and its horrific images are 
confined to the mass media’ (Angelaki 122). After years of deprivation, the shortage of 
food, medicine, and education becomes a daily agony for Iraqis; completely the opposite of 
what Crimp’s play describes as a utopian world:  
 
Avoid slippery floors and at the first sign of unremitting fever, do 
call a doctor, call a doctor straight away. The doctor will come 
straight away at the first sign of unremitting fever. She will have the 
latest drugs and the most up-to-date skills. If necessary she will 
intubate. Don't be frightened to call out your doctor: she is waiting 
for your call, she has spent her whole life waiting for it. (Crimp, 
web) 
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But why does the play address women rather than men or Iraqi people in general? Perhaps, 
the play suggests that Iraqi men have to continue their fate of fighting in senseless wars, 
including the recent invasion. Or, probably, it is a way of drawing the attention of Western 
audiences to the vulnerability of the vast majority of Iraqi women who live in a male-
dominated society, where the safety of children is the responsibility of their mothers. 
Crimp’s play also might hint at the fact that, because of Saddam’s oppression and his 
successive wars since 1980, a large number of Iraqi mothers are widows, whose chances of 
a second marriage are noticeably limited; on the grounds of socially enforced traditions, 
which are ironically against Islam, not only does the Arabic widow’s reluctance to get 
remarried allegedly prove her piousness, but also her loyalty to the dead husband and her 
protection of their children from a potentially cruel step-father.134 
Although Advice to Iraqi Women does not directly mention either the economic 
sanctions or the invasion, it forcefully urges its British or American spectators to recognise 
the Iraqi disaster by comparison. For Sierz, who is against documentary theatre altogether, 
the play ‘is a perfect example of how resonance is achieved by indirection and metaphor’ 
(Sierz PAJ, 60). This metaphor though is intrinsically and intentionally incompatible and 
the message of the play relies in highlighting this fact. The most important aspect of this 
discrepancy is that the comparison is not based on western privilege in general but on the 
long time that Iraqi people have suffered. Even for those who strictly believe in the military 
option, Crimp’s piece of serious irony may invite them to realise that innocents are usually 
the ones who have to pay the high price of political and military confrontations. Finally, 
despite being written in 2003 to respond to the American-led invasion, Advice to Iraqi 
Women can be read as a retrospective comment on the economic sanctions.  
So far, I have explored four examples of British topical plays, whose political 
comment on the 2003 Invasion of Iraq theatrically represent tribunal, Verbatim, and 
imaginary plots. The latter includes traditionally linear and fragmented structures. The 
question is where are American playwrights’ comments on the disputation about the 
legality and the necessity of the war? As far as my search is concerned, the vast majority of 
American plays, which represent the War in Iraq in general, are written in the first half of 
the 2010s. I suggest that one of the reasons for such a phenomenon can be the jingoistic 
insistence on supporting soldiers, especially when the US army is fighting in Afghanistan 
                                                 
134 For more information about the increasing number of Iraqi widows, see Al-Ali (72) and Kadhim.  
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as well. In addition, whether as part of the War on Terror, or for removing Saddam – as a 
strategic enemy of the US – the American majority supported an immediate or later 
invasion of Iraq. A gradual diversification in the American public opinion on the war was 
mainly influenced by the high human and monetary cost, especially with no guarantee for 
withdrawal in the near future.135 
The American writer, actor, and director Tim Robbins’s unpublished play 
Embedded: Live is a rare and significant example, stylistically and thematically. The 
reaction this play received can partly explain why there are not many American plays that 
criticise the invasion. 
 
Embedded: Live: documentary material within musical satire 
Premiered in July 2003 at the Actor's Gang Theatre in Los Angeles, Embedded: 
Live is a harsh mockery of the American administration’s eagerness to invade Iraq. 
Prominent members of the American regime are represented by masked characters. The 
exaggerated features of these masks make them a parody of the politicians rather than a 
realistic representation of them. Similarly, the dialogue consists of pieces of burlesque that 
suggest the politicians’ obsession with making a war and inventing lies. The play scorns 
their radical belief in Leo Strauss as the God of new-conservatives, when they hold candles 
as if they are in a religious ritual. In another scene, while they excitedly talk about war, they 
reach sexual orgasm. In addition, the play gives these recognisable figures funny names 
such as Rum Rum, Gondola, Woof, Dick, and Covo, which respectively represent 
Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, and Colin Powell. Nevertheless, 
the American President is not represented. Elyse Sommer argues: ‘Perhaps the focus on the 
"Cabal" rather than the President is the author's way of saying that Mr. Bush is a puppet on 
these over the top strategists' string -- a common perception that helped Mr. Bush win two 
gubernatorial elections!’ (Sommer, web). Put differently, because Bush himself is absent 
from this group of masks, it seems that the play hints at the mighty role of his 
administration in convincing him to take the decision to invade Iraq.  
In contrast to the image of politicians, the play represents the vast majority of 
soldiers as loyal, brave and victims of unnecessary war. Through three imaginary 
characters, Sarge, Monk, and Jen, the play keeps an emotional line that contradicts the 
                                                 
135 For reference to the American public’s inclination to support the invasion, see Gallup, Jr. (34). For the 
change in this public opinion, see Holsti (2012, 69–72), and Mirra (17).   
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comic meetings of the masks. To insist on his sympathy with soldiers, Robbins creates 
three relationships that reveal the agony soldiers’ families have to endure. Sarge’s wife, 
Monk’s girlfriend, and Jen’s parents are introduced to the audience from the beginning in 
an emotional situation, at the moment the soldiers are ready for departure.  
The play suggests that some soldiers choose military life for financial reasons as the 
conversation between Jen and her father reveals: 
 
JEN’s DAD: Honey, I feel as though I have failed you.  
JEN: What do you mean daddy? 
JEN’s DAD: If I had a better job, then we would have the money to 
send you to the college. (Embedded: Live DVD)   
 
One of these relationships will shape the finale when Monk reads a letter to his girlfriend, 
who is reading his letter simultaneously. In the letter Monk vents his feelings of guilt: 
 
I can’t sleep. That night still burns fresh in my eyes. I closed them 
hoping that darkness takes them away, but they’re still there. I see 
the child’s severed arm, the look on the dead mother’s face, the 
blood. […] I have killed a family in a moment I wish I could get 
back. […] please forgive me. (Embedded: Live DVD) 
 
Because Monk mistakenly kills this family, we sympathise with his regretful confession. 
Moreover, the circumstances of the incident suggest that he was afraid. He apologises to his 
girlfriend because neither tolerate the death of civilians. At the moment Monk killed his 
innocent victims, he becomes a victim of the war himself.  
Between mocking US officials and appreciating soldiers, Robbins focuses on the 
role of embedded journalists in covering the events of the war. Laura Hitchcock defines 
‘embedded’ as ‘the term used for journalists authorized by the United States Government to 
cover the recent invasion of Iraq’ (Hitchcock, web). Although the title of the play refers to 
them, the presence of these journalists is marginal compared to the characters of politicians 
or soldiers. However, the play insists on revealing the rules these journalists had to obey 
when they were accompanying the troops, which prevented any of them from sending any 
information about the war without the army’s permission. By referring to this matter the 
play seems to comment on the huge critique of the lack of information about many events 
of the war.  
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Commenting on the embedded journalists’ reports about the battle of Fallujah, Lisa 
Finnegan argues: ‘What was happening in Fallujah? How many marines had been injured? 
How many insurgents were there? Who were they? There are dozens of questions that 
could have been asked’ (Finnegan 91). As Finnegan’s comment suggests, although the 
battle in Fallujah was one of the most disastrous events of the War in Iraq, these embedded 
journalists said almost nothing about it. In Jonathan Holmes’s introduction to his play 
Fallujah, first performed in 2007 at the Truman Brewery, Brick Lane,136 the playwright and 
director blame European countries, especially the UK, for ignoring the carnage. Such 
neglect, according to Holmes, can be partly attributed to ‘[t]he prevention of news 
broadcasts from the city’ (Holmes 2007, xiii). The effect of these embedded journalists on 
preventing the American people from getting an accurate image of the war is represented 
by the play in two short successive scenes. On a hospital bed in Iraq, Jen is frustrated by 
seeing an Iraqi person, who does not appear on stage. As he introduces himself as an Iraqi 
doctor, Jen is surprised to learn that he studied in the UK. However, she does not believe 
that an Iraqi person might help her. In the next scene, at Jen’s home, she tells her parents 
about her appreciation of the Iraqi doctor and his gesture of tolerance. However, the 
American soldier is shocked by the way in which the American media tells her story. As 
Jen’s parents insist on repeating that she was beaten and tortured by the Iraqis, her shock 
turns into a hysterical weeping, which prompts her parents to declare that they believe her.   
As a playwright and a director, Robbins weaves these three imaginary lines with 
documentary information mainly introduced through Piscatorian/Brechtian techniques. 
Each actor played two or more characters. In addition, there are two small screens on the 
black backdrop on which short videos and pictures were displayed at the beginning and the 
end of the show in addition to the moments between the scenes of the play. This footage 
displays demonstrations against the invasion of Iraq in several countries all over the world, 
including American and British cities. ‘Metaphorical parallelism’ can be realised in pictures 
and movies of demonstrations against the War in Vietnam, actions of combat from the War 
in Vietnam and the two World Wars. The most striking footage is the Nazi army moving. 
All these clips, which seem to suggest the illegality of the war, are accompanied by the 
song Know Your Rights.137 While the words ‘You have the right not to be killed’ (qtd. in 
Embedded: Live DVD) contradict the scenes on screen, they affirm the overall message of 
                                                 
136 A space was particularly arranged at the Brewery to perform the play.   
137 1982 song by the English band The Clash in their album Combat Rock. 
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the play: the lives of both Iraqi civilians and American soldiers are the high price of the 
unjustified war.    
Not only is Embedded: Live the only American play within which the invasion is 
portrayed as an illegal crime, the play also condemns the American media for overlooking 
the truth. Moreover, no other American playwright suggests a resemblance between the 
2003 war and Vietnam.  In contrast, Rajiv Joseph’s Bengal Tiger at the Baghdad Zoo 
distinguishes between the two wars. Driven by boredom, the American soldier Kev 
complains to his colleague: ‘I ain’t seen shit. [...] Not one Iraqi did I get to kill! And I ain’t 
got my dick wet neither! You know back in Vietnam, there was so many Vietnamese 
bitches all over the place, and everyone got a piece’ (Joseph 153). The only rape in 
Joseph’s play is committed by the ghost of Uday, Saddam’s son.138 
Therefore, although Embedded: Live supports the American soldiers, both the play 
and Robbins himself were accused of being pro-Saddam and even traitorous. Such criticism 
in the mainstream media, though, was accompanied by public praise. Robbins declares: ‘In 
L.A. we sold out an eight-week run in two days, which never happens. We wound up 
extending it for four more months. In New York we were lambasted by the critics. And 
people still came and we sold out for four months’ (Robbins, web). Perhaps such harsh 
critique can help in answering the question about American playwrights’ reluctance to 
comment on specific events, especially by using documentary material, even if this material 
was employed metaphorically.  
Since the invasion became a de facto occupation, no incident caused an 
international debate, and was condemned by the vast majority of the Americans themselves 
more than the shocking revelation of the scandal of Abu Ghraib with the infamous scenes 
of the torture of civilians by American soldiers.  
 
Soldiers in a wrong and long war: heroes, villains, or victims? 
It is a fact that the celebration of torture in Abu Ghraib was an action of individuals, 
and it is not fair to blame the entire American army for some soldiers’ crime. I agree with 
Peace when he claims that, ‘instead of identifying with the guards’ visual perspective, upon 
bearing witness to the prisoners’ suffering, the spectatorial public protested against these 
obscene acts of state violence’ (Pease, 185). Put differently, the revelation of the Abu 
                                                 
138 Joseph’s play was written in 2008 and premiered in May 2009 at the Kirk Douglas Theatre in California. 
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Ghraib scandal was an exceptional moment at which the American principle of an ultimate 
and unconditional support for the troops was challenged.139 
If all sorts of torture intrinsically contradict the international laws and the principles 
of human rights, both of which are at the heart of the so-called modern Western values, the 
War on Terror seems to demand an exception to these rules and values. While a group of 
American academics and specialists in law suggest that nonlethal practices of coercive 
interrogation, described as ‘torture lite’, could be partially considered acceptable to prevent 
possible terroristic operations, some Western academics and many journalists raised their 
claims that torture was accepted, or even ordered, by high-ranked American officials, as a 
method of interrogation.140 
The question is, did American theatre respond to Abu Ghraib in a way that reflects 
the enormity of the incident? I have found three American plays that address torture, all of 
which were written after the incident of Abu Ghraib: Anne Nelson’s Savages (2006), Eve 
Ensler’s The Treatment (2006) and Francis Cowhig’s Lidless (2010). Not only does 
Nelson’s play draw the strongest link with Abu Ghraib, but the play was also read, and 
criticised as a metaphoric representation of the recent incident.141 
Savages, which premiered in April 2006 at the Lion Theatre in New York, does not 
include any mention of Iraq. However, it is a comment on Abu Ghraib. In a metaphorical 
way, different from Crimp’s contradictory analogy, Savages goes back to American history. 
Nelson’s play depicts fact-based events that occurred in 1902 during the American 
intervention in the Philippines. Cherry explains: ‘The plot is based on actual historical 
events — an American Marine named Littleton Waller, acting under orders, water-boarded 
and killed a large number of Filipino civilians in reprisal for an insurgent attack’ (Cherry 
167). In contrast to the enthusiastic reaction to the Guys, Savages had to suffer from the 
reservations of both American critics and spectators. The reason for such a response could 
be the fact that the play was performed when the guards who committed the crimes in Abu 
                                                 
139 There are few American journalists and politicians who expressed their sympathy with the guards, 
especially with the consideration of the tough circumstances these soldiers have to endure in Iraq. Examples 
of these rare voices are cited in Brown (2007, 308), and Babington (A18). 
140 For more information about advocating the so-called ‘torture lite’, see the studies of Dershowitz (2001) 
and Dershowitz (2002), Lingis (91–2), Saul, Homant, and Blakeley. Examples of claims that torture is 
tolerated by leaders of the army can be found in Pease (185) and Greenberg.  
141 Lidless portrays a melodramatic meeting between an ex-prisoner of Guantánamo and the woman who used 
to be his brutal interrogator fifteen years ago. In an undefined place, The Treatment represents a soldier, who 
is lured by his female psychiatrist to admit practicing torture. Then he discovers that her only goal was to 
know and expose his crimes.  
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Ghraib were in court. Even before the play was performed, according to Robin Finn, 
Nelson had to accept the producer’s advice to expunge twelve pages from the script of 
Savages (Finn A12). This kind of self-censorship might indicate how American society, 
including playwrights became hesitant to criticise their soldiers in general, and to press on 
the open wound of the scandal of Abu Ghraib in particular.   
Commenting on its performance, the American critic Charles Isherwood argues that 
‘few will be entertained by a play that has too much information to impart and too many 
contemporary parallels to underscore to allow time for nuanced interpersonal drama to 
emerge’ (Isherwood B11). I agree with Isherwood that Savages is full of historical 
information, which extends its dramatic function beyond contextualising Waller’s cruel 
action. Rather, Nelson’s play seems to give many details as if it seeks to provide a thorough 
record of the American presence in the Philippines. On one hand, I argue that this 
informative mission is too ambitious to be achieved by a single play. My claim could be 
supported by the fact that, in order to enable the reader of the published text to know more 
about historical circumstances than what the live performance might offer to its audience, 
Nelson included a seven-page afterward of a ‘Historical Chronology’ (Nelson 2007, 55-61). 
On the other hand, Nelson utilises Waller to address other characters about historical 
happenings or geographical facts. For instance, in order to underscore the American-
Spanish competition to extend their dominance in the region, Nelson’s protagonist refers to 
Magellan’s arrival in the Philippines in the sixteenth century (Nelson 2007, 21). Such 
speeches seem to distract the focus of the play away from Waller’s comment on his violent 
conduct against the innocent Filipinos, the incident to which Savages draws ‘contemporary 
parallels’. 
The resemblance between the historical incident of torture and the disgraceful 
scenes of Abu Ghraib suggests that the latter is a repeated behaviour of American soldiers 
rather than an occasional breach of the rights of prisoners of war. As figure (6) illustrates, if 
one American Marine is responsible for the brutality against the civilians in the Philippines, 
the torture and humiliation of the Iraqi prisoners are practiced by a small number of 
American soldiers. Nevertheless, the repetition of such brutality might cast doubt on it 
being an exceptional phenomenon. Perhaps, such a suggestion of repetition is what caused 
the American audience’s reluctance to watch Nelson’s play. Put differently, American 
spectators did not accept being asked whether the brutality of soldiers in Abu Ghraib is an 
exception or the rule.  
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Figure (6) 
Savages: The re-occurrence of an exceptional crime 
 
Savages extends the parallel between the present and historical events to hint at one 
of the most controversial questions that accompanied the aftermath of Abu Ghraib: Who is 
really responsible for the embarrassing scandal? Within her play, which adheres to the 
records of the historical incident, not only does Waller oppose the orders of Jacob Smith, 
his higher officer, but the former also seems less brutal than his boss. Waller claims ‘Jake 
Smith told me — to kill anyone “capable of bearing arms against the United States.” 
(Beat.) This sounded … excessive … to me. So I said, “General, what is the limit of age to 
respect?” And he said — […] Kill anyone over ten — years — old’ (Nelson 2007, 43). In 
this respect, Waller’s speech seems to repeat part of the discourse of the media, within 
which torture practiced by the guards at Abu Ghraib are claimed to be a manifestation of 
orders given by high officials of the army.  
Moreover, considering the linking of historical and current incidents, when the 
character of Waller states such a defence, perhaps Nelson’s play attempts to portray the 
allegedly undeclared facts as if they are being pronounced by the tried guards. To illustrate 
my claim about this parallel between incidents, I have modified the previous diagram, 
turning it into the following figure: As figure (7) suggests, although both Waller and the 
group of guards at Abu Ghraib are obviously the direct aggressors, who are tried for the 
crime of torture, neither is really responsible as both were acting according to the their 
leaders’ orders or acceptance. 
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Figure (7) 
      Between the declared and real responsibility for torture 
 
In its exploitation of the historical incident to comment on the aftermath of Abu 
Ghraib, Nelson’s play goes further by highlighting the exceptional state of danger within 
which the brutal act was committed. Waller declares: ‘Someone was goin’ to die, and it 
wasn’t gonna be my men. (Quietly.) […] So now I’m a butcher? (Beat. Louder:) That 
makes me a butcher?’ (Nelson 2007, 42). As with Monk in Embedded: Live, whose fear 
entices him to exterminate an entire Iraqi family, Waller’s fear is the reason for killing the 
civilian victims. However, while Monk regrets his mistake, Waller justifies his intentional 
act.  
In addition, Waller extends his defence beyond putting the burden of responsibility 
on the shoulders of Jake Smith—the higher authority—to insist on the exceptional state of 
danger wherein the violent act was to protect the American soldiers. Therefore, not only 
does Waller deny the accusation of being ‘a butcher’, he indirectly blames those who might 
claim that his act was out of brutality, including the American public opinion. Waller 
argues: ‘I’m the “hot topic” at all the Washington dinner parties. […] (With consternation.) 
They think their hands are clean?’ (Nelson 2007, 40). As Waller’s speech suggests, he 
extends his anger to include the vast majority of the American public, who condemn his 
violence, which was an obligatory act to save the lives of a group of American fighters, 
including Waller himself. In other words, because the American people accepted this war in 
the first place, they must share responsibility for what they see as a brutal act, especially 
because the latter was unavoidable. However, and apart from any parallel aspects between 
the brutal acts in the Philippines and Iraq, the latter would be always distinguished from the 
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former by the photos, which not only document the brutality of the guards, but these photos 
also represent torture as a pleasurable practice, which is not out of necessity. Put 
differently, some Americans might reluctantly understand the fact that nonfatal torture 
could be a ‘lesser evil’ than the loss of American civilians and soldiers. Nevertheless, the 
guards’ bragging about this brutality will always be denied as an unethical act. On the 
grounds of this observation, I partly understand why Savages was seen by the American 
audience as more of a shock than a defence of the guards, whose disrespectful behaviour 
was mainly conceived as an exception either to human values or to military rules. 
A stark difference between the ways in which American and British plays portray 
the matter of torture can be realised by reading Tactical Questioning: Scenes from the Baha 
Mousa Inquiry, the tribunal play in which Norton-Taylor edited the investigations into the 
death of an Iraqi man as a result of British soldiers’ violent interrogations. On one hand, the 
play acknowledges the tough circumstances the soldiers endure in Iraq.  
Elias, the council to the Inquiry, describes that soldiers ‘faced a very challenging 
operational environment in Iraq. As well as increasing disorder, looting, and the activities 
of insurgent groups. […] The temperature in Iraq in September regularly exceeds 50 
degrees centigrade’ (Norton-Taylor 2011, 15). However, as far as the tribunal form exposes 
the exact words of the testimonies, all brutal techniques utilised to humiliate, hurt, panic, 
and interrogate the Iraqi prisoners, including Baha Mousa, are mentioned through the play. 
In his overview of the Inquiry, Norton-Taylor declares:  
 
Thousands of British soldiers took part in the US-invasion of Iraq, 
ill-prepared and badly-informed. […] It became clear that British 
Soldiers had little or no idea of the legal, let alone moral, 
boundaries of behaviour. The case of Baha Mousa and others in 
Iraq led General Dannatt, the former Head of the Army, to suggest 
that many members of the Armed Forces lacked moral values when 
they joined. (Norton-Taylor 2011, 9)   
 
The significance of such a statement relies, firstly, on the fact that the editor, who used to 
write very short introductions to his tribunal plays, most of which are usually descriptive of 
the Inquiry, gives his opinion. Is Norton-Taylor too angry at the soldiers’ behaviour to deter 
his comment? Or, does he assume the role of the playwright, rather than the objective 
editor? It is hard to know. Secondly, describing the war as a ‘US-invasion’ expresses 
Norton-Taylor’s opposition to Britain’s participation in the coalition. Finally, compared to 
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the insistence of most American media that the torture at Abu Ghraib was committed by a 
‘few bad apples’, who do not represent the US army, Norton-Taylor harshly describes 
‘British soldiers’ in general. 
The critique of British soldiers can be found in imaginary plots such as Simon 
Stephens’ Motortown (2006) and Roy Williams’ Days of Significance (2007). In 
Motortown, Danny is a returned soldier from Iraq, who, as Stephens’ play suggests, was as 
mentaly disturbed before the war as he is after his homecoming. Days of Significance 
harshly condemns the vulgarity, ignorance and shallowness of its characters of British 
young generations, whether in their urban life or on the battlefield in Iraq. Commenting on 
the 2007 premiere of Williams’ play, Quentin Letts argues that ‘British soldiers die in Iraq 
almost every week. But that has not stopped the Royal Shakespeare Company from 
premiering an anti-war play which depicts our squaddies as cowardly, rapacious, socially 
incontinent, selfish, feral losers’ (Letts 29).142  
In contrast, nearly six years after the invasion, including the scandal of Abu Ghraib, 
not only has the latter been ignored by American playwrights, but the slogan ‘supporting 
our soldiers’ has been turned into a play. Produced by the Two River Theatre Company in 
New Jersey, Reentry received its premiere in January 2009. Based on factual interviews, 
Reentry is a Vebatim play in which Emily Ackerman and KJ Sanchez give a group of 
American marines and some members of their family the chance to reflect on their 
memories about the war. The vast majority of the soldiers’ statements answer the question: 
what does it mean to be a Marine? The common feature of these testimonies is the 
description of their participation in the war as a profession: a job whose duties have to be 
done, regardless of the reasons for the invasion of Iraq, or even the American public 
opinion on the aftermath of the war. A mid-level enlisted Marine, Tommy recalls: 
 
Northern California some lady called me a baby-killer. I was like in 
a bar and some lady asked me what I did. “I’m in the Marine 
Corps.” “Oh, you’re a baby killer.” And I kinda got offended at 
first. And then I was like, I’m not gonna let her ignorance get to 
me—not gonna let it ruin my day. So she’s, “You’re a baby killer” 
(Shifts strategy:) “Yeah, got any kids?” “AAAAH!” She went off. 
I’m like, “Look, I’m not a baby killer, okay? I just do what I gotta 
do.”  (Ackerman 15) 
                                                 
142 Critical reviews of Motortown can be found in Spencer (2006), Gardner (2006), and Macaulay. For 
different opinions on Days of Significance, see Ledent and Cavendish.         
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It is important to realise that although Tommy does not need to be seen as a monster, he 
does not claim to be a hero either. As a Marine, he just needs to be appreciated as a man 
who properly commits himself to the obligations of his job.  
Part of soldiers’ responsibilities is to finish their military task as safely as they can. 
In his interview, Pete, who is a badly wounded sergeant, remembers:  
 
When I first got back, […] everybody cheered when they 
introduced me. A lot of people came up to me: “Thank you for your 
service.” […] And I used to be a little bit embarrassed, thinking, 
“The only reason you’re doing this is because I got wounded.” And 
to me getting wounded doesn’t make you a hero—you know, that’s 
the one gun fight I lost! (Ackerman 11)  
 
As with Pete Tommy’s speech, Pete insists that fighting in Iraq, as it is in any other war, is 
part of his unavoidably dangerous duty, which he accepts without any hint of regret or self-
pity. The play indirectly criticises the way in which some American civilians see their 
soldiers. Tommy and Pete went to the same war, wherein their specific roles or deeds are 
unknown to the American people. Put differently, it is impossible to know whether both or 
neither mistakenly killed Iraqi babies. However, Tommy is described as a ‘baby-killer’, 
while Pete is seen as a hero only because he was seriously injured.  
In this respect, Reentry supports the American soldiers by highlighting their 
modesty and sense of responsibility. However, as their statements repeatedly demonstrate, 
they see themselves as neither victims nor heroes of the war. They have to fight because 
this is what their duty demands. Even the statements of the members of these soldiers’ 
families suggest that these civilians are as aware of their own obligations as the soldiers 
themselves. In her interview, a mother of three Marines—two sons and a daughter—
declares:  
 
When I think of my sons being in harm’s way, that’s—that’s kind 
of incomprehensible. Because it’s one thing to talk objectively 
about my kids’ goals in life, [sic] but I hate this part of it. But it’s a 
harsh reality, you know? I’m supporting my sons’ decisions, and 
yet to them I would never show this part of me. I feel that’s my 
responsibility to them—my service to them—to keep them from 
worrying about me. (Ackerman 17)    
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By using the word ‘service’, this mother seems to draw a metaphorical link between the 
role of soldiers on the battlefields and their families’ duty to support this role. The 
testimony of this mother suggests that the families might believe that they have to hide their 
fears in order to support the soldiers. Nevertheless, I claim that Reentry, although with a 
softer tone than Embedded: Live, indirectly makes this suffering recognisable.  
Moreover, despite the soldiers’ brave and modest description of the intrinsic danger 
of their jobs, it is hard for any civilian in general and for American people in particular, not 
to commiserate with these soldiers when they are killed or even badly injured. However, as 
Tommy’s speech suggests, even American citizens cannot tolerate the murder of Iraqi 
civilians, especially children. Within the only statement that describes the catastrophic 
effect of the war on Iraqi people, a Commanding Officer recalls: 
 
We passed by a boy on the side of the road—his nose and his jaw 
shot away. And he was gurgling this bloody pink froth as he lay in 
his mother’s arms. She was pleading with us to, uh, to stop, in a 
language you didn’t need to understand. And I looked at this 
woman, this scene, and I walked right by—and didn’t feel a single 
thing. The only thing I felt was a little bit of shock at my own 
indifference. And, uh, I was not the person I thought I was. […] By 
that day my well of fortitude was about dry, and I had nothing left. 
(Ackerman 19)           
 
Not only does this testimony indicate the high price Iraqi civilians have to pay for a war 
thought by a large number of them to be their last hope to get rid of their dictator, but it also 
demonstrates the high-ranking Marine’s deeply wounded soul. This wound, though, is 
different from Monk’s feeling of guilt in his mistaken killing of innocent civilians. Rather, 
the Commanding Officer is deprived of being able to regret or even to sympathise with the 
tragedy of this boy and his mother. While such a state of ‘indifference’ could be an 
inescapable result of being a professional soldier, the Commanding Officer is a leader 
whose sense of duty towards his men demands him to be strong enough to take the 
responsibility for all the victims of the young soldiers. The high-ranking Marine argues:  
 
We had already asked God to forgive us for what we were about to 
do. I tell my men: “When we kill, we kill as a unit, we kill as a 
team, we kill as a pack. [sic] We don’t kill as an individual.” For 
that reason, those deaths are on me. And I’ll answer to my maker. 
It’s important for leaders to do that. […] I should have more 
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emotional shock absorbers, more inoculations in my system, than an 
eighteen-year-old-last year’s high school senior. (Ackerman 13)             
 
For this Commanding Officer, the war in Iraq is similar to any war, a de facto event 
wherein he willingly claims the sins of his men. On one hand, the statements included 
within the play highlight the strength of these soldiers and underscore their respect for their 
duty. On the other hand, the overall message of Reentry indirectly suggests that these 
soldiers are partly victims, not of the war in Iraq specifically, but victims of the brutality of 
any war as such.    
Ironically, the toughness showed by this high-ranking Marine is represented with a 
shadow of heroism. His heroic image increases because of his sacrifices as a savior of 
young soldiers. He is probably what Monks needs as a leader, if I imagine characters might 
move between plays. Similarly, the dignity with which Pete reacts to his serious injury is 
the opposite of Stubbs’ humility in States of Shock. Does Reentry suggest an end to 
‘Vietnam Syndrome’, or is the play filled with a denial of a newly shaped ‘Iraq Syndrome’? 
It is hard to decide. Perhaps more plays in the following years may answer.  
Finally, and in contrast to Pete, Dai in the British playwright Jonathan 
Lichtenstein’s The Pull of Negative Gravity is more like Stubbs, but Dai even lacks the 
latter’s insistence on making his voice heard. Premiered at the Traverse Theatre, Edinburgh 
in August 2004, the war in Iraq is initially seen by the members of a Welsh family as the 
last hope to rescue their heavily indebted farm. However, Dai, who joined the army only to 
get money, returns from Iraq with his body’s right side paralysed. In spite of being upset at 
Dai’s disability, his girlfriend Bethan marries him. This marriage ends up adding emotional 
wounds to his physical incompetence. On their wedding night, Bethan cannot hide her 
feeling of disgust and she vomits. In response to this, Dai disgraces himself by hitting his 
head on the floor and crawling. His humiliation reaches its peak when Bethan runs away, 
before she returns and tries to seduce Dai’s brother, Rhys. As the latter embarrasses her by 
insisting on their ethical obligations towards Dai, Bethan commits suicide.   
For Vi, Dai’s mother, not only is her son proven unable to be the saviour of the 
farm, but he also becomes a burden. To gain a little amount of money, she spends long 
hours in stuffing envelopes with promotional scratch cards. In the very short eleventh 
scene, Dai ruins his mother’s efforts; he accidentally drips beer into a box of stuffed 
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envelopes. Then he deliberately ruptures some of them and scratches the cards. Before Dai 
convinces his mother to help him to die, he answers some of her questions about the war: 
 
VI. Did you kill people in Iraq? […] Does it haunt you? […] I 
suppose it was you or them. […] If the crowds moved towards you, 
you shot at them. […] Women, children. It was the only thing you 
could do. Afterwards, you saw their bodies swelling in the sun. 
There they are. No one, really. Just in the way. […] You’ve seen 
things no one should see; done things no one should do? […] 
(Lichtenstein 63) 
 
Instead of declaring his regretted actions in the war, Dai’s speeches are reduced to brief 
replies that repeatedly express his agreement with his mother’s speculations about the 
situation in Iraq. The most striking feature of this dialogue is that Vi, who might represent 
thousands of wounded soldiers’ mothers, is aware that her son was obliged to kill civilians, 
whether driven by fear or by mistake. Such stances of unwilling killing could be seen as an 
inevitable aspect of any occupation, wherein both soldiers and civilians have to endure 
daily encounters and confrontations with each other. As with these examples of dramatic 
responses to the war in Iraq, several plays that comment on the presence of the American-
led coalition’s in Afghanistan, of which I analyse some examples in the next chapter, 
highlight incidents of the unnecessary death of civilians as a result of soldiers’ fear.  
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Chapter Four 
Afghanistan: tracing misconceptions in three phases of conflict 
 
Whether compared to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the invasion of Iraq, the 
American-led War in Afghanistan was less controversial for the international community, 
especially before it turned out to be a sort of occupation. First and foremost, it was initially 
declared to punish Al-Qaeda for committing one of the most abominable terrorist crimes in 
human history on American soil. However, while there was a kind of international society 
quasi-consensus about the justifications of the American-led War on Terror, the increasing 
numbers of the murdered and injured soldiers in the battlefields of Afghanistan have raised 
questions not only about the feasibility of the war, but also about its real purpose. In 2007 
David Loyn described the invasion of 2001 as ‘A New Great Game’ (Loyn 24). Later, John 
Pilger also identified the current occupation as an American Great Game when he declared 
his controversial argument: 
 
The truth about the “good war” is to be found in compelling 
evidence that the 2001 invasion […] was actually planned two 
months prior to 9/11 and that the most pressing problem for 
Washington was not the Taliban’s links with Osama Bin Laden, but 
the prospect of the Taliban mullahs losing control of Afghanistan to 
less reliable mujahedin factions, led by warlords who had been 
funded and armed by the CIA to fight America’s proxy war against 
the Soviet occupiers in the 1980s. (Pilger 28)  
 
Such polemic claims, which suggest that the US reproduces the nineteenth-century colonial 
model of the British Empire, usually extend their justifications beyond the American-led 
War in Central Asia to include the war in Iraq and its chaotic consequences.143 
On one hand, although both Afghanistan and Iraq are battlefields of the War on 
Terror, it seems imprecise to neglect the unique geopolitical and historical features that 
distinguish the conflict in each county from the other. On the other hand, the metaphorical 
reading of the American-led interventions in the two countries as a new Great Game 
ignores the different circumstances of historical Imperialism in the complicated political 
                                                 
143 An example of such journalistic claims can be found in Walberg, wherein the alleged ‘Zionist goals’ are 
controversially described as the dominant factor in the so-called American Great Game in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. For more scholarly utilisation of the term ‘new Great Game’, see Ahrari within which the author 
analyses the political, not colonial, competition over Central Asia in the second half of the twentieth century 
between the US, Russia, Turkey, and Iran.  
174 
 
scene in the twenty-first century. Three striking features distinguish the American-led 
presence in Afghanistan from both nineteenth-century British colonialism and twentieth-
century Russian occupation. Firstly, the coalition includes a large number of countries, 
including NATO, Turkey, and Jordan. Therefore the military presence in Afghanistan 
cannot be described as a force of American colonialism. Secondly, and most importantly, 
these countries intervention in Afghanistan is out of necessity. Not only are these military 
forces protecting international NGO charities, which help the Afghans in health and 
education. The coalition has to endure the attacks of the remains of the Taliban and war 
lords. Although the latter fought against the Taliban, they became a burden as they keep 
expanding their power over the land of the Afghans in the countryside. The question is: 
how do British and American playwrights represent such a complicated situation? This is 
the main question of this chapter.   
The Tricycle Theatre in London chose The Great Game: Afghanistan (2009) to be 
the title of its project, which seemed to be an attempt to motivate both British and 
American playwrights to find answers, or to ask their own questions about the ongoing 
conflict. In Britain, it was premiered at the Tricycle Theatre, London on 17 April. On 15 
September, its first American performance was at Sidney Harman Hall in Washington DC. 
The project consisted of thirteen plays that represent three milestones in the long history of 
Afghan confrontations with occupiers.  
The first group includes four plays: Stephen Jeffreys’ Bugles at the Gates of 
Jalalabad, Ron Hutchinson’s Durand’s Line, Amit Gupta’s Campaign, and Joy 
Wilkinson’s Now is the Time. These plays portray British and Russian competitive attempts 
to occupy Afghanistan between 1842 and 1930. The second group of plays focuses on the 
Russian occupation and the establishment and growth of the Taliban in the period from 
1979 to 1996, and includes four plays: David Edgar’s Black Tulips, J. T. Rogers’ Blood and 
Gifts, David Greig’s Miniskirts of Kabul, and Colin Teevan’s The Lion of Kabul. Finally, 
five plays comment on the American intervention in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2009:  Ben 
Ockrent’s Honey, Abi Morgan’s The Night is Darkest before the Dawn, Richard Bean’s On 
the Side of the Angels, Simon Stephens’ Canopy of Stars, and Naomi Wallace’s No Such 
Cold Thing. 
Nicolas Kent, the artistic director of the Tricycle Theatre, explains the reasons for 
such a production at this specific time:   
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For a short period in the Autumn of 2001, just after 9/11, 
Afghanistan took centre stage. But after the fall of the Taliban both 
Bush and Blair ensured that the world’s attention moved swiftly 
back to Iraq. […] However in early 2008, […] I began to notice that 
[the] world’s political focus was very slowly but inexorably 
swinging back towards Afghanistan. Afghanistan was surely going 
to be the main focus of British, European and American policy for 
at least the next decade. (Kent 7) 
 
Kent’s words reflect a high degree of awareness of both the political situation and the social 
role of theatre. However, the noticeable aspect of this thirteen-play project is the fact that 
all the authors are either Britons or Americans. It seems reasonable to suggest that if some 
native Afghan playwrights were involved they could have offered additional insights into 
the conflict. 
The historical approach of the project can be justified by the need for raising the 
Anglo-American audience’s awareness of the roots of the conflict. To assure this 
instructive goal of the three-night performance of the project, more information about 
Afghanistan was delivered to spectators by ‘Verbatim pieces from public figures giving 
their views on the future of Afghanistan – these were from interviews conducted and edited 
by Richard Norton-Taylor; there were also monologues by Siba Shakib telling some of the 
stories of Afghanistan before 1842’ (Kent 251).144  
The overall enlightening purpose can be realised within single plays, where the 
playwright weaves factual material with—and sometimes imposes it on—the characters’ 
speeches. Within the project, many matters are repeatedly mentioned through 
representations of specific historical incidents in different plays. Consequently, these 
matters or events are profoundly spotlighted. That explains why Ben Brantley argues that 
‘the production’s strength is in how its different chapters reinforce one another and in the 
echoes they set off in your mind’ (Brantley, Web).  
To create an appropriate context to include their informative discourse about 
Afghanistan, most plays of The Great Game usually rely on situations in which dramatic 
characters are expected to mention such documentary content. To give examples, Amit 
Gupta’s Campaign takes the form of a meeting, where a Pakistani historian is consulted 
                                                 
144 Wallace’s No Such Cold Thing was part of the festival of Afghanistan theatre, film and visual arts, which 
was held at the Tricycle theatre from 17 April to 14 June 2009. However, it was performed apart from other 
plays, prior to the sessions of political discussions during the festival. Eventually, it was published as part of 
the project.    
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about the reign of Amanullah,145 the king of Afghanistan in the period between 1919 and 
1929. David Greig’s Miniskirts of Kabul introduces its historical information through an 
imaginary interview with Najibullah,146 a former President of Afghanistan from 1987 to 
1992. In Black Tulips, David Edgar utilises the form of a lecture to represent specific 
moments of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. That enables Edgar to give detailed 
description of historical and even geographical facts. In the first scene, the high-ranked 
Russian officials refer to a huge map on a screen to tell some facts about Afghanistan. 
Characters’ speeches, including presentations and testimonies, turn the process of 
spectatorship into getting information rather than watching dramatic action: 
 
1ST DEPUTY: Afghanistan. A landlocked central asian [sic] 
country approximately the size of France.  
 COMMANDER: But, unlike France … 
1ST DEPUTY: … consisting largely of impassable high mountain 
chains and backing desert. […] Its history being one of successive 
invasions and resistance, from the time of Alexander the Great. 
(Edgar 85)  
 
A similar description of the rough Afghan environment is given by the nineteenth-century 
British soldiers in Jeffreys’ Bugles at the Gates of Jalalabad. Drawing such images 
elucidates the implacable nature of the battlefields, where the British and American soldiers 
are fighting at the moment. On the other hand, the many historical failures of powerful 
countries in Afghanistan, especially the British Empire and the former Soviet Union, raise 
questions about the future of the current war. Michael Billington argues that The Great 
Game: Afghanistan clearly suggests ‘that Afghanistan's tragedy stems as much from 
geography as history. And the failure of America, especially, to grasp local realities 
emerges time and again’ (Billington 2009, 19). In this sense, portraying historical events 
does not contradict the topicality of these plays.  
 
Representation of the past comments on the present 
It is crucial to realise that, because these plays were written during the ongoing War 
on Terror, their playwrights are unlikely to ignore the current military existence in 
Afghanistan. Regardless of the historical themes of the plays, they are relevant to the third 
                                                 
145 Amanullah Khan (1892 –1960). 
146 Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai (1947 –1996).  
177 
 
phase of the conflict, which started in 2001. For instance, although the bulk of the dialogue 
in Campaign is about the unsuccessful attempt of Amanullah to enforce his project of 
secular social reform in the third decade of the twentieth century, the action takes place at 
the present time. The play portrays a desperate British endeavour to exit the continuing War 
in Afghanistan in a dignified way. To avoid any accusation of leaving the country under the 
pressure of Islamists, British politicians strive to invent a fake Afghan secular tendency that 
demands their withdrawal. By reminding Afghans of Amanullah’s old project, the plan seek 
to convince them, and the entire world, that this new secular movement has authentic 
internal origins, and is not a British political trick. In what seems a confession of the 
disastrous results of the coalition’s existence in Afghanistan, Harry Hawk, a fictional 
character that represents the Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, declares: 
 
HAWK: Wouldn’t be the British thing to do. Start a war – not finish 
it – make a bit of mess and go. Doesn’t add up, does it? But an 
Afghan nationalist campaign fuelled by the desire for a secular 
democracy? Now that would leave us with no choice. And we could 
leave, having left something behind! 
KHAN: That’s crazy! 
HAWK: No Professor, that’s politics. (Gupta 61)     
 
Apart from Khan’s surprise, which reflects his specialization as a historian who believes in 
facts compared to political maneuvers, the most striking point of Hawk’s speech is his 
claim that the British Empire has not made similar mistakes. This claim is contradicted by 
Bugles at the Gates of Jalalabad, which portrays the aftermath of the British occupation in 
the 1840s.  
Such intersections between the informative discourses of these plays achieve a kind 
of organic unity; while each play can be performed independently, it also can be considered 
as an act within the whole project of The Great Game: Afghanistan. This feature is 
designed to increase the audience’s awareness about historical and topical events, figures, 
and political discussions within the plays. Examples of these cross-play connections are 
various. For instance, Joy Wilkinson’s Now is the Time depicts King Amanullah’s escape 
from Afghanistan after his abdication, accompanied by his wife Soraya Tarzi and her 
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father.147 Throughout the play, Tarzi refers to Amanullah’s overhasty attempt to implement 
his secular dreams of modernizing Afghanistan:  
 
AMANULLAH: I’ve done everything I can for my country, so 
don’t you dare accuse me of failing it. 
TARZI: Perhaps you’ve done too much. That’s what angers people. 
(Wilkinson 69)  
 
A similar opinion on the king’s project can be found in the discussion between Hawk and 
Khan in Campaign. Such a resemblance seems at first to weaken the cycle because it 
repeats information irrelevant to the current conflict. However, the intersection between the 
two plays is not limited to sharing the same historical narrative. While the call for secularity 
in Gupta’s play comments on Britain’s opportunistic policies in Afghanistan in the 2000s, 
Now is the Time focuses on the ugly face of Amanullah, whose dream of secular modernity 
in the 1920s is cast as a selfish desire for his own luxury. His wife bluntly declares ‘I see all 
that matters is you, you hanging on to your precious life, your mighty power, your stupid 
motorcar’ (Wilkinson 73). Historically, there is no evidence of such a dispute between 
Soraya and her husband regarding his lavish type of life, which she shared as a common 
feature of the Afghan monarchy in different times. By referring to the arduous life of the 
bulk of the Afghans, it seems that Wilkinson’s play comments on the situation in the late 
2000s. Now is the Time was written in 2009, the year in which the regime of Hamid Karzai, 
the pro-America President of Afghanistan since 2004, was accused of huge financial 
corruption; Rani D. Mullen argues: ‘Corruption charges against high-ranking government 
officials and many of Karzai’s own family members continued to surface with little 
indication that the government was willing to address this issue’ (Mullen 133). The 
highlighting of such a link between historical and current events is one of the most striking 
features of The Great Game: Afghanistan, especially the plays that belong to the first and 
second groups. 
While most playwrights of The Great Game Afghanistan are keen to make the 
connections between their dramatisations of historical incidents and the present conflict 
detectable, having enough knowledge about the latter is crucial in order to move to such an 
analytical level. Otherwise, any single play may work separately to provide information 
                                                 
147 In addition to being Amanullah’s father-in-law, Mahmud Tarzi was the King’s friend, consultant, and his 
Foreign Minister.  
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about a particular historical incident. However, the relationship between the events of the 
past and the current conflict is usually based on causality as well as resemblance. Thus, 
historical events that are depicted by some plays can be conceived as origins of more recent 
situations within other plays. By tracing the impact of historically-distant situations on the 
current conflict, The Great Game: Afghanistan accentuates one of the crucial dilemmas 
regarding the responsibility for Afghanistan’s struggles; are they internal or external factors 
that have been badly damaging Afghans’ lives for centuries? Both Gupta’s Campaign and 
Jeffreys’ Bugles at the Gates of Jalalabad direct the blame towards Britain’s historical 
intrusions in two different eras. Likewise, in Durand’s Line, Ron Hutchinson goes back to 
1893 to portray the last minutes before Abdur Rahman Khan, the Amir of Afghanistan, 
accepts to give a sector of the North West borders of his country to British India for one 
hundred years. While he yields to the carrot-and-stick pressure of Sir Henry Mortimer 
Durand, the Foreign Minister of British India, Abdur Rahman complains of his country’s 
fate of being the reward of a competition between Russian and British imperial ambitions. 
The Amir wonders: ‘I’m to choose between the embrace of the Bear and the claw of the 
Lion?’ (Hutchinson 47). However, it seems that Hawk knows how to induce the Afghan 
Amir to accept the British plan to re-draw the Afghani-Pakistani borderline, the British 
politician is not ashamed to declare: ‘I’ll sweeten the deal – I’ll increase the subsidy we pay 
you and give you the monopoly of the opium trade’ (Hutchinson 36). Referring to Durand’s 
Line, the dramatic character of Najibullah in Miniskirts of Kabul claims: ‘My country has 
been imagined enough. My country is the creation of foreign imaginings. The border 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan is an imaginary line’ (Greig 2009, 130).  
Ben Ockrent’s Honey exploits a more recent historical event to forge links between 
the questionable American policies in Afghanistan in the period of the Cold War and the 
strength of international terrorists. The play depicts the American efforts to retrieve Stinger 
missiles, which were deployed by the United States in Afghanistan during the Soviet 
occupation. CIA Operative Gray Schroen asks Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Afghan Minister 
of Defence, to buy these missiles from the Taliban. Although Massoud shared the Taliban’s 
resistance to the Soviet occupation, he is against their radical thoughts. Therefore, he 
refuses Schroen’s suggestion because it will offer the Taliban a huge amount of money: 
 
MASSOUD: You know Mullah Omar is helping the terrorists you 
seek to destroy. 
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SCHROEN: At this stage we have no evidence of any connection 
between terrorism and the Taliban.  
MASSOUD: And of course you don’t. Not when your glasses are 
the Pakistanis. (Ockrent 178-9) 
 
Based on a real meeting that took place in the American Embassy in Islamabad148 in 1996, 
the play ends by referring to 9/11 as the stage directions read: ‘the projection of the two 
aeroplanes flying into the World Trade Centre’ (Ockrent 190). The most striking feature of 
Massoud’s speech is that he blames the United States for its over-reliance on Pakistan.  
Ockrent’s play hints at Pakistan’s controversial role, whether distributing American 
weapons or in concealing the potential threat of the Taliban. According to a large number 
of political studies, damaging foreign influences on Afghanistan were not confined to the 
direct actions of powerful countries with colonial goals. Thomas Johnson and M. Mason 
claim: 
 
The United States and Saudi Arabia poured $7.2 billion of covert 
aid into the jihad against the Soviets, the vast majority of which was 
channeled by the ISI149 […] to the most radical religious elements, 
deliberately marginalizing Durrani Pashtuns and those parties with 
a less radical, more nationalist political vision for the future of 
Afghanistan. (Johnson 2008, 70-1)  
 
In Miniskirts of Kabul, Najibullah blames the regimes of many Muslim countries for 
sending extremists to his country. In addition to the main players of the Great Game such as 
Russia, Britain, and the United States, several Arabic and Muslim countries were influential 
on the course of the game. Apart from the foreign countries, Afghan leaders have been 
participating in the agony of their country. The image of the puppet ruler echoes in several 
plays of the project. In addition, most Afghan rulers within plays blame foreign countries 
for their own faults. In Now is the Time, for example, the queen challenges her husband 
when she declares: ‘It’s always the British. Or the Soviets. Point your finger in 360 degrees 
and you still won’t see who has brought us to this’ (Wilkinson 73). It does not mean, 
though, that the play denies any British or Soviet influences, but it precisely insists on 
drawing attention to the mistakes of Afghan rulers, who are represented by Amanullah. The 
                                                 
148 Holding the meeting in the capital of Pakistan indicates the chaotic situation in Afghanistan. In addition, it 
hints at the American ultimate trust in the Pakistani regime. 
149Inter-Services Intelligence is the Pakistani intelligence agency.  
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question of responsibility is always raised within the plays that comment on the 
consequences of the conflict rather than exploring its roots. 
The cooperation between CIA and the Afghans against the Russians is portrayed as 
a mistake in J. T. Rogers’s Blood and Gifts. The American playwright portrays how 
Abdullah, a leader of an Afghan tribe, keeps asking the American agent, Jim, for more 
effective weapons. A friendship gradually grows between the two men in seven years 
between 1981 and 1888, depicted in three scenes of Rogers’s short play. At the finale, 
while they celebrating the defeat of the Russians, the agent informs the tribal leader that the 
US will retrieve the weapons. Then Abdullah declares that he will ally with the Taliban, 
which he denounces all the time for their radicalism, against the US Abdullah’s last word in 
the play is ‘we will cross the ocean’ (Rogers 121). This unconvincingly swift and childish 
change in Abdullah’s opinions and behavior is part of Rogers’ depiction of the tribal leader, 
which doubts his ability to manage her men.    
In the third group of plays, except for Honey,150 the informative nature gives way to 
more dramatic representation, where imaginary characters represent the real victims of this 
conflict. Some of the first and second groups of plays also reveal the agony of both British 
and Russian soldiers and civilian Afghans. These texts include Bugles at the Gates of 
Jalalabad and Black Tulips, which can be conceived as a comment on the similar aspect of 
the current phase of the conflict. However, in these two plays, the atrocities of the British 
and the Soviet occupations are respectively mentioned, with a few exceptions, as a matter 
for political discussion. Put differently, we are informed about the struggle of the victims 
rather than watching their despondent suffering and hearing their desperate complaints. In 
contrast, we are provoked to sympathise with Jay, the British Sergeant in Stephens’s 
Canopy of Stars, when he urges the medic to rescue one of his soldiers, who has got a 
deadly wound. The same can be said about Alya, the Afghan girl who recalls the last 
moments before her meaningless death in Wallace’s No Such Cold Thing. However, such 
an emotional aspect does not mean that this third group of plays tends to be melodramatic. 
On the contrary, they urge the audience not only to think of several consequences of the 
conflict, but also to challenge it by a lot of questions, which the playwrights themselves do 
not answer. These questions mostly focus on the complicated situation in Afghanistan after 
                                                 
150 Out of the five plays in the third group, Ockrent’s play is the only one whose action takes place before the 
coalition’s attack on Afghanistan in 2001. On the grounds of the unity of the entire project, Honey can be 
considered a link between the second and the third phases of the conflict.   
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the defeat of the Taliban. Both Richard Bean’s On the Side of the Angels and Abi Morgan’s 
The Night is Darkest before the Dawn portray the important effort of international 
charitable organisations to achieve Afghanistan’s transition from a focus of terrorists to a 
safe and modernised country. Nevertheless, the plays reveal that such philanthropic actions 
are challenged by several difficulties.  
In Bean’s play, Dawood is one of the Afghan warlords who has extended his 
dominance over vast rural areas in order to plant poppies. Using his thugs, he seized the 
land of one-hundred farmers who had to wait for the arrival of Jackie and Graham, two 
workers in a nongovernmental organisation that provides humanitarian services to the 
Afghans. Although the two Britons eventually convince Dawood to allow the farmers to 
return to their land, he stipulates that the farmers should accept his request to marry three of 
their girls whose ages are ten, eleven, and twelve. While Jackie pragmatically approves this 
weird deal in order to save the starving farmers’ lives, Graham sharply expresses his 
condemnation. Then she argues:  
 
Graham, listen! You know perfectly well that there’s no such thing 
as right and wrong in our business, there’s only culture. It’s not our 
job to impose our values. You have put your mother in an old 
people’s home. […] You judge them, let them judge you. You think 
they treat women badly, they would not even believe that a human 
being could sink so low, could be so vile as to abandon their own 
mother, ill as she is, in local [sic] authority facility, and leave the 
country. (Bean On the Side, 225)     
 
Here, On the Side of the Angels suggests that there are some aspects of every culture that 
cannot be understood by those who belong to other cultures. However, despite Jackie’s 
harsh critique of contradicting the Afghan traditions, the last scene reveals that the two 
Britons sacrificed their lives while they were trying to rescue the youngest Afghan girl. 
Whether Jackie had changed her opinion or she was mainly protecting her colleague, their 
shocking murder reveals Dawood’s undisputed power.  
The play draws a picture of the complicated situation in Afghanistan after the 
supposed defeat of the Taliban. In the first scene of the play, through an argument between 
Jackie and two of her co-workers in the British office of their charitable organization we 
realise that the Taliban is still active: 
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FIONA: Most NGOs have withdrawn from Taliban controlled 
areas. […] Icelandic Action Alliance, quite rightly in my opinion, 
abandoned that school because of Taliban interference.  
JACKIE: Yes, and I rescued it and kept it open. 
JONATHAN: Without girls! 
JACKIE: If you close that school the boys will be sent to a 
madrassa in Pakistan where the syllabus is Monday, all day hatred; 
Tuesday, automatic weapons; Wednesday, how to park a 747 in a 
stationary cupboard. (Bean On the Side, 216) 
 
Here, we understand that the Afghans endure Dawood’s brutality because he protects them 
from the Taliban. The fear of the Taliban’s potential threat is realised in many plays. 
In No Such Cold Thing, for example, Alya keeps warning her sister to be quiet and to wear 
her scarf. Similarly, in Abi Morgan’s The Night is Darkest before the Dawn, when Omaid 
explains why he refuses to send his daughter to school, he claims: ‘You think the Taliban 
has gone far? They are only a few kilometers away. Hiding across a border or in the 
mountain. They do not go away’ (Morgan 2009, 202). However, he finally follows his 
leader Elmar who represents a more positive image of warlords compared to Dawood in On 
the Side of the Angels. As his conversation with the American civilian who is responsible 
for building a new school in Afghanistan reveals, the warlord believes in the importance of 
education for girls despite the danger of the Taliban:  
 
Elmar: I’m a father. Five girls. […]  
Alex: That’s a lot of wedding cake. 
Elmar: You teach my girls. You make them clever. When Taliban 
comes back, if Taliban comes back, they know something at least. I 
give you money for school. Money from poppies. (Morgan 2009, 
209) 
 
As practical as Jackie in Bean’s play, Alex agrees to use Elmar’s money to build the school. 
There is a low possibility of finding a poppy-grower who believes in education for girls, let 
alone risking his business by challenging the Taliban. However, Morgan’s play suggests 
that if the Taliban is invincible militarily, its thoughts can be challenged by a peaceful goal 
like education. Billington claims that ‘the only play that sounds a note of hope is Abi 
Morgan's The Night is Darkest Before the Dawn, […] which suggests that education and 
female enfranchisement will counter years of oppression’ (Billington 19). The factual 
statistics suggest that Billington’s hope is just an optimistic wish; Johnson and Mason 
affirm ‘In Afghanistan, where the U.S. Agency for International Development has built 
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hundreds of schools since 2001, the Taliban burned down 1,089 from 2005 to 2007’ 
(Johnson 2008, 65). If Abi’s play is a whisper of optimism, it is subdued by loud cries of 
pain throughout the vast majority of the plays of the project. To give its spectators 
unjustified hopes is not one of The Great Game: Afghanistan’s goals.  
Neither On the Side of the Angels nor The Night is Darkest before the Dawn 
suggests whether the Anglo-American declaration of the Taliban’s defeat was a military 
misjudgement or a political manoeuvre. What they mainly seek to reveal is the complicated 
situation in Afghanistan, which is defined by the danger of the Taliban and the prosperity of 
the drug trade. Although both playwrights establish their plots by imaginative 
dramatisation, they indirectly refer to one of the most difficult problems that challenge 
reform in Afghanistan. The American politician Thomas Schweich argues:   
 
[S]ome of our NATO allies have resisted the anti-opium offensive, 
as has our own Defense Department, which tends to see 
counternarcotics as other people’s business to be settled once the 
war-fighting is over. The trouble is that the fighting is unlikely to 
end as long as the Taliban can finance themselves through drugs – 
and as long as the Kabul government is dependent on opium to 
sustain its own hold on power. (Schweich B45)  
 
Such a mess should fuel anxieties about the time needed to end this war and might increase 
doubts about the possibility of Afghanistan being turned into a stable country.  
If On the Side of the Angels portrays Afghanistan as a savage place where British 
civilians lose their lives, Canopy of Stars takes a further step by doubting the viability of 
sending British soldiers. Because he believes in the right of the Afghan people to live in a 
safe country, Jay insists on returning to Afghanistan. He is proud of the role of the British 
army, including himself, in fighting the remnants of the Taliban. In contrast, his girlfriend 
considers the death of the Afghans an effective way to reduce the world’s excessive 
populations, she argues: ‘People shouldn’t survive in places like that. […] It’s good. There 
are too many of us in the first place. We just need to decide where. And that’s a good 
fucking place to start if you ask me. It’s a hole in the bottom of the world. You should let 
them burn. They deserve it’ (Stephens 249). Cheryl’s cruel speech can be understood, to 
some extent, as a desperate response to her boyfriend’s decision to return to Afghanistan, 
especially with his odd behaviour. Not only did he become haunted by the dreadful scenes 
of the battlefield, he also does not show any sign of yearning for either her or their boy. 
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Stephens’s play gives both characters a chance to say what seems to be his/her last desire at 
the end of the last scene.  
As thousands of soldiers’ relatives may do, Cheryl expresses her constant fear as 
she begs her boyfriend to stay: ‘I don’t want you to go back there. Every day I think that 
it’s going to be you they talk about on the radio as being the person the Ministry of Defence 
are informing the family about. I hate that feeling. It exhausts me’ (Stephens 249). Jay, on 
the other hand, justifies his decision by recalling the struggle of Afghans, especially 
children. He tells his eyewitness-testimony about the mutilation of a ten-year girl whom he 
used to see during his visits to the village’s school:  
 
On our last afternoon there she was coming home from school when 
a forty year-old man stepped from out of one of the houses […] 
with a water pistol in his hand and he sprayed it at Delaram. 
Laughed a bit. Giggled a bit. Sprayed the water pistol in her face. 
[…] Only what was in his water pistol, of course, wasn’t water, […] 
it was acid. He burnt her eyes out because she was ten and she was 
going to school. (Stephens 248)  
 
Ironically, even his presence did not prevent this tragedy from happening, which supports 
his girlfriend’s belief in the uselessness of sending the British soldiers there. The play also 
raises spectators’ awareness of the soldiers’ complaints of their country’s lack of both 
financial and emotional appreciation. Richard, a disgruntled soldier from Oldham expresses 
his upset to Jay:  
 
I’ve got a mate working security in the Trafford Centre gets paid 
five grand a year more than me. […] last time I was at home I went 
out with him and a couple of his pals. You should have seen the 
looks on their faces. They asked me if I’d met Saddam Hussein. 
Straight up. They haven’t got a clue, you know? (Stephens 236)      
 
Apart from the comic effect of the question about Saddam, perhaps the playwright hints at 
media coverage being dominated by the War in Iraq. Richard’s grievance resembles what 
we see in Bugles at the Gates of Jalalabad and Black Tulips. 
The overall message of the thirteen-play series is that the consequences of 
politicians’ repeated and accumulated mistakes are victims from both sides, whether 
civilians or soldiers; on the battlefields and at home. While most plays in the first two 
groups tend to contain a kind of descriptive discourse, in which information is delivered to 
186 
 
the audience, the vast majority of the third group’s plays takes a further step by focusing on 
the dramatic representation of imaginary characters. The plays in the third group take 
advantage of the documentary material within the more historical plays, but every single 
play of the project adds to the essential purpose of the production overall, which mainly 
revolves around circulating knowledge about this highly complicated conflict. Moreover, 
every single play comments on the current phase of the conflict by representing a specific 
point in the long history of confrontations that goes back to the middle of the nineteenth 
century. Links between the three successive phases of great countries’ interventions in 
Afghanistan can be specifically explored in Stephen Jeffreys’ Bugles at the Gates of 
Jalalabad and David Greig’s Miniskirts of Kabul. Naomi Wallace’s No Such Cold Thing is 
representative of the third group of plays. 
 
Repeated mistakes: Bugles at the Gates of Jalalabad 
In Bugles at the Gates of Jalalabad, the British playwright Stephen Jeffreys 
comments on the conflict in Afghanistan by returning to the eighteenth century. The play 
tells the story of one of the most infamous disasters of the British Empire; while part of the 
British army were retreating from Kabul, more than sixteen thousands were killed, 
including the families of high-ranking officers and their servants. Senzil Nawid states that 
‘In January 1842, 4,500 British troops left Kabul for Jalalabad. Only Dr. William Bryden, a 
medical officer, survived the continuous attacks en route through the passes. So ended in 
total disaster the first British invasion of Afghanistan’ (Nawid 588). However, it seems that 
because he focuses on the military loss, Nawid ignored that civilian victims amounted to 
three-fold the casualties from soldiers. In their eight-day escape, they were attacked by 
Afghan tribes and suffered in the tough environment of Afghanistan; Charles Morris 
declares that ‘On the 6th of January the fatal march began,—a march of four thousand five 
hundred soldiers and twelve thousand camp-followers, besides women and children, 
through a mountainous country, filled with savage foes, and in severe winter weather’ 
(Morris 332-3). It seems that Stephen Jeffreys chose such a huge tragedy to represent the 
history of Anglo-Afghan conflict; William Trousdale argues: ‘The single most important 
event of the first Afghan War (1838-42) is the virtual destruction of the British Army in the 
wintry mountainous terrain between Kabul and Jelalabad [sic] in 1842’ (Trousdale 26). But 
did Jeffreys confine his play to portray this historical incident? Put differently, to what 
extent does Bugles at the Gates of Jalalabad comment on the 2001 War in Afghanistan? 
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In the steps of the factual event, the play portrays a group of soldiers who stand in 
front of the Kabul gate of Jalalabad. By using their bugles, they endeavour to attract 
potential survivors. When Hendrick declares that ‘yesterday morning, the thirteen of 
January 1842’ (Jeffreys 17), the play defines the time of its action as taking place the day 
after the disaster when news of the disaster had already been delivered by William Bryden, 
the only one who managed to complete the journey from Kabul. Neither the number of the 
real buglers nor their conversations can be found in any historical writing. However, their 
hopeless prediction that there were more survivors is described in many historical sources. 
The huge scale of the disaster motivated the German novelist and poet Theodor Fontane 
(1819-1898) to write his poem Das Trauerspiel von Afghanistan (The Tragedy of 
Afghanistan), in which he depicted the same situation used for Jeffreys’ play.  
While it is hard to prove that Jeffreys was influenced by this poem, I can suggest 
two sources from which Bugles at the Gates of Jalalabad seems to have acquired its 
documentary aspect. For instance, when one of the Buglers describes the four of them as 
‘Sentinels on the ramparts of Jalalabad’ (Jeffreys 18), he borrows the exact words by which 
Morris starts his chapter about the event: ‘The sentinels on the ramparts of Jelalabad [sic]’ 
(Morris 331)151. The other source is the diary of Lady Florentia Sale (1790 –1853), an 
eyewitness to the real catastrophe, who managed to write her detailed observation of the 
events.152 The significance of this documentary source is that Jeffreys’s play includes Lady 
Sale as one of its dramatic characters. The first line in the play precisely cites her 
introduction to the diaries: ‘It is easy to argue on the wisdom or folly of conduct after the 
catastrophe has taken place’ (Sale 3).153 In his comment on Lady Sale’s introductory line, 
Brantley argues that the entire project suggests ‘that when it comes to the history of 
occupied Afghanistan, even hindsight is irrevocably blurry’ (Brantley, Web). Perhaps, but 
the plays are still able to warn us from repeating the same mistakes.   
 
Documented history within dramatic structure: 
Jeffreys weaves documentary materials with his imaginary dramatic structure in 
order to comment on the current conflict in Afghanistan and even to predict its future. One 
                                                 
151 Charles Morris’ book was first published in 1902 in Philadelphia by J.B. Lippincott Company.  
152 Sale’s manuscript was published in both London and Paris in 1843.  
153 It is hard to know whether the real Lady Sale was trying to protect her diaries from a potential accusation 
of pedantry, or/and she was suggesting that the British political and military mistakes in Afghanistan were 
inevitable, or at least understandable on the grounds of the complicated circumstances there. 
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of the noticeable features of this fictional context is the subtle differences among the 
buglers. By portraying their individual responses to the same agony of defeat and desperate 
waiting, Jeffreys’ characterisation of the buglers goes further than their common identity as 
soldiers. The play distinguishes Lady Sale from other characters by her location onstage, 
which is ‘either elevated or to the side’ (Jeffreys 17). While she can hear and see others, 
Lady Sale is invisible and inaudible to them. This ghostlike presence emphasises the 
temporal/spatial distance between her and the world of the buglers. The play utilises her 
presence as a link between the documented facts of the historical incident and the 
imaginary realm of dramatic action. For the audience, because she is the only character that 
represents a real person, she has the authority of assuming the role of first-person narrator. 
In addition, as an eyewitness, she tells details about the real disaster, which the buglers did 
not see, especially when she describes the agony of the journey: 
 
We are starving. My horse gnaws voraciously at a cartwheel. 
Nothing is satisfied for food except the pariah dogs who are gorged 
with eating dead camels and horses. Even some of the gentlemen 
are eating camel, particularly the heart. I was never tempted by 
these choice viands so cannot offer an opinion. (Jeffreys 20)    
 
She also challenges the heroic image of Dr. William Bryden’s survival, which was just a 
matter of luck as she recalls: ‘A copy of Blackwood’s Magazine stuffed in his forage cap 
cushioned a blow from an Afghan blade. The pen, for once, is mightier than the sword 
(Jeffreys 20). This stylistic method of utilising the adage for a pun can be considered comic 
relief. More importantly, it seems a bitter mockery of the military leaders’ exaggerated 
confidence in the British army’s power, which led them to be deceived by the Afghans. 
Although the pun fits the historical disaster, it partially hints at the current Anglo-American 
war. When Dickenson accuses the tribes of treason, Hendrick reveals that the British 
Generals started by deceiving the leaders of these tribes, which used to be British allies. 
This scenario is similar to the relationship between the leaders of the Taliban and the 
American administrations since the 1980s.  
Apart from treason, the play reveals several British soldiers’ misconceptions, which 
draw an image of the inferior Afghans by giving them derogative descriptions such as 
pusillanimous and treasonous. Lady Sale may seem tolerant when she denies the allegations 
that Afghans fear fighting by declaring that ‘they show no cowardice in standing as they do 
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against guns without using any themselves’ (Jeffreys 26). However, her arrogant attitude 
towards the Afghani women is another slanted judgment, which is based on her belief in the 
British superior civilisation.Edward Said argues that ‘as [far as] the West was concerned 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an assumption had been made that the Orient 
and everything in it was, if not patently inferior to, then in need of corrective study by the 
West’ (Said 41). 
The danger of such biased conceptions increases when they become part of the 
individual soldier’s belief in his/her enemy’s inferiority, especially on ethical bases. 
Because Winterflood believes that all the Afghans are fearful and deceitful murderers, he 
unnecessarily kills Afzal, a forty-year civilian Afghani. Although he peacefully interrupts 
the soldiers’ hours of waiting, Afzal insists on reminding them of the fact that they are 
occupiers of his own country:  
 
McCANN: Who are you? 
AFZAL: The question is curious. You stand in a bright red coat in 
my country’s customary snow and ask me who I am? But who are 
you? 
McCANN: I am an admirer of simplicity. When I ask you who you 
are and I am the one with the rifle, you tell me. (Jeffreys 25) 
 
Despite McCann’s aggressive tone, the Afghani man does not show any sign of fear. It 
seems that this courage causes Winterflood to panic; he suddenly draws his bayonet and 
stabs Afzal. Therefore, Winterflood instantly regrets his action and keeps claiming that he 
‘meant something else’ (Jeffreys 28). He meant to defend himself, as his earlier 
conversation with Dickenson reveals: 
 
WINTERFLOOD: I will not let any Gilzye154 get so close he can 
use a knife. 
DICKENSON: Gets the fear running in your guts though, doesn’t it, 
Winterflood? 
WINTERFLOOD: I’m not afraid. (Jeffreys 23)  
 
Affected by the British army’s disaster and the desperate waiting for survivors, 
Winterflood’s misconceptions of the Afghans generated his unjustified fear, which led him 
                                                 
154 Winterflood means any Afghan person. The most common translation of the tribe’s name is ‘Ghilzai’ the 
playwright borrows from the diary of Lady Sale, whose translation of the tribe’s name as ‘Gilzye’ cannot be 
found in any other source.  
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to murder a guiltless civilian. In this sense, and to some extent, Winterflood’s crime is 
similar to Monk’s in Embedded: Live, Waller’s in Savages, and Dai’s in The Pull of 
Negative Gravity.  
In contrast to the fearful situations, which soldiers have to endure, the play refers to 
the luxurious life of British officers of high ranks as the following dialogue reveals:  
 
HENDRICK: Indeed. There was a Brigadier in our regiment came 
to the war with sixty camels bearing plate, bedding, dressing cases, 
Windsor soap and eau-de-cologne.   
McCANN: It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle 
than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God (Jeffreys 24).  
 
Apart from the linguistic trick of playing on words, citing this biblical verse is unsurprising 
from McCann whose Christian religion always determines his argument. As the leader of 
the group, McCann has the authority to control them, but his vision of this authority 
extends beyond the military rules; he argues ‘My authority is vested in me by my superior 
officers and comes through them by the grace of God’ (26). Consequently, his religion 
defines his opinion on the Muslim Afghans; he declares: ‘We call them Infidel and they say 
the same of us. But who is the infidel here? Which is the side of no faith? Let it not be us’ 
(23). This claim does not mean that Jeffreys suggests the British war in Afghanistan was a 
religious conflict; highlighting religious discrepancy is rather one of the results of the 
military confrontation. Religion is one of the methods by which soldiers convince 
themselves of their side’s rightness, especially when the politicians from both sides 
promote religious slogans to justify their decisions. In this sense, McCann’s argument 
reminds me of the sixteenth-century using of the word ‘infidel’ by the leaders of the 
Ottoman Empire and European states in order to denounce each other. More recently, the 
Taliban’s claim of a ‘holy war’ against the alleged ‘Crusade’ intentionally recycles the 
same religion-based means of ‘legitimisation’ and ‘mobilisation’.  
 
A retrievable myth: warning from future disasters 
Jeffreys utilises the idea of the prophecy in order to link between the historical event 
and the current war in Afghanistan. While they are waiting for more survivors, the buglers 
repeat rumours about a Brigadier called Dennie, who warned the General earlier: ‘They are 
all massacred, every soul - […] Every soul but one. And he shall come to bring news of the 
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death of every other soul’ (Jeffreys 17). Similarly, Lady Sale assures the mythic 
explanation of the disaster when she cites lines of Hohenlinden, a poem written by the 
Scottish poet Thomas Campbell (1777 –1844) that reads: 
 
Few, few shall part where many meet 
The snow shall be their winding sheet: 
And every turf beneath their feet 
Shall be a soldier's sepulchre. (Jeffreys 24) 
 
These exact lines are mentioned in Lady Sale’s diaries as a forewarning before the journey 
to Jalalabad; she states ‘I found […] Campbell's Poems, which opened at Hohenlinden 
[sic]; and, strange to say, one verse actually haunted me day and night: […] I am far from 
being a believer in presentiments; but this verse is never absent from my thoughts’ (Sale 
227). 
It seems that the gloomy shadow of Campbell's lines inspired Jeffreys to precede 
Sale’s by Hendrick’s singing of part of an English folk lyric story:  
 
To heal my lovesick passion 
If you'll consent with me to go 
I'll roll you in my morning cloak 
And bring you home to Easter snow. (Jeffreys 24)  
 
The origin of the lyrics, according to Roger Renwick, is ‘Easter Snow’, which is a variant 
of the popular English ballad The Bold Fisherman where the fisherman’s offer to roll the 
maid in his ‘morning’ cloak reveals his sexual intention to seduce her (Renwick 27-28). 
The joyful image of Easter snow at home contradicts the harmful snow in Afghanistan, 
which was one of the factors leading to the disaster, which Campbell's verse predicted. 
However, this mythic atmosphere does not prevent Bugles at the Gates of Jalalabad from 
seeking a rational explanation for the disaster. In contrast, the playwright utilises the notion 
of prophecy in order to give his prediction of the upcoming consequences of the ongoing 
conflict. But before reflecting on the future, the play underlines some similarities between 
the historical event and the current war. 
Because of its tremendous number of victims, the vast majority of which were 
civilians, the massacre of 1882 seems to be comparable to the situation in 2009. Therefore, 
when the soldiers attempt to define who is responsible for the disaster, their comments echo 
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a very tiny part of what has been being proposed throughout the Anglo-American media 
since 2001 in order to trace the reason for the coalition’s growing number of casualties: 
 
McCANN: Who is to blame? 
HENDRICK: The politicians who put them there –   
DICKENSON: The dithering, numbskull Generals –   
WINTERFLOOD: The cowards in the ranks –  
McCANN: The bloodthirsty, deceitful enemy. (Jeffreys 18-19)  
 
Moreover, when the play starts to debate some of these possible answers, the playwright 
takes a further step towards revealing the similarity between the historical and ongoing 
wars. This discussion is dominated by Hendrick who, unlike his colleagues, does not 
deceive himself by accusing the merciless enemy. Instead, Hendrick identifies the core of 
the problem, claiming: ‘And we wake up to the fact that we are stuck in a country we do 
not understand upholding a puppet king nobody wants’ (22). When Hendrick’s refusal of 
his colleagues’ prejudice leads him to criticise the British presence in Afghanistan, the play 
focuses on the crucial role of such misconceptions as reasons for the British occupation. If 
we read Jeffreys’ play in the context of the relationship between the plays of The Great 
Game Afghanistan, we can realise that both Black Tulips and Miniskirts of Kabul suggest 
that both the Russian invasion and the American action against it were claimed by the two 
powerful countries as an attempt to extricate Afghanistan from its troubles. Such claims 
imply a condemnatory image of the helpless Afghan people.  
When Hendrick claims that the weak king was a reason for the Afghans’ uprising 
against the British army, we are invited to reflect on the repeated uprisings against the pro-
coalition Afghan president. In his exploration of the reasons for growing Afghan rebellions 
since 2005, Seth Jones argues that ‘U.S. and Afghan efforts failed to prevent the rise of an 
insurgency in that country. […] The newly established interim government was too weak to 
provide essential services or security to most of the country, especially rural areas’ (Jones 
37).  
However, the message of Bugles at the Gates of Jalalabad extends beyond drawing 
our attention to such resemblances between the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839 to 1842) 
and the Anglo-American invasion in 2001. Most importantly, the play suggests that 
because the mistakes are repeatable, the future of the current conflict can be seen through 
the historical disaster. Before he devises the consequences of the disaster, Hendrick insists 
193 
 
on the unique geographic and demographic aspects of Afghanistan as crucial factors in the 
British defeat; he describes ‘This country is a death-trap for foreign armies. The narrow 
defiles, the paths through the mountains. Sixty Afghan tribesmen, hiding on the tops of 
ridges with their long rifles can take out a battalion’ (Jeffreys 22). Using the phrase ‘foreign 
armies’ rather than saying British army suggests the references to the current war. 
Conceiving the disaster as an inevitable result of initial mistakes enables Hendrick to 
produce his own prophecy of the future:  
 
I am here, we are all here, because of a mistake. […] There was a 
mistake. […] The war will become more expensive. We, here in 
Jalalabad, must be relieved. Then our enemy must be punished. […] 
Then all us soldiers must be got out, evacuated. Leaving the country 
in a worse state than you found it. (Jeffreys 27-28) 
 
Unlike Dennie’s prediction of the disaster, Hendrick’s prevision cannot occur within the 
imaginary realm of the play. On the other hand, for the audience of the play, the future of 
the British war in Afghanistan is part of the history, which affirms that the British army 
withdrew from Afghanistan to leave the country in a very bad condition. The play 
highlights this fictional prophecy/historical fact as a warning of what can be worse in the 
Anglo-American coalition in the 2000s. This message could not be communicated without 
the play’s emphasis on the similarity between the past and present wars. While Bugles at 
the Gates of Jalalabad suggests that both foreign countries and Afghan accomplices 
repeated similar policies in Afghanistan, observing history suggests that, apart from the 
historical gap between British, Soviet, and American interventions, their consequences 
intersect and collectively reproduce disastrous situations in Afghanistan and affect the 
entire world. Such an interactional relationship defines Miniskirts of Kabul’s depiction of 
historical events in order to comment on the ongoing coalition’s war in Afghanistan.  
 
Repeated mistakes are mutual and connected: Miniskirts of Kabul 
By focusing on the Russian/American indirect competition over Afghanistan, which 
shaped the end of the Cold War, Miniskirts of Kabul suggests that the history of 
Afghanistan was a series of political and military mistakes. Greig’s play goes further by 
suggesting that historical mistakes, whether committed by internal or external sides, have 
influenced the current conflict. In the play, an unidentified British Writer imagines her 
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meeting with Najibullah, the president of Afghanistan during the Russian occupation of his 
country, which ‘destroyed many Afghan provinces, and caused 50,000 Soviet and over 1.2 
million Afghan casualties’ (Westad 49). Unlike most puppet-rulers, he managed to stay in 
power for almost four years without Soviet military support. According to Lansford, ‘the 
majority of international observers expected the Najibullah regime to fall in the immediate 
aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal’ (Lansford 2003, 136). Najibullah’s political ambition 
took the priority over the stability and security of his country. He refused all demands to 
step down, regardless of the disastrous consequences of his persistence. In April 1992, just 
a few days before the removal of Najibullah, Amin Saikal argued: 
 
Of course, no progress is possible while the illegitimate government 
of Najibullah holds sway in Kabul. The sooner that this regime, a 
tragic legacy of Soviet communism and the Cold War, is removed 
from the scene, the better it will be for both the Afghans and the 
region as a whole. (Saikal 102) 
 
Although his secular project to modernise Afghanistan enhanced education and women’s 
rights, Najibullah’s reforms were opposed by the vast majority of the Afghans, especially in 
the rural districts, because these reformative measures did not consider either the Afghans’ 
traditions or religion. Therefore, even after the Russian withdrawal, as Phillip Corwin 
declares, ‘The Mujahidin saw Najib[ullah] as a Soviet puppet, and even worse, a godless 
atheist ruling a devout Muslim country’ (Corwin 2). The large number of civilian victims of 
his mistakes suggests that he is one of the most brutal leaders in the history of Afghanistan. 
All these elements justify the Writer’s decision to imagine meeting Najibullah. Put 
differently, the play used him as a dramaturgical device to reveal the links between 1990s 
and 2000s. 
 
Laws of imagination: presentation defines reception  
As the stage directions state, this imaginary meeting is supposed to be held just two 
days before Najibullah’s death, at ‘The United Nations Compound, Kabul, 26 September 
1996’ (Greig 2009, 123). In this trans-decade meeting the Writer’s imagination went back 
from the actual night of production in 2009 to the time of the dramatic action. Therefore, 
when the narration of historical events reaches the day of the interview, Najibullah exploits 
195 
 
the Writer’s privilege of belonging to the present time to know the rest of his story. His last 
words eagerly ask her about his fate. She responds:  
 
This morning. September 27th 1996 Kabul falls to the Taliban. […] 
The Taliban capture you. They beat you. They castrate you. They 
tie your dying body to a jeep and drive round the compound pulling 
you behind them in the dirt. Finally they take you to a busy road 
junction where they hang you from a concrete lamp post. They put 
money in your pocket and stuff cigarettes in your mouth as a 
symbol of your decadence. (Greig 2009, 144-5) 
 
While the Writer is recalling what she knows about the historical incidents, Najibullah does 
not comment on his future/death. This description of extreme brutality suggests that 
terrorists’ violence and hatred are not an exceptional attitude towards Westerners or 
Christians. In addition, the gruesome disfiguration of his corpse draws our attention to the 
Taliban’s deviation from the rules of Islam.155 
Because the entire discourse of the play is an internal dialogue within the Writer’s 
mind, the lines of the two characters are not preceded by their names in the printed text. 
Theatrically, this imaginary aspect influences both the elements of performance and the 
process of reception. The repeated insistence on the imaginary nature of the dramatic action 
frees the play from the restrictions of realistic representation. Throughout the play, visual 
and audible theatrical elements immediately respond to verbal speeches as if it is a fantasy 
world. As soon as they are mentioned, things such as a bottle of whisky, a woman’s skirt, 
and torchlight appear. These moments of revealing theatrical artifice challenge the dramatic 
illusion in order to draw spectators’ attention, inviting them to the political discourses that 
accompany these moments. The play also exploits nonverbal sound effects in order to 
highlight particular lines of characters’ speeches. Before the play affirms that the interview 
is just an imaginary conversation with a dead man, it hints at his death by a slip of the 
Writer’s tongue:  
 
WRITER: Imagining what it was like to be you.  
NAJIBULLAH: Was? 
WRITER: Is. I mean ‘is.’ 
A shell lands nearby. (Greig 2009, 130-1)156 
                                                 
155Islam, just like all religions and human norms, insists on respecting dead bodies, even those of enemies, by 
burying them as soon as possible. Any sort of humiliating a corpse is considered a big sin.  
156The names of characters are added for the sake of clarification.  
196 
 
These offstage explosions are partly utilised to denote the constant threat of the Taliban 
fighters. Towards the finale, the gradual increase of the noises denotes their successful 
attack on the army of Masood.157 In addition, throughout the play, Greig employs these 
audible elements at specific moments as a method of highlighting the last line of speech. 
For example, while Najibullah starts to tell the Writer about the historical mistakes that led 
his country to its present miserable situation, the backstage noises prevent him from 
proceeding: 
 
NAJIBULLAH: We Afghans always make the same mistake. 
WRITER: What mistake? 
NAJIBULLAH: We always –  
A massive explosion nearby. (Greig 2009, 128) 
 
Cutting the flow of the conversation intentionally leaves the Writer’s question without 
answer, which invites us to trace such mistakes within Najibullah’s speeches throughout the 
interview. Moreover, to involve the audience within this game of imagination, Greig turns 
what is supposed to be part of his stage directions into a character’s speech: 
 
WRITER: Perhaps you could begin by describing where we are? 
NAJIBULLAH: You know where we are. 
WRITER: Yes but pretend I don’t know. Paint me a picture. 
NAJIBULLAH: We are in the reception soom of the guest house in 
the United Nations compound. You can see all this with your own 
eyes.    
WRITER: I want to see it with your eyes. (Greig 2009, 127) 
 
Initially, Najibullah’s description seems like a dramatic trick to inform spectators about the 
scene where the action of the play occurs, but when he continues to tell the Writer about the 
offstage yard with its pool and trees, the play reveals its intention to establish the rules of 
imagination that will frame the two characters of the interview and define the audience’s 
relationship with each character. Here, the members of the audience share the position of 
the Writer; both are listeners to Najibullah’s discourse. Thus, the audience is positioned to 
identify itself with the Writer, who supposedly belongs to her time, against Najibullah, who 
                                                 
157 He is an absent character that refers to Ahmad Shah Massoud, the main character in Ben Ockrent’s Honey. 
Because Massoud fought against the Soviet occupation of his country, he was one of Najibullah’s rivals. 
However, both were enemies of the Taliban. Therefore, Massoud’s defeat means that Najibullah should 
expect the arrival of Islamist militias. 
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represents the other culture and era. Consequently, when Najibullah advises the Writer to 
read Peter Hopkirk’s book The Great Game, the play indirectly encourages its spectators to 
broaden their knowledge about the history of Afghanistan. Such knowledge is important to 
recognise the cultural misapprehensions, which create and justify the conflict. 
 
Individual mistakes represent an international conflict   
Najibullah’s replies to the Writer’s questions are full of references to historical 
incidents. However the play does not reduce the character of Najibullah to a source for 
informative discourse. He is not a character in a tribunal play, who gives testimony. By 
highlighting some facts from his private life, the playwright portrays Najibullahas an 
individual who, to some extent, may win respect and sympathy from the British and 
American audiences. For instance, as a self-made person, he successfully utilised education 
in order to challenge the difficulties of being a member of an underprivileged social class. 
The play also refers to Najibullah’s stand against reactionary movements, when he 
declares: ‘we had to fight to defend the future – because the conservatives, the mullahs – 
they wanted to keep Afghanistan in the past’ (Greig 2009, 132). However, these positive 
traits are challenged by the play’s profound exploration of his character, which in turn 
exposes concealed aspects of the conflict. Gradually, this constant process of shifting the 
narrative from Najibullah’s life to the political and military conflict and vice versa suggests 
that what may seem personal mistakes can end up destroying the lives of thousands. 
Najibullah’s own statements replace the false image of the saviour of his people with the 
more realistic picture of a disguised savage, whose modernity is limited to wearing western 
suits instead of traditional Afghan clothes. To give some examples of Najibullah’s 
declarations of his crimes, the following dialogue shows his dictator attitude:   
 
WRITER: Did you kill anybody? 
NAJIBULLAH: Once. […] I killed another student during an 
argument.  
WRITER: What were you arguing about? 
NAJIBULLAH: I don’t remember. […] 
WRITER: Why did you kill him?  
NAJIBULLAH: To prove the point. (Greig 2009, 132-3) 
 
This cruel behaviour, even before he occupied any official job, is consistent with his later 
brutality when he became the head of the secret police:  
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WRITER: How many people did you kill? […] 
NAJIBULLAH: With my own hands or by my order? 
WRITER: With your own hands. 
NAJIBULLAH: Not many. A few. […] I don’t remember. 
WRITER: How many by your order? 
NAJIBULLAH: A few thousand. (Greig 2009, 135-6) 
 
Such atrocities are enough to disprove his claims to assume the role of the moderniser and 
civilised politician. But why does Najibullah confess to these crimes? For Najibullah, 
Afghans are not able to have a democratic regime—a typical discourse of all 
dictatorships—as he claims: ‘Democracy is not a possibility for us. It is not desirable for us. 
It may never be possible for us’ (Greig 2009, 143). The end of the play suggests that 
Najibullah’s murderers had suffered from his previous crimes. When the Writer informs 
him about his brutal death, she tells him that ‘most reports say they are Taliban foot 
soldiers. The Taliban general had lost a father and a brother to your secret service who had 
pushed them out of a helicopter. Imagine what it’s like to be pushed out of a helicopter’ 
(Greig 2009, 145). The play emphasises how the violent practices of authoritarian regimes 
play a crucial role in creating more violent responses.  
Preoccupied by his incessant ambition to repossess power, the play focuses on 
Najibullah’s baseless invented cocoon of hope, which will be proven too feeble to protect 
him from his horrible destiny. Even, at the crucial moment of his life when he expected the 
Taliban fighters to arrive, he wasted the last opportunity to escape. The Writer declares: 
‘Some reports say that in the last hours before dawn your old enemy Ahmed Shah Masood 
comes to the UN compound and offers to take you to safety in the north. You refuse’ (Greig 
2009, 144). He thought that he would deceive the Taliban fighters if he only changed his 
Western appearance. Therefore, he ‘takes off his suit and shirt. He dresses in Afghan 
clothes, an Afghan waistcoat’ (Greig 2009, 144). This chameleonic behaviour suggests that 
his secular project of reformation was just a pretext to get the Russian shelter. Najibullah’s 
story is a chapter of the same repeated mistakes of the three great powers, namely Britain, 
Russia, and the US.  
 Greig’s play significantly reveals one of the most repeated misconceptions of all 
Western interventions in Afghanistan, which is the supposition that a puppet ruler can be 
accepted, especially if he is tough, seems to regulate Western misconception. Here, a series 
of ‘metaphorical parallelism[s]’ can be drawn, where a long history of Afghan puppets are 
created by British, Russian, and American occupations. Because of its colonial history, 
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Britain’s puppets outnumber those made by the other two great powers. Seán Lang 
explains: 
 
The British were afraid that the Russians were going to invade India 
through Afghanistan, so they sent an army into Kaboul and put their 
own man in charge, a hapless character called Shah Sujah. The 
Afghans knew a British puppet when they saw one. […] When the 
British finally did retreat, the Afghans shot them to pieces. Then 
they did the same to Shah Sujah. […] Invasions of Afghanistan 
have a habit of going badly wrong. The British imposed another 
government in 1878 and the Afghans overthrew that one too. (Lang 
306)   
 
Karzai is described as an American puppet not only by his political foes, but also by 
Western media, including those of the United States. In February 2009, he was asked by 
Dan Rather, the Anchor from CBS News: ‘Someone who knows Afghanistan, loves 
Afghanistan said, "Nothing speaks 'puppet' more than being guarded by U.S. bodyguards." 
Do you agree with that?’ (ctd. in Chan, web). 
Hawk, the British politician in Campaign reveals Karzai’s pretension of asking 
NATO occupation to leave. Hawk argues: ‘You think that Karzai means it? Of course he 
doesn’t, Taliban knocking on his front door – no way! He wants us to stay’ (Gupta 61). 
Likewise, Najibullah could not expand his power to rural areas. He even deceivingly 
declared that he asked the Russians to withdraw, as both the history and Greig’s play 
suggest. Nothing proves the fragility of puppet rulers more than their insistence on keeping 
the occupation because if they lose its support they will be overthrown or killed.  
 
When poetry creates a virtual world: No Such Cold Thing 
 
When Alya and Meena, the thirteen and fourteen-year Afghan girls, meet in the first 
moment of the play we realise the difference between their appearance; as the stage 
directions read ‘ALYA, wearing a burka, [...] MEENA is wearing a headscarf covering her 
hair, and a long coat, covering her more Western-style dress’(Wallace No Such Cold 
Thing, 253). Then they start to cite lines from Faiz’s verse:  
 
MEENA: Hedgehog? Is it you, Hedgehog? Alya, is it you? 
ALYA: (Quotes.) ‘He is the lord of sleep/lord of peace/lord of 
night’ MEENA: (Quotes.) ‘on whose arm your hair is lying.’ 
(Wallace No Such Cold Thing 253) 
200 
 
 
It seems that the Pakistani poet’s verse acts like a secret code, a password that enables them 
to recognise each other. But if Alya’s burka prevents Meena from recognising the former, 
why does the latter need to introduce herself by such a poetic identification? When they 
quarrel about Meena’s stealing of Faiz’s collection of poems, we learn more about the two 
girls:    
 
ALYA: You stole it when you left. That was our one book of verse 
that Uncle Khan brought back from his studies in Pakistan. 
MEENA: What do you care if I took it? You don’t like Faiz. 
ALYA: But I like to read. Mother taught us from that book. 
(Wallace No Such Cold Thing 253) 
 
Apart from the significant role of this book of poetry in their life, they are two sisters who 
did not meet for several years because Meena travelled to England with their father. Now 
she has returned just to take her younger sister to what seems a heaven compared to their 
own country. Later we discover that the sisters did not easily identify each other because 
both are dead, victims of an American raid. Before revealing such a shocking turn of 
events, the play utilises Meena’s supposed absence to highlight the calamitous situation in 
Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban, especially for women.    
 Compared to the vast majority of the Afghan girls, Alya is lucky because her 
mother is a teacher, but with the absence of her father, who is supposedly in England with 
Meena, both the younger sister and her mother have to suffer. Alya recalls ‘We’ve been 
alone, mother and I, and outside, the Taliban. We cannot leave the house. Mother had to 
stop her teaching; she is forbidden to work. Uncle Khan keeps us alive with scraps from his 
table’ (Wallace No Such Cold Thing, 255). Although Alya is the younger, she is more 
aware of the restrictions that should rule girls’ behavior under the authority of the Taliban. 
Meena’s absence prevented her from realising the hell her younger sister had to get used to. 
Therefore, Alya reminds her sister ‘We have no one to travel with us. If the Taliban see us 
travelling alone, they’ll beat us’ (Wallace No Such Cold Thing, 254). Instead of rushing 
towards the taxi that will take them to the airport, where their father waits, Alya starts a 
series of stories that inform her sister, and the audience, about her life while her sister was 
abroad. Understandably, the Taliban’s brutality is the centre of her speech; she recalls:  
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Fauzia was walking with her father to see family. It was two years 
ago. She had on her best shoes and they made a click, click, click. 
Not loud but too loud. The Virtue Police heard Fauzia clicking and 
they shot her. […] Our cousin Nargis laughed too loud at the market 
and the Virtue Police hit her and now she is missing three front 
teeth and is ugly. Girls are not allowed to go outside at all. I’m 
forbidden to learn to read and write. (Wallace No Such Cold Thing, 
255) 
 
Alya tells these stories not only to complain about the situation under the Taliban, but also 
in order to warn her sister of their punishment. In addition, Alya’s speech indirectly accuses 
her sister of betrayal because she did not share her suffering. Later, Alya obviously blames 
her sister and father for leaving her as she declares: ‘You left us to rot. Father left us to rot’ 
(Wallace No Such Cold Thing, 264). Nevertheless, at scattered moments, Alya looks as if 
she has adapted to this kind of life, or is at least pretending that she is happy. Moreover, she 
tries to assume the role of the wise sister whose experience allows her to advise Meena, and 
she even punishes her sister for breaching the Taliban’s rules about women’s appearances 
and behaviour: 
 
MEENA: I’ve been held in the arms. Of a man. 
ALYA slaps her sister’s face.  
MEENA touches the sting with her hand. 
ALYA: You are dirty. You are disrespectful. You shame me. You 
shame father. MEENA just stares at her sister. Tell me more. […] 
Did he squeeze your boobs? (Wallace No Such Cold Thing, 257) 
 
As adolescents in Afghanistan, Alya was forced to forget, if not to hate the fact that she is 
on the threshold of womanhood. Naturally, she is curious about the world of men, which 
should be more available to her sister. Therefore, she cannot hide her eagerness to know 
more about what she has just considered immoral. Nevertheless, she is still obsessed with 
the fear of punishment; she declares ‘You’ve been touched by a man not of your family. 
That’s a death sentence for you here. Whore. Whore’ (Wallace No Such Cold Thing, 257). 
Alya’s hesitation reflects her contradictory feelings towards her sister; a mixture of jealousy 
and fear of the Taliban. While Alya is burdened by years of oppression, Meena’s alleged 
living in England makes her optimistic. Gradually, the older encourages her sister to air her 
wishes and think of what they will be able to do when they return to Afghanistan in the 
future; they express their dreams loudly: 
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ALYA: We’ll come back here when we’re teachers? 
MEENA: Yes. And we’ll teach in the daylight. And girls will be 
allowed to go to school. 
ALYA: And we’ll scrape, scrape the paint from the windows. 
MEENA: And we’ll open our doors, skip out any time, 
ALYA: And we won’t need a man to be with us. 
MEENA: And we can click and shout as loud as... 
ALYA:  cannons! And we can eat till our bellies are round... 
MEENA: as buckets! 
ALYA: And we’ll have radio and singing 
MEENA: and so many apples we can fill our mouths 
ALYA: till they burst! (Wallace No Such Cold Thing, 257) 
 
These simple rights, which do not need to be even asked for in any Western society, 
compose what seems the long petition for women’s demands in the era of the Taliban. 
However, their daydream is interrupted by the appearance of Sergio, the American soldier 
in his twenties, who does not realise that he was sleeping on the springs of a grave-like bed 
without a mattress. From this moment, we gradually discover that the three characters are 
already dead. That explains why the two girls and the American soldier are altogether in a 
desert.  
Meena, the poor Afghan girl that has never actually been to England, and Sergio, 
the American soldier in the battlefield away from home, are reluctant to accept the fact of 
their death. The most striking point of their denial is that they do not claim to be alive as 
they were at the moment of their death; they talk about their dream rather than reality. In 
contrast, Alya, who deals with her death as a matter of fact, helps them to remember the last 
minutes of their lives:  
 
SERGIO: I got drunk last night. In my home town bar. With 
Kubick, Tony, Mike and. With Kubick, Tony, Mike and... (Shouts.) 
Mama? Wake up. Come in here. […] 
ALYA: There were twenty of you, maybe thirty. We raised our 
arms. (Wallace No Such Cold Thing, 267-8) 
 
Thus, Alya drags Sergio from dream to reality to make him remember that what he alleged 
as the names of his friends in his home town are actually those of the soldiers, who 
accompanied him when they broke into the sisters’ house. Similarly, Meena still adheres to 
her dream of studying in England:  
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ALYA: You didn’t go to England. We can’t even speak English. 
MEENA: But we are speaking English. 
ALYA: Yes. Father and Mother would be impressed. 
MEENA: Father is waiting at the airport. We’ve come back to get 
you. We’re going to university! 
ALYA: We’ve never left our village. […] What is real is that we 
are usually hungry. We are usually afraid. We are usually more 
hungry than afraid for years now. [...] We dream of escaping the 
Taliban, of going to England, of you and father leaving first, of your 
coming back to get us. (Wallace No Such Cold Thing, 272) 
 
It is part of theatrical tradition that dramatic characters usually speak the language of their 
spectators, regardless of the place and the time of the action. Here, Wallace intentionally 
refers to the fact that the sisters who are deprived of going to school cannot speak English. 
Eventually, Alya succeeds in getting them involved in representing the incident that led to 
their death. Frightened of the soldiers, both sisters ran. While Alya distractedly fell in a 
well, Meena was shot by Sergio after he repeatedly asked her to stop. Finally, while he was 
leaving with the other soldiers, their car hit a ground-emplaced mine. All survived except 
him.  Similar to thousands of stories about the death of both soldiers and civilians, many of 
which are even more poignant, this story is weaved through Wallace’s poetic images, 
which are full of bitter ironies. For instance, as the last moments of the play reveals, the 
bodies of these dramatic characters are tucked in three sand bags. In addition, to explain 
why she wears Sergio’s boots, Alya declares: 
 
Your friends are unharmed but you fly up in the air, high, high, and 
your boots fly off your feet, one with a foot still attached and Uncle 
sees your boots lying a hundred feet from your body. He throws 
your boots in the well to hide them. He is afraid the village will be 
blamed. He doesn’t even know I’m down there. (Wallace No Such 
Cold Thing, 271) 
 
The main focus of the play, though, is on revealing their real life rather than the way they 
died. The connotation of Alya wearing Sergio’s boots extends both the emotion behind this 
description and the earlier comic effect of her stumbling movement on large boots. It is the 
link between their unnecessary deaths.  
After we become aware of the siblings’ deaths, we realise that all Alya’s memories 
about her poor life describe Meena’s struggle as well. Even the latter’s adventure of being 
touched by a man, which was a reason for Alya’s envy, is proven to be a moment of pain; 
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the man was Sergio who tried to get his bullet out of her neck, while she was dying. 
However, as a teenager, she is as excited as her sister to ask him:     
 
MEENA: Am I pretty? (Beat.) Were we pretty? My sister and I. 
SERGIO: You were just kids. 
MEENA: But if we had grown up? [...] 
SERGIO: Well, I wouldn’t kicked you out of bed, that’s for sure. 
MEENA: Bastard. (Beat.) Thank you. (Wallace No Such Cold 
Thing 274) 
 
Although she is aware of her death, Meena is glad to be flattered by her killer. Considering 
their short tough life, such words of praise should mean a lot for the two Afghan girls. Yet, 
the most striking aspect of the sisters’ lives is their utopian imagined world, in which they 
experience an alternative life. If reading books is the way in which Ali, the young Irqai man 
in Wallace’s The Retreating World, escapes his suffering under Saddam’s political 
dictatorship, poetry is the refuge in which the mother of Meena and Alya protects their 
hope from being stolen by the religious tyranny of the Taliban. Meena, Alya, and their 
parents are victims of both sides of the military conflict, the Taliban and the coalition. They 
are just like Omaid in The Night is Darkest before the Dawn who watched his brother’s 
punishment for his insistence on teaching Afghan girls.  He recalls: 
 
They tied his arms to one truck, his legs to another. They 
disembowelled him. They made the people watch and then the 
footballers come on. Kicking the ball, his guts still on the ground. 
The Taliban with the guns, shouting at them ‘keep your head 
up...keep watching. Don’t look down...Watch the game.’ (Tapping 
the side of his head.) I will be watching that game all my life. 
(Morgan 2009, 202-3) 
 
However, the arrival of the coalition did not end his agony because his pregnant wife and 
two of his sons were killed by the American bombs.  
Sergio in Wallace’s play is not a victim of the land mine planted by the Taliban only; as an 
unemployed young man, who cannot afford to resume his study at the university, he chose 
to join the army for money, and went to Afghanistan.158 Instead of returning to achieve his 
dream, he is dead in the desert, away from his mother’s French toast and the oak tree 
                                                 
158 Sergio is just like Dai in The Pull of Negative Gravity, Danny in Motortown, and Jen in Embedded: Live, 
who joined the army in order to get money. 
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outside his window. No Such Cold Thing says nothing new about the history of the conflict, 
but Wallace’s play turns the theoretical discourse about the conflict into live world 
occupied by dramatic characters whose simple dreams are crushed before losing their lives 
to what seems to be endless conflict. Does Wallace seek to comment on the conflict by 
sending a message of despair?  Does the play suggest that the death is the best possible end 
of the characters’ agony? Is it a declaration of despair as no justice in this world? Or, it is a 
mystical escape from what seems unliveable reality? The play urges us to recognise the 
unretrievable victims from both sides as precious losses of unnecessary disputes, not as the 
obligatory casualties of unavoidable conflicts. Neither killed civilians nor soldiers are 
abstract numbers on the wars’ bills; they are human beings whose dreams will never come 
true, whose families and friends have no chance to see them anymore. However, we should 
be optimistic; in the context of its overall purpose, The Great Game: Afghanistan insists on 
the fact that, as long as there are questions to be asked, answers will be found. Then 
mistakes can be unrepeatable.  
 
Documentary material within imaginary plots: the ethical borders 
Unlike tribunal or Verbatim plays, an imaginary plot is supposedly the playwright’s 
invention. However, the parallels between historical information and invented speeches 
sometimes raises questions about the limits of using, modifying, or even contradicting 
documented facts. The form of interview in Grieg’s Miniskirts of Kabul enabled the play to 
include documentary information, whether pertinent to the Afghan ex-president’s private 
life or his political career that should be reflected on the conflict. For the audience, this 
information can be obtained through Najibullah’s answers to the Writer’s questions such as: 
‘Where were you born? […] When did you become interested in politics?’ (Greig 2009, 
131). In addition, the Writer, herself, directly refers to some facts in order to induce his 
comments; she declares: ‘You became an assistant to the party leader. […] You went to 
University to study medicine’ (Greig 2009, 132). In both cases, her questions and hints are 
followed by Najibullah’s announcement. Although the bulk of this information can be 
considered as documented fact, there are some more speculative happenings such as 
Najibullah’s declarations about torturing or killing people. The problem of Miniskirts of 
Kabul is that these Najibullah’s negative features are revealed by his own speeches within 
the interview form, which suggests that they are as factual as documented historical 
incidents. Moreover, in her last monologue, where the Writer explains how Najibullah was 
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killed and who, exactly killed him, she uses the phrase ‘Some reports say’.  When there are 
contradictory versions of the story she refers to them but, ultimately, she prefers one 
version explaining: ‘Some reports say […] but most reports say’. In addition, and most 
importantly, when the Writer needs to guess Najibullah’s reaction to the Taliban torture, 
she declares: ‘No one wrote it down. I imagine you fought. You spent four years lifting 
weights. You were a boxer. They called you the ox. I imagine you fought’ (Greig 2009, 
144-5). This precise attitude suggests that every single piece of information within the play 
should be a matter of fact. Greig’s play might be defended on the grounds of its insistence 
on the imaginary nature of the interview. What rebuts this claim is that some spectators 
may fail to distinguish invented yet plausible incidents or information from the narration of 
historical events. As a result, the former will get undeserved credibility.   
Speculation seems to be a challenge that topical and historical drama must face. 
Throughout The Great Game: Afghanistan, playwrights deal with alleged incidents in 
different ways. To give an example, the disputed responsibility of Amanullah for his 
father’s assassination is one of the most debatable matters in the history of Afghanistan; as 
Fraser-Tytler explains: ‘By some it was attributed to political motives; by others to a plot 
hatched within the ruling family itself for private reasons and connived at if not instigated 
by the Amir’s third son Amanullah’ (Fraser-Tytler 192). This incident is portrayed in both 
Now is the Time and Campaign. In the former, Wilkinson nearly adopts Fraser-Tytler’s 
description because the play tends to accuse Amanullah. Nevertheless, it is indecisive. To 
prove the soon-to-be-king’s role in killing his father, Wilkinson utilises another speculation 
about Amanullah’s agreement with the rebels, in which he survives at the expense of his 
father-in-law’s life. It is very important to realize that once this agreement is mentioned by 
the queen, her father recalls the old rumors: 
 
TARZI: Some said you had your father killed. […] 
AMANULLAH: I did not kill my father. […] it was the British. 
[…] 
SORAYA: It wasn’t the British in that room today, signing my 
father’s death warrant, was it? It was you. (Wilkinson 72-3) 
 
While Amanullah denies the charge of patricide, his wife persists to accuse him of a more 
recent betrayal. On the other hand, Amanullah’s defence is still reasonable to some extent. 
For the audience, when Amanullah accuses the British of murdering his father, his claim 
can be supported by several historical incidents and speculations that suggest the great 
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countries’ interferences in the ruling of Afghanistan. In terms of his alleged treason of 
Tarzi, Amanullah does not deny his deal with the leaders of the revolution, but he describes 
it as a kind of political tactic, claiming: ‘I negotiated, to buy us time, to form a plan. Tarzi, 
you know how it is, we say things. I would never betray you’ (Wilkinson 72). It is 
understood that the king addresses Tarzi as a politician, who is supposed to be familiar with 
political tricks. A more objective depiction of the incident can be found in Campaign, 
where Gupta equally introduces both accusation and vindication. Although the defendant is 
not one of the dramatic characters, Professor Khan, the specialist in the history of 
Afghanistan, is present to answer Hawk’s questions: 
 
HAWK: Was he involved, you think? In the assassination?   
KHAN: Some believe he was – others blame the British, the 
Soviets, Habibullah’s brother Nasrullah…there’s nothing 
conclusive.  
HAWK: What do you think? 
KHAN: Amanullah was ambitious, maybe the best placed to seize 
power, that’s all. Suspicion was always likely to fall on him.  
HAWK: But in your opinion, he wasn’t involved? 
KHAN: Yes that is my opinion and it’s what I say in my book. 
(Gupta 54-5) 
 
The word ‘involved’ seems precise because, just like many aspects of the conflict, this 
assassination could be a result of the cooperation of different sides, including the two great 
European countries. But what is the significance of such a debatable issue that prompted 
commentary by two playwrights? Is it just to inform spectators about the history of 
Afghanistan? Although this incident appears to be irrelevant to the invasion of 2001, its 
connection to the overall meaning of The Great Game: Afghanistan can be seen from two 
perspectives; in terms of the dichotomy of internal/external responsibility for Afghanistan’s 
problems, this incident is one among identical cases in other plays, Campaign included. In 
addition, regardless of the playwrights’ own opinions on the ongoing conflict, they refer to 
one of the toughest obstacles of dealing with the available information about this conflict, 
which is uncertainty. For spectators who came away puzzled that they could not decide on a 
point of view, it is a way to tell them that they have the right to be confused; it is a really 
thorny conflict that deserves much more thinking. Simultaneously, those who naively 
understood the conflict as a simple confrontation between good and evil are encouraged to 
deepen their thinking and reconsider their view. 
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Chapter Five 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict: controversial plays comment on a complicated dispute  
 
Compared to the large number of British and American plays that comment on the 
invasion of Iraq and the war in Afghanistan, the Anglo-American playwrights’ responses to 
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute are noticeably few. Unlike the case of the other two locations 
of conflict, neither Britain nor the US has had a direct military confrontation, which may 
account for such a phenomenon. However, it seems that the controversial nature of the 
conflict itself may account for playwrights’ reluctance to write about it.159 
With decades of historical, geographical, religious and political writings and media 
coverage, several old questions have not been answered yet. It would be enough to ask, for 
example, whose land is it? Each side produces its elaborate answers for every single 
question, but the discrepancy between these answers is no less baffling than the depth of the 
conflict. It is unlikely, nearly impossible, that a play attempts to comment on the conflict 
without being accused of bias from one side. However, as the first chapter of this thesis 
suggests, the increasing power of Hamas has had a big influence on the conflict since the 
middle of the 1990s. Many playwrights such as Toni Kushner, David Hare, Naomi 
Wallace, and David Greig, were keen to visit the most disputed land in order to know more 
about the conflict. Commenting on the effect of his visit to Palestine, Greig argues: 
‘Politics has changed, and after my experiences in Palestine, I had changed. I was no longer 
satisfied with letting my work simply exist and not questioning whether it was helping or 
hindering the powers shaping our lives’ (Greig 2007, 212-13).  
Because of the significant role of the conflict on the Western confrontations with 
Muslim and Arabic countries, some playwrights refer to it within their plays, in which they 
comment on another topic. For instance, in Stuff Happens, one of those interviewed to give 
a statement about the invasion of Iraq is a Palestinian academic. In her statement, as Hare 
writes it, she argues that: ‘For the Palestinian, there is no other context. We see everything 
in the context of Palestine. […] For Palestinians, it’s about one thing: defending the 
interests of America’s three-billion-dollar-a-year colony in the Middle East’ (Hare 57). It is 
important to mention that this explanation is adopted by a big sector of the Arabs and 
Muslims as if it was a fact. Therefore, it is hard to find an Arabic study about the 2003 War 
                                                 
159 It may be useful to mention that since the 1950s, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the most political topic 
that concerns Arabic playwrights of political drama. 
209 
 
in Iraq without mentioning Israel as the main beneficiary. Moreover, it seems that Hare, as 
with many Western left-wing writers, suggests that Israel’s interests are a main factor in 
shaping US foreign policies. Roy explains:   
 
[W]e should be wary of traditional analyses from a section of the 
anti-imperialist left which sees American Middle East policy either 
as being defined in Tel Aviv or as governed chiefly by oil interests. 
In intervening in Iraq, the Bush administration was neither seeking 
to control oil nor acting on Israel's wishes. (Roy 2008, 16) 
 
Whether Hare’s character’s opinion seems to be reasonable or not, the inclusion of the 
Palestinian academic’s statement within Stuff Happens, which comments on the war in Iraq, 
suggests that both conflicts are correlated, especially since 1991as I have highlighted in the 
first and third chapters. In the latter I specifically underscore Wallace’s references to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict within In the Heart of America, which is mainly about the First 
Gulf War.   
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is mentioned in Soans’ Verbatim play Talking to 
Terrorists. In his statement, an ex-member of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claims: 
 
1993 was a good time. […] I started working for a peace 
organisation as a policeman for the Palestinian Authority. And on 
first day of Intifada, when I am in Jericho, there was a big 
demonstration. […] Civilians started to throw stones at the Israeli 
soldiers. The Israeli soldiers started shooting gas, then plastic 
bullets, then real bullets. I was sitting on a doorstep with a friend. A 
six year-old boy came and sat by me. He look [sic] at me. ‘You 
have a gun, why aren’t you using it?’ The last he told me, ‘If you 
are too shy to use it, I will shoot them.’ Me and my friend started 
shooting at the soldiers. (Soans 2005, 60–61)         
 
As his comment suggests, the Palestinian man attempts to justify his violence by the Israeli 
soldiers’ attack on Palestinian civilians. The most shocking declaration in the play is 
included within a speech of a Bethlehem schoolgirl, by which Soans ends his drama: 
‘When I first saw the Twin Towers on television, I felt sorry. But now I feel happy that they 
died. It’s their turn to suffer. I could see many thousands of them die. I wouldn’t feel a 
thing’ (Soans 2005, 97). By referring to 9/11 in the context of commenting on the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the play invites spectators to realise that Palestinians believe 
that the US is responsible for Israel’s violence against them. In addition, it is upsetting to 
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hear such a comment from a young girl, who is sad because her friend was killed by Israel. 
Violence leads to hatred and brutality.   
As with Hare’s Via Dolorosa, The Arab-Israeli Cookbook, which premiered at The 
Gate Theatre in London in 2004, is another Verbatim play in which Soans records his visit 
to Israel and the West Bank. The play includes forty-two speeches by both Palestinian and 
Israeli citizens. The characters’ testimonial memories of the violent conflict are interwoven 
with their recipes for food. All the Palestinian characters in the play, including Christian 
Palestinians, live in the Occupied Territories. Therefore, the play indirectly diminishes the 
religious factor in the conflict, according to which the radical group of Hamas is the source 
for terror. Consequently, Soans presents the relationship between the two sides as a dispute 
between an occupier and occupied people. Debbie Young comments: 
 
As someone who places herself quite far to the left on the political 
spectrum, particularly when it comes to Israel, I was pleased to hear 
Palestinian narratives told so movingly, and there were voices 
which it is important for a Jewish audience in particular to hear. But 
in neglecting to balance the stories as might have been done, the 
powerful dialogue that might have been created, even if only on 
stage, was somewhat lost. (Young 2006, 120)  
 
What Young considers an unbalanced representation of the factual suffering of both sides is 
part of the message of The Arab-Israeli Cookbook. Although the play affirms the 
possibility of co-existence, it portrays, but does not justify, the Palestinian violence as a 
response to both Israeli occupation and aggression. In this sense, Palestinians’ violence can 
be seen as a reaction to the Israeli government’s oppressive measures. Juergensmeyer 
argues that ‘the feeling of oppression held by Palestinian Muslims, for example, is one that 
many throughout the world consider to be an understandable though regrettable response to 
a situation of political control’ (Juergensmeyer 12). Even some Americans declared their 
support to Palestinian people. A good example is Naomi Wallace who wrote two plays 
about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition to A State of Innocence (2004), which I 
analyse in this chapter, Between This Breath and You (2005) portrays an encounter between 
an Israeli young woman and a Palestinian father whose deceased son’s lung was 
transplanted in her body saving her life, a fact she was not aware of. 
Furthermore, in 2002 Wallace was commissioned by the Guthrie Theatre in 
Minneapolis to write a play about her visit to Palestine. Wallace collaborated with the 
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Jewish American playwright Lisa Schlesinger and the Muslim Palestinian writer 
Abdelfattah Abusrour in writing Twenty-One Positions: A Cartographic Dream of the 
Middle East. Commenting on Israel’s building of the security wall, a 430-mile barrier that 
separates the Palestinian West Bank from Israel, the play ignited angry responses even 
before it was performed. Kelly Stuart explains: 
 
As soon as the Guthrie advertised the reading of her play on its Web 
site, they received a phone call from someone threatening to lobby 
their board to pull funding. Without ever seeing or reading the play. 
As if some subjects simply cannot be dramatized or discussed. 
That’s the climate we’re in. (qtd. in Garrett 61) 
  
The most striking feature of Stuart’s statement is its highlighting of the way in which the 
boards of the so-called nonprofit theatres in America might yield to the pressure of specific 
sectors of the audience, especially the subscribers.  
More infamous incident of this kind of public-motivated censorship is related to My 
Name is Rachel Corrie, which is edited by Alan Rickman and Katharine Viner and 
premiered in April 2005 at the Royal Court Theatre in London. The documentary play that 
uses the diary and e-mails of the twenty-three-year-old activist, who was killed under an 
Israeli bulldozer while she was attempting to prevent Israeli soldiers from demolishing a 
Palestinian house in March 2003, was scheduled to get its premiere in the US at the New 
York Theatre Workshop (NYTW) in March 2006. However, the show was decided to be 
delayed to an undefined date because of potential accusations of being biased, which might 
be intensified by the recent victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections and, also, due to 
Sharon's severe illness. On 22 March 2006, under the title ‘In Defense of a Play’, the New 
York Times published a letter signed by twenty-one British writers and theatre practitioners, 
including Harold Pinter and Gillian Slovo, who expressed their upset at the shocking 
decision made by the NYTW. In April 2006 a panel discussion on the NYTW’s decision 
was held at Barnard College. Contributors included American academics, critics and 
playwrights such as Marvin Carlson, John Heilpern, and Alisa Solomon.160    
This chapter will investigate two plays that respond to brutal reality in a country 
which was described by its founders as a utopia, while the victims of violence from both 
                                                 
160 For more information about the reasons for this postponement, which were given by the artistic director of 
the NYTW Jim Nicola and its managing director Lynn Moffat, see the articles of McKinley and Borger. A 
transcript of the panel discussion held at Barnard College, see Garrett.           
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sides live in a dystopia. The two plays are Caryl Churchill’s Seven Jewish Children: A play 
for Gaza, premiered at the Royal Court Theatre in London in February 2009, and Wallace's 
A State of Innocence, premiered at Theatre 7:84, Scotland in 2006.161  
 
A State of Innocence: Exceptional tolerance 
The two factual events that Naomi Wallace's A State of Innocence dramatises are 
quite discrepant, both in terms of their impact and their moral dimensions. On 20 May 
2004, the more influential event occurred when the Israeli army attacked the local zoo in 
Rafah. As a part of what Israel called Operation Rainbow, aggression caused dangerous 
injuries, and the death of most animals: 
 
Among the casualties of the Israeli raid into the Rafah refugee camp 
has been the local zoo - the only one in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli 
army probably took about 10 minutes to turn it into a wasteland, 
with tanks churning the whole area into an expanse of mud and 
twisted metal. There were ostriches, kangaroos and crocodiles, but 
the zoo's pride was its jaguar - he is missing now. An ostrich is 
rotting in the rubble and its stench hangs over the ruins. [...] The 
week before, five Israeli families had lost their sons in Rafah when 
a roadside bomb tore apart their troop-carrier. (Johnston, web) 
 
After describing the animals' agony, the BBC correspondent in Gaza ended his report with 
what can be considered, at least partly, an implied justification for the attack not only by 
referring to the earlier murder of the Israeli soldiers but also by giving this military incident 
a civilian shadow by relating the loss to the soldiers' families. Evidently, there is no 
mention of the suffering of civilian Palestinians. Although the human casualties of the 
Israeli military operation exceeded the animals’ injuries and deaths, the Western media 
gave the latter significant attention.  
Undoubtedly, it is hard to imagine that priority was given to animals on the grounds 
of the value-comparison with Palestinian human beings, or, even because of the novelty of 
                                                 
161 In 2008, Wallace decided to combine three separate plays in a kind of three-piece text under the title The 
Fever Chart: Three Visions of the Middle East. In addition to A State of Innocence, the trilogy includes 
Between This Breath and You, written in 2005, which has never been performed as a single play, but was 
premiered as a staged reading in 2005 at Menagerie Theatre, Cambridge. The third play is The Retreating 
World, a monodrama written in 2000 and premiered at The Cambridge New Writing Festival in July 2002. 
The trio’s world premiere was in Egypt at the American University in Cairo in March 2008. Later, in April 
2008, it was produced by New York’s Public Theatre. Its British premiere was in 2009 at York Theatre Royal 
and the Trafalgar Studios 2. 
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the incident. Arabic media, in contrast, focused basically on the humanitarian catastrophe 
with scattered and minor mentions of the pragmatic danger of released wild animals, the 
children's loss of the only accessible leisure attraction, the financial impact on the zoo's 
owner, and finally, the death of animals. Israeli officials found it more difficult to 
rationalise the destruction of the zoo. Chris McGreal reveals their hard task of presenting a 
reasonable justification: 
 
The army's explanation evolved through the day. At first it said it 
had not destroyed the zoo, then it said a tank may have accidentally 
reversed into it. By the end of yesterday, the military said its 
soldiers had been forced to drive through the zoo because an 
alternative route was booby-trapped by Palestinian explosives. 
Finally a spokesman said the soldiers had released the animals from 
their cages in a compassionate gesture to prevent them being 
harmed. (McGreal 1) 
 
The demolition of Palestinian houses and the murder of civilians, including children, were 
justified implicitly as revenge: ‘The incursion, the biggest in years, followed the killing of 
13 Israeli soldiers in Gaza last week’ (Cowell A6).  
Regardless of the difference between the number of dead Israeli soldiers as reported 
by the New York Times and declared by the BBC, there was sophism in using the murder of 
soldiers who were invading an occupied territory to provide a rationale for the killing and 
frightening of civilians. As Donald Macintyre argues, 
 
The despoliation of the zoo at the Brazil refugee camp may seem 
insignificant after 41 Palestinian deaths in Rafah this week and the 
trail of destruction left by the Israelis elsewhere in the Al Salaam 
and Brazil camps - the Israelis demolished an estimated 43 homes 
in Brazil, reducing them to rubble still awaiting clearance yesterday 
- but it is a potent symbol of the much wider havoc wrought in the 
two camps and a third, Tel Sultan, since the Rafah incursion began 
on Monday. (Macintyre 30) 
 
Wallace invests the symbolic virtue of the zoo's destruction to embody the entire 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict by merging this event with another actual occurrence. The 
second incident, unlike the former, involves a blink of leniency: ‘Um Hisham Qishta [A 
Palestinian woman] cradled a dying Israeli soldier in her arms a few days ago’ (McGreal 1). 
There was no single mention of this action by Arabic or Israeli media. Why was such a 
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prominent extraordinary gesture neglected? Was it too peaceful to accord with the enmity 
that normalised as the only type of relation between members of the two conflicting sides? 
For Palestinians, was this real woman seen as a shameful example of weakness and lunacy 
that must be ignored? Or, perhaps, should she be accused of treason? For Israel, was it 
painful to the military pride to accept this moment of disgrace when a Palestinian woman 
did a favour to an Israeli soldier? Or, did this incident contradict the Israeli insistence on 
confining the Palestinians to the image of merciless violent enemy?  
By using these two factual events, Wallace's play portrays a confrontation between 
a Palestinian woman and two dead Israelis, a young soldier and a middle-aged architect. 
The entire play could be considered as an illusion in the mind of a sorrowful mother who 
expresses her paradoxical experience. While Um His ham was prevented from cradling her 
murdered daughter, she bestowed her care on a dying Israeli soldier. She enters the ruin of 
Rafah's zoo to force the Israeli soldier Yuval to face the fact of his earlier death in her 
house. Finally, he gives up his denial and both share a kind of ritual consolation by reliving 
the last three minutes of his life.  
This dreamlike play adopts a nonlinear structure that transgresses the boundaries of 
time and place. Inside this spatiotemporal confusion, the dramatic act revolves around 
several paralleled narrative threads that intersect at scattered moments to create occasional 
interactions among their fragments. Therefore, a number of narrative gaps are left to be 
filled by the audience. This dramatic structure enables Wallace to mingle two factual events 
within the imaginary realm of the play. The demolition of the zoo and the tolerant gesture 
of a Palestinian woman towards an Israeli soldier shed their status as raw material to be 
woven into the fictional life of the dramatic characters. Likewise, the documentary 
information that the play offers about the history of Israel is problematic, not only because 
it is delivered mainly by Shlomo the other dead character, but also because it is presented 
as a part of conversational arguments among the three characters. However, neither these 
non-realistic aspects nor the merging of political claims with the dramatic speech of 
opposing characters can hide the partisan discourse of the play.   
Compared to the two Israeli characters, Um Hisham is portrayed as a merciful 
character that shows her tolerance to one of her enemies, and her sympathy extends to 
Yuval's mother. Moreover, every evil act of aggression inside the play belongs to Israeli 
people, whether soldiers or civilians; the building of settlements on Palestinian lands, the 
destruction of the zoo, including the brutal killing of animals, the attacking of Palestinian 
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houses, and, finally the killing of a Palestinian child. Even the murder of Yuval by the 
unknown Palestinian sniper can be justified as an act of resistance against an Israeli soldier 
while he was invading a Palestinian house. Um Hisham dominates the process of telling all 
the stories. In addition to her awareness of the circumstances that led to, and followed, 
Yuval’s death, she tells about her daughter Asma’s life and death. If Yuval, who became 
the zoo keeper after his death, has the authority to tell the audience about the present state 
of the zoo, Um Hisham is the only person who can talk about the beautiful past of the zoo 
before the destruction, which can be considered as Wallace’s reference tithe Palestinian’s 
original right to this land.  
Wallace’s play declares its opposition to the official Israeli version of the zoo’s 
destruction. Yuval tries to repeat the official explanation: ‘The military dismissed those 
accusations. A spokesman said the soldiers released the animals from their cages in a 
compassionate gesture to prevent them being harmed’ (Wallace 2006, 109). The aftermath 
of the Israeli attack reveals these lies as: ‘The ostrich was flattened, as were the squirrels, 
goats, and kangaroos. The single deer lay on her side all night, paddling with her broken 
legs as though she were swimming’ (Wallace 2006, 109). Wallace puts the realistic events 
into a grotesque atmosphere in this unrealistic zoo where animals lose parts of their bodies 
at night and retrieve them in the morning, and a woman insists on giving the last three 
minutes of a soldier’s life to his mother. However, the play is full of references to some real 
historical incidents and famous people whether by mentioning their names, such as 
‘Kaganovich’ and ‘Herzl’, citing some of their quotes, like Shuqayri’s alleged sentence 
about  throwing Jews into the sea (Wallace 2006, 104), or by both methods: 
 
Shlomo: (Suddenly quotes, excited:) “Move, run and grab as   many 
hilltops as you can to enlarge the Jewish settlements because 
everything we take now will stay ours . . . everything we don’t grab 
will go to them.” 
Yuval: Ariel Sharon. (Wallace 2006, 107) 
 
The play’s comment on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict moves between two states of 
awareness: the nightmarish reality and the utopian dream. Starting from the title of the play 
to the very end, Wallace keeps pushing the dramatic action to the edge of both of hope and 
despair. The word ‘state’, as a noun, in the title of Wallace's play is a multi-denotation sign. 
Simply, it can refer to a territory or a country. On the other hand, it can describe an exact 
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status at a particular time. Surprisingly, both meanings are possible, especially when 
considering the relationship between the title, as a threshold to the whole text, and specific 
vectors inside the play. Since the play deals with a conflict that is developing almost daily, 
it is not unusual to find traces of realistic happenings within A State of Innocence. The non-
textual contextual elements may be essential in the process of interpretation, particularly, 
because of the intrinsic connections between the play and specific socio-political 
circumstances. 
Working as the dominant element of the plot, this binary aspect of the title 
encapsulates the play, and it is, finally, what gives the play its tone of dialectical relation 
between two approaches: the real and the dream, dystopia and utopia, respectively. While 
the introductory stage directions suggest a minimum use of scenic elements, the verbal 
signs insist that we are in a zoo, or more specifically, in a zoo that has been destroyed. A 
zoo in Israel can be taken as a dramatic sign that stands for the whole country.  
However, it may be a kind of exaggerated interpretation unless more signs support 
this connotation. In his direct speech to audiences, Yuval, the 27-yearold Israeli soldier 
describes the place: ‘it's a small zoo, but it's got a big spirit’ (Wallace 2006, 103). This 
sentence has been connected to Israel since October 1948 when Chaim Weizmann, the first 
President of the State of Israel, said, ‘We are a small country, but a big people’ (qtd. in 
Time, web). After 56 years, Julie Burchill, a British journalist, chose similar words as a title 
of her promotional article: ‘Israel: small country, big impression’ (Burchill 4-5). This 
metaphor of the zoo/Israel is emphasised several times through the play. Yuval tells Um 
Hisham that he does not discriminate, and everyone is welcome to his tiny zoo provided 
that they are not threatening: ‘the one who comes to kill us, we shall rise early and kill him’ 
(Wallace 2006, 104). Yuval here paraphrases one of the Jewish religious principles, which 
is derived from the Old Testament: 
 
The Torah determines that a home-owner may kill a thief who is 
breaking into his property at night (Exodus 22:1) and Rava 
concluded from this that "If somebody comes to kill you, rise early 
and kill him first" (Sanhedrin 72a). In other words, if someone 
approaches an individual with the intention of killing him, that 
person is permitted to kill the attacker as an act of self-defense. 
(Golinkin, web) 
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In addition to setting up a fundamental tension along religious/doctrinal lines, Yuval uses 
the pronouns ‘us’ and ‘I’ instead of ‘you’ in the religious text, thereby assuming the role of 
the entire Jewish people who live in Israel. Without losing his uniqueness as a dramatic 
character, Yuval, as a member of a specific group, can signify his people. This process of 
representation, albeit a sort of reification, enables the audience to perceive the different 
levels of meaning. Subsequently, these intersecting significations reveal the connections 
between the dramatic text and the external social, political, and historical contexts.   
Similarly, when Yuval accuses Um Hisham of the ultimate hatred that she needs to 
get rid of him, his words extend beyond an argument between two individuals to a 
representation of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, especially when he uses one of the most 
infamous quotes in the long history of the war of words between the two sides:  
 
Yuval: You want to throw me in the sea. 
Um Hisham: I just might. But I can’t get on the sea. Seventeen and 
half checkpoints keep me from it.   
(Wallace 2006, 104)  
 
Um Hisham does not deny Yuval's accusation, and when she mentions the Israeli 
checkpoints, Wallace cleverly directs our attention to the essence of the enigma that creates 
the vicious circle of violence: do the Israeli measures really protect them from Palestinian 
anger? Or does the exaggerated Israeli violence of collective punishment provoke the 
desperately tough response of the Palestinians? It is easily understood that politicians may 
use this kind of fierce statement, especially in times of war or conflict, and it is not hard to 
find similar examples in which we may find more brutal words. However, being addressed 
to Israel makes it different, mainly because Jews have just suffered from the genocide that 
was committed by the Nazis. This alleged desire of throwing Israeli people into the sea 
implies a racial extermination, as if there is a threat of new Holocaust, this time by Arabs. 
Here, the play refers indirectly to the Jews’ inherited fears from the long history of 
suffering and migration. These fears may explain, but do not justify, the Israeli violence 
against Palestinians.  
One of the most striking signs in the play is the porcupine. It is obvious that it has 
special treatment from Yuval, which can be explained inside the frame of the image of the 
Israeli people who are surrounded by hostility, especially when seeing it in the light of 
social and historical signs. Alongside the zoo/country metaphor, there is another metaphor 
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of porcupine/Israel, which intersects with the main metaphor of the zoo/Israel and 
emphasises it. In April 2007, the United States' Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
disclosed more than a thousand pages of what were previously secret documents. In his 
reading of these documents, the Israeli writer Amir Oren cites a discussion dated 23 May 
1967 when Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, tried to explain the reasons for Israeli fears 
from Arab countries. According to Israeli foreign minister Golda Meir: 
 
You see, Israel is in a very, very difficult geographic position, and 
Mrs. Meir's comment to you in that conversation is relevant here. 
They are surrounded by Arab states who declare periodically or 
publicly their hostility towards Israel. They have not got much 
wriggle room in there. Therefore, they feel that they have got to 
bristle like a porcupine to fend off these neighbors if anything ever 
starts. (Oren, web) 
 
Wallace creates the appropriate context that makes Um Hisham show her kindness to 
Yuval, who studied philosophy and keeps citing philosophers, repeating Platonic utopian 
thoughts in particular: ‘He whom love touches not, walks in darkness’ (Wallace 2006, 103). 
Even animals are treated by Yuval as if they are human beings, as he gives them human 
names and talks to them: he humanises the animals and expects them to act according to his 
imagination.  He is a dreamer of a utopian world where love becomes the dominant feeling: 
 
Yuval: If there were only some way of contriving that a state or an 
army should be made up of lovers, they would be the very best 
governors of their own city. (Wallace 2006, 109)   
 
Wallace’s portrayal of Yuval as an amateur philosopher with utopian solutions to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict simultaneously critiques the inadequacies of simple humanist 
politics that ignore the complicated nature of the conflict, and exposes the reasonable 
longings of the populace to escape the daily agonies of war.  
Here, Yuval's dream of ending the conflict is a kind of avoidance. Noticeably, a 
state of lovers is a state of innocence. But if the word ‘state’ in the title really means the 
country, does the play suggest, or rather dream of, a homogeneous country, where the daily 
contact between Israeli and Palestinian people reflects their acceptance of each other? A 
country, where, eventually, the state of innocence means a society of peace? Oz describes a 
specific type of political theatre which includes a prophecy: 
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[T]he state structures its citizens, and since these are never 
completely obtainable, integrity requires the constant 
acknowledgement of lack, [which] is expressed through the 
fictional prophecy, never totally fulfilled, but its existence as a 
prophecy which aims at its fulfilment on the experiential level of 
the theatrical show is totally concrete, and may even, surprisingly, 
please, through a kind of cathartic pleasure. (Oz 29-30) 
 
It is vital to remember that the establishment of Israel was itself based on a utopian thought 
for Jews. This explains why Shlomo, the Israeli architect in the play, mentions Altneuland, 
Herzl's novel, which is essentially a literary utopia (Wallace 2006, 107). But, the actual 
bloody conflict, whether in the play or in the real world is extremely far from any utopian 
dream. Miserably, it is nearly a dystopia, where all the dreams have become daily 
nightmares.  
Is Israel, where the dramatic incidents take place, the country of innocence? Or is it 
the tolerance of two characters, a Palestinian mother and an Israeli soldier, that creates the 
state of exceptional innocence? Not before the last moment of the play can these questions 
be fully explored, though there are no decisive answers. In contrast to Yuval’s utopian 
dream, the play insists on revealing the rooted hatred between both sides. For instance, the 
play exposes the stereotyped image of Palestinians at different points: 
 
Yuval: We’re always under attack. I’m not afraid of you. Are you a 
terrorist? 
Um Hisham: Palestinorist. Terrestinian. Palerrorist. I was born in 
the country of Terrorist. I commit terrible acts of Palestinianism [...] 
Yuval: (Interrupts.) Don’t get playful with me. You want to throw 
me in the sea.  
(Wallace 2006, 104) 
 
It is utterly senseless of Yuval to ask this question, as if he is expecting Um Hisham to 
confess: ‘Yes, I am’. Or, to deny: ‘No, I am not’. So Um Hisham, who is aware of the 
futility of answering this idiotic interrogation, plays with words to reveal the unjust 
accusation of terrorism for being Palestinian.  
By mixing her nationality with the detestable charge she makes up the new identity: 
'Palestinorist', who, logically, should perpetrate the crime of 'Palestinianism'. But Um 
Hisham takes the device of word play further by innovating ‘Terrestinian’, which, similar 
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to 'Palestinorist', can be considered as another variation compounding both ‘Palestinian’ 
and ‘terrorist’. Additionally, 'Terrestinian' may be the result of blending 'Palestinian' and 
'terrestrial'. Thus, Um Hisham indirectly hints at the contrast between Palestinians who 
inhabited the land as opposed to Israelis who came from the sea.  
This implicit meaning may refer to Wallace’s belief in the Palestinian right to the 
land, compared to the Israelis who came from the sea, and that explains Yuval's reply. In 
this scene, Wallace suggests that offensive and degrading charges are part of the Israeli 
propagandist machine. Although Yuval sometimes tends to see Palestinians according to 
this systematic official myth, neither he nor his colleagues are totally convinced that it is 
true:  
 
Yuval: Do you really think that I believe that the Palestinian is a— 
Um Hisham: —land-grabbing trickster with a head full of gasoline-
soaked rags, feeding off— 
Yuval:—the pure, steamed and distilled— 
Um Hisham/Yuval: —hatred of Jews? 
Um Hisham: Do you believe it, Yuval? Do your friends believe it? 
Yuval: Sometimes. Some of them. It’s what we eat. 
(Wallace 2006, 109 - 10) 
 
Here, Yuval perhaps, seems disloyal as he refuses the essential motive of a soldier in the 
Israeli Defence Army; nevertheless, he is not a traitor. Although he keeps obeying the rules 
and acts as a proper patriot, his personality seems to be against any kind of violence. After 
short elusiveness, he confesses: ‘You’re right. I never wanted to be a soldier’ (Wallace 
2006, 110). Sadly, his kindness may be the reason for his death when he chooses to 
counteract the wild behaviour of his compatriots. This is the first step in his destiny as a 
dead soldier living in the imagination of Um Hisham where he works as a zoo keeper.  
Absent characters are employed as a justification for the narrative process which is 
undertaken by Um Hisham. While the factual event of the destruction of the zoo is revealed 
through the dialogue between her and Yuval, Um Hisham is the only person who knows 
everything about his death, and, through her telling of the story, Yuval starts to recall the 
situation that led to his tragic end. Um Hisham’s husband, who is a physically absent 
character, is portrayed as a victim of Israeli soldiers' violence. Although they had not found 
any weapons in his house, they punish him for no reason except their feeling of boredom: 
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Your friends were bored so they began to beat my husband. He was 
on the ground. They kicked him in the chest seven times […] But 
then you stopped them. Why did you stop them? (Wallace, 2006 
112)  
 
It took a relatively long time for Yuval to interfere with his comrades’ unprovoked 
violence. This delay reveals the difficulty that he would suffer in risking his image in the 
eyes of his colleagues when he shows his sympathy to a Palestinian man. It is hard to 
contradict your people, and it is harder if you do so in front of your enemy.  
Whereas Um Hisham’s question might reflect her astonishment at Yuval’s kind 
reaction, it is suggestively full of blame, as if she says: ‘I wish you did not intervene to 
rescue my husband from your colleagues' violence’. Simultaneously, she blames herself for 
expressing gratitude for Yuval's behaviour by giving him a cup of tea, which he was 
drinking when he was shot. Then, she found herself suddenly embroiled in the murder of an 
Israeli soldier. Her remorse reveals the brutal reality of the dystopian state where any single 
kind gesture may be rewarded by a similar response, or, surprisingly lead to disastrous 
consequences: a chain of unjust punishments for uncommitted crimes. Um Hisham’s 
paradoxical situation rests on the simple fact that the Palestinian sniper is a kind of 
emancipator whom she has to praise.  
However, Um Hisham acts as if she is harmed by his effort. It seems that she is 
against the killing of Yuval not only because of his kindness, but also because it can cause 
more trouble. Among the contradictory feelings which she experiences, neither the 
sympathy with a merciful Israeli soldier, the anxiety for an imprisoned husband, or the 
grievous homelessness after the demolition of her house can equal losing her own daughter. 
Asma's death may be a relatively old incident, but the bereavement is still so alive that 
sorrow will perhaps be the most constant feeling through the rest of Um Hisham’s life. 
What keeps exacerbating her distress is the fact that she was not able to hold her daughter 
while dying. Asma was alone, except for pigeons, and all that Um Hisham can do is 
reimagining her daughter’s last moments.  
Likewise in Wallace’s The Retreating World, pigeons are victims again. This time 
pigeons are just numbers on the killing list. Pigeons, together with tea, are the signs of 
peace and friendship. In the face of the conflict between their different peoples, there is a 
kind of resemblance between Asma and Yuval. First and foremost, both were murdered 
while they were peacefully relaxed and neither was able to feel the mother's passion at the 
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moment of dying. Moreover, each had a kind of obsession: Asma's fondness of counting, 
nearly matches Yuval's propensity to repeat philosophical quotes. Furthermore, both of 
them were killed for the sake of political goals supported by religious motivations. Here, it 
seems that Wallace’s point of view, which accuses Israel of exaggerated use of power 
against unequal victims, also encompasses consideration of the Israeli victims. Of course, 
Um Hisham was disturbed by the death of this kind soldier, but it is impossible for her to 
consider him as the equivalent of her daughter. Visibly, nothing can equal the enormity of 
losing Asma, even the appreciation of Yuval’s behaviour. In addition, Um Hisham is a 
member of the large proportion of Palestinian population who has suffered from a long 
history of conflict and thus she has accumulated inherited hatred: 
 
Everything I have despised, for decades–the uniform, the power, the 
brutality, the inhumanity–and I held it in my arms. I held you, 
Yuval, and God forgive me I held you as I would have held my own 
child. (Wallace 2006, 112) 
 
In this respect, A State of Innocence can be this unique situation which includes the Israeli 
soldier Yuval and the Palestinian mother Um Hisham as just two individuals, whose 
exchanged kindness reflects humanness as an exceptional behaviour in such a fierce 
environment. These two exceptional states of tolerance can be seen in figure (8):  
 
Figure (8)  
Exceptional tolerance 
 
Amazingly, the resemblance between these tolerant individuals occurs apparently 
where each of them acts against his/her own people’s history of hatred. Here, the play’s 
The Rule: 
Hatred/ 
Denial/  
Conflict/ 
Revenge/ 
A single Palestinian case (state) of tolerance 
Um Hisham 
X 
      Palestinian 
         people 
 
Yuval 
   A single Israeli case (state) of tolerance 
    The Exception: 
   Tolerance/ 
   Mercifulness/ 
   Acceptance/ 
   Appreciation/ 
   Forgiveness 
 
      Israeli people 
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message is obvious: tolerance is possible. However, it is still an exceptional choice, not 
only because it is difficult for others to repeat it in this environment, but also because both 
of them, Um Hisham and Yuval, would have never done the same thing if they had another 
chance to choose their destiny. It is not unusual for this Palestinian lady to be described as 
unpatriotic by one or more of the Palestinian snipers. Similarly, Yuval’s act is likely to be 
seen as a weakness, which is a shameful trait for any soldier.  
If I consider the fact that Um Hisham’s name in Arabic means ‘the mother of 
Hisham’,162 the latter is supposed to be Asma’s brother. However, as one of the several 
narrative gaps, neither the play nor the real incident has any mention of him. So, we should 
regard him as one of the absent characters. Hisham may be a victim of an Israeli action, 
imprisoned like his father or killed like his sister. However, irrespective of how he lost his 
life, his absence should make his mother’s loss of Asma more grievous. 
 Wallace uses the character of Shlomo to insist on revealing the ugly nature of the 
conflict which is shared by Um Hisham. Shlomo, unlike Yuval, is a radical and elegant 
Israeli architect who believes that building more settlements is the only proper and sacred 
action to strengthen Israel. He keeps repeating the phrase: ‘Homa Umigdal’ (Wallace 2006, 
106), which is the English translation of a Hebrew term that means ‘Tower and Wall’. 
Rabinowitz explains: 
 
the name given to Zionist settlement operations that took place in 
the late 1930s, primarily in Galilee [...] The operation had 
prefabricated huts, watchtowers and fences erected literally 
overnight to enclose residential compounds of new kibbutzim. 
(Rabinowitz 835) 
 
This operation reflected the early attempts by Israel to use settlements as a subterfuge to 
expand its existence on Palestinian land. Unfortunately, it was not the last time: 
 
The operation was meant to secure the hold of Jews in areas where 
their claim to sovereignty was in question [...] More than sixty years 
later (March 1997), when the Likud government wanted to ensure 
Israeli control over the areas surrounding Jerusalem prior to any 
                                                 
162 In most Arab countries, an uneducated housewife of the low social classes is usually named by referring to 
her elder son. It is mainly because of a ridiculous thought that any man should be embarrassed when his 
mother's name, or wife's, is uttered. Stunningly, this unique phenomenon of degrading the woman was rooted 
in the old Arab traditions, but was strictly prohibited by Islam. 
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further implementation of the Oslo agreement, it accepted a plan to 
swiftly build a neighborhood [sic] on Har Homa (Wall Mountain). 
In both cases, the expansion strategy generated a profound crisis in 
the relations between Jews and Arabs. (Chowers 675) 
 
Although he looks just as old as Um Hisham (they are in their fifties), Shlomo claims that 
he is 96-years old; besides, he used to eat the remains of demolished Palestinian houses. It 
is not so strange that he insists on recalling this old term of ‘Homa Umigdal’:  
 
Shlomo: I do not eat anymore. I will be 96 years old in November. 
Yuval:           What? You look barely 40. 
Um Hisham:  The lies of an Israeli architect! 
Shlomo:      I assure you I am indeed that old. I bathe in the Dead 
Sea. Each time I give it some of my dying.  
(Wallace 2006, 107) 
 
With this use of word play, Shlomo’s illogical explanation looks like a speech in a play of 
the theatre of the absurd, such as we can find in Eugene Ionesco’s Maid to Marry:  
 
Gentleman: How old is she? 
Lady:          Ninety-three! 
Gentleman: She’s passed her majority then? 
Lady:         No. She owes us eighty years, so that makes her only 
thirteen. (Ionesco 159)  
 
Shlomo enters with an authoritative, bragging attitude. However, he gradually loses his 
domination and becomes so obedient that he leaves the zoo even though he wants to stay 
longer: 
 
Um Hisham: Leave us, Shlomo. 
Shlomo:        I would like to stay a little while. 
Um Hisham: Not now. Your ruins are missing you. Go. [...]  Come 
and see me again tomorrow. You know I always expect you. 
(Shlomo nods, then says some quiet words to her in Arabic: “And I 
will always expect you, Um Hisham. Let us go with God.” Then he 
leaves.) (Wallace 2006, 111) 
 
 Shlomo, like Um Hisham, speaks the language of his enemy. Both are aware of the history 
of the conflict, and expect it to continue; surprisingly, both once slapped Yuval. In addition, 
he teases Yuval because of his origin:  ‘Nothing more sacred. Mother and son. Like the 
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land and the settler—though the ones from Brooklyn ... don’t get me started!’ (Wallace 
2006, 105).  This vague contempt may reflect his awareness of the fact that neither Yuval 
nor his mother is comfortable with their life in Israel; as he tells Um Hisham, his mother 
‘doesn’t like the zoo’ (Wallace 2006, 104). It seems that Wallace, again, refers to the 
heterogeneous nature of Israeli people as they come from different backgrounds. Here, 
Shlomo with his socialist background may think that he is more suitable as a member of 
Israeli society than Yuval’s family. Generally, Shlomo, with his grotesque nature, enables 
the play to escape the trap of emotional overstatement which Wallace was keen to avoid.  
In addition to surrealistic and grotesque elements that tend sometimes to 
characterise the theatre of the absurd, Wallace uses Brechtian techniques to avoid the 
exaggeration of emotional expression. As John Willett argues: 
 
Brecht wanted it set out economically, with a minimum expenditure 
of words, temperament and other resources (orchestral scoring, 
stage set). This economy, like the intelligibility and ease of 
execution that went with it [...] was partly a reaction against the 
verbal and emotional wastefulness of Expressionism and the 
inflated egos that went with it. (Willett 225) 
 
Wallace interrupts this sentimentality when Um Hisham slaps Yuval. Even at the end of the 
play, the accompanying song is a crucial element in destroying this exaggerated sympathy. 
Firstly, it is uttered in Arabic, which creates a kind of alienation for the Western audience. 
Secondly, in addition to the ambiguity of the words, Wallace’s stage direction states that 
‘Her voice is strong and echoes across the zoo’ (Wallace 2006, 113). 
Brechtian traces in the play extend beyond some apparent features like Yuval's 
direct speech to the audience at the beginning of the play. Wallace presents a profound 
dialectic between notions of innocence and guilt where there is no ‘pure innocence’ or 
‘complete guilt’ in the world of adult enemies. Yuval's innocent gesture of preventing his 
fellow Israeli soldiers from harming Um Hisham’s husband is contaminated by his guilt at 
breaking into their house. Moreover, he cannot forget his crime of using his tank to kill the 
animals. The latter may explain his endless suffering from the animals’ cries while he is 
haunted by visions of losing and retrieving parts of their bodies every night. Similarly, Um 
Hisham’s innocent act of holding him as a mother is confused, not only by her conscious 
feeling of guilt as she contradicts her peoples’ heritage, but also by her unconscious guilt 
about her daughter dying alone. In spite of her occasional use of poetic language, Wallace 
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does not portray the innocent acts in an emotionally charged manner. She challenges them 
by contrary actions or opposite speech. Um Hisham slaps Yuval just before an imaginary 
conjuring up of the moments of his death.  
Even her act of singing, which may be seem like a kind of lamentation, is alienated 
by her strong voice and by the distancing that results from her Arabic language. Although 
Wallace chooses this merciful act to end the play, it is hard to ignore the visual fact of 
Yuval's death and Um Hisham's grief for her daughter while there is no evidence that the 
unknown snipers from the two sides may retreat. The dialectic between innocence and guilt 
that is explored through the characters, together with the dreamlike structure of the play, 
works to elicit sympathy for the victims from both sides of the conflict.  
The play portrays Um Hisham as a modernised woman who can challenge Yuval in 
terms of Western music: ‘Yuval screams a couple lines of rock and roll, but just the tune, 
not words. Then quits abruptly and stares at Um Hisham. Suddenly she does the rock and 
roll line back to him, but even better. Then she stares back’ (Wallace 2006, 108). In 
addition, she is more aware of Jewish history than Yuval. For instance, she knows the 
origin of the name of his country’s capital, Tel Aviv, and she speaks and understands 
Hebrew while he cannot understand Arabic language. Not only has she read Hertzel's 
novel, but she is also aware of the date of its publication. What is more, there is no 
hesitation in her voice when she evaluates it in front of two Jewish people. On one hand, 
this image is far from the vast majority of Palestinian housewives. On the other hand, 
Wallace may suggest that the weaker side in terms of military power can be the better on 
the grounds of knowledge and culture. Moreover, she sympathise with Yuval’s mother: 
 
Um Hisham: … I have thought of sending your mother a bouquet 
but I am too angry and I hate the smell of flowers. So just tell your 
mother I think of her. I don’t want to, but I do.  
(Wallace 2006, 112) 
 
Finally, it can be said that Wallace’s A State of Innocence, although it depends on two 
factual events, tries to produce a kind of fair dramatic comment on the entire Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. This balanced point of view chooses to support the Palestinian side 
while considering the agony of the victims on both sides. When Um Hisham informs Yuval 
of his earlier death, he overcomes his denial rapidly to ask her to sing her song again. He 
needs to recall his last three minutes; this is a pragmatic, wise demand that suits a dead man 
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who needs to get rid of his loneliness by fixing these moments of sympathy in time. He 
wishes he could live them forever. Thus, the play's vision of tolerance at the end is clear: it 
is possible for people to be tolerant, even with those hated as the historical and constant 
enemy. It is possible that hatred can be temporally forgotten in such a distinguishing 
moment.  
When violence claims triumph over life, it is the time to support hope at least by 
sympathy. Therefore, despite her verbal refusal to sing the song again, Um Hisham 
eventually acts against all her established beliefs. As if they were sharing a ritual action, 
Um Hisham and Yuval repeat the retrieved situation of his death. Although the text does 
not mention the nature of Um Hisham's song that accompanies this situation, it can be 
conceived appropriately as a kind of lamentation, or perhaps a lullaby. When Yuval puts his 
head in Um Hisham’s lap, he seems to consider this song, although it is uttered in Arabic, 
as an aspect of universal motherhood that may replace, at least partly, his absent real 
mother. By showing her merciful response toward Yuval, Um Hisham tries to resurrect her 
daughter's last moments as an alternative consolation to her interrupted grief which may be 
reached by transforming her impossible desire to embrace her dying daughter into an 
imitative action of caring for another mother's son in the last three minutes of his life. With 
this emotional ending, Wallace manages to give a somewhat optimistic view with the hope 
of tolerance extending beyond two individuals to become the dominant mood of the entire 
country.  
However, with this high price, it is hard to say that many individuals will be ready 
to try the same route. While critiquing the brutality of the Israeli regime, Wallace is thus 
able to show the human consequences of the war as well as the paradoxes and 
contradictions it encompasses. When Wallace republished the play in 2009, she made 
alterations to the 2006 version; one of these was making Um Hisham wear a head scarf. I 
directly relate this visual sign to the increase of the religious aspect of the conflict as part of 
the War on Terror, especially as when she wears her scarf, the stage directions read, Um 
Hisham becomes ‘ready for the vision to begin’ (Wallace 2009, 7).  When I asked the 
playwright, she gave me a different reason for such a change. Wallace declares:  
 
As far as my further research revealed, Um Hisham, in Gaza, would 
most likely wear a scarf on her head.  [...] I was thinking more to 
honor [sic] the reality of women in Gaza, and how they dress. […] 
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We Westerners have many blind-spots we have to break through in 
writing about these subjects. (Wallace 2013, e-mail) 
 
The most striking alteration in the new version is the finale where Um Hisham is more 
reluctant to express her tolerance, especially in terms of physical contact with Yuval 
(Wallace 2009, 24). I asked if she realised that Um Hisham’s behaviour in the 2006 version 
was too idealistic to come from a mother who had lost her daughter to Yuval's army, 
Wallace answers:  
 
Yes, it was too idealistic to have physical contact.  But more so, it 
was sentimental.  I critique myself here. […] However, it’s not too 
sentimental just because Um Hisham has lost her daughter, but 
because of the whole illegal Occupation. That Um Hisham even 
converses with Yuval is enough.  That she says 'no' to singing the 
song again at the end is a resistance to all the conditions of the 
occupation, and refusal to 'follow orders'.  And yet her humanity 
allows her to 'glance back' and sing the song again, but on her own 
terms. (Wallace 2013, e-mail) 
 
The new finale may be more realistic. However, it is upsetting to see tolerance fade, even—
or perhaps especially—within a play, where dreams of a better world are more likely to 
survive. It seems that the bloody events of the conflict during January 2009 have provoked 
Wallace to change her play. On these events, Caryl Churchill’s Seven Jewish Children: A 
Play for Gaza comments. 
 
Seven Jewish Children: anti-Semitic or pro-victims? 
Churchill’s play responds to the Israeli raid on Gaza in December and January 2009 
and it can be considered one of the most controversial plays in contemporary British 
theatre. Moreover, Seven Jewish Children urged another playwright to write his dramatic 
response to it after only a few months of its debut, as did the British writer and actor 
Richard Stirling with Seven Other Children: A Theatrical Response to Seven Jewish 
Children in May 2009.  
For a political play written at the peak of the event on which it comments, 
Churchill’s call for donating to Gaza makes the performance itself look like a component of 
a greater political act of supporting Gaza and not just a dramatic reflection on its disaster. 
Susannah Clapp states: 
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You don't have to pay for a seat for Seven Jewish Children, though 
there's a bucket person at the door collecting for Medical Aid for 
Palestinians. Even so, it's remarkable how many people, on the 
sleetiest day of a grim winter, trekked into the Royal Court for 10 
minutes'-worth of Caryl Churchill's words. (Clapp, 17) 
 
When Aleks Sierz defines the features of a controversial play, it seems that he was 
describing Seven Jewish Children. He argues that: 
 
It needs to touch raw nerves. Often, although the audience's feeling 
of discomfort and outrage are real enough, the form that 
controversy takes is itself a performance: walkouts, letters to the 
press, leader articles denouncing 'waste of public money', calls for 
bans or cuts in funding, mocking cartoons, questions in parliament, 
or even prosecution on charges of obscenity or blasphemy. (Sierz 5) 
 
Although Churchill has rarely been included among the writers of In-yer-face, Dan 
Rebellato mentions ‘that writers like Brenton, Griffiths, Churchill and Daniels sometimes 
used aggressive effects in their work.’ (Rebellato 193). Actually, there is no trace of 
physical violence in Seven Jewish Children unless we consider the kind of linguistic 
brutality that occurs in its final scene, especially the last speech. Here, while one of the 
Jewish parents is supposed to comment on Gaza’s disaster, he unleashes his hatred with no 
space for guilt, shame, or even worry about his, or her child’s morality or feelings. It is a 
shocking experience to read these words in a dramatic text or listen to them in a live 
performance: 
 
Tell her about the family of dead girls, tell her their names why not, 
tell her the whole world knows why shouldn’t she know? … Tell 
her we’re the iron fist now… tell her we won’t stop killing them till 
we’re safe, tell her I laughed when I saw the dead policemen … tell 
her I wouldn’t care if we wiped them out, the world would hate us 
is the only thing, tell her I don’t care if the world hates us, tell her 
we’re better haters, tell her we’re chosen people, tell her I look at 
one of their children covered in blood and what do I feel? tell her all 
I feel is happy it’s not her. (Churchill  6) 
 
Do we have to watch those dead bodies on stage to feel brutality? Most probably, the 
answer is no.  
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It was not surprising that this final speech, along with the title of the play, were the 
most provocative evidence that proved Churchill’s partiality according to several critics. 
The criticism of the play, though, was not limited to theatrical reviews. A fierce debate 
extended beyond theatre reviews to political and historical discussions, in which both 
Churchill and her play were the targets of attack, As Tim Walker declares: 
 
Caryl Churchill has been accused of being "anti-Israel" by The 
Board of Deputies of British Jews, which was invited to provide 
input for her play Seven Jewish Children at the Royal Court 
Theatre, London. "We knew the play was going to be horrifically 
anti-Israel because Caryl Churchill is a patron of the Palestine 
Solidarity Campaign," says Mark Frazier, the organisation's 
spokesman. "This is an anti-Semitic play," claims The Jewish 
Chronicle. "It is one of those occasions when the merits of a play 
are eclipsed by its politics." (Walker 8) 
 
Despite the mingling between the playwright and her work, the last passage contains 
another confusion that seems to be a common feature of the Israeli-Palestinian political 
discourse, from both sides.  
In her letter to The Independent, Churchill hints at this identity’s mingling as she 
argues that there is not anything ‘new about describing critics of Israel as anti-Semitic. But 
it’s the usual tactic. We are not going to agree about politics … But we should be able to 
disagree without accusations of anti-Semitism’ (Judd, 20). Some critics agree with 
Churchill’s argument such as Charlotte Higgins who claims: ‘The play did not strike me as 
antisemitic and I do not now believe it to be antisemitic [...] I cleave strongly to the view 
that it is possible to be critical of Israel without being antisemitic’ (Higgins, 25), but 
Churchill received more critique. Siobhain Butterworth states: 
 
Dave Rich and Mark Gardner joined critics who have deconstructed 
the play and characterised it as antisemitic. It is not for me to 
challenge this analysis and I accept that it is one possible 
interpretation. What I don't accept is the complainant's suggestion 
that it is the only possible reading. (Butterworth 29) 
 
Commenting on the debate caused by Churchill’s play, Mark Ravenhill defends the 
partiality of prominent writers in their political plays: 
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Great writers don't just produce goodies and baddies, though, 
however strongly they support one side of an argument. [...] Of 
course, having a strong point of view is no guarantee of great art. 
[...] But having a powerful, partial or even partisan slant is far more 
likely to end in a piece that, ultimately, everyone can appreciate - 
even if they view the world differently. So let's stop calling for 
balance: that way dullness lies. (Ravenhill, 24) 
 
 Despite his general and indirect appreciation of Churchill’s writing, Ravenhill avoids any 
analysis of Seven Jewish Children. The writer’s biased way of looking at or presenting 
something can be acceptable as long as he/she does not suggest any kind of discrimination 
on the basis of religion, race, or belief. Is this a truism as well? Perhaps, but the breaching 
of this latter rule was the way in which Churchill's play was interpreted by its opponents. 
Christopher Hart degrades the play by excluding it from the realm of art, as he claims:  
 
Seven Jewish Children isn’t art, it’s straitjacketed political 
orthodoxy. No surprises, no challenges, no risks. Only the enclosed, 
fetid, smug, self-congratulating and entirely irrelevant little world 
of contemporary political theatre. Fresh air is urgently needed. But 
I’m not holding my breath. Meanwhile, donating to Medical Aid for 
Palestinians seems a good idea. I just hope the supplies get through. 
Two weeks ago, the UN suspended all food aid to Gaza after 10 
lorryloads of supplies, 3,500 blankets and 400 food boxes were 
stolen at gunpoint. By Hamas. (Hart, 22) 
 
In spite of Hart’s reference to the uselessness of any kind of donations because, according 
to him, Hamas will steal them, I realise that a theatrical review does not ignore the 
inseparable relation between the play and the donation to Medical Aid for Palestinians. The 
awareness of this relationship was supposed to emphasise Churchill's message. 
Unfortunately, it distracted most of the critics as further evidence of partiality. Because the 
situation in Gaza was so disastrous that any effort except for succouring would be 
irrelevant, it is not surprising that Churchill’s appeal for donating to Gaza's children 
accompanied the debut of her play. That is why Seven Jewish Children avoids any kind of 
detailed exploration regarding the historical rights of the two sides. The play acts like a cry 
for help rather than a judicial investigation.    
It is hard to claim that Churchill’s play was misunderstood just because of the 
confusion of the different aspects of identity, Israeli, Jewish, and Semitic. It is a mistake 
also to suggest that opponents of the play were totally biased against Palestinians, or pro-
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Israel. Neither the form of the play nor its intersected thoughts are as simple as they appear 
at the first reading, or watching. Starting from its elusive title to the shocking speech in its 
last scene, the play keeps weaving its complicated mixture of historical events, Gaza’s 
disaster, and the imaginary world that coherently includes all these inharmonious elements. 
Relatively, Churchill’s response to Gaza’s factual events was so swift that it may be 
anticipated to be not profound enough. However, Seven Jewish Children reflects the depth 
and creativity of her long career as a prominent playwright. It is important to mention that 
both supportive and critical comments on the play have created an increasing momentum. 
For instance, when the BBC decided not to broadcast the play it created an opportunity for 
attracting more interest in it.  
The officials at the BBC did not ban Churchill’s play in terms of dramatic values. In 
contrast, ‘Radio 4's drama commissioning editor Jeremy Howe said that he and Radio 4 
controller Mark Damazer thought Churchill's play was a "brilliant piece"’ (Dowell 2009, 9). 
However, the BBC backed out of broadcasting its radio production of the text, and 
confessed ‘that a significant factor in the decision was awareness of the controversy stirred 
by Seven Jewish Children during its theatre run’ (Dowell 2009, 9).  
If these fierce protests had prevented the play from being introduced to a wider 
audience through the BBC, this banning, alongside the continuous objections, has increased 
people's desire to watch it, or, at least, to read its text. The Royal Court Theatre has put a 
printable copy of the text on its site. Later, a video version of the play was produced by The 
Guardian and has been made available on line, with the possibility of sharing it through 
social networking websites such as Facebook and Twitter. Moreover, with the increasing 
number of productions in different languages, several videos of different performances can 
be watched and downloaded on a large number of video-hosting sites and blogs. 
Furthermore, every new production has brought more arguments. In addition to its status as 
a remarkably short play with minimal requirements for production. The unprecedented 
circulation of the play via new media technology makes it perfect in addressing those who 
are interested in the political issue whether or not they are theatregoers. Even those who 
have never watched a single play have the opportunity of reading, watching, and debating 
it. Actually, the more opposition the play faced, the greater attention it acquired.   
While Seven Jewish Children refers to the problematic topic of identifying the 
historical right to a land inhabited by ancient ancestors of Jews and Palestinians 
respectively, the play avoids assuming the authority of the judge. Alternatively, Churchill's 
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play considers the conflict as an inevitable clash between two groups that are compelled to 
share the same land since Jewish immigration, or return from Diaspora, to Palestine. 
Despite criticising Israel’s exaggerated use of power, the play does not ignore the 
responsibility of Hamas as an Islamic extremist group that commits the same sin of 
targeting civilians, even if the effect of the latter is tiny in comparison with the casualties of 
the former.  
By using the linear structure that adopts the developing narrative, the seven scenes 
of the play, albeit significantly condensed, attempt to introduce a comprehensive 
presentation of the most influential moments of the entire conflict in the frame of causality. 
This diachronic narrative enables the play to explore the increasing brutality of the conflict. 
Moreover, Churchill's play delivers this documentary-like discourse through a group of 
actors who change their roles in different scenes without neglecting their constant identity 
as Israeli parents. Therefore, these parents can be considered as the successive generations 
of Israeli people who may have different points of view, but share the same dilemma 
regarding informing their children about the conflict. Similarly, the absent Jewish children 
and Palestinian people are mentioned in general terms. In addition, the use of reported 
speech, repeated phrases, and linguistic manoeuvres is employed to prevent any emotional 
effect from confusing Churchill's analysis of the conflict.  
Although the play suggests that Israeli nation as a political project was established 
at the expense of Palestinian agony, the play portrays Jews as a religious group that 
suffered from racial discrimination. Not only in the first two scenes where the play reflects 
the catastrophe of the Holocaust and its aftermath, but also through the rest of the scenes. 
The play does not produce this Jewish historical anguish as a justification for the victim of 
Nazi aggression becoming the aggressor whose victim is the Palestinian people. Actually, 
the play refers several times to the world’s awareness of the disastrous conflict. As the title 
of Churchill's play suggests, Seven Jewish Children: A play for Gaza, reflects a balanced 
consideration of the victims from both sides. However, the play does not seek our futile 
sympathy. In contrast, it criticises the international community’s sympathy unless it is 
going to be translated into actions that may prevent humanity from reaching such a degree 
of brutality. Otherwise, this conflict is predicted to continue and its violence is likely to get 
worse.  
Unlike Wallace's play, Churchill's play adopts a linear structure. As a journey 
through time between two places, the play summarises the historical existence of Jews 
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between the Diaspora and their present life in Palestine. However, despite this linear 
structure, the storytelling process is undertaken by all the characters who act like a chorus. 
This epic use of the narrator who owns the authority to tell the story coincides with the 
play’s approach to challenging traditional notions of dramatic character by marginalising its 
individuality.  
Additionally, as with Crimp’s Advice to Iraqi Women, Churchill play gives any 
potential performance the ultimate right to choose the way in which the speeches can be 
shared out among the characters who may be played by any number of actors. It is 
important here to mention that this kind of abstraction can be traced in many previous 
theatrical traditions, especially Expressionism. Similarly, the use of the chorus in non-
classical plays can be traced in a huge number of plays, and not just in the Brechtian 
legacy, or the works of his disciples. But, in Seven Jewish Children it seems that there is a 
return to the primitive shape of the ancient chorus before the use of actors. Commenting on 
the specific features of Churchill’s political theatre Elaine Aston and Elin Diamond claim: 
‘For Churchill, dramatizing the political is not just a question of content, but also of form. 
With the renewal of form comes the renewal of the political: new forms and new socially 
and politically relevant questions’ (Aston 2). 
  Although there are some contradictory opinions in the text, these differences are 
not embodied in different personalities. Rather, they are different tones inside the same 
discourse. The narrator here is the chorus that consists of Jewish parents and relatives. On 
the other hand, the narratee is the Jewish child who is always absent. Indeed, the actual 
audience is the implied receiver to whom Churchill delivers each element of the play.  
In terms of the absent child, she is supposed to believe her parents – the reliable 
narrator– not only on the ground of their patriarchal authority, but also because she is not 
aware of their discrepant speeches. In contrast, the actual audience which hears the 
different facets of the story discovers the unreliability of the parents whose historical stories 
are filtered by the pragmatic factors. Spectators have the virtue of receiving the raw 
documentary material as if they are watching a documentary movie before the process of 
editing. The structure of the play, including the title, creates several controversial issues. 
While the title refers to ‘Jewish Children’, the play itself contains five scenes that primarily 
portray Israeli people with Zionist views. This textual fact should raise the question: what is 
the purpose of mentioning the Holocaust? And, more to the point is Seven Jewish Children 
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a play about the history of the Jews? Again, the subtitle of the play ‘A Play for Gaza’, 
contradicts this assumption because it refers to Gaza in a kind of implicit sympathy.  
Moreover, the image of Palestinians inside the play, although they are physically 
absent, emphasises Churchill’s consideration of Palestinian agony to the extent that can be 
described as partisan. It is hard also to think that a playwright like Churchill may use the 
first two scenes just as a kind of ingratiation to balance the overall image of Jews in the 
play. These first two scenes can be justified in the frame of Churchill’s dialectic focus on 
the notion of the victim and the aggressor. The result of her dialectics may seem to be 
limited to the simple exchange of roles: the Jewish people who were once the victims of the 
Nazis have become the aggressors whose victims are the Palestinian people.  
Out of seven scenes that compose the entire play, the first six scenes reflect the 
agony of those innocent children. Structurally, the first six scenes may be considered as an 
introductory background to the last scene which is dedicated to comment on the factual 
contemporaneous tension in Gaza between December 2008 and January 2009. It seems that 
Dominic Maxwell reaches the meaning of Churchill’s play when she claims that: 
 
Churchill is not just stating that victims can become aggressors. She 
shows people wrestling with whether to define themselves by their 
situation or by some broader notion of humanity.  Wrestling with 
what innocence means. [...] There are no heroes or villains, for all 
that Churchill decries what is happening in Gaza. There is just the 
constant colliding of the two big, mutually exclusive truths of our 
lives: we’re just like everybody else, and we’re nothing like 
anybody else. (Maxwell 16) 
 
It is a vicious circle of converting innocence to brutality. Some of the Jewish children who 
survived the Nazis became Israeli soldiers who used tanks to kill Palestinian children, and 
some of these Palestinian children have survived to become suicide bombers in Israeli 
cafes. In this respect, we can interpret the final speech in the last scene as uttered by an 
Israeli adult who was just a child when he escaped an explosion by a suicide bomber where 
he lost one or some of his family.  
Therefore, the continuity of the scenes is a crucial element in order to understand 
each single line in every scene. Every single child in each scene stands for tens of 
thousands of children. Despite being absent as children, they are figured as adults in the 
next scenes. Losing this sense of continuity and causality may damage the meaning of 
236 
 
Churchill's play as we can find in the Guardian video production of the text. Although old 
black-and-white photographs are utilised as interludes among different scenes, only one 
actress performs the whole play. In addition to her fixed gesture, she wears the same 
modern costume, and looks at the same point outside the frame of the scenes, which are 
taken from the same angle. Another defect of the Guardian's performance video is 
explained by Travis Bedard, a director who staged his own production of the play. He 
claims that: 
 
The problem lies in the fact that it is performed by only one person. 
This, he says, "does the piece and the discussion a disservice ... the 
balm to the outcry against the presumed antisemitism in the piece 
was to show the conflict in the unnamed and textually 
undifferentiated characters" but with only one voice there can be no 
debate and this "leaves the trendline towards Ms Churchill's 
conclusion as the ONLY point of the piece". (Wilkinson, web) 
 
In Bedard’s version, the speeches are distributed to different speakers in every scene. 
However, he has fixed a sitting woman as the constant addressee in the first six scenes 
before she bursts in the last scene to utter the notorious monologue.  
Perhaps Bedard’s performance has avoided the one-sided point of view, but it 
ignores the factor of multiple points of time. Rachel Shabi claims: 
 
The performance in Rabin Square featured a terror-stricken woman 
constantly rearranging a row of sacks around her baby's pram, in 
increasingly restrictive barricade formations. Around her, three 
actors debate, argue and advise on what to tell the child about the 
Holocaust, Israel, Palestinians and the war in Gaza. (Shabi 29) 
 
Although the absence of the baby in the scene may bring more sympathy, especially with 
the mother’s panicky movement, this Israeli performance, like Bedard’s, avoids the passage 
of time. When the addressor or the addressee is the same person, without any visual sign of 
time changing, the chronological historical nature of Churchill’s play is neglected. It is 
possible to conceive the main title of Churchill’s play as a preliminary indication of 
backing the Israeli operation, or, at least, justifying it on the basis of Israel's legitimate right 
to react, albeit toughly, to protect its people from Hamas' danger. 
In addition, the title uses the religious description ‘Jewish’ with its long history of 
suffering oppression, instead of the political word ‘Israeli’. This initial interpretation is 
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contradicted by the sub-title: ‘A Play for Gaza’. This complementary part of the title seems 
to be a kind of author’s dedication, and it is obvious that it is not a play about Gaza, it is for 
it. As long as Gaza, the city and the people, are the victims of the military operation, this 
sub-title implies that the play may be sympathetic to Gaza.  
Regarding this title, with its two discrepant parts, a two-part question may be raised: 
Is it just an elusive artistic method that acts as a preventive defense against any probable 
accusation of bias? Or, on the contrary, does this title imply that the play is going to 
introduce an objective, balanced vision? The expectations that can be directed by the 
complete title should become more problematic after reading the very first sentence of the 
opening stage directions which insist that ‘No children appear in the play’ (Churchill 1). 
Does the play itself resolve this confusion by unveiling the reason for mentioning 
‘Seven Jewish Children’ who are not represented in a play dedicated to Gaza? In seven 
short parts, the play portrays seven different phases of Jewish history. Seven sequences 
involve different parents, perhaps relatives, who are talking about a different child. The 
main issue that pervades the entire play seems to be the simple common educative question: 
What must, and must not, our children know about real life? However, because the parents 
and the children are Jewish in some serious moments of existential danger, the simplicity of 
the educative question becomes the crucial matter for survival. Deliberately, neither the 
number of characters nor actors who will play these characters is fixed. Consequently, a 
single actor may portray different characters by moving from one to the other in the 
different parts of the performance.  
Moreover, there are no specific features to distinguish physical, psychological, or 
individual aspects of any character. Even the characters’ gender is vague, except for the 
children who, although absent, are girls; a different girl in every scene. This absent girl is as 
different as the parents are in every situation. This exclusiveness in terms of the child's 
gender is a functional choice on the basis of the situations’ purposeful succession. The 
sequence of situations are supposed to take place in different historical times and places, 
and a change of the child’s gender may lead to a mistaken conclusion that these events 
occur at the same time in different places. Being a girl, especially in the case of fear, is 
more able to elicit sympathy than a boy. In my first reading of the play, I recalled the diary 
of Anne Frank, the Jewish girl, who had to hide with her family from the Nazis, especially 
when she complains: ‘All the conflicts about our upbringing, about not pampering children, 
about the food – about everything, absolutely everything – might have taken a different turn 
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if we'd remained open and on friendly terms instead of always seeing the worst side’ (Frank 
171). 
Although the play is plainly so short that it may not last more than ten minutes on 
stage, this concentrated play tries to define the dominant factors of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. Starting before the establishment of Israel as a country/dream and ending at a point 
of what seems to be an endless and controversial conflict, the play reveals the paradoxical 
situation of any Israeli discourse that importunately seeks to persuade successive 
generations of a happy, peaceful, and legitimate dream, without neglecting the dangers of 
their intrinsically brutal enemy. 
Through the entire play, Churchill uses the repetition of words effectively. The 
excessive repetition of the encouraging phrase ‘tell her’ and the negatively warning one ‘do 
not tell her’ reflects the fanatical fears about the future that obsess those parents, and 
reveals their inherited anguishes from their past. Therefore, the cautious sentence: 'Don't 
frighten her' is repeated by different parents six times in the play. It is meaningful that this 
warning is the very last phrase said at the end of the play. Theatrically, these repeated 
words may act like the index that refers to, and emphasises the rest of the dialogue and 
gives it more significance. 
The first three parts happen outside Palestine, somewhere in one of the European 
countries invaded by the Nazis during World War II. While the first and second scenes can 
be construed as a representation of the Holocaust, the third is an introduction to the 
Palestinian era of Jewish modern history. The danger of being killed by invisible pursuers   
dominates the first scene where the parents try to make the situation as easy as possible by 
borrowing concepts from the realm of children’s imagination: 
Tell her it's a game …  
Tell her she’ll have cake if she’s good … 
Tell her it's a story…  
Tell her she can make them go away if she keeps still 
By magic. (Churchill 1)  
 
However, as happens through the entire play, the parents’ hopes of protecting the child by 
hiding hurtful facts are always contradicted by the necessity of making her safe from 
danger:  
Tell her it’s serious …  
Tell her it’s important to be quiet …  
Tell her to curl up as if she’s in bed 
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But not to sing 
Tell her something about the men 
Tell her they’re bad in the game … 
But not to sing. (Churchill 1) 
 
There is a conditional survival that is dependent upon silence and stillness. It is obvious 
here that the child, for security's sake, must abandon the most prominent aspects of 
children's behaviour: excessive movement and talk.  
Singing, specifically, is completely forbidden in this brutal dangerous world which 
may resemble the situation in Wallace’s A State of Innocence, where children’s singing was 
the Israeli soldier’s justification for destroying the zoo: 
 
Yuval:  gurgling is no longer permitted. There was gurgling coming 
from the Rafah zoo, day in, day out. Gurgle, gurgle, 
gurgle.  The children were gurgling. 
Um Hisham:    Not gurgling. Singing. 
Yuval:             Same thing. 
(Wallace 2006, 104) 
 
In both plays, the innocent expression of freedom and happiness is challenged by the rigid 
laws of the tough authority. While Jewish children are the victims in Churchill's play, it is 
the turn of Palestinian children to suffer in Wallace's.  
As part of her potent use of contradictions, Churchill embodies the ambiguous 
dangerous men through the parents' cautions where the discrepant aspects of utterances 
symbolise the elusive outside danger: 
 
Tell her not to come out even if she hears shouting … 
Tell her not to come out even if she hears nothing for a long time. 
(Churchill 1)  
 
It is clear that parents themselves are not safe. They have to hide from the same danger to 
not be hunted: ‘Tell her we’ll come and find her … Tell her we’ll be here all the time’ 
(Churchill 1). 
The second scene of the play depicts a family that survived after the Holocaust as 
the characters refer to some hurtful consequences by remembering their killed relatives. 
Through opposing sentences, Churchill exposes the paradoxical situation of Jewish adults 
who are keen to keep the roots of their own culture and religion alive inside their child 
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without hurting her innocence, by pushing her to recognise that she is different from other 
children on the basis of religion: 
 
Tell her this is a photograph of her grandmother, her uncles and me 
Tell her her uncles died 
Don’t tell her they were killed […] 
Tell her there were people who hated Jews […] 
Tell her there are still people who hate Jews 
Tell her there are people who love Jews 
Don’t tell her to think Jews or not Jews 
Tell her more when she’s older 
Tell her how many when she’s older. (Churchill 1-2) 
 
As a matter of protecting her sensitive feelings, this child, according to her parents must 
know nothing about people who hate her just because of her religion. But, as a matter of 
protecting her life, she must be aware, not only of the existence of this hatred, but also of its 
real dimensions.  
This is the only way to defend herself and her religion as well. Jerusalem is the last 
word to be pronounced by one of the parents in the third scene. In this part of the play, the 
parents try to prepare their child to accept the thought of immigration to Palestine. The 
discrepancy in this scene resides in the disputed blurred space of identity among religion, 
history, and politics. One of the mentioned privileges of the new country is that ‘…no one 
will tease her’ (Churchill 2009, 3). The play does not reveal whether this teasing was a kind 
of discrimination that the child has been suffering because of her religion, or it was just 
normal, as those things happen between children. 
The sixth scene is the longest one in the play because it portrays the everyday 
suffering of constant contact between the new settlers and the Palestinian residents. 
Whether the Jewish parents choose to inform their child of these issues or not, the whole 
scene reveals the suffering of Palestinian people by Israeli army and Israeli civilians. The 
parents’ speeches always portray an image of Palestinians as violent people who are not 
able to be discussed. In other words, they are not able to share any negotiations with them:  
 
Tell her, tell her they set off bombs in cafés […] 
Tell her they want to drive us into the sea  […] 
Tell her they don’t understand anything except violence. (Churchill 
2009, 4 - 5) 
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Contrarily, and despite all the Palestinian daily misery, the parents seek to persuade the 
child that Israelis are completely peaceful. Ironically, their own words destroy this claim: 
  
 Don’t tell her anything she doesn’t ask […] 
Don’t tell her anything. […] 
Tell her we kill far more of them […] 
Tell her we’re stronger 
Tell her we’re entitled. (Churchill 2009, 4 - 5) 
 
The most remarkable feature of the sixth scene is the incongruity between verbal claims 
and real actions. Churchill uses this verbal-action contradiction to scorn the Israeli parents’ 
fake declarations of peace: 
 
Tell her we want peace 
Tell her we’re going swimming.  
 (Churchill 2009, 5) 
 
As Israeli swimming pools are causing the death of Palestinian crops because of the lack of 
water, the insistence on going swimming contradicts the will to peace. 
The seventh and final scene is an extension of the previous, not only in terms of 
referring to the current moment of the conflict but also because of the constant increase in 
the tone of hatred. New tough words are added to the description of Palestinians: ‘terrorists 
… filth … animals living in rubble’ (Churchill 2009, 5-6). Churchill’s play refers to the 
apparent discrepancy of powers: 
 
Tell her they’re attacking with rockets […] 
Tell her only a few of us have been killed […] 
Don’t tell her how many of them have been killed 
Tell her the Hamas fighters have been killed […] 
Don’t tell her about the family of dead girls 
Tell her you can’t believe what you see on television 
Tell her we killed the babies by mistake 
Don’t tell her anything about the army. (Churchill 2009, 5 - 6) 
 
Churchill’s play shows that it is an unequal war whether in terms of military power or the 
number of civilian casualties, especially when bearing in mind the fact that Israeli existence 
in Gaza is an action of occupation. However, the parents’ false justifications and their 
continuous attempts to hide facts to prevent their child from recognising Israeli brutal 
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activities, restore some hope. As long as they feel that there is something wrong, it means 
that someday, maybe they can do something to stop it.  
Churchill's play selectively displays specific moments of Jewish history and 
contains what can be described as deliberate narrative gaps that avoid mentioning some 
historical events, while focusing on dramatic aspects such as portraying an absent character. 
Similarly, although Wallace's play reflects one major event of military violence that 
includes an occasional incident of tolerance between two individuals, the play brings the 
incident to the foreground, and uses the main event as a background. While Wallace’s play 
emphasises the distinction between documentary quotes and dramatic discourse, 
Churchill’s play intentionally hides the borders between documentary and dramatic aspects. 
However, regarding the real incidents A State of Innocence, just as Seven Jewish Children, 
mixes the imaginary elements with the factual incident. So, we cannot find a precise literal 
record of any real event inside the two plays, but rather, the playwrights’ interpretation of 
these events. 
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Conclusion 
In addition to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the disaster of 9/11 generated two 
phenomena in Western countries. Firstly, individual stances of discrimination against 
Muslims, Arabs, and even Jews were directly and temporally realised in the US and 
different European countries. However, due to official and public condemnations, such 
incidents of intolerance increasingly became remarkably rare. Secondly, and most 
importantly, the post-9/11 Western world has become more aware of the new challenge that 
faces the notion and practice of multicultural societies. This challenge is mainly motivated 
by the discrepancy between many rules of the Sharia Law and the values of secularity.  
The first phenomenon provoked many playwrights to express a situation of troubled 
minority whose members were denounced, because terroristic operations were committed 
by groups, which utilised hateful, albeit claimed to be religious, mottos. The vast majority 
of the writers of these dramatic texts, who live in Western countries, belong to Muslim or 
Arabic background. The Egyptian-American Yussef El Guindi’s Back of the Throat is a 
good example. However, playwrights from other ethnic groups such as Sikh and even Jews 
expressed similar feelings of unease or even fear resulted from scattered incidents of 
discrimination. Salam. Peace: An Anthology of Middle Eastern-American Drama, edited by 
Hill and Amin, can represent this type of plays. More authentic and increasingly becomes 
recognised by both secular and Christian Westerners, I argue that the second phenomenon 
will lead to writing massive literature, including dramatic texts. Richard Bean’s England 
People Very Nice (2009) is an example.  
Because of its large number of victims, the calamity of 9/11 is usually considered as 
the prelude to the so-called War on Terror. However, such a disaster was preceded by 
several attacks on American targets. These violent operations against the US before 9/11 
were planned and executed by both Arabic organisations and radical Islamic groups. The 
leaders of these groups always describe their operations as a direct response to specific 
harmful actions by the US or/and Israel.  
The growth of both nationalist and Islamist violent groups in Arabic and Muslim 
countries can be attributed to domestic circumstances as well as the competition between 
some of these countries over the political leadership of the region. The main aspects of this 
rivalry are, firstly, the so-called Saudi-Egyptian cold war, within which the Saudi project of 
pan-Islamism collided with Nasser’s call for pan-Arabism in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
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aftermath of this political confrontation was the alliance between the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Saudi Wahhabis. This alliance was the early sign of the multi-national 
Islamic terror materialised in al-Qaeda. Secondly, the Saudi-Iranian cold war reflected a 
dispute between the Sunni and Shii projects of pan-Islamism, which was an active factor in 
the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) and the Iranian-Iraqi War (1980–1988).  
All plays can indirectly and occasionally reflect on the dominant political structure 
of their playwrights’ societies at specific moments. Specifically, political theatre 
intentionally utilises textual and theatrical methods in order to express its opposition to a de 
facto situation. By addressing this situation, which was created by the dominant political 
power(s), political theatre insists on the need for change. While earlier propagandist drama, 
which was introduced by Erwin Piscator and improved by Bertolt Brecht in the twentieth 
century, insists on suggesting communism as an alternative to Capitalism, the lack of a 
political alternative is one of what distinguishes the enlightening goal of political theatre in 
the era of the New World Order. Political plays of the 2000s mainly act as the witness on 
the atrocities of many episodes of the War on Terror, rather than assuming the role of the 
ideological foe of the American-led Capitalist coalition(s).  
By commenting on different aspects of the three conflicts, contemporary British and 
American playwrights in the 2000s reveal the catastrophic consequences of the violent 
conflicts included in the War on Terror. This informative purpose seems to account for 
adopting forms of documentary theatre whose practice has a long history since initiated by 
Piscator and Brecht in the 1920s and revived by Peter Weiss and Heinar Kipphardt in the 
1960s. Apart from different historical contexts and theoretical bases of that political theatre 
in each period, the common feature of these three booms in Documentary Dram is that a 
cycle of apolitical-political theatre is repeated. Put differently, the rise of political theatre in 
the 1920s, the 1960s, and the 2000s were preceded by the so-called Late Expressionism 
after First World War, Theatre of the Absurd after Second World War, and Postdramatic 
and In-yer-face plays in the 1980s and the 1990s, respectively.  
Many British and American playwrights, such as Caryl Churchill, Trevor Griffiths, 
David Hare, Richard Bean, Simon Stephens, and Robin Soans, have shown their interest in 
the Muslim-related confrontations with the Anglo-American coalition by writing more than 
one play, whether to respond to the War on Terror in general, or to comment on events 
related to one or more of the three locations of conflict. For instance, the American 
playwright Naomi Wallace comments on the First Gulf War and the economic sanctions 
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that followed it, in In the Heart of America and The Retreating World, respectively. The 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the War in Afghanistan are correspondingly represented in A 
State of Innocence (2006) and No Such Cold Thing (2009). 
Regardless of the playwright’s style of writing and whatever the aspect of the war 
he/she chooses to dramatise, the common feature of the vast majority of American and 
British representations of the war in Iraq is the inclusion of Western characters’ speeches 
that depict the agony of Iraqi civilians. Such speeches are usually occasional and seem to be 
marginalised in the context of doubting the reasons for the war or depicting Western 
soldiers as victims. While there is not any Iraqi character in plays such as Hare’s The 
Vertical Hour and Martin Crimp’s Advice to Iraqi Women, both portray the disastrous 
effect of the war on the Iraqi people through the narrative of Western characters. What 
distinguishes Crimp’s play from Hare’s is that the text of Advice to Iraqi Women gives the 
director of this play the right to distribute its lines to undefined number of actors. The same 
tactic is utilised by Churchill in Seven Jewish Children, which comments on the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
The narrative about the civilian causalities in Iraq remarkably interacts with the 
main theme of the play to highlight its overall message. For instance, Monk’s recalling of 
his killing of an Iraqi family in Embedded: Live urges the spectators of Tim Robbins’ play, 
which mainly focuses on the controlled media coverage of the war, to sympathise with the 
Iraqi civilians, who represent a large number of innocent victims of the war. This incident 
itself is the cause for the American soldier’s own psychological wound, which according to 
him will never be cured. More examples of soldiers’ short speeches, within which they 
retrieve images of civilian Iraqi victims on the battlefield, can be found in Emily 
Ackerman’s and KJ Sanchez’s Verbatim play Reentry (2009) and Jonathan Lichtenstein’s 
The Pull of Negative Gravity. As with Lichtenstein’s play, the war is a background to 
imaginary plots where playwrights criticise their domestic societies more than commenting 
on the war in Simon Stephens’ Motortown (2006) and Roy Williams’ Days of Significance 
(2007). 
In what I see as a reaction to the increasing blame laid on American soldiers in Iraq, 
Reentry celebrates American soldiers for their sense of responsibility and modesty. In 
contrast to the Stubbs in States of Shock, the soldiers in Reentry, even when they are 
victims of the war, do not lose their dignity or power. Moreover, the families of these 
soldiers are as brave and reliable as the latter. The play extends the motto: ‘Supporting our 
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soldiers’ to include the latter’s families, which addresses calls raised in the American media 
to consider the sacrifice made by the relatives of combatants. 
While many journalistic writings describe the American intervention in Afghanistan 
after the defeat of the Taliban as a reproduction of the British colonialism, the complicated   
situation in Afghanistan suggests that the US is not involved in a new Great Game as an 
occupier. Rather, domestic players such as war lords and members of the still active 
Taliban are preventing the transition of Afghanistan into a democratic country. The 
American-led international coalition, which includes NATO as well as Arabic and Islamic 
countries, may be seen as necessary not only to deal with these destructive powers, but also, 
and most significantly to enable international charitable organisation to facilitate education 
and health care for the Afghans. Ironically, while several British playwrights have 
highlighted the role played by the international coalition, I could not find any American 
play that underscores the humanitarian reasons for the American-led presence in the Asian 
country. Such a phenomenon can be attributed to the fewer number of American political 
plays compared to the British in general. Another explanation can be the foregrounding of 
the debate and news about the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath since 2003. 
The project The Great Game: Afghanistan, which was produced by The Tricycle 
Theatre in London in 2009, traces the history of foreign interventions in Afghanistan in a 
three-phase military dispute between Afghanistan and the British, the Soviets, and the 2001 
coalition. Out of the thirteen plays included in the project, only two plays written by 
American playwrights: Wallace’s No Such Cold Thing and J. T. Rogers’ Blood and Gifts. 
The former is a dream-like play with three ghosts of two Afghan girls and an American 
soldier. As with most of her plays, Wallace portrays emotive moments in the life and death 
of three innocent victims of the war. In his imaginary plot about factual events, Rogers 
depicts the American support for one of the tribal leaders to fight the Russians. However, 
when the Afghan man is asked to return the American weapons, he declares that he will 
fight against the US. In the complicated matter of American weapons given to the fighter 
for freedom from Russian occupation, the Afghan is portrayed with more depth in the 
British Ben Ockrent’s Honey, within which the playwright stresses that Pakistan played a 
role in deceiving the US. 
The War on Terror has been accompanied by an excessive use of metaphors which 
are utilised by both Western and Arabic politicians and media to comment on specific 
aspect of the conflict. Metaphors also were utilised by each side of confrontation, whether 
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to praise itself or to denounce the other side. One of the most debated metaphors has been 
Bin Laden’s claim that the American-led coalition is a Christian war on Islam: a new 
version of the Crusades. My reading of Bush’s statement suggests that he most probably 
was not referring to the historical religious wars. In either case, it is important to mention 
that since the 1990s, years before Bush infamous sentence, Bin Laden’s speeches included 
claims about a ‘Judaic-Christian Crusade’ against Islam. Such alleged ‘Crusade’ was the 
reason, according to the leader of al-Qaeda, for his declaration of his holy war on the US 
and other Western countries. In turn several writers have seen Bin Laden as the monster, 
which was created by the US/Frankenstein. I realise more examples of the the utilisation of 
metaphorical discourse to deliver political messages in Saddam’s propaganda, which 
identified him with Saladin, while the Iraqi dictator was described by Western media and 
politicians as Hitler. The German infamous leader was regularly mentioned by Arabic 
media to describe Bush’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even the Jews, the victims of the 
Holocaust, have been dubbed by a large number of Arabic politicians, journalist, and even 
academics who comment on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as the new Nazis.  
In their comment on the conflicts, playwrights also utilise a number of metaphors, 
so that their dramatic texts suggest resemblances between common aspects of the conflict 
and historical events. To give examples, in Savages (2006), the American playwright Anne 
Nelson comments on the scandal of Abu Ghraib by portraying a factual historical incident 
in the Philippines, when an American Marine was ordered by a high-ranked officer to 
torture and kill civilians after their failed insurgence.  Ironically, using the metaphor as a 
method of avoiding any direct comment on the incident ends up suggesting that the 
brutality of the guards at Abu Ghraib is not an exceptional act of bored, tired, or even 
feared soldiers; it is repeated conduct. Therefore, although the incident was categorically 
condemned by the American public, the latter, as critical reviews of the play reveal, did not 
accept the allegation that torturing civilians in occupied countries is an American habit, 
which mistakenly the play suggests. 
American spectators’ and critics’ lukewarm reception of Savages might explain why 
there is no American equivalent to Tactical Questioning: Scenes from the Baha Mousa 
Inquiry (2011), the tribunal play developed from Norton-Taylor’s edited investigations into 
the death of an Iraqi man as a result of British soldiers’ violent interrogations. In the 
introduction to his tribunal play, Norton-Taylor gives his opinion on the matter by 
extending the blame to include the British military system, which sends these soldiers to the 
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war without enough training to deal with the tough situation in Iraq. While several inquiries 
in different incidents of the war were turned into British tribunal plays, I cannot find a 
similar phenomenon in the US, where reports of most trials related to the war are not 
available in detail to the public. Usually, only the results of these investigations are 
declared. One of the most famous examples of British tribunal plays is Justifying War: 
Scenes from the Hutton Inquiry (2003).  
If in the Gulf between Us (1991) Trevor Griffiths’ critique of the American 
intervention in Iraq in the First Gulf War extends to include the historical genocide of the 
Native Americans and the twelfth-century Crusades, both of which have no resemblance to 
the factual incident when American planes mistakenly killed Iraqi children, who were put 
in a military building. Similarly, In the Heart of America draws comparisons between the 
First Gulf War and the War in Vietnam on the grounds of the utilisation of excessive 
military power by the US. Such a comparison downplays the stark differences between the 
two wars, whether in terms of each war’s target or outcome. Wallace’s attempt to link both 
wars seems to address the Americans’ horrific experience with the US military intervention 
in foreign countries on the grounds of the so-called ‘Vietnam Syndrome’. Even Stubbs in 
Sam Shepard’s States of Shock was conceived by American critics as recycling the image 
of physically and mentally wounded soldiers portrayed in the literature of the Vietnam War. 
The same metaphorical reading of the invasion of Iraq is utilised by Embedded: Live. 
Although Robbins’ dialogue does not include any reference to Vietnam, he uses visual 
elements through videos scenes of the Vietnam War with other footages of the two World 
Wars, including scenes of the Nazi Army. It is important to note that the mention of 
Vietnam, as a national disaster, in Robbins’ play is a warning that the agony is possible to 
be repeated. Stuff Happens directly claims that the invasion of Iraq and its early 
consequences repeat the American’s disastrous adventure in Vietnam. However, Hare 
focuses on the suffering of the Iraqi people from what he portrays as an Anglo-American 
conspiracy to invade Iraq. Wallace’s In the Heart of America includes an encounter 
between two ghosts from the war in Vietnam, where the victim – a Vietnamese girl – is 
chasing her American killer.   
It seems that the two British socialist playwrights, Griffiths and Hare, along with 
Wallace, conflate their perspectives on the specific war, on which they comment, with their 
political critique of the hegemony of the US over the world, which has defined international 
politics since the beginning of the 1990s. For being more anti-America than anti-war play, 
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Griffiths’ Camel Station is a good example. The imaginary plot portrays the death of a 
Kurdish child by an American drone in a Northern No-Fly Zone in Iraq.  
Ironically, the two plays that comment on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, namely 
Wallace’s A State of Innocence and Churchill’s Seven Jewish Children do not highlight the 
role of Hamas in creating the vicious circle of violence, for which my thesis included 
dramatic presentations of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Was I wrong for including them? 
But some scholars argue that when the Israeli Prime Minster Ariel Sharon identified Hamas 
with al-Qaeda, Israel identified with the US in what Gilles Kepel calls the Bush-Sharon 
‘common war on terror’ (Kepel 2006, xiii). In addition, when Hamas was classified as a 
terrorist group by the US and the European Union in 2003, a few months after the invasion 
of Iraq, the supporters of Hamas in Arabic and Muslim countries claimed that such a 
declaration is a sign of the American-Israeli – Christian-Jewish – war on Arabs and Islam. 
Then, why do both plays focus more on the Israeli reaction with only passing reference to 
the violent actions of Hamas? Consequently, do the two plays consider the killing of Israeli 
civilians as an act justified by fighting for freedom? No play does, but neither also stress 
that Hamas is a terrorist movement.   
Although A State of Innocence does not plainly support Hamas, Um Hisham insists 
on distinguishing between the Palestinians who defend their lands and the Israelis as 
occupiers. Then why did Seven Jewish Children offend Jews, although it mentions Israel as 
an occupier less regular than Wallace’s play? My answer is that Churchill puts these 
scattered references on the tongues of Israeli parents who insist that such information 
should never be told to their children. The Israeli parents look as if they are confessing the 
guilt, which they inherited from their ancestors, but dare not mention it to their children.  
A historical perspective of the relationship between war and theatre might suggest that, 
whether through comedies such as Aristophanes’ Lysistrata (411 BC), or within political 
theatre like Brecht’s Mother Courage and Her Children (1939), theatre always insists that, 
in spite of the justifications for politicians’ mistakes, and whether they eventually concede 
the responsibility, wars in both history and the present prove that innocents are the real 
victims of political wrong decisions. Does it mean that theatre is not able to change the 
world? Perhaps, but at least it can raise humanity’s awareness of their disastrous deeds. 
That is why these groups of topical plays were written and have been produced. And, in 
addition to its dramaturgic values, this body of work is worthy of an academic study. 
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